ABSTRACT
DOI: https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.14.2017.50.11
Marek CZAJKOWSKI Jagiellonian University in Kraków marek.czajkowski@uj.edu.pl
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE –
TECHNOLOGY, EFFECTIVENESS AND
ORGANIZATION – KEY ISSUES
The article serves as an introduction to the set of papers that are devoted to the issue of ballistic missile defence as seen from the Polish perspective. It therefore refers in the most general terms to the key problems of the technology and the organization of missile defence. First of all, ballistic missiles and their strategic roles are considered as it is necessary to understand the threat before the defence against it is analyzed. Secondly, the nature of the ballistic missile defence is de-scribed, together with extensive reflections on its effectiveness. Further on the paper depicts in short missile defence systems of the world with the special at-tention to the United States.
Key words: International Relations, International Security, Strategic Studies, Ballistic Missile Defence, Ballistic Missiles
This article is an introductory part of the collection of four consecutive articles per-taining to the issue of missile defence. This function reflects in its form and substance, as it is supposed to provide the background for further considerations. Therefore, we are going to explain here the basic technical and organizational realities that define missile defence. It seems especially valuable, because detailed technical issues are usu-ally omitted in general considerations or, at best, are brought to the simple tusu-ally of the armaments together with the uncritically optimistic assessment of the effectiveness of certain weapons systems. Such an attitude dominates the public and political space, especially in Poland, where real knowledge on the matter is usually juxtaposed to wish-ful thinking. But the technical side of the problem is by far more complicated than it is commonly understood. The more comprehensive analyses suppose rather sceptical
ap-praisal of the capabilities of the contemporary missile defence. So, as this set of papers considers missile defence in the context of the national security of Poland it seems right to start it with the assessment that could provide such an analysis, even if short and very general one. Therefore, the main technical determinants, the current state of missile defence in the world and its effectiveness, together with the most general political and strategic realities will be mentioned in this text.
Such a technical approach is valuable especially because the technologies involved determine the basic parameters of weapon systems and that define their combat effec-tiveness. This in turn reflects on the tasks that a certain weapon could carry out and then on the role of missile defence as an instrument of the security policy of the state and, in many instances, of its broadly understood foreign policy as well. However ob-vious it might seem, the problem still persists that the technical realities determined by the related laws of physics and the capabilities of certain technologies are largely unknown to the public. It is hard to find well informed opinions even in the politi-cal discourse or within the foreign policy experts community, again especially in Po-land. It is usually instinctively assumed that missile defence it is just another air defence, with some special features of course, but essentially the same in nature. Such thinking is deeply flawed, as missile defence profoundly differs from the classic air defence, much more than it is commonly believed.
Let us therefore reiterate that there is not only the need but also the necessity to de-tail some technical realities in order to understand the military and the political mean-ing of missile defence. This, however, requires a host of complex technical and organi-zational issues to be risen in the paper which is supposed to remain within the realm of the political science, and this is not an easy task. On the one hand, we have to address quite a complicated matter starting with reminding of the basic laws of the nature, on the other we must avoid too much technical reasoning that would likely become un-clear to the reader of this journal which is devoted to the social sciences, not to the physics, engineering, technology or the military sciences.
Another difficulty is that our topic concerns the issues that are not only kept top secret but are also a subject of various disinformation activities. The latter is mainly due to the fact that missile defence is usually a very important factor in many international and internal political controversies, with economic interest and business opportunities in the background. Thus it is difficult not only to get the accurate data regarding the key technical parameters, but also to sort out the false information which exists in great abundance. Fortunately, there are many research centres and independent experts that deal with the available information and publish technical issues already processed into a more accessible form. There are also unclassified reports prepared by credible state institutions or scientific bodies that shed light on the important technical problems. This very paper is based on the selection of such sources, although we cannot always quote them directly or in full in order to avoid excessive technicality of the argument. The most important are: mostlymissiledefence.com, Missilethreat, GlobalSecurity, Arms Control Assciation, Union of Concerned Scientists, Federation of American
Sci-entists, National Research Council of the National Academies, Defense Science Board and Congressional Research Service – there are of course many more.
The order of this article is as follows. Firstly, we describe ballistic missiles as a weapon, because their properties obviously reflect on missile defence – thus we de-fine and describe the threat. Secondly, we discuss missile defence as such – specifically pointing out at its inherent limitations. And finally, we shortly present missile defence arsenals of the world with particular reference to the United States.
1. BALLISTIC MISSILES – THE CHARACTER OF THE THREAT
The first question we have to address when we start the considerations on missile de-fence is against what it is directed, because the dede-fence always follows the existence of the offence. Today there is a number of weapon systems that are named by their design-ers, operators and owners missile defence (MD) or ballistic missile defence (BMD).1
The basic task of such systems is to destroy ballistic missiles in flight.
According to the most common definition, a ballistic missile is a rocket-propelled self-guided strategic-weapons system that follows a ballistic trajectory to deliver a payload from its launch site to a predetermined target.2 This notion is as widely accepted as it is
misguiding because it is very narrow and in fact refers only to the very special kind of a ballistic missile. The more precise definition produced by the US Department of De-fence states that a ballistic missile is [a]ny missile which does not rely upon aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and consequently follows a ballistic trajectory when thrust is termi-nated.3 In turn, a missile is in a strict sense an object that is thrown, shot, or launched as
a weapon […].4 To clarify all those considerations we have to underline three distinct
features of a ballistic missile: it is a rocket, it is a missile and it moves along a ballistic trajectory.
A rocket is a kind of vehicle which is propelled by an engine that induces its move-ment by a reaction force of a jet stream of hot gases produced while burning fuel with oxidizer which is carried by this very object. To describe it plainly let us point to the important difference between a rocket engine (motor) and a common airbreathing jet engine (motor). The latter gathers the oxygen for the combustion from the air it moves through, while the former carries both the fuel and the oxygen (oxydizer) in the tanks 1 Russian: противоракетная оборона – ПРО, Hebrew equivalent of the term BMD:
French: La défense antimissile, German: Raketenabwehr.
2 “Ballistic Missile”, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017, at <https://www.britannica.com/technology/ ballistic-missile>, 9 February 2017.
3 “Ballistic Missile”, in DoD Dictionary, 2017, at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/ data/b/2726.html>, 9 February 2017.
4 “Missile”, in Dictionary by Mirram-Webster, 2017, at <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ missile>, 9 February 2017.
(in case of solid fuel rocket motors the mix of the fuel and the oxidizer is stored in solid state). There are three most important properties of a rocket engine:
– very high thrust-to-weight ratio, that makes it capable to move a large masses and accelerate them to high velocities,
– very high fuel consumption, what means that a launch mass of a rocket in most cases consists mainly of fuel and oxidizer that burn out relatively fast,
– it is capable to operate outside dense layers of the atmosphere and in the relative vacuum of space.
It is a missile. If a rocket is supposed to hit distant objects as a weapon it becomes a missile. We have to remember, however, that there are many other missiles that are not rocket-propelled. And there are of course many kinds of rocket-propelled missiles, mis-sile defence deals only with some of them, namely with ballistic mismis-siles.
A ballistic missile is a rocket-propelled missile, which travels the greatest part of its distance by the inertia, along the trajectory which is defined by the laws of Newtonian physics. In practice it means that during its relatively short work a rocket motor gives a missile desired speed and vector of movement and then it stops. The velocity, how-ever, is already so high that the mass that remains after the burn-out of the fuel (and after the detachment of the lower stages in case of the composite missiles) covers very great distance compared to the propelled phase of the flight. For example, a ballistic missile with the range of 3000 km covers this distance in around 14 minutes, rising to the ceiling of some 650 km, but the accelerated portion of the trajectory has a dura-tion of only 80-140 seconds and extends to 100-120 kilometres – all the rest of the flight proceeds due only to the energy gathered during the acceleration phase. In case the missile has a range of 10000 km, those values are, respectively: 30 minutes, 1300 kilometres, 170-300 seconds and 18-220 kilometres. For the missile with 300 kilo-metres of range it is, respectively: 4 minutes, 80 kilokilo-metres, 60-70 seconds and 25-35 kilometres.5 All the above-mentioned calculations are based on the presumption that
the given missile travels along the minimum-energy trajectory, what means that its throw vector has the angle optimized to achieve the greatest distance. If this angle is greater or lesser than that, the range decreases and the highest point of the trajectory is located higher or lower. All this also implies that ballistic missiles are very fast as well, their burn-out speed varies from 1.5 km/sec for the missiles of nominal range of 300-400 kilometres to even 7 km/sec or more for those capable to cover 12000-15000 km. These characteristic features of ballistic missiles are of the foremost importance from the point of view of their applications. Due to the great velocity and the high arching trajectory they are capable of delivering warheads very fast to very distant plac-es with a great ease. It means that they can penetrate deep into the potential enemy’s defensive space very effectively and avoid counteraction because they are very difficult to destroy in-flight for many reasons that will be elaborated further on. It should be strongly underlined, that this certainty to achieve the desired effect by the use of ballis-5 Data according to: J.M. Lindsay, M. O’Hanlon, Defending America. The Case for Limited National
tic missiles, regardless the enemy’s defence, is their most important trait and this is why their significance usually go beyond the military role on the battlefield.
To clarify and summarize to this point, it has to be said that ballistic missiles of vari-ous types and with varivari-ous characteristics are of course very important instruments of warfighting of the countries that possess them. Some of the missile systems, the ones with the range of tens of kilometres or even several hundred kilometres are just the bat-tlefield weapons, powerful but limited in use within the operational framework of the conventional conflict – they are usually called artillery-rocket systems. But other6 types,
especially equipped with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) or precision-guided munitions may become a separate and especially important instrument of security pol-icy of a state, or even more broadly, of its foreign polpol-icy.
The illustration of this mechanism may look as follows. Country A is threatened by country B which has a significant number of highly precise conventionally armed ballistic missiles in its arsenal. B is therefore able to strike A’s vital military and civilian targets within minutes, no matter how deep inside the territory they are located. Thus A may suffer very much without even slightest chance to avert at least the part of the damage, so it must consider that compelling fact in all its calculations vis-à-vis B. Of course, the existence of a missile defence would change this equation again, adding also to the uncertainty of the situation, as anti-missile systems are still largely unproven and in fact problematic as far as their real capabilities are considered. And this is exactly the reason why international relations, international security and strategic studies are inter-ested in ballistic missile arsenals as tools of deterrence, coercion or intimidation and in missile defence as the instrument designed to offset the abovementioned capabilities. So let us reiterate that ballistic missiles are not just a warfighting tool but serve also as an instrument of broadly understood security and foreign policy of the state;7 the same
refers to missile defence.8 Both are very important factors of the international stability
and the balance of power on the global as well as on the regional level.
Currently there are dozens of countries and some non-state actors that possess the arsenals of ballistic missiles capable to become a political instrument in certain circum-stances. We will shortly mention the most profound cases, highlighting the role of the missile stockpiles as the especially important tool. To maintain the clarity of the argu-ment, from this point we will strictly follow the American, range based classification of ballistic missiles with the addition of the subcategory artillery-rocket systems which is important in some instances.
6 This is the theoretical classification; the real division in real situations may be blurred somehow. 7 More about the role of ballistic missiles in the states’ policies, see M. Czajkowski, Obrona
przeciwrakie-towa w stosunkach międzynarodowych, Kraków 2013, pp. 179-205. 8 More about the role of missile defence, see ibid., pp. 204-260.
Table 1. The classification of ballistic missiles
Range ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Above 5500 km IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 3000-5500 km MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile 1000-3000 km SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile up to 1000 km SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile N/A
Source: National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, March 2006, p. 3.
USA. There is a large number of ICBMs and SLBMs in stock, that form two of the three elements of the classic strategic nuclear deterrence triad (the third leg is the force of long range bombers capable of delivering nuclear free-fall bombs and cruise missiles). They are the American ultimate safeguard on a global scale, so their basic task is to be able to perform retaliatory strike in every possible circumstance and against every en-emy. Thus they fulfil a very important role in the comprehensive US deterrence strategy.
Russian Federation. ICBMs and SLBMs that Russia possess in a similar quantity as the United States,9 have the same function of the ultimate deterrent as the American
counterparts. But Russia has also modern SRBM class missiles in its arsenals that may have the political importance as the deterrent in the smaller, regional scale. Their de-ployment at the Russian borders may also be the important factor of the foreign policy, for example it may become the instrument of exerting pressure on the neighbours.10
Those missiles can also be dispatched to various regions in the world, like recent de-ployment of the Iskander missiles to Syria.11 There they serve as the political safeguard
of the expeditionary operations and of the growing influence, as well as the proof of the Russian determination to continue the regional engagement.
China. The People’s Republic of China also owns the ICBMs and SLBMs, their inventories and capabilities increase steadily. Although smaller in number, they fulfil the same mission that their American and Russian counterparts. But China’s arsenal comprises also of the large number of the MRBMs and SRBMs that may be armed with nuclear weapons or the precision-guided munitions. They have a key role within the framework of the Chinese military strategy, being also important part of the for-9 For the exact numbers, see “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms”, Bu-reau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, 1 April 2017, at <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/ newstart/269406.htm>, 7 April 2017.
10 V. Gera, J. Heintz, “Baltic Region Worried about Russian Missiles in Kaliningrad”, U.S. News, 8 Octo-ber 2016, at <http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-10-08/poland-concerned-about-russian-missiles-sent-to-kaliningrad>, 8 January 2017.
11 B. Opall-Rome, “Israeli Satellite Imagery Shows Russian Nuclear-Capable Missiles in Syria”, Defense News, 6 January 2017, at <http://www.defensenews.com/articles/israeli-satellite-imagary-shows-russian-nuclear-capable-missiles-in-syria>, 8 January 2017.
eign policy of Beijing which is oriented to deny or at least to complicate foreign armed forces access to some crucial areas not only within but also outside the country’s bor-ders. The implementation of this strategy, termed Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), means that China is trying to exert its influence in the more and more remote regions through making them be accessible only by own armed forces. This strategy is aimed chiefly against the United States and the Chinese rocket force has its role here, as it is ready to attack the key American installations on the Far Eastern theatre, together with American aircraft carriers and the satellite systems. By doing so Beijing would be capa-ble to impede the execution of the operational freedom of the US forces in the region and around it. The effectiveness of this strategy depends of course on the capability of the American missile defence deployed on the theatre to defeat Chinese missile should such need arise – this is not clear as of today, the whole issue will be discussed below. India. This country has a significant number of relatively modern SRBMs, MRBMs and IRBMs; there are also ICBMs and SLBMs in development. The main task of this arsenal is to form the core of the strategic deterrence policy that is directed against Pak-istan and China, although it does not yet match more capable missile force of the lat-ter.12 What is more, quick and comprehensive development of missile and space
tech-nology is very important part of the strategy to build the modern indigenous industrial base. It adds profoundly to the international prestige of India as well.
Pakistan. The main strategic foe of this country is undoubtedly India, therefore its MRBM and SRBM together with nuclear weapons pose mainly as a deterrent. They are a sort of the ultimate argument against the enemy which is otherwise superior by every military and economic standard, save the possession of the weapons of mass de-struction. But if the weapons of mass destruction are to secure Pakistan’s safety they must be deliverable in every circumstance. With the overall superiority of India’s mili-tary, ballistic missiles are the obvious choice as the most effective deterrent. This case shows very clearly the essence of the importance of ballistic missiles.
Iran. Teheran considers its growing and steadily modernizing arsenal of SRBMs and MRBMs, together with the development of the IRBM, and perhaps even the ICBM, an asymmetric response to the military predominance of the USA, Israel and the Per-sian Gulf states.13 It is supposed on the one hand to deter the enemies and to be an
in-strument of coercion within the offensive strategies14 on the other. Iran frequently
un-derlines that there are at least 35 American military installations within the range of its 12 S. Thaliyakkatti, Chinese Perceptions on India’s Long Range Missile Development: How Credible is India’s Deterrence against China?, ISAS Working Paper, no. 258, 24 April 2017, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, at <https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/ISAS%20Reports/ ISAS%20Working%20Papers%20No.%20258-Chinese%20Perceptions%20on%20India’s%20Long%20 Range%20Missile%20Development.pdf>, 15 May 2017.
13 M. Elleman, W. Alsayed, “Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation in the Arabian Gulf ”, in C.M. Kelle-her, P. Dombrowski (eds.), Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective, Stanford 2015, p. 179. 14 P. Izewicz, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programme. Its Status and the Way Forward, EU Non-Proliferation
missiles;15 there are also advanced development efforts to construct the anti-ship
ballis-tic missile.16 This approach closely resembles the Chinese strategy with respect to that.
North Korea. Korean missile stockpile consists of SRBMs and MRBMs, but this country does not hide that it is developing the ICBM class weapon and possibly even the anti-ship ballistic missile. In the security strategy of Pyongyang ballistic missiles are of the paramount importance17 – they are supposed to deter the United States by
threatening the US armed forces, the American allies in the region (Republic of Korea and Japan) and, potentially, even the territory of the USA.18 Nuclear weapons, which
North Korea is developing constantly and openly, are immanent part of this threat. The most recent developments clearly indicate the increasing capability of the increasingly diverse and versatile Korean missile force,19 highlighted by the apparently successful
test of the missile which falls in the category of the ICBM with its calculated range of 6700 km.20
Israel. Israeli missiles that belong to the MRBM and IRBM classes, perhaps also supplemented by the ICBMs, are important part of the nuclear deterrence against the unfriendly Arab states and Iran. The quick response time, i.e. very short period be-tween the decision to do so and the actual launch of the missile is extremely important, having in mind Israel’s uncomfortable geostrategic position.
Hamas, Hezbollah and other anti-Israel militant groups. These organizations possess large numbers of unguided ballistic missiles that may be labelled artillery-rocket systems, with ranges varying from a few to over a hundred kilometres. Despite the lim-ited range, the lack of guidance systems and the conventional warheads, those weapons form the important part of the asymmetric war between Israel and these non-state actors, and the rockets were used as counter-value instruments – that is, to hurt and harass the ci-vilian population […].21 It is because the military and strategic realities of Israel make the
15 “Commander: IRGC Will Destroy 35 US Bases in Region if Attacked”, Fars News Agency, 4 July 2012, at <http://english2.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9103084990>, 8 January 2017.
16 J. Binnie, “Iran Successfully Tests Radar-Guided Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile”, IHS Jane’s 360, 10 March 2017, at <http://www.janes.com/article/68625/iran-successfully-tests-radar-guided-anti-ship-ballistic-missile>, 7 April 2017.
17 J. Lewis, “Kim Jong Un’s Quest for an ICBM”, Foreign Affairs, 9 June 2017, at <https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-06-09/kim-jong-uns-quest-icbm?cid=int-lea&pgtype=hpg>, 10 June 2017.
18 More about the role of the North Korean missile arsenal, see M. Czajkowski, “Korea Północna vs. BMDS”, in W. Sokała, B. Zapała (eds.), Asymetria i hybrydowość – stare armie wobec nowych konfliktów, Warszawa 2011, pp. 65-70.
19 I. Williams, T. Karako, “North Korea’s New Missiles on Parade”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 18 April 2017, at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-koreas-new-missiles-parade>, 20 April 2017.
20 D. Wright, “North Korea Appears to Launch Missile with 6,700 km Range”, (Blog) All Things Nucle-ar, Union of Concerned Scientists, 3 July 2017, at <http://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/north-korea-appears-to-launch-missile-with-6700-km-range>, 6 July 2017.
21 A. Levite, S. Brom, “From Dream to Reality”, in C.M. Kelleher, P. Dombrowski (eds.), Regional Missile Defense..., p. 138.
very special tool out of those relatively not so powerful weapons.22 Israel assesses that
the stockpile of the Hezbollah alone consists of 100 000 missiles.23 Currently anti-Israel
groups are in the process of acquiring more potent weapons systems with greater range and fitted with guidance systems that should be classified as SRBMs. Probably some of them have the range of even 700 km.24
Others. Ballistic missiles of the SRBM class are stockpiled in the arsenals of many countries and non-state actors, especially in the Middle East and across the post-Soviet space. Most of them, however, are relatively out-of-date Soviet models designed during the ’50 of the 20th century. Some of them are domestically modernized end then
ex-ported by such countries like North Korea or Iran, some originate from China. Despite this technical backwardness, all those missiles can easily become a political instrument of the sort we have described above, if they are successfully equipped with WMD or precision-strike munitions. There are also some instances of modern and very capable missiles, like Saudi Arabia that owns Chinese made MRBMs DF-21,25 or Armenia, that
has recently acquired Iskander SRBMs from Russia.26 In both cases the deterrent role of
those weapons is quite clear.
Summarizing, according to the official assessments by the US authorities, outside the arsenals of the NATO countries, China and Russia there are well over 7000 ballistic missiles of the SRBM class or bigger – by the end of the decade this number is supposed to reach 8000.27 Apart from this, many countries possess large quantities of
artillery-rocket systems, but they are not relevant from our point of view, because of lack of the special political importance – save the arsenals of the anti-Israel militant groups.
22 M. Czajkowski, Obrona…, pp. 149-152.
23 “Israel: Any War with Hezbollah Will Be Devastating”, Al Jazeera, 20 April 2016, at <http://www. aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/israel-war-hezbollah-devastating-160420183832190.html>, 8 January 2016.
24 Russian made Scud-D missiles, allegedly transferred to Hezbollah from Syria, see A. Barnard, E. Schmitt, “Hezbollah Moving Long-Range Missiles from Syria to Lebanon, an Analyst Says”, New York Times, 2 January 2014, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/03/world/middleeast/hezbollah- is-said-to-transfer-missiles.html?_r=0>, 9 May 2017.
25 J. Lewis, “Why Did Saudi Arabia Buy Chinese Missiles?”, Foreign Policy, 30 January 2014, at <http:// foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/30/why-did-saudi-arabia-buy-chinese-missiles/>, 8 January 2017. 26 Z. Shiriyev, “Azerbaijan’s Possible Reactions to Armenia’s Iskanders: Defense Versus Offense”, Eurasia
Daily Monitor, vol. 13, no. 160 (5 October 2016), at <https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijans-possible-reactions-armenias-iskanders-defense-versus-offense/#sthash.fsQvtrgA.dpuf>, 8 January 2017. 27 According to the Missile Defense Agency, see J.D. Syring, Ballistic Missile Defense Overiew, Missile
Defense Agency, 14 August 2013, at <https://pl.scribd.com/document/176023320/Ballistic-Missile- Defence-Overview>, 8 January 2017.
2. THE NATURE OF MISSILE DEFENCE
It has already been stated that the properties of ballistic missiles make them extremely difficult to counter – and this is obviously one of their most important features. It stems out of the following:
– high velocity of ballistic missiles is very high in comparison to distances they cover; therefore, when they enter the detection range and subsequently the firing range of the defence system the time that remains for it to react is relatively short,
– velocity of ballistic missiles requires use of the interceptors which are also very fast and which have the ability to conduct very accurate and extremely quick manoeu-vres,
– high altitudes of ballistic missiles’ trajectories add up to the fact that they are in range of classic endo-atmospheric air-defence weapons for very short time – de-ployment of multiple lines of defences against ballistic missiles calls for the weapons systems capable to operate within very high layers of the atmosphere or even out-side of it,
– ballistic missiles or their independently travelling warheads are relatively small tar-gets and it also adds to the difficulty of countering them in all phases, from the de-tection, through the whole process of the target acquisition and calculation of the fire solution to the interception sequence.
Because of all the above-mentioned technical parameters a ballistic missile is an of-fensive weapon that maintains overall superiority over deof-fensive systems. This situation persists from the moment ballistic missiles were used for the very first time as the in-strument meant to deliver the strategic impact on the enemy during the World War II. Since some 5500 A-4/V-1 rockets were used by the Germans between September 1944 and March 1945, ballistic missiles remain the weapon that is extremely difficult to cope with. Save one very specific example, there is virtually no defence system capable of de-feating ballistic missiles effectively enough that it would be comparable to other current defensive weapons such as anti-tank or anti-aircraft systems.28 And it is despite the fact
that since 1945 missile defence was one of the centrepieces of the strategic planning and vast amounts of money have been poured into its development over decades, especially in USA and USSR.
The 21st century did bring some new technologies that could be used to intercept at
least certain kinds of ballistic missiles. But on the other hand we are witnessing a con-stant development of rocketry that nullifies that progress to great extent, rendering mis-sile defence still unreliable. Over the decades ballistic mismis-siles have become more and more resistant to defence, which adds up to their already mentioned properties that come out of the general laws of physics. The development of the strategies and the tech-nologies designed to overcome missile defence started as early as in the sixties of the 20th century and soon yielded considerable effect. Thus, already over half a century ago
many types of ballistic missiles were routinely equipped with the devices called penetra-28 More on the development of missile defence, see M. Czajkowski, Obrona…, pp. 93-145.
tion aids (penaids), designed to overcome missile defence. Special strategies supposed to help the missiles go through were also being perfected through the decades.
Thus, ironically, there is an important asymmetry in the development process and current state of ballistic missiles versus missile defence. The former were being perfect-ed for a long time, with special attention to their capabilities to overcome the defences that until today, have not materialized in the military relevant form. The latter was be-ing developed simultaneously, but only today it has reached the stage of deployed weap-ons systems supposed to be effective to an extent. So, while still in statu nascendi missile defence has to stand up against the huge obstacle of experience with its penetration that has been accumulated over the decades.
In short and without details, the technical means designed to overcome missile de-fence are as follows:29
– decoys are the objects that defence sees as identical to the actual rocket or warhead; missile might deploy them in significant number to compel defence to multiply the number of interceptors fired; there are many kinds of decoys and their effectiveness differs, but is generally considered high – the simplest of them, as some analyses hold, are available for the installation even on board of the relatively unsophisti-cated ballistic missiles,30
– jamming devices that may be fitted on missiles, their upper stages or on the war-heads to distort radar or thermal tracking and targeting systems,
– stealth technologies or the other means of camouflaging missiles or their warheads may also be employed to protect them from the detection or to make the tracking and targeting more difficult.
Besides the technical means of overcoming missile defence there are also certain strategies that may be applied to enhance the effectiveness of ballistic missiles. The most important are:
– a missile, its upper stage or even the single warhead may manoeuvre on its flight to conduct course corrections; even the slightest change of the missile’s trajectory compels the defence to recalculate tracking or targeting, thus delaying the moment when the fire solution is computed and shortening the time left for the intercep-tion; it may even force the repetition of the whole process, even several times, finally wrecking all the defence action and even causing the waste of the interceptor units, – if there are more ballistic missiles available for the attack, some of them may be di-rected to blind the radar and other surveillance, tracking and targeting systems by the multimegaton nuclear blast in the stratosphere – it is one of the most effective countermeasures,
– missile force may use multiple attack patterns designed to impede defence, especial-ly by the way of cutting the time left for defence actions – there may be other than 29 More on this, see comprehensive technical analysis in: A.M. Sessler at al., Countermeasures. A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, Mass. 2000, at <https://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle /1903/4333/2000-UCS-CM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, 25 April 2017.
minimum energy trajectories employed, like lofted or depressed ones; a missile may even enter the low orbit instead of travelling along the ballistic curve that would al-low it to appear over the radar horizon of the defence very late,31
– the offensive side may also decide to allocate the missiles in several waves where the first few would be designed specifically to destroy or saturate the defences – addi-tionally it may concentrate on some selected area in order to make a local break-through by saturation and by doing this it could achieve the strategic objective. It is worth noting that all of those means and strategies are relatively unsophisti-cated, at least the simplest of them. It is generally understood that the penaids, not to mention attack strategies, are generally easier to develop than missile defence. And that is precisely why ballistic missiles, those which can apply means and methods to over-come missile defence, are still way ahead of defensive capabilities. It is even argued, and it is an argument which is convincing to some extent that this state of affairs is an im-manent feature of certain technologies and their combinations and it is rather impos-sible to change.32
It is necessary to underline at this point that every country that relies on ballistic missiles in its defensive or offensive strategies and therefore regard them as the special tool of the security policy, would certainly do everything to ensure its rocket force re-tain its value. Thus it would undoubtedly use every available method to enhance the accuracy, penetration capability and the survivalability of the whole arsenal. It would do its best to ensure the other actors of the international stage that its missile force is fully capable to fulfill its mission regardless of all the defence. So, in the peacetime or during the international crisis the owner of a missile arsenal would surely be developing the technologies and strategies and would be strengthening the organization, morale and the training of the missile force to stay ahead of the potential opponent’s missile defence development. One of important ways to achieve this goal is the development of the comprehensive strategies to defeat missile defence in the very first hours of the con-flict by a concentrated effort of different combat platforms such as the cruise missiles together with the possible commando raids and cyber and electronic warfare.
The last issue is certainly worth elaborating. It is commonly believed that in the combat situation missile defence would face ballistic missiles together with their pen-etration techniques and strategies in a sort of the duel. But in the reality of the actual conflict missile defence with its own protective force would be faced not only by the enemy’s missiles but also by wide-range multi-spectral counterforce attack relentless-ly exploiting its inherent vulnerabilities. The newest weapon which might be used to counter missile defence is currently entering the advanced testing phase in Russia and China and it will probably enter service in the near future. It comprises of warheads
31 Such a strategy is called fractional orbit bombardment and is especially effective at great distances of the attack which would otherwise require very high altitude of ballistic flight instead of fractional orbit which may be set as low as 150 km over the Earth’s surface or even lower.
with hypersonic propulsion launched atop ICBMs that can attack at great speed and at relatively low altitudes with the capability to execute aggressive maneuvers.33
In short, there is multi-faceted offence vs. defence arms race and ballistic missiles, modern and sophisticated ones operated by modern and well organized militaries, are way ahead every missile defence that is deployable now or would be in the foreseeable future.
The other problem that affects the effectiveness of missile defence is obviously the economic dimension of the development, deployment and maintenance of the suffi-cient defensive force, because as there are the most advanced technologies involved, the costs are very high. Missile defence is substantially more expensive than classic air de-fence and that limits the number of the sensors and interceptors which can be bought in certain economic circumstances. But here come the numbers:
– as multiple interceptors are routinely launched against one target, the inventory of missile defence assets must in theory be at least twofold larger than the whole mis-sile force of the potential enemy,
– add maneuvers, decoys and other countermeasures that foil the defences and make it use even more munitions, the defensive arsenal multiplies again,
– the more advanced the force that the opponent wields, the larger anti-missile stock-pile is necessary.
But it is not all. In case of the vast territory it should also be considered that the en-emy may use the saturation tactics, sending its forces against selected targets. It means that to make it effective, every single part or the territory must be protected by missile defence systems many times bigger in numbers that the missile force of the enemy. How high the other multiplier is depends on the technical data of the defence systems in terms of effective firing range versus missile’s velocity.
All in all, every missile defence must be much larger in numbers than the arsenal it is supposed to counter. Finally, it may be too much a burden for certain country, even a rich one. That is why it is usually argued that missile defence is crafted against limited targets, in fact no one has ever seriously thought about a total missile defence, and the reason for that is in fact mostly economic.
Summarizing to that point, main impediments to the development of missile de-fence as an effective and reliable weapon are by their nature both technological and eco-nomic. Both dimensions are also very strictly linked together because the state-of-the art technology yields costs. This is of course relative to mission certainty an anti-missile system is supposed to fulfill in the given realities, determined by the size and the quality of the opposing missile force.
All the above mentioned difficulties were conceptualized as early as the late six-ties when the construction of the strategic missile defence systems Sentinel34 and
sub-33 See for example G. Noris, “Classified Report on Hypersonics Says U.S. Lacking Urgency”, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 February 2017, at <http://aviationweek.com/defense/classified-report-hypersonics-says-us-lacking-urgency>, 14 February 2017.
34 See the seminal article R.L. Garwin, H. Bethe, “Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems”, Scientific American, vol. 218, no. 3 (1968).
sequently Safeguard was debated in the United States. Scientists and politicians were pointing to material limitations that rendered missile defence ineffective in the light of the economic impediments and strategic realities.35 The sole strategic system which
was eventually build for several billion dollars, Safeguard, was designed only to defend a small portion of the US nuclear deterrence force as the part of the overall effort to retain and enhance its survivalability. The fact that it was also highly vulnerable to the enemy’s countermeasures and saturation attack lowered Safeguard’s military sig-nificance even more. No wonder that the decision to dismantle the system was made by the Congress on October 2, 1975, just one day after it was officially introduced into the combat readiness.36
The reservations voiced over half the century ago are quite accurate today, though many of the corresponding circumstances have changed, especially the general equa-tion: ballistic missiles versus missile defence. In the sixties, the missile threat first of all had the form the strategic nuclear offensive weapons that were in possession of the su-perpowers alone (with China slowly joining but still way behind). Those powers were not only producing vast amounts of delivery systems and nuclear payloads, but were also capable to continuously upgrade and deploy new systems with enhanced pene-tration aids. The subsequent generations of missile defence systems conceived during those years were being designed to counter this threat and thus were attributed with the term ‘strategic’. Today the missile threat is profoundly more diverse in the quality, quantity and the nature of the military and the political missions the missile force of a certain nation have to fulfil.
On the other hand, the research conducted throughout the decades has led to prac-tical applications of the new technologies which in turn resulted in the construction of the weapons able to intercept at least some kinds of ballistic missiles. More precisely, the development of radiolocation technologies, electronics, optronics and computers together with the creation of the new construction materials allowed to design and field the sensors and weapons systems that can be used to defeat ballistic missiles, with-in the substantial limitations elaborated below.
Missile defence systems that are currently in active service are designed along the same general principle: radar stations supplemented with infrared and optical sensors detect, track and target ballistic missiles that are subsequently destroyed by anti-mis-sile rockets. The differences among the existing systems lay in the parameters of cer-tain sensors, interceptors and the command and control units, such as: wavelength on which the radar stations operate, power of the emitters, gain of the receivers, range and speed, agility and the capability to acquire targets by the interceptors, processing speed of computers and capacity of the communication lines. These differences reflect mostly the ability of given defence system to destroy certain class or classes of ballistic missiles and the ability of missiles to penetrate given defences. Defensive systems may also be 35 See for example A. Chayes, J.B. Wiesner (eds.), ABM. An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy
Antibal-listic Missile System, London 1970, first published in the USA in 1969. 36 D.R. Baucom, Origins of SDI 1944-1983, Lawrence, Kan. 1992, p. 96.
compiled into a vertically layered structure, where a certain area is protected by the multiple weapons systems. In such a case different types of weapons are tasked either to be deployed against different threats or to be deployed subsequently against one threat as it passes through the layers of the defence.
As it was mentioned above, certain weapon systems are designed to engage a certain range of targets. As we deem this fact very important, we will now present two exam-ples of well-known systems and their basic applications in some detail.
First of them is the American air defence system Patriot, the PAC-3 variant which is designed to use the interceptor missile MIM-104F (also referred to as PAC-3) dedi-cated to anti-missile warfare. The system is able to defeat only the SRBMs within thick layers of atmosphere with the operational ceiling of 20 km and at the range of 40 km.37
The other classes of the missiles are too fast for the Patriot – it is not able to calculate fire solution within the range of the fire control station and execute the interception sequence within the range of its interceptor. Some sources indicate that PAC-3 has a limited ability to engage MRBMs and this means that the successful intercept of the missile of that class by Patriot is possible only in certain tactical situations, relative to the location of the missile’s target with respect to the launcher, its speed and the vector of the flight path.
The second example is also American Aegis BMD weapons system with its Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). In its current stage of the development it is able to defeat SRBMs and MRBMs in every circumstance, with the limited ability to engage IRBMs as well. The range of the missile of the fielded versions block IA and block IB is several hundred ki-lometres and the ceiling about 150 km.
The weapons systems mentioned in the examples above may also be combined into a layered structure where the SM-3s engage the volleys of SRBMs or MRBMs outside the atmosphere and then Patriots are used to intercept the remaining SRBMs, and, if the tactical situation allows, the MRBMs as well.
The problem with the reaction time is common to all missile defence systems no matter what kind of missiles it is supposed to counter. Some answer to it comes from network-centric organization of defensive force that would allow targeting the inter-ceptors via a remote sensor array or guidance system of the platform other than the one that actually launched it. This is the core of the upcoming American systems that are currently close to the acquiring this capability. But this concept adds to the techno-logical complexity of the whole system because it must be deployed across wide areas in order to cover the possible flight paths of incoming missiles far enough to make this capability be relevant. Such a solution certainly aggravates the economic burden of mis-sile defence.
We must stress at this point, that even the most modern and highly sophisticated missile defence systems still have their significant limitations that reflect the same res-ervations that Garwin and Bethe pointed to in 1967 in the paper mentioned above. 37 “Patriot PAC-3”, Military Today, 2017, at <http://www.military-today.com/missiles/patriot_pac3.
Penetration aids and attack strategies evolve constantly, as well as the means and tactics to engage and destroy missile defence itself, thus the impediments to countering the ballistic missile are still in place, or may even be rising.
But here we come to the differentiation of missile arsenals that is important from the point of view of the modern missile defence and its role in the security strategies and the foreign policies of given states. Today the missile threat is not only a global one that concerns the very existence of the civilization, but also has regional and even lo-cal dimension, as we have mentioned it describing the roles of ballistic missiles in the politics of different countries. Let us remind that today there are both the most modern and very primitive ballistic missiles in the stockpiles along with the whole range of the types that may be classified in between of those two. Therefore the problem of missile defence is very diverse, starting from the global plane, through transregional, regional, subregional and local dimensions. In all those perspectives, in different areas there are different missiles to be reckoned with, from the huge ICBMs to garage-made artillery rockets. That also overlaps with the level of technical sophistication of the missiles that means, from the point of view of missile defence, the penetration capabilities.
Thus, in every given instance the quantitative and qualitative value of the missile arsenal must be projected onto the economic capability of the given state to withstand the financial burden of the required missile defence. And here we come to the crucial conclusion, that the potential and actual effectiveness of missile defence and so its role in the state’s policies may vary strongly and depends on a generally simple calculus: ac-tual threat vs. defence capabilities. What has to be considered firstplace is the acac-tual destructive power of a missile arsenal in comparison to the existing critical targets. It strictly determines what portion of the every possible attack may be ‘let pass’ by the defence. Plainly speaking, it means that it is necessary to calculate what percentage of the missiles may go through without crippling the defender beyond the accepted level. This calculation becomes very difficult and the error margin comes close to zero in case when nuclear weapon is considered. Therefore, if to quote a noted American weapons expert: although it is likely that defenses can achieve some degree of effectiveness against shorter-range, conventionally armed missiles, for the key mission of defense against long-range nuclear-armed missiles, the potential effectiveness of missile defenses remains un-proven.38
If to make a conclusion concerning the problem of effectiveness, we might observe most generally, that modern missile defence (the types that are fielded now or are to be introduced soon) may counter qualitatively and quantitatively limited ballistic missile threats. It refers to the missiles that do not apply sophisticated penetration techniques and strategies and, cumulatively, are not deployed in the number enough to saturate the defences, both overall and locally. It is the most general observation that applies to every situation in the world where there is the missile threat and the defence to coun-ter it. More specifically, it should be stressed that the modern ballistic missiles that 38 G.N. Lewis, “Technical Controversy: Can Missile Defense Work?”, in M. Kelleher, P. Dombrowski
are capable to deploy a whole range of penaids and are able to attack with the use of the sophisticated tactics are extremely difficult to defeat. And it is going to remain so in the foreseeable future. Additionally it is expectable that the eventual ballistic mis-sile offensives would always be accompanied with the attempt to destroy or otherwise eliminate missile defence assets by the concentrated effort with the use of diverse means and methods of warfare. Especially during broad and complex military campaigns, the elimination of the opponent’s missile defence would be surely one of the first opera-tional goals.
On the other hand, there is research effort underway to enhance missile defence, especially in its ability to counter penetration techniques and strategies. It concerns both the detection/tracking/discrimination/targeting capabilities and the interception techniques of weapons systems. Right now it is relatively difficult to predict what way the relation between the missiles penetration capabilities and the defence abilities to counter it would evolve in the future, because we do not know what kind of technolog-ical breakthroughs would occur. But, what is otherwise quite obvious, the qualitative change in the available technologies must take place in order to change current advan-tage of the missiles over the defence. There are, of course, some promising technologies under development, such as directed energy weapons or electromagnetic weapons that would theoretically allow rapid change in missile defence effectiveness but their real combat potential is unknown now.
3. MISSILE DEFENCE IN THE WORLD
The following presentation of missile defence systems of the world contains the facts that are present in the public information space. But we have to remember that many of the key parameters of certain types of weapons are considered top secret, so the pic-ture is not complete. We will briefly describe the main systems of the main countries (save the USA that is mentioned in more detail in the next chapter). We will also refer in short to the mission that missile defence has to fulfil within the strategies of those countries.
Israel. The Jewish State is confronted with the threat of the SRBM/MRBM ar-senals of its neighbours, especially with the vast force of the Iranian missiles, as well as with the huge stockpile of the artillery rocket systems that are in the possession of the anti-Israeli militant groups. The latter is of significant strategic importance due to the particular geographic determinants of the Tel-Aviv’s security politics.39
Gener-ally speaking, the Israeli missile defence is the indispensable answer to the build-up of enemy’s capabilities that could effectively offset the overall military preponderance of 39 See M. Czajkowski, “Obrona przeciwrakietowa Izraela”, in R. Kłosowicz, B. Szlachta, J.J. Węc (eds.), Dylematy strategiczne XXI wieku. Księga Jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Michałowi Chorośnic-kiemu z okazji czterdziestolecia pracy naukowej, Kraków 2013, pp. 221-235.
Israel in the region. It is then considered a very important instrument of the local stra-tegic balance.
The multitude of threats with very specific features compelled Israel to develop multi-layered missile defence that starts from the Iron Dome40 system that is designed
to intercept missiles fired from artillery rocket systems. Its currently fielded variants are capable of shooting down the rockets with the range up to 70 km and this task has been fulfilled with great success since April 2011. Unique technologies applied in this design make itsome 80-90% combat effective. It is being used on regular basis against harass-ing attacks of anti-Israeli militants and at times against barrages of missiles that occur during the more intense hostilities. For example, throughout the operation Protective Edge that lasted between July 8th and September 26th, 2014 Hamas fired over 4500
rockets against Israeli targets. Among them only 700 did actually approach residence areas and therefore required interception – according to the official statements 90% of them were shot down by the Iron Dome.41 As of August 2016, there were
10 bat-teries in service – everyone is equipped with 3 or 4 launchers with the complement of the 20 Tamir missiles each.42 To date Iron Dome is the only one missile defence system
in the world with the capability to fulfil designed task comprehensively and proven in combat.
The higher layer of the Israeli missile defence comprises of the recently introduced multi-role air and missile defence system David’s Sling.43 Its task is to intercept an
air-breathing target of every kind and ballistic missiles of the 40-300 km range.44 In
prac-tice it is supposed to defeat artillery rocket systems of greater range and small SRBMs, for example of the Scud family, abundant in the arsenals of Israel’s neighbours, appar-ently in possession of Hezbollah as well.
The next fielded system is Arrow-245 that is designed to intercept SRBMs and
MRBMs, especially Iranian Shahab-3 MRBMs,46 at high altitudes up to 50 km.
Cur-rently there are 2-3 batteries of that type in service,47 one of them was used to intercept
40 (Kipat Barzel) in Hebrew, the English name is the most widely used.
41 A. Ben David, “Iron Dome Blunts 90% of Enemy Rockets”, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 Sep-tember 2014, at <http://aviationweek.com/defense/iron-dome-blunts-90-enemy-rockets>, 6 January 2017.
42 J. Lokshin, “Iron Dome (Israel)”, Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance, August 2016, at <http:// missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-systems-2/allied-air-and-missile-defense-systems/allied-intercept-systems-coming-soon/iron-dome-israel/>, 6 January 2017.
43 (Keleh David) in Hebrew, but the English name is the most widely used.
44 J. Lokshin, “David’s Sling (Israel)”, Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance, August 2016, at <http:// missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-systems-2/allied-air-and-missile-defense-systems/allied-intercept-systems-coming-soon/davids-sling-israel/>, 6 January 2017.
45 ץח (Chetz) in Hebrew, but the English name is the most widely used.
46 R. Haddick, “This Is Not a Test”, Foreign Policy, 17 August 2012, at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2012/08/17/this_is_not_a_test>, 12 September 2011.
47 Z. Berger, “Arrow (Israel)”, Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance, September 2016, at <http:// missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-systems-2/allied-air-and-missile-defense-systems/allied-intercept-systems-coming-soon/arrow-israel/>, 21 January 2017.
Syrian air-to-air missile that entered Israeli airspace on March 17, 2017;48 it was the
baptism of fire of this system.
The highest layer of Israeli missile defence is Arrow-3, capable to intercept warheads of the MRBMs and probably even IRBMs outside the atmosphere. The initial opera-tional capability of this system has been announced on 18 January 2017.49
Western Europe. The European members of NATO have two weapons systems that may be used against ballistic missiles. First is the Patriot that is represented by two vari-ants: PAC-2 which is basically air defence weapon but has limited capabilities to en-gage SRBMs and PAC-3 that has already been mentioned before. The second system with roughly similar anti-ballistic capabilities is SAMP/T,50 designed in Franco-Italian
cooperation. Its land version is called Mamba and it is basically a modern air defence system, that thanks to the missile Aster 30 it is able to intercept SRBMs, and it may have a limited capability against MRBMs, although the latter has never been tested. It is worth noting that in contrast to the American counterpart, SAMP/T deploys the same missile against air-breathing and ballistic targets. France has 10 batteries and It-aly 551 of Mamba, the system is also offered for export. Its maritime variant is called
PAAMS52 and in the version that includes Aster 30 missile it is installed on the ships of
French, Italian and British navies, giving them the same anti-ballistic capabilities. There is another type of missile defence weapons system, although it has not been fully developed yet, named MEADS,53 designed in the German-Italian-American
co-operation. It was supposed to be the continuation and supplement to the Patriot and SAMP/T in the air and missile defence of partner countries, combining European ra-dar technology with the American PAC-3 missile. The program went through vari-ous difficulties, including the withdrawal of the American side from its financing, but finally the system has been selected by Germany as a replacement of the currently used Patriots.54 MEADS is also offered for export.
The NATO countries also developed a common project termed Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD), which was not a weapon system as such but rather a structure within the NATO framework. It was tasked with the devel-opment of the doctrine, planning and training of those elements of the Allied armed 48 A. Harel, G. Cohen, J. Khoury, “Israeli Air Force Strikes Targets in Syria; Assad Forces Threaten ‘Direct’
Retaliation”, Haaretz, 17 March 2017, at <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.777902>, 18 March 2017.
49 Z. Berger, “Arrow (Israel)”.
50 Sol-air moyenne portée terrestre – medium range, surface-to-air, mobile.
51 N. de Larrinaga, “France Receives Last SAMP/T Air Defence System”, IHS Jame’s 360, 17 March 2016, at <http://www.janes.com/article/58841/france-receives-last-samp-t-air-defence-system>, 21 January 2017.
52 Principal Air-to-Air Missile System.
53 Medium-Extedned Range Air Defense System.
54 M. Dura, “Niemcy: Umowa na system MEADS w przyszłym roku?”, Defence24, 14 July 2016, at <http://www.defence24.pl/408446,niemcy-umowa-na-system-meads-w-przyszlym-roku>, 7 January 2017.
forces that were involved in missile defence efforts – it was then the integration struc-ture built over the national units. Initially NATO envisioned only the limited defence of its armed forces deployed at the theatre – hence the name of the effort. However later on, at the Lisbon summit in 2010, the creation of a defence of the whole Alli-ance’s territory in Europe was established. Gradually, theatre defence programme was merged within awider approach termed NATO Ballistic Missile Defence. The Lisbon summit also declared that the NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS), operational since 1961, would be transformed into the effort called NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NIAMD), according to the holistic vision of comprehensive defence against all kinds of threats. When the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence was declared operational in July 2016, the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence Sys-tem (NATINAMDS) became the reality. The sysSys-tem comprises of numerous assets as-signed by the member states, interconnected to form the unified structure. The Ameri-can European Phased Adaptive Program (EPAA), together with some other countries’ sensors is the key part of the territorial defence, while the other countries’ missile de-fence units may be used as a theatre dede-fence.
All this effort is directed chiefly against potential limited threats from the Middle East or elsewhere, but not against the Russian vast missile arsenal, although it is often portrayed as such. The limited number of missile defence assets and the specifications of the Russian modern missiles cannot shift the strategic balance between NATO and the Russian Federation.
Russian Federation. Missile defence is not treated in Russia as an independent military instrument. The only dedicated missile defence system is the cold war lega-cy A-135 Moscow defence perimeter, ineffective and partially deactivated. Apart from this within the structures of the Land Forces, The Navy and the Aerospace Force55
there is a vast number of the S-300P, S-300W and S-300F (the newest variants are des-ignated S-400 and S-500) multi-role air and missile defence weapons systems. They all have some capabilities against ballistic missiles but it is very difficult to define it pre-cisely. As the Russians treat their air defence, especially S-400 Triumph, as an impor-tant tool of political propaganda and information warfare, perceived as such. That is why its capabilities are on the one hand largely unconfirmed by independent sources and highly ‘mythologized’56 on the other. From time to time the information on the
other Russian systems, including new strategic ones appears, but their verification is also highly problematic.
Japan. This country is an important partner of the United States in the development of sea-based SM-3 system, including the newest SM-3 block IIA. It is already installed aboard four guided missile destroyers of the Kongō class and two more of the Atago class. Apart from this, the Japanese have sixteen batteries of Patriot PAC-3, which op-55 In Russian: Воздушно-космические силы Вооружённых сил Российской Федерации, ВКC ВС
России. The military branch that combines air force plus space force and air defence force under single command, established on December 1, 2011.
56 M. Dura, “Rosyjska ‘prawda’ o systemie S-400”, Defence24, 26 January 2017, at <http://www.defence24. pl/533952,rosyjska-prawda-o-systemie-s-400>, 27 January 2017.
erate missiles manufactured by Mitsubishi.57 Japan also mulls further enhancement of
its missile defence by purchasing American-made THAAD or preferably Aegis Ashore systems.58 Missile defence sensor network is also well developed and it is highly
inte-grated with American missile defence infrastructure on the Asiatic theatre. From the point of view of Japan the most immediate missile threat is of course North Korea with its increasingly capable missile arsenal, but the threat from China is also taken into the consideration.
India. Delhi is working on the development of missile defence since the half of 1980s59 and currently a composite, two-layered system is being fielded. The first layer is
PAD-1,60 the weapons system that has been developed with the components acquired
from Israel and from some other countries. It is adjusted to intercept ballistic missiles that have the range of 200-2000 km within the 80 km operational ceiling61 and at the
distances 150-200 km.62 The lower layer of the Indian missile defence is the newly
de-signed, point-defence weapons system AAD63 that is supposed to intercept targets at
the distance of 30 km and up to the ceiling of 30 km.64 Basically it is an air defence
sys-tem, the anti-ballistic capability is only one of its functions. According to the current plans missile defence is to cover Mumbai area in the first place and the region surround-ing New Delhi later on.65 The establishment of Indian missile defence may
undoubt-edly affect regional stability, taking into account the abovementioned role of missile arsenal in the security strategy of Pakistan – it is very likely that it could speed up the regional strategic arms race.
China. The Chinese military is highly secretive, that is why not much of detailed information is available with regard to missile defence. However, it is well known that this country has imported Russian S-300 systems and copied them domestically, prob-ably with some upgrades. Thus, there are original S-300PMs, S-300PMUs, S-300Fs and 57 S.M. Pekkanen, “Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense and ‘Proactive Pacifism’”, in C.M. Kelleher, P.
Dom-browski (eds.), Regional Missile Defense..., pp. 207-218.
58 B. Perrett, “Tokyo Seeks New Ways to Stop North Korean Ballistic Missiles”, Aviation Week & Space Technologies, 19 May 2017, at <http://aviationweek.com/aviation-week-space-technology/tokyo-seeks-new-ways-stop-north-korean-ballistic-missiles>, 19 May 2017.
59 “Powtórna oferta USA dla Indii”, Altair. Agencja Lotnicza, 26 July 2012, at <http://www.altair.com. pl/news/view?news_id=8233&q=Powt%C3%B3rna%20oferta%20USA%20dla%20Indii>, 27 July 2012.
60 Prithvi Air Defence.
61 “DRDO Ballistic Missile Defence System, India”, Army Technology, 2012, at <http://www.army-technology.com/projects/drdo-bmd/>, 11 March 2013.
62 P. Topychkanov, India’s Prospects in the Area of Ballistic Missile Defense. A Regional Security Perspective, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Moscow Center Working Papers, 3, Moscow 2012, p. 21.
63 “Kolejne testy Akash”, Altair. Agencja Lotnicza, 14 April 2016, at <http://www.altair.com.pl/news/ view?news_id=19175>, 16 April 2016.
64 P. Topychkanov, India’s…, p. 21.
65 A.C. Winner, “Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia”, in C.M. Kelleher, P. Dombrowski (eds.), Re-gional Missile Defense..., p. 186.
indigenous HQ-9s in service, however, the combat capabilities of the latter are prob-ably lesser than of the original.66 China also conducted two test of midcourse missile
defence,67 but there is no detailed information on that fact. It is widely thought that
currently China is intensely pondering on the role of its own missile defence in the se-curity strategy but there is still no precise and comprehensive understanding on this matter.68 One of important doctrinal conundrums that China currently has to solve is
to how to reconcile its long standing and adamant objection with regard to develop-ment of the American missile defence, considered a threat to the strategic deterrent of China and thus highly destabilizing, with its possible own enlarged and evolved, dedi-cated missile defence.
Others. Basically we may divide other users of missile defence weapons systems into the two camps: one that uses the American systems and the second that operates Russian ones. Apart from already mentioned countries, the following Middle Eastern countries belong to the category: Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates and in the Far East Korea and Taiwan. All of them operate Pa-triot PAC-3 air and missile defence systems. Moreover, the UAE have ordered two up-per tier batteries of the THAAD weapons system to become the first export user of this highly sophisticated, dedicated anti-missile system. Qatar is also about to introduce its missile defence based on the PAC-3 and THAAD systems.
It is worth noting that Saudi and Emirati missile defence is in constant combat situ-ation, routinely conducting intercepts of ballistic missiles. In the course of the interna-tional military intervention in Yemen, that started in April 2015 and is led by Saudi Arabia, the rebel Houthi forces regularly fire ballistic missiles against Saudi targets. This are mainly Scud family obsolete SRBMs, but there is also the information that more sophisticated Russian made Tochka missile was also used. Since the start of the operation until May 19th, 2017 as many as 44 ballistic missiles were shot down and 13
more reached their targets in Saudi Arabia and UAE.69 This data does not however
give the picture of the combat effectiveness of missile defence assets deployed in Saudi Arabia, because, firstly, the defence does not cover whole area of the country and sec-ondly, these are mostly the official Saudi communiqués, which are routinely denied by Houthis. But even if unconfirmed in detail, there is a missile war on the Saudi Arabia’s and UAE’s borders.
Russian systems of the S-300P family are in the service in Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine, Slovakia, Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Iran, Kazakhstan, Syria, Vietnam 66 T. Szulc, “S-300 i Buk po kantońsku, czyli chińskie wariacje na temat rosyjskich systemów
przeciwlot-niczych”, Nowa Technika Wojskowa, no. 11 (2012), pp. 18-29.
67 T. Farnsworth, “China Conducts Missile Defense Test”, Arms Control Association, March 2013, at <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/China-Conducts-Missile-Defense-Test>, 30 March 2013. 68 Ch.P. Twomey, M.S. Chase, “Chinese Attitudes Toward Missile Defense”, in C.M. Kelleher, P.
Dom-browski (eds.), Regional Missile Defense..., pp. 207-210.
69 The source of all the data: “The Missile War in Yemen”, Missile Threat – CSIS Missile Defense Project, 23 October 2016, at <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile-war-yemen/>, 9 November 2017.
