The Subnational Dimension
of EU-China Relations
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The Subnational Dimension
of EU-China Relations
Editors:
Adriana Skorupska, Justyna Szczudlik
Authors:
Tomasz Kamiński, Adriana Skorupska, Justyna Szczudlik
Reviewer
Prof. Dominik Mierzejewski, University of Łódź Proof reading
Brien Barnett Technical editor Dorota Dołęgowska Cover design and maps
Studio27
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Chapter 1. Various Levels of EU-China Cooperation . . . 7
1.1. EU-China Relations . . . 7
1.1.1. Political and Economic Relations at the EU Level . . . 7
1.1.2. Relations at the Inter-state Level . . . 9
1.1.3. Social Relations . . . 11
1.2. EU-China Paradiplomacy—The Perspectives of Six EU Member States . . . 13
1.2.1. France . . . 16
1.2.2. Spain . . . 18
1.2.3. Germany . . . 20
1.2.4. Poland . . . 23
1.2.5. United Kingdom . . . 25
1.2.6. Italy . . . 28
1.3. EU-China Paradiplomacy—The Chinese Perspective . . . 30
1.3.1. European Regions on a Map of China . . . 30
1.3.2. Chinese Regional Policy and Paradiplomacy:
“Mountains are High, and the Emperor is Far Away” . . . 37
Chapter 2. Specialisation in EU-China Paradiplomacy—Case Studies . . . 41
2.1. Pays de la Loire . . . 41
2.2. Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes . . . 43
2.3. Castile and León . . . 44
2.4. Valencia . . . 46
2.5. Berlin . . . 48
2.6.
Brandenburg . . . 49
2.7. Dolnośląskie . . . 51
2.8. Łódzkie . . . 52
2.9. Liverpool. . . 54
2.10. Scotland . . . 56
2.11. Umbria . . . 58
INTRODUCTION
This report is the result of a three-year project conducted by the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Łódź and the Polish Institute of International Affairs and funded by the National Science Centre.1 The aim of the project was to understand the role of cooperation between European and Chinese regions in the politics of the European Union as regards China. The study involved the phenomenon of paradiplomacy, i.e., relations of international subnational entities whose goal is to achieve economic, cultural, and political benefits. It is assumed that the growing independence of local governments brings new challenges to the foreign policy of the state.2
The report presents the specificity of relations with China at the subnational level of the six largest EU countries in terms of population: Germany, France, Spain, Poland, Italy, and the UK. It also analyses selected case studies of European regions cooperating with Chinese partners. The text also includes references to relations between the European Union and China. The conclusions are based on the analysis of the selected countries and cannot always be generalised to the entire European Union.
The analysis was based on a review of the literature and information gathered during a survey of regions in five EU Member States (France, Spain, Germany, Poland, and Italy) and selected local government units in the UK.3 In total, the data from 75 regions in the five countries (91% of all the regions in these countries) and 12 surveys from the UK were collected. The survey was conducted in December 2016 and in the first half of 2017.4 The questionnaire of the survey was distributed in paper and electronic version to representatives of regional authorities (the units responsible for international cooperation). Some regions did not respond and for others, the data was supplemented with information from the websites of the analysed local government units. In Germany, the survey was completed by eight out of 16 Länder. Information on the others was obtained from another survey.5
The second part of the project included interviews with EU officials and representatives of the authorities of selected regions from the six countries surveyed. In the EU, interviews were conducted at the European Commission in the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO) and Energy (DG ENER); in the European External Action Service (EEAS), with the person responsible for EU-China relations; with diplomats from Member States (Polish MFA; Germany). In the regions, 11 interviews were conducted: three in Germany, two each in Spain, France, and Poland, and one each in Italy and the UK. In total, in 2017–2019, 16 interviews were conducted, of which 12 were in the form of semi-structured extensive individual interviews, one was informal and two were in the form of an e-mail (written replies).
An extensive analysis of the issues presented here will be included in a book published in 2020 by the University of Łódź Publishing House.
The authors
1 Projekt 2015/19/B/HS5/02534 “Rola regionów w polityce Unii Europejskiej wobec Chin,” financed by the
National Science Centre.
2 A. Kuznetsov, Theory and Practice of Paradiplomacy, New York: Routledge, 2015.
3 The study covered administrative units at the regional level (most often classified by Eurostat as NUTS 2) that
carry out paradiplomacy activities. In Poland, these are voivodeships, in Italy and France, regions, in Spain, autonomous communities, in Germany, Länder, that is, federal states. In the United Kingdom, which has a specific administrative division based largely on small counties, the questionnaires were sent to the governments of the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, as well as to major cities and metropolitan unions (agglomerations).
4 The survey from Île-de-France was the only one received in 2018.
5 In Germany, data obtained from the survey were verified and supplemented with information from the work
of A. Goette, Gao Qinlan, Deutsch-Chinesische Kommunalbeziehungen, Bonn: Servicestelle Kommunen in der Einen
CHAPTER 1. VARIOUS LEVELS OF EU-CHINA COOPERATION
1.1. EU-China Relations
Relations between the EU and China occur at three levels—EU, national, and subnational (regions and cities)—which influence each other. For these reasons, the analysis of the regional level should be preceded by a review of relations at higher levels.
1.1.1. Political and Economic Relations at the EU Level
The first contacts between the European Communities and China can be traced back to the 1970s (the first visit of the European Commissioner to Beijing took place in 1975, and in 1978 the first agreement was signed); however, bilateral relations gained significance only two decades later when China’s international position grew and the process of European integration was extended.6 The crucial moment was China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, which intensified the development of economic contacts. Trade turnover increased fivefold in subsequent years and China became the EU’s second most important trading partner after the U.S. At the same time, the problem was the large trade deficit on the EU side, which in 2005–2008 amounted to 50% of the mutual exchange (Fig. 1).
Figure 1. EU-China Trade, 2002–2018 (EUR billion)
Source: authors’ compilation based on Eurostat data.
Along with the increase in trade, mutual investments also increased (in 2017, €180 billion, of which only less than €60 billion comprised Chinese investments in the EU7). In the Union,
6 T. Kamiński, Sypiając ze smokiem. Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Chin, Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Łodzkiego, 2015, https://wydawnictwo.uni.lodz.pl.
7 China—Trade—European Commission, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
unequal. The EU accuses China of not fully implementing its obligations under WTO membership, in particular, discriminating against European enterprises by hindering their access to the Chinese market, for example, through high-entry thresholds, non-tariff barriers, the obligation to establish a joint venture with a Chinese partner or forced technology transfer, resulting in inadequate protection of intellectual property rights. The Chinese government also interferes in the economy by subsidising domestic companies. As a result, they gain a stronger position in the markets (local and international), which means an imbalance in competition, e.g., against EU investors.
The Chinese authorities’ control over domestic enterprises (including private firms that must cooperate with the authorities) makes it possible to use them as tools in foreign policy, a factor perceived in the EU as a security threat. It is concerned about the takeover by Chinese investors of European technology solutions and access to critical infrastructure. Examples of these types of risky Chinese investments have appeared in the EU since 2016 when a Chinese company took over German company Kuka, an industrial robot manufacturer. These activities were part of the “Made in China 2025” programme announced by Chinese authorities to achieve leadership status in high-tech. Since then, the EU began to modify its approach to China by introducing the first safeguards in 2018, such as a “screening” mechanism to help identify and possibly block Chinese investments considered security threats in Europe.8
China’s assertiveness and the accompanying security fears have meant a change in the EU’s approach to reciprocity in relations, mainly economic, with China. The term “reciprocity” is being
consistently used by the EU to push China to follow the same rules as those that apply to Chinese entrepreneurs operating in the Union—ensuring an open market, the equal treatment of investors, equal opportunities, and free competition. With the slow pace and limited liberalisation of the Chinese economy and the growing concerns related to 5G infrastructure, offered mainly by the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei (which also is probably subsidised by the state), the EU is redefining its perception of China, including the principle of reciprocity, perceiving the country not only as a partner but also as a competitor. This transition from the EU’s policy of engagement to an approach that focuses on protective measures and a readiness to compete with China is also a reaction to human-rights violations in China. Economic rights (so-called second-generation rights) are only part of the issue, with violations of so-called “first-second-generation rights” (personal rights) evidenced by the repression of Uyghurs or the use of new technologies for public control (e.g., face recognition or creating a “social credit system”).
Another manifestation of tightening EU policy is the document “EU-China: A Strategic Outlook,”9 published by the European Commission in March 2019 in which China was called “a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance” and “an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership.” The EU signals that under its reciprocity principle, it will no longer only issue rebukes but may introduce similar rules to those that China applies to EU entities, for example, fully implement the screening mechanism or restrict the access of Chinese companies to tenders in the EU. In addition, the Union demands that negotiations of investment agreements or geographical indications, which have lasted for years, should be concluded within a specified period. As a result of China’s growing dispute with the U.S., it is willing to make concessions to the EU, as evidenced by the results of the last EU-China summit in April 2019. The joint declaration set deadlines for completing the current negotiations, acknowledged that there
8 J. Szczudlik, D. Wnukowski, “Investment Screening Reforms in the U.S. and EU: A Response to Chinese
Activity,” PISM Bulletin, no. 1 (1247), 2 January 2019.
9 EU-China–A strategic outlook, 19 March 2019 and in a previous document, Elements for a new EU strategy on
resolved at the WTO.10
Despite its critical approach to China, the EU seeks cooperation with the Chinese. The new EC document underlines the similar positions of both parties on climate issues and on agreements involving Iran or North Korea. The EU strives to involve China in solving global problems through institutionalised multilateral cooperation, an example of which is the EU-China working group on WTO reform set up in 2018.
It is worth noting that EU-Chinese relations are characterised by a high level of institutionalisation, compared only with transatlantic relations. Apart from the annual summits of the president of the European Council, chairman of the European Commission, and the prime minister of China, there are many meetings in various formats and at various levels. They are arranged in three pillars corresponding to the dimension of bilateral relations: political, economic, or social (Table 1).
Table 1. The Institutional Framework of EU-China Relations
Political pillar Economic pillar Social pillar
Strategic dialogue
(High Representative for EU Foreign and Security Policy and China’s State Councillor for Foreign Affairs, meets annually)
High-level dialogue on economy and trade (EC Vice-President and China’s Deputy PM, annually)
High-level dialogue on people-to-people contacts
(Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth, China’s Deputy PM, every two years) Political dialogues
(regular contacts between the High Representative and the Chinese Foreign Minister, meetings of high-level officials)
Joint Committee operating under the 1985 TCA agreement (at the ministerial level, meets annually)
Political dialogues
(on Youth, culture, and higher education and vocational education) Regional and thematic dialogues
(10 formats, including ones on human rights, Africa)
Sectoral dialogues (48 formats, including one on urbanisation)
Economic and financial dialogue between representatives of the EC, and ECB, and the Chinese Ministry of Finance and the central bank
A roundtable between the European Economic and Social Committee and the Chinese Economic and Social Council
Inter-parliamentary dialogue Source: authors’ compilation.
1.1.2. Relations at the Inter-state Level
Bilateral relations between Member States and China constitute the second level of EU-China contacts. They are developed, to some extent, regardless of European policy, which raises difficulties in maintaining EU unity in its approach to China. For these reasons, it is not clear whether the new stricter policy towards China will be fully pursued. This despite the fact that in
trade policy.
The Member States have different perceptions about the benefits and risks of cooperation with China. Some countries in the EU are more open to it (e.g., Greece, Hungary, the UK, and Portugal, and recently, Italy), counting on economic benefits or, by playing the China card, can negotiate with the Commission on solutions more beneficial to them. They also use this tack to distance themselves from meeting EU requirements regarding reforms and standards (e.g., on rule of law, budgetary discipline, or access to EU funds). In recent years, this has been the case, for example, with Greece and Hungary. There are also countries that approach relations with China with increasing caution (e.g., Germany, France, Poland), which besides the economic benefits also see a security risk.
For all six of the countries discussed in this report, their relations with China are primarily economic. Trade turnover between them and China is growing, although in most cases, the trade deficit on the Europeans’ side is also growing (Fig. 2). All except for Germany (which has an 11% surplus) have a negative trade balance with China. The largest deficits in 2018 were with Poland, at 86%, and Spain, at 59%.
Figure 2. Trade Turnover between Selected EU Countries and China, 2014–2018 (EUR billion)
Source: authors’ compilation based on Eurostat data.
Also, the government in Beijing simultaneously maintains relations with the Union and with individual Member States. It can be assumed that for China the most important of these relations are those with which it has a “strategic partnership,” “comprehensive strategic partnership,” or other similarly named partnerships (“mature,” “stable,” etc.). As a German diplomat points out, these terms are particularly important to the Chinese: “they attach great importance to the wording of these terms. For them, there is a difference between a ‘strategic partnership’, ‘comprehensive strategic’ or ‘deep’. In turn, on our side, often these nuances are not comprehensible.”11 Strategic partnerships with European states began to be signed after 2003 when China defined the EU the same way (Table 2).
State Year Partnership type
France
2004 Strategic partnership
2010 Comprehensive strategic partnership
2014 Close and permanent comprehensive strategic partnership for a new era Germany 2004 Partnership in global responsibility as part of the China-EU strategic partnership
2014 Comprehensive strategic partnership
Italy 2004 Stable, friendly, long-term and sustainable strategic partnership United Kingdom 2004 Comprehensive strategic partnership
2015 Global, integrated strategic partnership for the 21st century Spain 2005 Comprehensive strategic partnership
2018 Comprehensive strategic partnership for a new era Poland 2011 Strategic partnership
2016 Comprehensive strategic partnership Portugal 2005 Comprehensive strategic partnership Greece 2006 Comprehensive strategic partnership Denmark 2008 Comprehensive strategic partnership Ireland 2012 Strategic partnership of mutual benefits Hungary 2017 Comprehensive strategic partnership Czech Republic 2016 Strategic partnership
Source: authors’ compilation based on information at the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, www.fmprc.gov.cn.
China is trying to focus on bilateral relations with the EU states with the aim of encouraging a favourable stance towards Chinese matters and to weaken the EU’s common critical position. To this end, the Chinese have used, for example, the “16+1” (“17+1”) format12 (China and 16, now 17 Central European countries) and high-level visits by Chinese leaders in individual EU countries. During the visits, they offer investments (usually as part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, BRI) as a form of assistance to countries with economic problems (e.g., Portugal, Italy, the countries of Central Europe).
1.1.3. Social Relations
The importance of the social aspect of EU-Chinese relations has grown. In 2016, over 10% of the foreign students studying in the EU came from China.13 In 2008, fewer than 40,000 Chinese lived in the EU as permanent residents. According to Eurostat data, by the end of 2017, this number had increased to more than 500,000, the vast majority having settled in Italy, Spain, the UK, Germany, and France (Fig. 3). It is difficult to state clearly whether the growing numbers of students and permanent Chinese residents in EU states are affecting the adoption of initiatives with Chinese partners at the local level or the inflow of Chinese is the result. The activation of these communities can foster new relationships and intensify existing partnerships.
12 In April 2019, after adding Greece to the group, its name was changed to “17+1.” 13 “Learning Mobility Explained,” Eurostat, September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu.
Source: authors’ compilation based on Eurostat data.
Figure 4. Positive Perception of China in Selected EU States, 2016–2018 (%)
among the Member States). Although public opinion differs significantly by country, in none of the analysed Member States does a positive assessment prevail. In the UK, France, and Germany, the percentage of people declaring a positive perception of China has decreased in the last three years. In 2018, the highest level of positive perception was in Poland, followed by Spain and Italy, respectively 42%, 38%, and 37%, compared with the EU average of 36% (Fig. 4). In the case of Poland, the percentages of those who either perceived China positively or negatively was evenly split, at 42% each. In Spain, there was more negative sentiment than positive (50% to 38%, respectively) and also in Italy (53% to 37%).14
1.2. EU-China Paradiplomacy—The Perspectives of Six EU Member States
By means of surveys, information about cooperation with China in 67 regions of five EU states was collected. Data on an additional 10 regions were supplemented from other sources. In total, information was collected from 77 regions in France, Spain, Germany, Poland, and Italy, which is 94% of all local governments at the regional level (Table 3).
Table 3. Regions in France, Spain, Germany, Poland, and Italy Included in the Survey15
Regions studied as
part of the project Information from other sources Regions with information on partnerships Total number of regions in the country
France 11 1 12 13 Spain 16 1 17 17 Germany 8 8 16 16 Poland 16 0 16 16 Italy 16 0 16 20 Total 67 10 77 82
Source: authors’ compilation.
Based on data obtained in 2017, nearly 80% of the regions in France, Spain, Germany, Poland, and Italy cooperate with partners from China. In addition, information was also obtained on 12 local government units from the UK (two regions and 10 cities), all of which declared having partners in China. Of the regions that currently have no partnerships with China, five had them in the past (out of the 16 reporting no current cooperation, hereinafter “non-cooperating”) and 11 never did. Of the non-cooperating regions, 10 declared the will to establish contacts with Chinese partners, and some of them in the survey period (2017) were in consultations (Map 1).
In total, 146 partnerships with China were identified among all of the analysed local government units of the six largest EU states. Of the local governments, representatives of 77% declared these partnerships were active at the time, 15% not active, and in the remaining cases there is no information (Fig. 5). Notably, there are several cases in Spain with no active relations, specifically two regions: Valencia16 and La Rioja. The term “active relationship” is defined as cooperation in which any joint activity has been undertaken in the last two years. However, the term “not active” refers to a relationship in which there has been no activity in the last two years but it is possible that the cooperation will be resumed in the near future.
14 “Special Eurobarometer 479, Future of Europe,” October-November 2018. 15 Without the UK.
Source: authors’ compilation.
When describing the dynamics of the contact, both the situation in each individual European state and its policy towards China should be considered. The contacts at the regional level began to be made in the 1980s, particularly with German Länder, French regions, and British local governments. Another period of increased cooperation activity occurred at the beginning of the 21st century when new relations were established with the Spanish, Polish, and Italian regions. A period of less activity was 2007–2009, which could have been related to the economic crisis in Europe. Another revival of contacts took place after 2014, probably in connection with both the BRI as well as changes in the foreign and domestic policies of individual states, such as Italy. More than half of the newly established relationships came within the years 2014–2016 (Fig. 6).
Figure 6. Partnerships with China in 1982–2018 by Six Member States
is presented below, and in the next chapter, the relations with specific European regions will be analysed from the Chinese perspective. For each of the six Member States, brief information is presented on their relationship with China at the government level, followed by an itemised list of characteristics of the cooperation at the regional level.
1.2.1. France
France was the first Western European country to sign a comprehensive partnership agreement with China (1997). The partnership was renewed in subsequent years, giving it a higher status. Relations have been dominated for years by economic exchange, and since 2013, a French-Chinese high-level dialogue on economic matters and trade has been taking place every year. China remains France’s sixth-largest trading partner, with the latter recording a deficit of about €30 billion in 2017.
Under the presidency of François Hollande (2012–2017), more attention was paid to decentralised cooperation. China, too, would like to maintain relations with France not only with the central authorities but also at a lower level, including with provinces from China’s western and central parts.17 In addition, as a result of the territorial reform of 2016, the French provinces gained more opportunities for economic cooperation. New this year is the National Commission for Decentralised Cooperation in the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. The commission perceives paradiplomacy as a tool to strengthen France’s position in the world. In the case of French-Chinese relations, regional contact, especially in the economic dimension, is meant to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership.18
Map 2. Cooperation of French Regions with Chinese Provinces and Cities
17 A. Ekman, J. Seaman, “France and China: A not so ‘special’ relationship,” in: M. Huotari, M. Otero-Iglesias,
J. Seaman, A. Ekman (eds.), Mapping Europe-China Relations. A Bottom-Up Approach, ETNC Report, October 2015.
survey (no response from Normandy or Corsica) and 10 have active cooperation with China. Only the region Hauts-de-France, which had previously worked with the city of Tianjin, has ended it for now. The region declares it is interested in cooperation and looked for a partner in 2017. From other sources, it is known that a 12th region—Normandy—has one partner from China. In total, 13 partnerships were identified among the surveyed regions, four of which were established in the 1980s. Some of them were renewed (for example, Occitania signed another agreement with the province of Sichuan in 2014). Three more partnerships were established in the 1990s, others after 2005. Only two relations were assessed as not active (Maps 2 and 3).
Characteristics −
− The economic sector dominates the contact. All the regions surveyed recognise the benefits of cooperation in the economic sphere and they point to business entities as local partners in contact with China, with economic missions as one of the most frequently indicated forms of activity. The activities undertaken are primarily to support French enterprises.
−
− Most regions also point to academic cooperation. All surveyed units indicated universities as a local partner. The contact concerns both the cooperation of scientists and student exchanges.
Map 3. Cooperation of French Regions with Chinese Provinces and Cities on a Map of China
19 There are also overseas departments and territories and overseas territorial communities, but they were not
there are instances of a changing formula in their cooperation in the Chinese regions. They have closed offices and instead cooperate with French entities that have delegated bodies in China, e.g., Business France (BF), a national agency for the promotion of exports and investments. The first region to sign an agreement with BF was Pays de la Loire.
−
− The international activity of local governments is supported by central authorities. Every two or three months there are meetings of regions and cities in Paris with a representative of, among others, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Projects, regional cooperation strategies and current events are discussed. For example, BF offers the regions its exhibiting pavilions at trade fairs.20
−
− The French regions also participate in projects that are part of the Chinese BRI. In April 2016, the first train from the Chinese city of Wuhan (Hubei province) reached Lyon, inaugurating a freight railway connection between the metropolises (11,300 km in 16 days). In tandem with the BRI, Normandy included its ports, including the largest French port of Le Havre. Local governments look for ways to attract Chinese investments to the French regions and build links with the Chinese market.21 The French government, like most Western European countries has not signed the BRI-related Memorandum of Understanding (“BRI MoU”).22
−
− French regions and cities have their own cooperation platforms for units engaged in foreign contact. An example is Cités Unies France, a federation of cities and regions involved in international cooperation. It is responsible, among others, for organising meetings with countries where the French regions have contacts. This kind of cooperation platform is also organised for local governments cooperating with China. In November 2018, in Toulouse, the capital of Occitania, six French-Chinese meetings concerning decentralised cooperation were held. The contact with Chinese provinces and cities is also supported by the Association of French Regions.
1.2.2. Spain
There is a political consensus in Spain regarding policy towards China. The government avoids raising difficult topics related to human rights, fearing that it may negatively affect economic relations, which remain a constant priority for the central government. In November 1990, during the period of isolation of China by European states, the Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez was the first representative of a West European state to visit Beijing. In the government’s first action plan for the Asia-Pacific region, published in 2000, China was indicated as the “most suitable country” for Spanish cooperation in Asia. In 2005, Spanish-Chinese relations were raised to the level of a strategic partnership. At the same time, China is the second-largest foreign holder of Spanish government bonds, and the level of bilateral foreign direct investment has been increasing significantly since 2010.23 Their good relations was confirmed during a visit by Chinese leader Xi Jinping to Madrid in November 2018 to mark the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. The meeting focused on cooperation within the framework
20 Interview with a representative of the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes region.
21 J. Seaman, A. Ekman, “France: On the Periphery of China’s New Silk Roads,” in: F.-P. van der Putten, M. Huotari,
J. Seaman, A. Ekman and M. Otero-Iglesias (eds.), Europe and China’s New Silk Roads, ETNC Report, December 2016.
22 China wants to sign a kind of declaration of willingness with states, a so-called “BRI MoU,” to cooperate within
this initiative. The documents are of a general nature (although not all are publicly available, which raises doubts about their actual content) and China treats them in a prestigious manner as an expression of support for BRI. The MoUs also serve as a key statistic for China because they view signing an MoU as automatically including a given country in the BRI. In the last 2–3 years, due to increasing criticism of projects implemented under BRI, many countries in Western Europe have been reluctant to sign such MoUs as long as they are recognised as an expression of political support for China and its opaque initiative.
23 M. Esteban, “Spain-China relations: friends but not partners,” in: M. Huotari, M. Otero-Iglesias, J. Seaman,
to an comprehensive strategic partnership for a new era, a new kind of strategic partnership characteristic of Xi’s second term of office.
Map 4. Cooperation of Spanish Regions with Chinese Provinces and Cities
China of 28.3% in 2017, trade cooperation is quite low compared to other European countries.24 Only 2.7% of Spanish exports goes to China and in 2017, the trade deficit amounted to €19.4 billion. Spain is seventh in the EU in terms of Chinese direct investment.
Most of Spain’s 17 regions took part in the survey in 2017; 14 autonomous communities sent completed questionnaires and for two others, information about the region was received by e-mail, while one region—Madrid—did not respond to the questionnaire and the partnership information was supplemented with data from websites. Of the 17, 11 declare active cooperation with Chinese partners and three (Aragonia, Cantabria, and Navarra) had contact in the past but their partnerships are currently not active. Among the three, Cantabria and Navarra indicate a willingness to enter into a new partnership. By contrast, the regions Balearic Islands, Castilla-La Mancha, and the Canary Islands did not have or do not have any current partnerships with the Chinese regions. However, Castilla-La Mancha declare its intention to seek cooperation in the future (Maps 4 and 5).
Characteristics −
− In comparison with the other surveyed Western European countries, the Spanish autonomous communities are characterised by young partnerships with China. In addition to the first partnership established with Valencia in 1994, the remaining partnerships were established at the beginning of the 21st century, with the greatest activity after 2010. This timing is connected, among other things, with greater interest in cooperation with China but also the intensification of Spanish-Chinese relations at the central level, including Chinese investment that supported Spain during the financial crisis.
−
− The economic and academic dimensions dominate the spheres of cooperation. Economic entities and scientific units are the most frequently indicated local cooperation partners with China.
−
− The contact at the level of regional authorities is also used to develop tourism and promote Spanish language and culture. Culture, tourism, support for entrepreneurs, and the development of trade are also the most frequently indicated benefits of the partnerships with China. The Spanish regions try to use the Chinese interest in Spain’s culture and language to promote less popular regions and cities to tourists from China.
−
− Cities and regions show an interest in involvement in BRI. Madrid was the second city to host a Silk Road Forum (the first was Istanbul), in 2015. The main BRI project in Spain is the freight rail connection between Madrid and Yiwu, the longest of its kind in the world and inaugurated in December 2014. The connection gives an opportunity to increase, especially, food exports to China.25 The Spanish government, like most Western European countries, has not signed a BRI MoU.
1.2.3. Germany
China is Germany’s largest trading partner, larger than the U.S. and France. It is one of the few countries in the world that maintains a positive trade balance with China, and the Chinese market is important for key sectors of the German economy (e.g., the car industry). The importance of economic relations largely determines the shape of their political relations. There are more than 80 different forums for bilateral dialogue covering a wide range of topics. Germany, in its policy
24 M. Esteban (ed.), Relaciones España-China, Real Institute Elcano, November 2018.
25 M. Esteban, M. Otero-Iglesias, “Spain: Looking for Opportunities in OBOR,” in: F.-P. van der Putten, M. Huotari,
demanding easier access to the Chinese market), and on the other hand, to defend itself against threats related to China’s expansive policy (e.g., taking over German companies of strategic importance).
Map 6. Cooperation of German Regions with Chinese Provinces and Cities
China also is important at the subnational level. Germany’s constitution leaves the Länder great freedom in shaping contacts with foreign partners. In contrast to China, Germany does not treat paradiplomacy as an instrument of its foreign policy but still attaches great importance to it. Foreign relations with Länder help achieve the objectives of federal policy towards China, such as, for example, the development of social and academic contacts, promotion of exports, cooperation against the effects of climate change. A German diplomat put it this way:
“The political relations between Germany and China are close. The economic relations—even closer. In comparison, social, academic, or cultural relations are clearly less developed.”26
Länder Partnerships are also an independent channel of relations with China that can maintain continuity of relations even in the event of a possible conflict or deterioration of relations at the federal level.
All Länder except Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania cooperate with Chinese provinces. Relations with partners from China are also developed over 130 cities and municipalities.27 The German Länder were among the first regions in Europe to benefit from the opening of China to the world thanks to the reforms of Deng Xiaoping. Out of 23 partnerships identified, more than half date back to the 1980s. Two subsequent partnerships were established in the 1990s and the remainder in the 21st century. Only two partnerships were initiated after 2013, which means that in Germany’s case, BRI has had little influence on establishing new regional partnerships. Out of the 23 declared partnerships, five were assessed as not active in 2018 (Maps 6 and 7).
26 Interview with a German diplomat, Berlin.
27 A. Goette, Gao Qinlan, Deutsch-Chinesische Kommunalbeziehungen, Bonn: Servicestelle Kommunen in der
−
− Economic issues dominate the contact at the regional level are largely focused on supporting German companies and attracting Chinese investments.
−
− The densest network of relations have the regions that export most to China, that is, North Rhine-Westphalia (three active partnerships), Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg (two each). There are also differences between the former East (GDR) and West (FRG) Germany. Länder in the former GDR established their first contact only after unification and have, at most, one active partnership.
−
− Other important subjects of cooperation are environmental protection and combating climate change.28 The Länder and German cities thus support the implementation of political priorities defined at the federal level.
−
− Relations with provinces stimulate the development of contact with universities. Germany’s university portal listed about 1,200 various bilateral agreements between German and Chinese universities in 2017, in student exchanges or research projects. At that time, around 8,000 students from Germany studied in China and more than 37,000 Chinese students in Germany.29
Map 7. Cooperation of German Regions with Chinese Provinces and Cities on a Map of China
28 Ibidem, p. 75.
With Poland’s accession to the EU, Polish regions became more attractive to geographically distant countries, including China. The intensification of bilateral relations at the central level was also important. In the declaration signed in 2011 on the Polish-Chinese strategic partnership, contacts between regions and provinces are indicated as one of the areas of cooperation. As a result, in 2013, the Regional Forum Poland-China, was established as a platform for contacts between entities from regions, cities, and provinces. Poland also responded positively to the Chinese BRI, announced in 2013, and during the visit by PRC’s Chairman to Poland in 2016, the level of relations was raised to comprehensive strategic partnership.
Map 8. Cooperation of Polish Regions with Chinese Provinces and Cities
The Poland’s main goal in relations with China is economic cooperation, including, above all, increasing Polish exports to China. The high trade deficit on the Polish side remains the biggest problem. In 2011, it amounted to almost €12 billion and the proportion in trade was 10:1, meaning Poland imported 10 times more goods from China than it exported. In 2015, this proportion increased to 11: 1 (on a deficit of €18.6 billion), and in 2016 to 12:1. In the following year, the deficit reached €22 billion, and in 2018, €24 billion.30 It should be noted that a significant portion of Polish goods and semi-finished products go to China indirectly, mainly by way of an EU partners. Political relations between Poland and China, however, have weakened since mid-2017. The Polish authorities negatively assess China’s implementation of the strategic partnership. This is evidenced by the unsatisfactory trade statistics, primarily the still-growing deficit on the Polish side. Other reasons include concerns about Chinese investments in Europe, negative evaluations of the economic and political results of the “16/17+1” format and the BRI, and increasing difficulties in maintaining the dynamics of the bilateral high-level political dialogue.
Polish local and regional authorities have tried to use the intensification of relations at the government level and China’s greater interest in Poland and Central Europe. The number
30 Synthetic information on Poland’s exports and imports, January–December 2018 in million euros, Ministry of
has become the most popular non-European cooperation entity of the Polish provinces. The Chinese provinces were third (after Ukraine and Germany) among the declared foreign partners of Polish regions in 2016. At the beginning of 2017, cooperation with Chinese provinces was declared by 13 voivodeships, of which only two—Zachodniopomorskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie—described this contact as not active. Three Polish regions—Świętokrzyskie, Podlaskie and Wielkopolskie—did not have partners in China, but the latter two planned to establish such a partnership in the future (Maps 8 and 9).
Map 9. Cooperation of Polish Regions with Chinese Provinces and Cities on a Map of China
Characteristics −
− The degree of activity involving the Polish regional authorities is based on relations at the central level. The intensification of Polish-Chinese relations at the government and presidential levels in 2011–2017 has translated into an increase in interregional activity. Since the establishment of the Polish-Chinese strategic partnership (2011), nine new partnerships with Chinese provinces have appeared. On the other hand, the weakening of international relations in 2017 resulted in less active contact between the regions.
−
− The initiative to establish or intensify cooperation lies more often with Chinese partners. The Polish local governments also have the opportunity to participate in Chinese initiatives promoted in Europe, such as in the “16/17+1” and BRI. The most famous example of this activity that the Polish part of the “Silk Road Railway,” the Łódź-Chengdu connection. However,
many undertakings—investments or projects—to prove the success of this initiative. As part of the “16/17+1” initiative, there is a forum for local governments in which Polish representatives of cities and regions participate.
−
− Relations place great emphasis on supporting economic and academic contacts. Cooperation in the cultural dimension is treated as an element accompanying meetings, fairs, and conferences. −
− The economic dimension of cooperation is primarily supported by the Polish regional authorities. The prerogatives of voivodeships’ self-government include the promotion and support of local business entities. An important partner for offices are regional development agencies, which in many voivodeships are companies appointed by their leaders (marshals). Among the tasks of the agency is to support the development of entrepreneurship, innovation, and competitiveness of regional companies. The agencies most often are the organisers or co-organisers of business missions and forums in China.
−
− Among the main barriers to cooperation, local governments indicate the geographical distance and related costs of undertaking joint actions. Another constraint is the different scope of competence of territorial administration in China and Poland, which may lead to differences in the expectations of partners from both countries. The tasks of the Polish territorial administration are primarily to support domestic entrepreneurs on foreign markets while the Chinese regions should first of all implement the foreign central government’s policy objectives.
−
− Polish-China Regional Forums were an effective and well-regarded initiative by Polish local governments. The annual event, taking place in 2013–2016, provided an opportunity for contact between interested entities from regions, provinces, and cities. Since 2016, subsequent forums have failed to be organised, partly due to difficulties in reaching agreement with the central authorities of both countries regarding the programme and participants (mainly at the higher level) of the forum. The next forum should take place in China.
1.2.5. United Kingdom
bilateral relations were raised to an comprehensive strategic partnership. In 2009, when the government was taken over by Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the UK published its first policy strategy towards China. The emphasis was put on engaging China in economic, scientific, and cultural fields. The British government also paid attention to sensitive issues, such as the rule of law or human rights. The conservative-liberal coalition under the leadership of Prime Minister David Cameron took over in 2010 and the UK, after an initial deterioration of relations with China after the Dalai Lama’s visit to London, from 2013 began to conduct a policy more favourable towards China, focused on the economy. After the formation of the independent Tory government in May 2015, the first state visit of the PRC’s Chairman to the UK came in October 2015. With full protocol and intense economic talks, bilateral relations were deemed to have entered a “golden age.” The British side did not raise sensitive issues in relations. After the change of the head of government in July 2016, Prime Minister Theresa May maintained the policy of engagement, although she presented greater caution towards China, as exemplified by the lack of official support for BRI (the BRI MoU was not signed), which China had counted on.31
Map 11. Cooperation of Selected Cities and Regions of the UK with Chinese Provinces and Cities on a Map of China
China is one of the UK’s largest trading partners but the latter records a trade deficit (about €4 billion in 2018). Until 2016, the UK was the largest recipient (now second after Germany) of Chinese investment in the EU. Britain is also an important partner for China in financial cooperation,
31 S.A.W. Brown, “Free Trade, Yes; Ideology, Not So Much: The UK’s Shifting China Policy 2010–2016,” Journal
bilateral relations at the local level is the growing number of Chinese tourists (391,000 in 2018) and students in the United Kingdom (about 100,000).
Due to the specificity of the local government system in the UK, it is not possible to speak strictly about relations at the regional level. Local relations include the cooperation of
British cities, metropolitan units, and component countries (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) with Chinese partners. Surveys were sent to about 40 local government units. Only 12 of them responded. In all cases of returned surveys, British entities cooperate with China and these partnerships are active (Maps 10 and 11).
Characteristics −
− The Chinese cities actively cooperate with groups of cities from England participating in the framework projects of public-private partnerships: Northern Powerhouse and Midlands Engine. The Northern Powerhouse project, initiated in 2014 by the Cameron government, brings together cities from the north of England (Liverpool, Sheffield, Manchester, Leeds). Whereas, the Midlands Engine project, which brings together northeastern cities (Birmingham, Nottingham, Leicester, Stoke on Trent), was initiated in 2017 by local authorities and local businesses. Both projects include municipal and regional authorities, universities and enterprises and their federations. The goal is to give development impulses to post-industrial areas. Most of the cities covered by both projects have partners from China.
−
− Half of the 12 examined cases of local cooperation were established in the 1980s, that is, when the period of so-called reform and opening began. Most of these partnerships covered cooperation with Chinese eastern and coastal provinces where the first special economic zones were created or with cities from these regions.
−
− The cooperation is dominated by economic issues: increased exports and investments in China and attracting Chinese investments to the UK.
−
− Also important is educational cooperation (recruiting students to British universities) and scientific partnerships (technological cooperation, environmental protection). The importance of educational issues is demonstrated by the campuses of British universities in China, created in cooperation with local authorities: e.g., in Ningbo (University of Nottingham) or in Suzhou (Xi’an Jiaotong University and the University of Liverpool).
−
− There is great freedom of action for British cities and regions to establish cooperation with Chinese partners. The model of British paradiplomacy towards China can be called complementary and discretionary, which means that the government encourages local authorities to cooperate while leaving them with a great deal of freedom.
−
− In the UK’s local relations with China, engagement and synergy with government policy are apparent. An example is the Northern Powerhouse, promoted by the British government as a cooperation partner with China during Xi Jinping’s visit to the UK in 2015. This was because of the personal involvement of the then Chancellor of the Treasury (and Minister of Finance and Economy) George Osborne, who was also the architect of the Northern Powerhouse. Another example is the organisation of the International Business Festival in Liverpool, which is a governmental event but promoted by municipal authorities. In the cities, projects are being implemented as a result of the cooperation between the authorities of the UK and China, such as the construction of business centres at airports (airport cities) in Manchester and Birmingham
with the participation of a Chinese investor. −
− The use of cooperation with China, especially by the constituent parts of the UK, is a way of increasing international visibility and extending political autonomy towards the central authorities in London. This is due to the fact that regional autonomy in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland serves the implementation of national aspirations in these parts of the UK.
authorities of Scotland and their relations with Chinese provinces and cities. −
− British cities or regions are trying to create their own brands or flagship initiatives in relations with China. Examples include Liverpool’s International Business Festival, the SENSOR city project (a joint venture of Liverpool universities engaged in high-tech research), and Scotland, as the flagship exporter of whiskey and salmon, as well as a leader in environmental protection. 1.2.6. Italy
In the first decade of the 21st century, Italy-China relations were not intense. In 2001–2011, there were only three visits of Italian prime ministers to Beijing. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, during his eight-year rule, only once visited China, during the Italian EU presidency in 2003. The low intensity of political relations was associated with the growing role of economic relations and fears related to Chinese competition. The liberalisation of trade with China was widely recognised as a threat to Italian companies. Italy was among the countries that demanded increased protection of the EU market in trade with China. It was only after Berlusconi left office in 2011 that Italy’s policy towards China began to change. This coincided with Xi Jinping’s assumption of leadership in China (2012/2013) and increase in the international activity of Chinese provinces under the BRI. Italy—one of the few Western European countries and the first of the G7 countries—signed a BRI MoU in March 2019.
Map 12. Cooperation of Italian Regions with Chinese Provinces and Cities
The intensity of political contact was accompanied by an increase in trade. However, despite growing exports to China (€13 billion in 2018, which was growth of almost 20% compared to 2016), Italy still has a large trade deficit, which in 2018 amounted to €17 billion, equivalent to 42% of its total trade. The growing number of Chinese living in Italy has had an impact on economic contact. According to Eurostat data from 2017, their number exceeded 170,000, which is almost a threefold increase compared to 2010. Of all Chinese living permanently in the
on the number of Chinese—290,000 in 2018.32
The greater political activity has also created opportunities for increased cooperation at the regional level. In the 2017 survey, 16 out of 20 Italian regions participated. Of the examined entities, 11 declared cooperation with partners from China. Among the five regions that in 2017 did not cooperate with China, four (Calabria, Basilicata, Abruzzo, Molise) did not have prior contact but are interested in future cooperation. In addition, Calabria in 2017 was in consultations with a potential partner from China. The last of the non-cooperating regions, Vallée d’Aoste, had had earlier contact because it implemented a project with Jilin province, but after its completion further cooperation was not continued and the region is not planning to undertake further activities with China. Among the regions that declared existing cooperation, the oldest relations were reported by Veneto, ongoing since the 1980s (with the province of Hebei), with further contact established in 1998, and two more in 2010 and 2014, respectively. Importantly, of the 30 Italian partnerships with China identified in the survey, only two existed before 2000. Seven partnerships were established in the first decade of the 21st century and the remaining 21 were concluded after 2011 (Maps 12 and 13).
Map 13. Cooperation of Italian Regions with Chinese Provinces and Cities on a Map of China
32 Lombardy (22.9%), Tuscany (18%), Veneto (11.9%) and Emilia-Romagna (10.2%), www.tuttitalia.it/statistiche/
−
− Cooperation at the regional level is marked by high dynamics. Most of the partnerships were established in the last 10 years and only three out of the 30 were defined as not active. In comparison to other countries surveyed, individual Italian regions have few partners in China. Umbria has the most active partnerships (five), plus one more partnership evaluated as not active. The next two regions have four partners (Veneto, Liguria), three regions have three each (Sicilia, Campania, Lombardy), and the others two or one partner only. The most common forms of cooperation are official visits, participation in exhibition events, and business missions. −
− Along with economic cooperation, academic partnerships represent the next most important area in relations between the Italian regions and China. Universities are also mentioned frequently as the most important partners for regional authorities. Local government officials use the expert knowledge of scientists, as well as their contacts in China and knowledge of the language.
−
− Establishing permanent representations in China is legally complex and, as a rule, is not supported by the government. That is why local-government authorities often work closely with foreign state institutions (such as agencies supporting home entrepreneurs), where they have representatives, embassy and consulates in China that support the implementation of regional and local initiatives.
−
− The promotion of culture and the related attraction of Chinese tourists is also important. In 2017, the most Chinese tourist visits were recorded in Veneto (785,000), followed by Tuscany (670,000) and Lombardy (554,000).33 It is worth noting that four regions that do not cooperate with China (Basilicata, Aosta Valley, Abruzzo, Calabria) also are last in the ranking of numbers of Chinese tourists, at fewer than 2,000 a year.
1.3. EU-China Paradiplomacy—The Chinese Perspective
1.3.1. European Regions on a Map of China
When analysing the dynamics of cooperation between European regions and Chinese partners, it is worthwhile to pay attention to these partnerships from the perspective of the six studied EU countries (Map 14). Taking into account the date of the beginning of cooperation with the Chinese regions, the regions of Germany, France, and UK started first. Their first partnerships date to the 1980s and mainly include the eastern provinces of China—the coastal regions and those that share borders with provinces having sea access. The pioneer was Germany, which in 1982–1989 established cooperation with the provinces of Liaoning (including the city of Dalian), Shandong, Beijing (city with a provincial status), Jiangsu (with two partnerships), Zhejiang, Fujian, Anhui, Shanghai (also city with a provincial status), Jiangxi, and Hunan. The only provinces in central China with which the German partners have been working since the 1980s are Sichuan and Shanxi. The areas of focus are similar for France—Shantung, Sichuan, Shanghai and Beijing— with all but one (Sichuan) located in the east of the country. The French partners have been cooperating with these Chinese provinces since 1985–1987. The UK also dates its partnerships to the 1980s. These are mainly cases of international cooperation between cities. In 1983–1989, cooperation was started with the Chinese cities of Changchun (Jilin Province), Dalian (Liaoning Province), Jinan (Shantung Province), Hangzhou (two partnerships, Zhejiang Province), Xiamen (Fujian Province). All of them are situated in the east of the country. The only city from inner China that began working with the British city in the 1980s (in 1986) is Wuhan in Hubei province. In the case of other three EU countries—Poland, Italy and Spain—only the Polish voivodeship of
Map 14. Partnerships of Chinese Provinces with Regions or Cities in Six EU States on a
in the east of China. However, in the case of Italy, one partnership was declared with Hebei province, also in the east of China (with the Veneto region), in 1987 (Table 4).
Table 4. Partnerships between Regions of the Six EU Countries and Provinces/Cities in China, 1982– 1989
Chinese provinces and Cities France Germany Poland UK Italy Total
Anhui 1 1 Beijing 1 1 2 Changchun 1 1 Dalian 1 1 2 Fujian 1 1 Hangzhou 2 2 Hebei 1 1 Hunan 1 1 Jiangsu 2 2 Jiangxi 1 1 Jinan 1 1 Liaoning 1 1 Shandong 1 1 2 Shanghai 1 1 1 3 Shanxi 1 1 Sichuan 1 1 2 Wuhan 1 1 Xiamen 1 1 Zhejiang 1 1 Total 4 14 1 7 1 27
Source: authors’ compilation.
Mainly, the cooperation of these three countries—Germany, France, and the UK—with China, and especially with their eastern provinces, may indicate the existence of a connection to China’s reform and opening-up policy Deng Xiaoping, which began in December 1978. Most likely, the impulse for cooperation was the creation in 1980 of the first special economic zones in the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian; 14 more zones were created in 1984 in the provinces of Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Guangxi, as well as cities with a provincial status— Shanghai and Tianjin. The aim was to open the eastern (coastal) regions adjacent to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea, that is, the most developed Asian areas (“Asian tigers”) to attract capital. These provinces received favourable fiscal conditions from the central government.34
The 1990s were less dynamic in terms of establishing cooperation, which may be associated with the events in China in 1989. While in the 1980s a total of 27 partnerships were established, in the 1990s that number was 11. Most of them were established by France, three partnerships, and Germany, Italy, and Spain with two each. In 1994–1997, the German regions began cooperation with Shaanxi and Hubei, France with Hubei (two partnerships, one in 1996 and the second in 1998) and Hunan (1991)—both regions located in the southeast, without access to the sea. Two new partnerships were established by autonomous communities of Spain, with Sichuan (1994) and Shanghai (1997). In the case of other countries, one new partnership
was established with Shanghai. Italy started cooperation with Jiangsu in 1998, and Poland with Anhui in 1997. The impulse for cooperation at that time (and still mainly with eastern centres) could be the confirmation of reforms by Deng during his famous “Southern Tour” (nanxun) in
1992, including further emphasis on the development of eastern coastal provinces (Table 5). Still, Eastern provinces comprised the vast majority of these partnerships, although they are not all regions with access to the sea.
Table 5. Partnerships between Regions of the Six EU Countries with Provinces/Cities in China, 1991–1999
Chinese provinces and cities France Spain Germany Poland UK Italy Total
Anhui 1 1 Changning 1 1 Hubei 2 1 3 Hunan 1 1 Jiangsu 1 1 Shaanxi 1 1 Shanghai 1 1 2 Sichuan 1 1 Total 3 2 2 1 1 2 11
Source: authors’ compilation.
The increase in the number of new partnerships (30) is noticeable in the first years of the 21st century. This could be the result of the intensification of bilateral relations between
European states and China at the government level, e.g., by raising relations to the strategic level. In the cases of Germany, the UK, France, or Spain, these occurred in 2004–2005. However, in the case of Poland, this may be the result of EU accession in 2004. During this period, partnerships were still concluded mainly with eastern provinces. In the case of Germany, in 2003–2007, these included the provinces of Heilongjiang, Guangdong (two partnerships), Hunan, and Hebei. In the case of France (2000–2006), Shandong, Guangdong, and Jiangsu. In the case of the UK (2005–2007), Zhejiang (the cities of Suzhou and Ningbo), Nanjing (Jiangsu), and Guangdong (Guangzhou). At the beginning of the 21st century, Spain formed the most relationships, eight in total: with Liaoning, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Heze, Liaocheng, Shandong, and Guizhou. Poland did so with Guangdong, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, Henan, and Hainan. It is also notable that in these years there was an increase in interest from Italy (five new partnerships), concluded with the provinces of Guangdong, Zhejiang, Henan, Shandong, and Beijing (Table 6). Interestingly, the distribution of new partnerships may indicate that the European regions probably were not reacting to China’s new regional policy of Great Western Openness programme (xibu dakaifa), announced
at the turn of 1999/2000. It covers the provinces of Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Chongqing.
Table 6. Partnerships between Regions of the Six EU Countries with Provinces/Cities in China, 2000–2007
Chinese provinces and cities France Spain Germany Poland UK Italy Total
Beijing 1 1 2
Guangdong 1 1 2 1 1 6
Guangzhou 1 1
Chinese provinces and cities France Spain Germany Poland UK Italy Total Heilongjiang 1 1 2 Hainan 1 1 Henan 1 1 2 Heze 1 1 Hubei 1 1 Hunan 1 1 Jiangsu 1 1 2 Liaocheng 1 1 Liaoning 1 1 Nanjing 1 1 Ningbo 1 1 Shandong 1 1 1 3 Shanghai 1 1 Suzhou 1 1 Zhejiang 1 1 Total 3 8 5 5 4 5 30
Source: authors’ compilation.
The years 2008–2009 were a time of crisis in Europe, apparent from the lower dynamics of cooperation with China, with only one new partnership (with a Spanish region) established in 2009. The next period when the number of partnerships increased was in 2010–2012 (18). Notably, they were formed by countries not very active in previous years, mainly Spain, Italy, and Poland (Table 7).
Table 7. Partnerships between Regions of the Six EU Countries and Provinces/Cities from China, 2010–2012
Chinese provinces and cities France Spain Poland Italy Total
Fujian 1 1 Guangxi 1 1 Guangzhou 1 1 Hainan 1 1 Hong Kong 1 1 2 Hubei 1 1 Hunan 1 1 Inner Mongolia 1 1 Jiangsu 1 1 Jilin 1 1 Liaoning 1 1 Ningxia 1 1 Sichuan 1 1 Shanghai 1 1 Shandong 1 1 Wenzhou 1 1 Zhoushan 1 1 Total 2 7 4 5 18
growth of regional cooperation has developed since 2014 (47 partnerships in 2014–2017). After the announcement of the BRI, there are more examples of cooperation with Chinese regions situated in the centre of the country but without sea access. A good example is Liverpool’s partnerships established in 2016 with Chongqing, Kunming, Chengdu, and Guiyang. In Poland’s case, this is primarily a partnership with Sichuan. Italy established a cooperation with Chongqing (four partnerships in 2014–2016), Yunnan, Qinghai, Hunan (2017), and Sichuan. Spain set up partnerships with Chongqing (2015), Hunan (2016), and Nanjing (2016). Despite the greater interest in provinces included in the Great Western Openness programme, the eastern direction (i.e., the coastal provinces), still prevail in the numbers. This is further illustrated by Italy, which in 2014–2017 established cooperation in Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, and Shanghai. Also, Poland in 2012–2016 began cooperation with the eastern regions, both those with direct access to the sea, such as Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, and Fujian, as well as those located further inland, including Shanxi and Hubei (Table 8).
Table 8. Partnerships between Regions of the Six EU Countries with Chinese Provinces/Cities, 2014–2017
Chinese provinces and cities France Spain Germany Poland UK Italy Total
Changchun 1 1 Changning 1 1 Chengdu 1 1 2 Chongqing 2 1 4 7 Fujian 1 1 2 Guangdong 1 1 Guangzhou 1 1 Guiyang 1 1 Hebei 1 1 1 3 Hong Kong 1 1 Hubei 1 1 Hunan 1 1 2 Jiangsu 1 1 2 Jinan 1 1 Jingdezhen 1 1 Kunming 1 1 Liaoning 1 1 Nanjing 1 1 Qingdao 1 1 2 Qinghai 1 1 Shandong 1 1 1 3 Shanghai 1 2 3 Shanxi 1 1 Tianjin 1 1 1 3 Xiangtan 1 1 Yangzhou 1 1 Yunnan 1 1 Zhangjiajie 1 1 Zhejiang 1 1 Total 1 12 2 3 10 20 48
Jiangsu (12) and Guangdong (11). These are eastern provinces with sea access and all of the states surveyed have partners there. Among the eastern provinces without sea access, the ones with the most partnerships are Hunan (8) and Hubei (7).
As for regions in central and western China, which includes those in the Great Western Openness programme, two provinces stand out: Sichuan, with seven partners representing all six EU countries examined, and Chongqing, also with seven partnerships. Shaanxi Province has three partnerships, Yunnan and Guizhou, two each, and Qinghai, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia, one each (Table 9; Map 14).35 No partnerships were recorded in Gansu, Tibet, or Xinjiang. It can be assumed that regions considered unstable by the Chinese authorities and under special supervision by the central government—associated with accusations by the authorities in Beijing of having separatist tendencies and terrorism (e.g. Xinjiang, Tibet)—are not attractive to European regions, and the central government’s restrictions also limit international cooperation opportunities with these regions.
Table 9. Provinces by Number of Partnerships with Regions in the Six EU Countries
Shandong 16 Shanghai 13 Jiangsu 12 Guangdong 11 Zhejiang 9 Hunan 8 Chongqing 7 Hubei 7 Liaoning 7 Sichuan 7 Hong Kong 6 Fujian 5 Beijing 5 Hebei 4 Tianjin 4 Jilin 3 Shaanxi 3 Anhui 2 Hainan 2 Heilongjiang 2 Henan 2 Jiangxi 2 Yunnan 2 Guizhou 2 Shanxi 2 Guangxi 1 Ningxia 1 Inner Mongolia 1 Qinghai 1 Source: authors’ compilation.
