U nited S tates
Deterioration of G erm an m ilitary position during 1944 ac
com panied b y drastic decline in output of steel and war ma
teriel in continental Europe. Large part of production facilities destroyed b y bom bing or lost to Reich in A llie d advance
UNDER German occupation, most of the European iron and steel industry was integrated with that of the Altreicht, (prewar Germany) hence a discussion of developments in individual countries be
fore their liberation is less easy than under peacetime conditions.
During 1944, the general position de
teriorated catastrophically. By the loss of Nikopol manganese early in the winter a situation developed which alone would probably have led to an ultimate reduc
tion in ingot output from an overall level of approximately 35 million tons to 20 million tons per annum, but further dis
asters followed. Supplies of other im
portant ferroalloy materials from Turkey, the Balkans and the Iberian peninsula were severely restricted shortly after
wards and finally cut off when the Allies advanced on all fronts during the sum
mer. Finnish nickel and molybdenum have also been lost. The long run ef
fect of these additional losses would have been further to reduce the quality and quantity of the enemy European steel supply without the help of events connected with the Anglo-American in
vasion. These, however, reflected them
selves much more quid Several weeks before ing of railways, sabotage own military transport priorities to hold up the movement of ore and other raw materials in
ern occupied countries so that iron and steel plants in France, Belgium and Luxemburg had to close down wholesale.
Supplies of minette to the Saar and Ruhr regions of Germany proper must also have suffered. Up to the early spring, the iron and steel plants in French Department of Moselle and Lux
emburg had been operating at about the same level as in 1937, while those in the rest of France and in Belgium had operated at less than 50 per cent of the 1937 level. No recovery took place after the collapse of operations and by the late summer practically all these plants as well as the minette ore fields were recovered by the Allies.
Measures taken by the Swedes late the summer have barred the Baltic route for Swedish ore shipments, which can now take place only in German bottoms Slag is poured from a bessemer converter in a European steelworks, now pro
ducing girders for XJ. S. Engineers Corps construction on the continent.
(From a n au th oritative sou rce in Lon don )
British troops, above, move through key port of Antwerp before mounting guard over the dock area. The idle docks were captured intact. N E A photo One of the remarkable feats of the war was the construction of prefabricated ports in England, and the towing of them to Normandy to facilitate the landing of men and supplies. A t left, British ambulances m ove along a pier
roadway leading to the wharf on one of the steel ports. N E A photo
using the Narvik route on a very limited scale. It is unlikely, therefore, that Ger
many will obtain more than half her usual supply of Swedish ore in 1944, while in 1945 shipments will be a mere trickle.
Barred the use of Swedish and minette ore, Germany now has to rely on her own poor quality output and on that of Aus
tria, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Be
cause she has had the use of minette for so long, she has not developed domestic output as originally planned, hence she is unlikely to be able to produce more than enough for about 9 million tons of pig iron annually under the most favor
able conditons. But the bombing of the Dortmund Ems canal has already made this more difficult because it has denied the Ruhr all its canal-borne supplies of central German ore and similarly dis
turbed the return movement of coke and coking coal to the other iron and steel plants.
With regard to coal and coke sup
plies, the problem is mainly that of transport. Coal output in the Ruhr, German and Polish Silesia and Moravia has either been maintained at the max
imum prewar level or considerably in
creased while coke output has been main
tained. In France and Holland output was at about the prewar level and in Belgium it was considerably below.
Their loss to the Allies, together with that of Luxemburg, has meant a some
what greater reduction in Axis coal and coke consumption than it has in pro
duction. The future limiting factors in enemy iron and steel output are there
fore iron ore supplies and transport. It is hard to believe that a long war can be sustained on the iron and steel re
sources now available.
REGIONAL ACTIVITY
Activity by regions has developed during 1944 roughly as follows:
Germany Proper
Overall iron and steel output early in 1944 probably failed to reach the high level of 1938 even with the output of the new Hermann Goering works at Salzgitter because the policy was to spread operations over as wide an area of German Europe as possible. By the end of the year, output declined, par
ticularly in the Saar and Ruhr regions, because of the advance of the Anglo- American forces and heavy bombing.
There is no hope of future operations exceeding more than a small propor
tion of capacity in either of these re
gions because the former relied almost entirely on French minette and the lat
ter on Swedish ore and minette. Out
put in Central Germany, Bavaria, Thuringia and Saxony has been well maintained because it is based on do
mestic raw materials but it may suffer through the disruption of coal and coke transport. Upper Silesian output has been at a high level, although it cannot be maintained without Swedish iron ore.
Austria
The works here have been fully em
ployed because local ore output is ample ( Please turn to Page 356)
January 1. 1945 307
By G. H. MANLOVE
A sso cia te E d ito r, STE EL
Steel output in 1944 sufficient to fill w ar dem ands. Regulation of production and d elivery easier than in earlier w ar years.
Num erous strikes and general m anpower shortage prevented full utilization of exp a n ded facilities
REPEATING its performance of three prior years in filling war demands, the steel industry in 1944 fully met all con
suming requirements and with increased producing capacity exceeded earlier rec
ords in providing armament for the global war. Labor, while in the main co-operat
ing, nevertheless staged numerous strikes that interrupted production and caused the loss of many thousand tons of steel.
Lack of manpower restricted production to some degree and producers were un
able to give capacity service from their equipment.
Regulation of steel production and de
livery was easier than in earlier war years; the Controlled Materials Plan worked more smoothly than any of its predecessors, channeling raw and finished material to most needed purposes and preventing uneven distribution. Where possible, regulations were relaxed, as in the case of pig iron, where a free market was established early in the year.
Heavy Load on Mills
Through the year mill books were heavily loaded and deliveries on current orders usually were several months in the future. Various shifts were made to pro
vide larger supply of a product for which demand became materially heavier, as in the case of plates and sheets, both rolled on the same type of mill. Raw ma
terial supplies for steelmaking offered no important drawbacks and shortages of that kind were not the factor they were in earlier years.
Steel ingot production for 11 months exceeded output in the comparable period of 1943, though by a small margin. For this period last year ingot production to
taled 82,199,288 net tons, compared with
81,581,222 tons in the prior year. Rate of operation by steelmakers was lower than in 1943, expressed in percentages of ca
pacity, but the broader capacity base brought greater tonnage at the lower rate.
While operation in the first three quarters of 1943 was at 98.1 per cent of capacity and produced 66,395,130 tons of ingots, the rate of 95.7 per cent of capacity for the first three quarters of 1944 produced 67,199,467 tons. Lack of manpower was the principal cause of the drop in rate.
Plates continued the most important product, shipbuilding being the main fac
tor. Although it seemed in 1943 that a limit had been reached in plate output, it was exceeded in 1944, total production for nine months being 10,066,308 net tons, compared with 9,561,493 tons in the comparable period in 1943. An all- time high was reached in March with 1,222,606 tons of plates.
Toward the end of the year shipbuild
ing activity began to taper and it was possible to return some continuous strip mills to production of sheets and strip.
For many months a great part of continu
ous mill capacity had been engaged in plate production at cost of sheet tonnage, demand for the latter being sucb that de
liveries had receded far into the future.
By May 1 little tonnage remained open for third quarter delivery and the War Production Board caused a shift of plate tonnage to provide more sheet capacity.
A factor in easing the sheet position was cancellation of a large tonnage for landing mats, early in October. This al
lowed mills to move other tonnage for
ward to fill gaps and delivery promises immediately were better. Later in the year sheet demand again increased and deliveries were pushed further ahead.
During the summer, after the success
ful invasion of France, the opinion pre
vailed generally that the war’s end was near and that military requirements would be severely curtailed. Predictions were made that steel production would be down sharply before the end of the year. Some cancellations resulting from changed re
quirements of the Army and Navy lent color to this belief and the deep cut in landing mat material added to the feel
ing. This produced an uncertainty and some retrenchment was started as a hedge against a sudden end of the war. Repre
sentations by the War Production Board and other government agencies that pro
duction for war needs was behind sched
ule and that no overall cut in steel needs was in sight had some effect, which was intensified when progress of the Allied armies was slowed at the German border.
Likelihood of victory before the end of the year soon disappeared.
Shell Program Enlarged This wave of optimism brought ex
pectation of large releases of steel for civilian purposes and the War Production Board was besieged by requests for per
mission to resume peacetime manufac
ture. However, only slight concessions were possible and nothing like the ex
pected rate of resumption was realized.
Permission was granted, among other things, for the manufacture of flatirons and innerspring mattresses in limited quantities where materials and labor were available after war materiel was fully provided but the latter provision
308 / T E E L
pean war seemed imminent. With slowing of the Allied advance into Germany think
ing was reversed and scrap stocks were rebuilt for winter demands, with material rebuilt for winter demands, with recovery almost to ceilings. Cast scrap was scarce low ceiling prices. Borings and turnings, especially alloy grades, were a drug on the market all year and disposal was diffi
cult.
Heavy Pig Iron Output In January Office of Price Administra
tion authorized an increase of 50 cents per ton on by-product coke in eastern states, effective Jan. 21. This order was based on higher costs of coal and labor.
Beehive oven operations fell off steadily through the year as additional by-product capacity came into operation.
Pig iron production continued its high rate and for ten months total output was 52,036,708 net tons, compared with 51,- 231,075 tons in the corresponding period in 1943. In March an all-time high of 5,434,240 tons was reached, passing the prior record of 5,323,738 tons set in Oc
tober, 1943. Monthly production was above 5,000,000 tons through August and in September fell only a trifle short of this mark, again passing it in October.
This high level was maintained in spite of larger consumption of scrap in steelmak- ing furnaces and a diminished melt by foundries. The latter was the result of the manpower shortage, which was ex
treme through the year, notably during the summer. Many important foundries
(Please turn to Page 347)
309 View in receiving yard of the Ambridge Works, American Bridge Co., XJ. S.
Steel subsidiary. These plates, angles, channels and other structural steel units are ready to be placed in fabrication when needed
slowed production materially in civilian output.
On the other hand, progress of the European war called for additional sup
ply of heavy shells and a program was outlined in the latter part of the year for greatly enlarged output, increasing monthly into 1945, to call for a final need of 80,000 tons per month over previous output. This stimulated the bar market, especially for larger rounds, until de
livery promises late in the year were great
ly deferred. At the same time larger sup
ply of heavy trucks was demanded, which also called for more steel bars, as well as plates, sheets and castings. Difficulty of obtaining sufficient of the latter inter
fered with meeting schedules for this form of military supply.
Earlier opening of the navigation sea
son on the Great Lakes and addition of several large ore carriers late in 1943 promised a record-breaking movement of Lake Superior ore in 1944 and a goal of 90,000,000 gross tons was set at the be
ginning. By July 1 this accomplishment seemed possible, cumulative shipments to that date totaling 42,285,902 tons, with the better half of the season remaining.
However, it developed later that a smaller tonnage would suffice and some vessels were diverted from ore to grain carrying and the goal was reduced to 84,000,000 tons, later cut still further. At the close of navigation shipments totaled 81,170,- 538 tons, which provided sufficient re
serve at lower lake docks and furnaces to meet all needs for the winter.
Pricewise the situation was unchanged for steel products, Office of Price Ad
ministration ceilings holding steady, ex
cept as a few producers were allowed premiums to balance increased costs. By Feb. 1 OPA had completed a study of steel costs submitted by steelmakers and some advances were expected to be an
nounced within a short time. No general rise was indicated but on some products relief seemed likely. In view of demand by labor that the Little Steel formula be abrogated and an advance of 17 cents per hour be allowed to match an alleged increase in cost of living a decision on prices was deferred. Continued delay by the War Labor Board in rendering a de
cision on this demand held back action on prices.
In September scrap prices broke and until late December ranged below ceilings on practically all steelmak- ing grades, No. 1 heavy melting steel, the base grade, falling as much as $3.50 per ton from the ceiling. Cast grades, be
cause of relative scarcity, continued at ceiling in most areas. The scrap market thus assumed nearly a normal state, with prices determined by supply and demand.
After the first decline the situation leveled and strength was added as steelmakers resumed buying at the lower levels, in an effort to rebuild inventories which had been depleted when the end of the Euro
January 1, 1945