A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S
FOLIA PHILOSOPH1CA 9. 1993
Bogusław M aryniok
H U M A N IST IC PH IL O SO PH Y O F SCIENCE AND ITS MAIN EPISTEM O LO G ICA L PROBLEM
Before I start to present my ap p ro ach to the m ain point o f the paper, I would like to m ention a linguistic problem which, in my opinion, is not unessential. In the English language philosophical trad itio n the philosophy o f science is based on the analitical philosophy and the division between science and hum anities or the A rts. In this philosophical trad itio n science is u n derstood as a study o f n atu re an d the b ehaviour o f n atural things likewise the know ledge ab o u t them th at we o b tain thro u g h observation and ex-perim ents. In opposition to science, the hum anities are u n d ersto o d as the subject o f study concerned with hum an beings, their ideas, action and relationships between them . In my opinion, the division into science and the hum anities has only a practical sence only. T he criteria o f this m ain division could be useful from the analitical point o f view. They divide attitu d es which are strict and based on observation or experim ents connected with n atu re from different and often irratio n al or irregular hum an activities which in m ost o f the cases have nothing to d o with any kind o f tru th .
M y conviction is th a t according to m odern and co n tem p o rary philosophy this division is rath er useless, because even though it builds som e borders, it skips the m ain epistem ological p roblem o f philosophy, m ention for instance by D escartes, K ant and Husserl. T he real problem is how to build the subject which is adeq u ate to the reality an d which will know som ething ab o u t the reality. In o th er w ords, the question is how the cognition is possible.
In consequence I have to reject the division and jo in those b o th sides in the hum anistic philosophy o f science. T he hum anistic philosophy o f science is a philosophical reflection connected with both science and hum anities (or the A rts). T he division is no t im p o rtan t, w hen you think ab o u t the epistem ological
problem o f relations between the subject and the object which is based on the hum an u n d erstanding o f reality.
Before I present my m ain topic, I w ould like to show the sources o f the hum anistic philosophy o f science an d its m ost im p o rtan t theses. I consider it quite relevant, because it is to som e extent original. T he hum anistic philosophy o f science, which I am trying to build, rises against trad itio n al, scientism ical ideal o f the philosophy o f science. Its m ain inspiration are non o rth o d o x philosophies o f science built by T h o m as S. K uhn, Paul F eyerabend, Edm und H usserl and Stefan A m sterd a m sk i1. I treat K uhn, Feyerabend and A m ster-dam ski as follow ers o f trad itio n al, scientism ical a ttitu d e in the so called philosophy o f science „w itnessing the crisis” which happened in this philosop-hy. O n the o ther han d H usserl an d som e o f his allies an d students are the critics o f the scientism . T heir criticism , I suppose, tackles m any im portant elem ents. A positive inspiration to my hum anistic philosophy o f science is c o n tem p o rary philosophical herm eneutics, represented by M artin Heidegger and H an s-G eo rg G adam er.
C o n tem p o rary philosophy o f science has been going th ro u g h a crisis. The first person who m ention it was H usserl2. He said th a t we c a n n o t speak ab o u t the crisis o f som e p articu lar branches o f science when we can easily and clearly see their success. A ccording to H usserl, the crisis o f science m eans th a t its scientific ch aracter, understood as a whole m anner in which it established its tru e goal an d w orked out its m ethod is being questioned. F rom the H usserl’s p oint o f view the problem o f p artic u la r b ranches o f science resolves itself into a riddle o f subjectivity o f the w ho apprehends. This is related with a riddle o f a topic and a m ethod o f a psychology. T he sccound h alf o f the nineteenth century was the time o f a big im po rtan ce o f sciences and the prosperity which the m an owed them . A long with it there was a change in the problem range, very im p o rtan t for the hum anity. Sciences, which are interested in facts only, create poeple o f facts only. A ccording to H usserl, the cruclity and tragedy o f the First W orld W ar m ade the problem s o f the h u m anity im p o rtan t again. Again some fundam ental philosophical question relating to the sense o f the w orld, rationality and freedom were asked. T he Objective, factual sciences (b o th strict an d the H um anities) c a n n o t give any answ er. Before, in H usserl's opinion, it was not always like th at. In the ancient G reek society the m ost im p o rtan t thing was „th e philosophical form o f existence” (D aseinform ) which was free education from a subject its whole life and rules o f the pure reason. T heoretical philosophy was the basic problem . Such philosophy m ade free no t
1 Compare: B. T U c h a ń s k a , R ozw ój poznania ja k o proces społeczny, Warszawa 1982; W. M e j b a u m , A. Ż u r o w s k a , W stęp do m etodologii nauk empirycznych. Kraków 1985.
2 Compare: E. H u s s e r l , K ry zys nauk europejskich a transcendentalna fenomenologia, „Studia Filozoficzne” 1976, nr 9, p. 93—121.
only a philosopher but anybody ,who was philosophicaly educated. This theoretical auto n o m y was followed by practical autonom y. T he m an, w ho built him self intuitively on his reason was the ideal o f an tiq u ity and the R enaissance. Such a m an built also the w orld which su rro u n d e d him. He built the political and social existance o f T he M ankind which he educcd from the free reason, from the intuition o f a universal philosophy.
T he positivistic philosophy o f science „cut dow n the head o f the philosophy” rejecting the questions ab o u t the essence o f the ratio n ality , the existance o f G od, the sense o f the w orld o r the im m orality. Instead it assum ed a dogm atic phenom enalizm . T h an k s to it, positivism becom e a p art o f the old, ancient, philosophical and m etaphisical conception o f science. It is a part o f this conception because other, irratio n al (so called irratio n al) p a rts o f the conception were rejected by positivism . New philosophy o f science, based on the E nlightenm ent’s ideal o f the hum anity paid a special atten tio n to m ethodology and efficiency. It had undeniably som e success but science becom e a dom ain ol professional an d expert scientists, w ho were fa r away from the philosophy and its questions.
A m sterd a m sk i' refers to the H usserl's trad itio n s o f the philosophy o f science criticism . H e presents tw o altern ativ e ideals o f science an d the conflict betw een them . A m sterdam ski is trying to present both o f them indisc-rim inately. From his p oint o f view the conflict o f these ideals is unsolvable on a philosophical ground because when we assum e, th a t we place ourselves outside the system which we exam ine and which we belong to we are unable to reach the whole knowlcge about it. O n the o th er han d , if wc agree th at we are a p art of the system which we exam ine from the inside, we are not able to reach an objective know ledge ab o u t it. In consequence, in A m sterdam ski's oppinion, o u r choices are conditioned by the values the realization o f which is expected from o u r knowledge.
The conflict o f these ideals o f know ledge is also unsolvable on a m et-hodological ground. T he acceptance o f the ideals o f know ledge excludes an acceptance o f som e m ethodologic al principles. F o r the first ideal o f the know ledge the m ost im p o rtan t is psychological, linguistic or historical (cultural in global) understan d in g o f the w orld in which m an lives and acts. F o r the second ideal the m ost im p o rtan t is expanding technological p o -ssibilities which are, in A m sterd am sk i's opinion, taking control o f the world: both people an d nature. C o n tem p o rary , so called, science is a result o f the realization of the second ideal. It docs not m ean th a t it is the only possible ideal o f the knowledge. This ideal could be critisized too. A m sterdam ski thinks th a t on the basis o f the ideal, which joins cognitive and technical function o f the know ledge it can be accepted and regarded as rational only when we accept
the m ethodological rules which enable its o p eratio n al usage. T he acceptance o f this ideal is not a necessity o f the reason bu t the choise m ade by the E uropean culture. The choice could be accepted o r rejected, but the ideal should not be treated as an eternal. It's analisis and criticism is one o f the tasks o f the philosophy of science. A m sterdam ski in his analises gives a distinctivcle racional bases for a pluralistic philosophy o f science. T o create the bases is the m ost im p o rta n t goal when you w ant to build the philosophy o f science, which is not based on a scientism.
A nother, really very interesting criticism o f the scientism was carried out by Leszek K ołakow ski4. His criticism is an effect o f the widened concept o f positivism including in it, for instance, pragm atism and conventionalism . K ołakow ski thinks, that widely u n derstood positivism could be characterized by such fo u r principles:
1. T he principle o f phenom enalism states that there is no real difference between the essence and the phenom enon.
2. T he principle o f nom inalism forbides the supposition th at the know led-ge has, in real, eqivalents different from individual, concrete objects.
3. T he principle o f rejection o f cognitive value o f evaluation and stan- d arization.
4. The principle o f belief in a fu ndam ental unity o f knowledge. A ltough I do not w ant to repeat K ohikow ski's explanation o f these principles. 1 would like to point out th at such a philosophical conception leads to a special kind o f „ideology o f science” (ideology o f the scientism). This ideology builds m onum ents for science, puts it in the m ost im p o rtan t place, and accepts all four principles. T h e scientism rejects the problem s linked with the m ctaphisics and the theory o f cognition. It results from the first two principles. T he acceptance o f phenom enalism and the nom inalism elim inates trad itio n al, philosophical problem s. T he third principle throw s out ethics, aesthetics and religion. T hese disciplines and their problem s are n o t interesting for scientism 's confessors. In their field o f interest lies the science for which the m ost im p o rtan t p attern is physics, a scietific m ethod and its im provem ent. Because o! this, he is especialy interested in the m ethodology and the theory o f language. T he scientism builds only one m odel o f science. It does not perm it any alternative. A p art from th a t, scientism excludes m a n 's every day life from philosophy.
Scientism can also be characterized by five m y th s5. This characteristic is very useful and it show s som e im p o rtan t features o f scientism , which are im p o rtan t from the point of view o f tod ay culture an d civilization.
4 Compare: L. K o ł a k o w s k i , Filozofia pozytyw istyczn a , Warszawa 1966. p. 9 18. 5 Compare: M. I ł o w i e c k i . Rozum nie jedn o ma imię, „Odra" 1987, nr 2. p. 83-86.
1. T here is only one kind o f tru th fu l know ledge it is the know ledge recived by m ethods o f science. T he know ledge is w hat can be expressed m athem atically. It can also be form alized and it was m entioned by met- hodologicaly rigorous experience. It m eans, th a t science is the only source o f cognition.
2. T he only thing, which is w orth cognition and exam ination is w hat can be exam ined according to scientific fundations. Because o f this, m any phenom ena are out o f the do m ain o f scientific interests. Reality is „m echani-cal” an d „analitiechani-cal” an d it is possible to explain the reality by reduction.
3. T he knowledge, both in the sphere o f its delivery (teaching an d learning) and o btaining (researching and investigations) should be split into separate elem ents o r segm ents. T his is why the only way to im prove know ledge is specialization. Only the narro w the specialization can g u arantee th a t you „k n o w som ething” in y o u r field.
4. Only the experts have a qualification for u n d ertak in g decisions in the spheres o f econom ic, social and political life, because they know w hat is right and w hat is w rong o r w hat is good and w hat is bad.
It is very easy to see th a t the first tw o m yths arc very near to the four principles o f positivism . Besides, the three next say quite a lot ab o u t the ideological aspects o f scientism like a belief in scientific an d technological progress an d specialization which will lead us to the tru th and happiness. Is the program m e o f scientism satisfactory? It is h ard to answ er this question uncqivocally. It is certain, th at scientism forced on a narrow ly u n derstood practice and efficiency. F rom the philosophical p oint o f view it could be useful if we agree th at the notion „philosophy o f science” and m ethodology are synonym ous.
This solution is not satisfactory for me. I found som e allies in the field o f con tem p o rary philosophy o f science. Som e o f them have been already m entioned. Instead o f m aking friends am ong them an d developing their trad itio n , I tend to look for co m p an io n sh ip am o n g philo so p h ers w ho create con tem p o rary herm eneutics. T hey were and still are „d isap p in ted ” , but they notice som e o th er im p o rtan t features o f the d o d ay philosophy o f scicncc. F o r instance, W ilhelm D ilthey shook the belief in the unity o f the ways o f cognition in different sciences. T his belief was com m on to the positivism o f the nineteenth and tw enteenth centuries. H eidegger points out, th a t even in scientism rejecting m etaphisics it is possible to find sonic realy im portant m etaphisical assum ptions. T hose assu m p tio n are quite often unconcious. If you w ant to find a m etaphisical assum ption, you have to ask in a philosop-h i c a l im p o rtan t way. G a d am cr m entioned, tphilosop-h a t m odern science an d scicn- tism. narrow ed dow n and im poverished the old, ancient conception o f science. C o n tem p o rary herm eneutics does no t w ant to give this conception up.
In my opinion, the p resentation and the criticism o f scientism m entioned above enable m e to form ulate som e postulates o f the hum anistic philosophy o f science. T he hum anistę philosophy o f science does no deny th a t scientism and positivism have som e achivem ents. It does not w ant to tak e an interest in m ethodological o r logical problem s which are not. how ever, rejected or considered as nonsense. It takes a pluralistic stan d keeping tolerance for some o th ers view points and at the sam e time en d eavours to reach their basis. 1 try to present m ain postulates o f the hum anistic philosophy o f science in three points.
1. T he acceptance o f the fact o f eqality o f different epistem ological and ontological theories. A possibility o f building the hum anistic philosophy of science m eans, o f course, th at I have to choose one o f the philosophical o rien ta tio n and som e onthological an d epistem ological belives. T he chosen view is favored only because it is my own acknow ledgem ent. It leads to the rejection o f the belief that the principle o f phenom enalism an d nom inalism stan d in the science as absolute. H um anistic philosophy o f science does not reject them com pletely. It ju st points o u t th a t science can give som e examples of the oceuranee o f these principles and som e exam ples in which these principles d o not occure. H u m anistic philosophy o f science accepts a m ulti-plicity o f cognitive ways which can lead to scientific cognition.
2. T he acceptance o f the cognitive value o f evaluation. It accepts the im portance o f religion, m etaphisies, arts an d ethics, and connected with these problem s for science. It can be supposed that their rejection is artificial and it can lead to som e falsifications. Because o f that, hum anistic philosophy of science does not w ant to avoid any problem s, connected with the hum an being-in-w orld.
3. T he rejection o f the belief in „w o u n d erfu l” possibilities o f science, especialy narrow ed to the strict science. T he belief in „w o u n d erfu l” cognitive possibilities o f science c a n n o t be retained when we agree th a t absolute truth an d know ledge is im possible. T he know ledge, which is a m om ent between everything, w hat I gain d uring learning a n d w hat I lose d u rin g forgetting can never be any absolute value. It has the only sense as a knowledge-for-m yself. T he social value o f science c a n n o t also be treated absolutely because it has a historical sense only. F rom the point o f view o f the hum anistic philosophy o f science social values are relative in a historical and linguistic sense.
P ostulates which were presented above have tem p o rary ch a rac te r only, and I will certainly change them alo n g with fu rth e r delim ination o f the field of a proposed reflection. H ow ever I suppose, that the proposed direction of a philosophical reflection is very attractiv e because it w ants to say som ething ab o u t science, w ithout rejecting the tradicional, philosophical questions. One of these is the problem of o ntologisation an d deonto lo g isatio n o f cognition which is. in my opinion, the m ain epistem ological problem o f the philosophy
o f science. In my conception o f o n to lo g isatio n o f cognition I try to follow H eidegger6. H eideggerian onto lo g isatio n o f cognition is based on the fact, th a t being o f heideggerian D asein is alw ays being-in-a-w orld. It is peculiar to being Dasein th at il meets w hat there is. D asein can Be-in-w orld doing som ething, building som ething, living som ew here, being interested in som ething, having som ething to d o with som ething etc. In all those changing ways o f bc- ing-in-w orld D asein is anxious ab o u t som ething as much as it is. F o r I Icideggcr, Dasein has to be anxious, an d even w hen m an speaks, th a t he is joyful, his jo y is a dillerent kind o f anxiety. T he objectification o f the w orld, connected with the division o f he w ho ap p reh en d s from w hat is apprehended has no sense. A ccording to H eidegger, when wc say th at wc m eet in our cognition an object, it assum es o u r being-in-w orld full o f anexity a b o u t the object which wc apprehend.
The cognition c a n n o t be qualified as a sensual influence o f the w orld on a subject or as som ething which is possible th an k s to the com m on origin o f the w orld an d the subject. T he cognition is a way o f being concious: be-ing-in-w orld is being concious that it is. All the efforts to separate the being (and the theory o f cognition) from the w orld (ontology) leads to a disto rtio n . How does it happen that the world appears? It is because we alw ays arc in som e relation to it. „B eing” (everything w hat does exist) ap p ears as a tool i.e. som ething I am anxious ab o u t. F o r instance a typew riter is not a typew riter at ail b u t the typew riter th at I am som ehow anxious ab o u t, because 1 am typing a w ork entitled Humanistic philosophy o f science am! its main epistemological problem. The anxiety gets the tool from the hiding-place, it exposes the tool. W ithout the anxiety the world w ould not be exposed and Dasein w ould be absent.
This short exam ple show s how I w ant to build my new philosophy o f science. It is ju st an exam ple, but I suppose that it could help to find out where I sec the m ost im p o rtan t, from the epistem ological point o f view, problem o f co n tem p o rary theory o f cognition, included in the philosophy of science.
Department o f Philosophy Łódź University Poland
6 Compare: K. M i c h a l s k i , Heidegger i filozofia współczesna.Warszawa 1978, p. 53 -63; B. T U c h a ń s k a , Problem poznania jako pylonie ontologiczne. „Studia Filozoficzne'- 1985, nr 7, p. 29; M. H e i d e g g e r . Bycie i czas, translated by B. Baran. Kraków 1985. p. 109 122.
Bogusław Maryniak
H U M A N IS T Y C Z N A FILO ZO FIA N A U K I I JEJ G Ł Ó W N Y PROBLEM EPIST EM O LO G IC ZN Y
Prezentowany artykuł stanowi próbę własnego podejścia d o filozofii nauki. Autor występuje przeciwko tradycyjnemu, scjentyzującemu stanowisku w tej dyscyplinie filozoficznej, Negatywnym odniesieniem dla pracy są także nieortodoksyjne filozofie nauki, budow ane przez Kuhna. l eyerahenda i Am sterdam skiego oraz niektóre aspekty fenom enologii transcendentalnej Husserla. Pozytywnym źródłem prezentowanego artykułu jest współczesna hermeneutyka filozoficzna. A utor próbuje także przedstawić wstępne tezy własnej, t/w . humanistycznej filozofii nauki oraz prezentuje jej główny problem epistem ologiczny. związany / deontologizacją i ontologizacją poznania.
