The West is deeply divided as to the reaction to the aggressive and violent policy of Russia towards Ukraine. At present, sanctions are the only viable response of the West (the US in particular) to the policy. This does not change the fact that Russian decision makers take sanctions into account.
More sanctions imposed on Russia and Russian politicians could weaken the Russian policy (though it is not certain they will do). An information campaign about the impact of the sanctions on the Russian policy is needed (they will be felt medium and long term). Although in 2014–2016 Russia was dealing well with the sanctions, later (in 2017) they will become more perceptible for both the authorities and the society. What is important is that the US has much less at stake when the sanctions are introduced. On the other hand, the EU will lose the most and it is a very divided organisation lacking in solidarity between its Member States. The less agreement there is between the Member States, the stronger and more effective the Russian policy is bound to become. Therefore, both sanctions and solidarity are needed to possibly change the situation. A lot depends on the policy of Germany towards Russia and its capacity to enforce a change of Russian policy (Putin’s policy). Actions of such German politicians as Gerhard Schröder, the former German Chancellor, weaken the position of the EU and undermine the effi ciency of its policy towards Russia.
The EU sanctions against Russia should continue unless the solutions for Donbas and Crimea acceptable for Ukraine are found. It should be clarifi ed among the Member States if the EU sanctions imposed on Russia are bound to the solution of the status of both Donbas and Crimea with respect to Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The EU would make a mistake if it agreed to cancel the sanctions against Russia provided that Russia helps with the settlement of the Donbas problem while continuing with its annexation of Crimea.1
1 EU sanctions were introduced on 31st July 2014 in response to the escalation of the confl ict in eastern Ukraine and Russia’s support for pro-Russian rebels.
Tomasz Stępniewski, European Union, Ukraine, Russia…
95
The EU could recognise Crimea as part of Russia only if Ukraine does it fi rst. Nevertheless, the EU should consider the option of promoting talks between Russia and Ukraine on resolving technical infrastructural problems of people living in Crimea having in mind that electricity, natural gas and water supply to the peninsula completely depends on Ukraine and its resources, and second, that Russia should compensate both the moral and material loss of Ukrainian nationals and companies in Crimea. The return to usual business-like relations with Russia shall not be possible unless Russia helps to settle both the Donbas and Crimea issues.
The problem is that through its aggressive policy Russia is forfeiting its achievements of the last years in the relations with the West. For two decades, the West has been trying to involve Russia in Europe, now it is striving to exclude it at any cost.
Conclusions
Without an active involvement of the West, Ukraine will not be able to handle the war with Russia. For this reason, the assistance of the West should be of both long-term and short-term nature. The long-term goal – to support Ukraine in implementing fundamental reforms (reform of the legal system, the economy, fi ght against corruption and the oligarchic system, etc.).
Achieving this requires that the Ukrainians be given training and expertise, the know-how, to help them in their effort to change the situation in their country. The immediate goal – actions aimed at stabilising the situation and terminating the military operation, provided that Russia is ready to accept federalization and pull its forces out of Ukraine. Ukraine is not capable of regaining control of the territories occupied by the pro-Russian separatists without military intervention from the West – and as the West is not ready to provide massive military assistance, we need to realize that Ukraine has no military option to solve the confl ict.
However, granting a wide autonomy to the territories may raise hopes that they will be given back to Ukraine in the future. Another solution would be – as rightly observed by Alexander Motyl from Rutgers University in
“Foreign Affairs” – to surrender the territories occupied by the separatists (i.e., to forego Donbas and other occupied cities), which are like a millstone round Ukraine’s neck. As it is now, Donbas will drag Ukraine down, both in political and economic terms, whereas re-establishing Ukrainian control in the area seems unlikely. Mykola Riabchukis of similar opinion and claims
96
Part II. The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Need for Evolution or Revolution?that as far as Donbas is concerned, “it is a Sovietized region. Politically, I see no prospects for it. And economically it is very backward. It would be best to freeze the confl ict going on there. And in the future, inhabitants of Donbas would perhaps want to vote in a referendum for their region to join Ukraine, as Eastern Germans wanted their country to join West Germany”
(Riabchuk 2016: 52). The best case scenario, though unfortunately also the most unlikely one, is that Russia, exhausted by the economic sanctions, will abandon its aggressive policy towards Ukraine and this (in the long run) will provide an opportunity for Ukraine to regain control of the territories.
References
Alexseev, M. (2016), The Tale of Three Legitimacies: The Shifting Tone and Enduring Substance of Moscow’s Ukraine Policy, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 431, June 2016, available at: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/fi les/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm431_Alexseev_June2016_8.pdf [accessed on: 15.09.2017].
Bachmann, K., Lyubashenko, I. (eds.) (2014), The Maidan Uprising, separatism and foreign intervention: Ukraine’s complex transition, First edition, Frankfurt am Main:
Peter Lang.
Biscop, S. (2014), Game of zones: the quest for infl uence in Europe’s neighbourhood,
“Egmont Paper 67”, Brussels: Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations, available at: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/
ep67.pdf [accessed on: 15.08.2017].
Grigas, A. (2016), Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Hajduk, J., Stępniewski, T. (2015), ‘Wojna hybrydowa Rosji z Ukrainą: uwarunkowania i instrumenty’, Studia Europejskie 4 (76): 135–151.
Kardaś, Sz., Konończuk, W. (2015), Minsk 2 – a fragiletruce, Analyses, 12/02/2015, Warszawa: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, availableat: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2015-02-12/minsk-2-a-fragile-truce [accessed on: 15.07.2017].
Kuzio, T. (2015), Ukraine. Democratization, Corruption and the New Russian Imperialism, Praeger: Santa Barbara.
McMahon, R., ‘Ukraine in Crisis’, Council on Foreign Relations, March 18, 2014, available at: http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/ukraine-crisis/p32540 [accessed on: 15.07.2017].
Menon, R., Rumer, E. (2015), Confl ict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Pridham, G. (2014), ‘EU/Ukraine Relations and the Crisis with Russia, 2013-14:
A Turning Point’, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 49, 4: 53–61.
Rácz, A. (2015), Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist, FIIA Report, no. 43, Helsinki.
Tomasz Stępniewski, European Union, Ukraine, Russia…
97
Riabchuk, M. (2016), ‘It Is Not worth It That Ukrainians Die for Donbas. An interview with Mykola Riabchuk by Filip Memches’, Aspen Review Central Europe, no. 2: 52, available at: http://www.aspeninstitute.cz/upload/pdf/Aspen_Review_2016-2.pdf [accessed on: 1.05.2017].
Sadowski, R., Wierzbowska-Miazga, A. (2014), The ceasefi re in eastern Ukraine, Analyses, 10/09/2014, Warszawa: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, available at: http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-09-10/ceasefi re-eastern-ukraine [accessed on:
11.02.2017].
Sakwa, R. (2015), Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, I. B. Tauris: London-New York.
Shelest, H., Maksak, H. (2016), Ukraine’s Security Options: Time for Strategic Choices, Smart Partnerships, and Comprehensive Reforms, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development/CIPDD, Tbilisi, June 2016: 7, available at: http://
prismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ukraine-security.pdf [accessed on:
13.02.2017] .
Stępniewski, T. (2015), ‘Wojna Ukrainy o niepodległość, pamięć i tożsamość’, Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 13, 2: 153–166.
Stępniewski, T. (2014), ‘Cele rosyjskiej inwazji i okupacji na Ukrainie oraz reakcja Zachodu i Europy Środkowej’, Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, T. Stępniewski, A. Gil, A. Szabaciuk, A. Visvizi (eds.), 12, 5: 13–24.
Tsygankov, A. (2015), ‘Vladimir Putin’s last stand: the sources of Russia’s Ukraine policy’, Post-Soviet Affairs 31:4: 279–303.
Umland, A. (2016), Russia’s Pernicious Hybrid War Against Ukraine, “Atlantic Council”, February 22, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/en/blogs/new-atlanticist/
russia-s-pernicious-hybrid-war-against-ukraine [accessed on: 12.04.2017].
UN update: Death toll in Donbas confl ict nearing 7,000 men, UNIAN, 29/07/2015, available at: http://www.unian.info/war/1106015-un-update-death-toll-in-donbas-confl ict-nearing-7000-men.html [accessed on: 1.05.2017].
Wilk, A., Olszański, T.A., Górecki, W. (2016), The Minsk agreement: one year of shadow boxing, Analyses, 10/02/2016, Warszawa: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, available at:
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-02-10/minsk-agreement-one-year-shadow-boxing [accessed on: 17.03.2017].
Wilson, A. (2014), Ukraine Crisis. What it Means for the West, New Haven and London:
Yale University Press.
Yekelchyk, S. (2015), The Confl ict in Ukraine, New York: Oxford University Press.
Youngs, R. (2017), Europe’s Eastern Crisis. The Geopolitics of Asymmetry, Cambridge:
University Press, p. 15.