O R G A N O N 20/21:1984/1985 P R O B L È M E S G É N É R A U X
Wiesław Strzałkowski [England]
PER C EPTIO N A N D ITS K IN A ESTH ETIC O R IG IN
1. T H E A R B IT R A R Y C H A R A C T E R O F T H E N A M E S : “P E R C E P T IO N ” , “ M E M O R Y ” , “ I M A G I N A T I O N ”
The three so called “faculties” : perception, memory and imagination, are in fact the products o f an artificial distinction o f philosophers. W hat we really observe in actual life is th at none o f these three “faculties” appear in their pure form. All three coexist in one active process o f the m ind; and according to which one prevails at any given m oment we make an arbitrary distinction between them and call them by their distinct names.
This naming would not be so dangerous if it did not suggest that the character of those processes is quite different from that which we observe in reality.
First of all, the different names given to these processes suggest that their natures are absolutely different; but we shall endeavour to prove that this is not the case.
Secondly, the names referring as they do to the visual sphere (to perceive, to imagine) obscure the origin of those “faculties”, which, though appearing to consciousness as mainly visual are formed by the m otor reactions o f all the organism, of which the visual elements are the abbreviated signs only.
2. O U R P E R C E P T IO N F O R M E D BY O U R P R E V IO U S E X P E R IE N C E S . W H A T R E A L L Y F O R M S O U R P E R C E P T IO N IS T H E G E N E R A L R E A D IN E S S T O A C T
When we are not moved to act upon any particular object, our perception remains vague and uncertain, is more potential than actual. But even this vague perception is form ed from the potentiality of activities directed towards objects.
When I perceive a room without being especially interested in it, I have a general knowledge about it, but I am not aware of any details.
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But when I fix my attention on any particular object, I begin to realise its potentialities. This is due to my previous experiences. I realise its shape and colour, its position and distance. If we exclude colour as due especially to the sense o f sight, all these qualities are due to our previous activities. M any objects o f similar shape form our knowledge of the shape of a given object; and our habit o f m easuring space by the combined help o f sight and m otor experience tells us how distant is the object with which we are concerned.
It is only an illusion that all that is given directly to us is due to the sense o f sight. It is our activity which forms our visual impressions as a whole, interpreting the particular data o f the sense o f sight in terms of our previous activities which had manifested themselves in conjunction with similar sense-data.
All these previous activities differ in this way only from those which we call memories; in the case o f perception we direct our attention to present activities, assimilating past activities to them ; while in the case o f memory we direct our attention to the past, partly eliminating the present sense-data, and partly assimilating them to the past.
But even if the purpose o f our activity is directed towards the present, it does not mean that we can avoid the past completely, because all our ability to perceive is formed by past experiences.
3. A N T IC IP A T IO N O F E X P E R IE N C E IN P E R C E P T IO N
Thanks to this ability shaped by the past and stimulated by our present need or desire we have the anticipation o f experience in perception. That is especially evident in the case o f delusions, which is as William James p u t it, “a false opinion about a m atter of fact, which need not necessarily involve, though it often does involve, false perception of sensible things.” 1 In delusions a m an moved by a strong desire, which is in conform ity with the system o f his false judgem ents, seems to see only what he desires to see, but he is not free to do so without the help o f some fragments o f perception. If he is suffering from the m ania o f self-importance and imagines himself to be for instance a king, he is inclined to interpret everything in such a way that it confirms his delusion. Seeing something yellow, for instance a straw on his bed, he would imagine that it is gold appertaining to the insignia o f his royal power. The glimpse only o f the object o f a yellow colour would be perfectly sufficient for him to create an illusory perception, which was ready in him, and only waiting for a more or less appropriate sign from his senses.
Although this particular example has been taken from the world of insane people, it seems however very characteristic and essential to the real
Perception and its K in a esth etic Origin 1
understanding of our perception. To those who would object that cases o f insanity are quite different from those o f norm al people, I would, o f course, answer that insanity is com pounded o f the same elements which characterise our norm al life, but mixed up in a different proportion and developed to a different degree.
On the other hand, mental diseases which are usually characterised by a great tension of em otional life naturally show many things m ore clearly than the m anifestations o f our normal life, where many o f our mental processes seem to be ruled much m ore by habit than by true emotion. But even in our norm al life every case which appears to be one of em otional stress, we can see nearly the same as what we can observe in these pathological states o f m orbid character.
People, when in a desert and suffering from intense thirst, are inclined to see everywhere the signs o f a desired well; a m an frightened in the darkness of the night would see a ghost or bandit even at the slightest signs from his senses, according to his previous pre-established dispositions and actual expectations.
If an anecdote be perm itted, the tale o f the young man who ventured to go alone to a cemetery at midnight, whose coat caught on a spike near a solitary grave, and who died o f terror imagining him self captured by a ghost, seems to be one o f many illustrations of the general truth.
W hat is here implied is that in deep emotions the anticipation o f percep tion exists to such an extent that even the slightest sense-data which have any connection with expected perception, are sufficient to create this perception.
To enumerate all the cases would be quite unnecessary, so I shall limit myself to a few striking examples corresponding to the well-known emotions. Each o f such emotions creates the illusion o f a perception.
If we take love as an example, we may see many m anifestations o f the same phenomenon. A man deeply in love, missing his beloved, would be inclined to see her everywhere, even though he knows th at her appearance in that place is impossible. Suppose he sees from afar the figure o f a woman similar to her, his heart begins to beat harder, and mixed feelings o f joy and surprise possess him before he is able to control himself and to realise painfully that the person whom he sees could not be the woman about whom he dreams.
A m an who is anim ated by sexual desire is able to conjure the shape o f a woman from a distant lamp post or letter box.
A m an who is hungry would take anything for food which resembles even slightly some particular food by its shape or colour.
Usually we attribute all such phenom ena in current life to imagination, but it is quite arbitrary and due to the great difficulty o f separating imagination from perception. Even if after a m inute of reflection a m an is inclined to treat his own illusion as a phantom of imagination, neverthe less in the very act o f experiencing it he felt ju st the same as he feels
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when he has a perception. There is no difference o f nature, his belief is the same, and so also is the adaptation of his body.
A m an who has the illusion that he sees a piece o f bread when he is hungry, has the same m otor adaptation as if he saw real bread. The saliva flows to his m outh, he moves his tongue as if he m asticated real bread, and there is a readiness in all his organism to reach out to the object which he considers to be a piece o f bread, able to satisfy his hunger. The same reactions would appear in a similar situation where there was no illusion, but real bread.
This is clearly expressed by William James, when he talks about hal lucination: “A hallucination is a strictly sensational form o f consciousness jis good and true a sensation as if there were a real object there. The object happens not to be there, that is all.” 2
The psychological “reality” o f hallucination may sometimes involve more than one sense even am ong norm al people who are under unusual emotional stress. An example o f such a kind of hallucination is quoted by William Jam es.3 The relation runs as follows:
O n the d a y ab o v e m en tio n ed , O ct. 30, 1886, I w as in . . . , w here I was teaching. I h a d p erfo rm ed m y reg u lar ro u tin e w o rk fo r the d ay , a n d was sittin g in m y ro o m w o rk in g o u t trig o n o m e trica l form ulae. I w as expecting every day to h e ar o f the co n fin em en t o f my wife a n d n a tu ra lly m y th o u g h ts fo r som e tim e h a d been m o re o r less with her. She was, by the w ay, in B., som e fifty m iles from me.
A t the sam e tim e, how ever, n e ith e r she n o r th e expected ev en t was in my m in d ; as I said, I w as w o rk in g o u t trig o n o m e try the entire evening. A b o u t eleven o 'clo ck , as I sat th ere b u ried in sines, cosines, tan g en ts, c o ta n g en ts, secants an d cosecants. I felt very d istinctly u p o n my left sh o u ld er a to u ch , a n d a slight sh ak e , as if som ebody h ad tried to a ttra c t m y a tte n tio n by o th e r m eans a n d failed. W ith o u t rising I tu rn ed m y h ead , and th ere betw een me and the d o o r sto o d my wife, dressed exactly as I last saw her, som e five weeks before. A s I tu rn e d she said : “ It is a little H e rm a n ; he has c o m e .” S o m eth in g m o re w as said, but th is is the only sentence 1 can recall. T o m ake sure th a t I w as n o t asleep a n d d re am in g , ! rose fro m the ch air, p in ch e d m yself and w alked to w a rd s the figure, which d isap p eared im m ediately as I rose. I can give no in fo rm a tio n as to the length o f tim e o ccupied by this episode, b u t I had k now n 1 w as aw ake, in my usual good h ealth . The to u ch w as very distinct, the figure was abso lu tely perfect, sto o d a b o u t th ree feet from the d o o r, w hich was closed, an d h a d n o t been opened d u rin g the evening. T h e so u n d o f the voice w as u n m ista k a b le , a n d I sh o u ld have recognised it as m y wife’s voice even if I h ad n o t tu rn e d a n d h ad n o t seen the figure at all. T he to n e was c o n v ersa tio n a l, ju s t as if she w ould have said the sam e w o rd s h ad she been actually sta n d in g there.
In regard to m yself, I w ould say, as I have alread y in tim ate d , 1 was in m y usual good h e a lth ; I h a d n o t been sick before, n o r w as I a fte r the o ccurrence, n o t so m uch as a h ead ach e h av in g afflicted me.
S h o rtly a fte r the experience above described, I re tired fo r the n ig h t a n d , as I usually d o, slept q uietly u n til m o rn in g . I d id n o t speculate p articu la rly a b o u t the stra n g e ap p ea ran c e o f the night before, an d th o u g h I th o u g h t o f it som e, I did n o t tell anybody. T he
2 Ibid., pp. 1 1 8 -1 1 9 . 3 Ibid.
P erception and its K inaesthetic Origin 9
follow ing m o rn in g 1 rose, n o t conscious o f h av in g d re am ed o f an y th in g , b u t 1 was very firm ly im pressed with the idea th a t th ere was so m e th in g for m e at th e tele g ra p h office. I tried to th ro w off the im pression above n o ted . I w alked aw ay fro m the telegraph-office. As I pro ceed ed , how ever, th e p re o c c u p atio n b ecam e a co n v ic tio n , a n d I actu ally tu rn ed a b o u t and w ent to th e very place I h ad resolved n o t to visit, th e teleg rap h office. T he first p erso n 1 saw on a rriv in g a t th e said office w as the teleg rap h o p e ra to r, w h o being on term s o f intim acy w ith me, re m a rk e d : “ H ello, p a p a I ’ve got a telegram for y o u .” T he teleg ram an n o u n ced th e b irth o f a boy, w eighing n in e p o u n d s, an d th a t all were d o in g well. N o w then, I have n o th eo ry at all a b o u t th e events n a rra te d ab o v e; I never had any such experience before n o r sin ce: I am no believer in sp iritu a lism , am n o t in th e least su p erstitio u s, k n o w very little a b o u t " th o u g h t-tra n sfe re n c e ,” “u n c o n sc io u s c e re b ra tio n ,” etc., b u t I am ab so lu tely c ertain a b o u t w h at I have trie d to relate.
In reg ard to the rem ark which I heard. “ It is a little H e rm a n ," etc.. I w ould add th a t we h a d previously d ecided to call th e child, if a boy, H e rm a n —m y ow n nam e, by th e way.
In this somewhat lengthy quotation, which, related with a naivete that is all the stronger guarantee of its authenticity, we see that the expectation of the event created the sim ultaneous illusion o f the sense of touch, the sense of sight, and that o f hearing. If we com pare this with many o f our ordinary perceptions, or rather, instinctive inferences from the perceptually given reality, which are considered by us as true perceptions, the psychological reality is on the side o f hallucination. Those perceptions themselves are very often based on one sense only instead o f m any as, for instance, were we to hear the voices o f our parents in a dark room, it would be sufficient to assure us o f their presence w ithout further confir m ation by other senses.
The strikingly active character o f perception occurs so evidently in every case o f great emotional stress, that we might be inclined to underestim ate the same phenom enon in the case of usual perceptions, attributing this active character rather to unusual circumstances o f emotional life.
It would however, be a great mistake to consider that this activity o f perception reveals itself exclusively in cases o f great em otional stirring.
Every perception is due more to our anticipated activity than to the sense-data in the proper meaning of this word.
If there are m any false perceptions due mainly to emotion, there are also those due to h a b it,4 or to both habit and emotion. How many times does it happen that we are mistaken concerning perception even without the agency o f any em otional stimulus, when we interpret, with all our readiness to act upon objects, the few sense-data we have, trying to fill in those that are lacking.
One might, for instance, hear the dripping o f water in the darkness;
4 Dew ey ad m its this influence o f h a b it in the fo rm in g o f false p e rce p tio n s in these w o rd s: “ Im m ed iate, seem ingly instinctive feeling o f the d irectio n an d end o f v ario u s lines o f b eh av io u r is in reality the feeling o f h a b its w orking below d irect co nsciousness. The psychology o f illusions o f p e rce p tio n is full o f illu stra tio n s o f th e d is to rtio n in tro d u c ed by h a b it in to the o b se rv atio n o f o b jec ts.” (H um an N ature and C onduct, p. 32).
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one would assume it was raining, and without any further investigation put on a m ackintosh when going out, though it may later transpire that the sound o f water was due to the open taps in the bathroom . If a clerk is accustomed to seeing his superior sitting at a certain desk in the office, he may sta rt to talk on entering the room , as he usually does, only after a while realising that someone else now occupies the desk.
M any such situations where recognition does no t follow immediately, are reproduced on the stage or in film for their comic effects.
A very typical example o f a false perception due rather to the first factor is given us by the American hum ourist, M ark Twain, in his short story where he describes people afraid o f thunderstorm s, who, hearing rum bling sounds, take all necessary and unnecessary precautions against a thunderbolt, locking all doors and shutters o f the house, and only later discovering th at their terror was caused by military m anoeuvres in the neighbour hood.
A similar story is told by the ancient Rom an writer, Petronius, in his
Feast o f Trimalchion, where a fire-brigade rushes to the rescue, thinking
that the house must be on fire since the noisy celebration o f the drunkards seems to them to be the voices o f people in distress.
One m ight object th at in this latter case the mistake o f the fire-brigade is more due to a faulty inference than a false perception, but it is not easy to draw a clear distinction between perception and a rudim entary kind o f thinking when we are concerned with hum an behaviour, as in this case and m any others.
It is possible that the m istake could be caused by an incorrect inference which we could translate into a traditional form o f syllogism such as this:
Where there is a great noise, there is usually a fire. There is a great noise,
Ergo there is a fire.
But it is more probable th at they went to the rescue w ithout any reasoning o f this kind, ju st because they had been used to adapting themselves in a case o f emergency to situations, which by specific perceptual qualities aroused in them the active attitude o f professional men, without any need for reasoning or for special investigations, as happens very often in everyday life. But even if there were some inferences o f such a kind it does not exclude the existence o f perception; for many psychologists claim perception to be an unconscious inference from the sense-data. Even if it were so, it would not invalidate our statem ent about the active character of perception.
Examples from the hallucinations and illusions o f insane people and o f normal people point out these im portant characteristics o f perception: its active character, and its form ation in anticipation o f sense-data, which confirm or deny it afterwards. For the creation o f a perception, only a very slight basis of sense-data is sufficient, because perception is m ore the product of our previous activity than the direct result o f the given sense-data, which it organises according to the desires and purposes o f our activity.
Perception and its K in a esth etic Origin 11
4. IS T H E A N T IC IP A T IO N O F S E N S E -D A T A I N P E R C E P T IO N G E N E R A L , O R D O E S IT O C C U R IN P A R T IC U L A R C A S E S O N L Y ?
W hat remains to be analysed is (1) whether the example o f perception characterised by the anticipation o f sense-data are not of unusual type and for this reason not typical of perception in general; and (2) o f what kind is this activity which forms our perception, and in particular is it similar or the same as the activity felt as movements o f our body?
Considering the first, we would stress this point, that all m ental facts are due to our hum an nature, which is determined by the general conditions of life: environm ent and our biological structure, and from whence arise the possibilities o f our satisfying needs com m on to all hum an beings.
If one drinks from a glass and another from a silver cup, it does not change the fact that they both drink.
Thus it is in the case o f perception: all men perceive, for without perceiving they could not live; some o f these perceptions are more appropriate to our needs, some of them less, but the process is the same.
We see that in some of these perceptions the active character of percep tion is more obvious than in others. We see this especially in the cases of false perceptions: in the hallucinations o f the insane or in the mistakes of a norm al person. And this active character is very evident in cases of false perceptions due to a great disparity between the anticipated percep tion and the sense-data. But if activity is a characteristic of every perception we should see it not only in cases o f false perceptions, but also in true ones. And if we do not see this active character so clearly in the case of normal perception, we must account for this and explain it, if our general statem ent about the active character of perception is to hold good.
As we know from everyday life norm al perceptions correspond so exactly to the external world that to average people it would séem sheer nonsense to talk about the active character o f such perceptions, and it would be most repugnant to them to hear them com pared in this respect to hallucinations, which are held in great contem pt because o f their misleading and pernicious effects in practical life.
If we keep in mind our general principle o f activity and anticipation of sense-data in perception we shall have to explain not so much why there are false perceptions, as why there are true ones.
In order to do this, we shall proceed by trying to isolate the factor to which is due the activity o f perception in the case o f false perception, and then we shall try to find similar m anifestations o f activity, if there are any, in true perceptions, and to explain the unconsciousness o f this activity in normal true perceptions, where the active character o f perception in general does not appear so obviously and strikingly as in the false ones.
Let us return to the familiar case o f false perception in delusion and especially in the m ania o f self-importance. Someone who imagines himself a king takes the yellow straw on his bed for the gold appertaining to his royal insignia.
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Delusion as such is not only characterised by false perceptions, it is characterised by faulty thinking as well.
The man in our case will be able to consider, for instance, the silence o f the doctor who examines him as a m anifestation o f the due respect o f his royal prerogatives, and to treat his confinement in the asylum as the result o f persecution by his powerful enemies. He would be inclined in fact, to interpret everything according to preconceived ideas, centralised in his main idea of his royal character which satisfies his emotional need of self-assertion and self-importance. W ith everything given in his daily experience he will deal in a double way, as it suits his unconscious need: either he will try to connect it with his main idea, or. if this is impossible, he will discard that from his consciousness and eliminate it as not existent.
As he does in his reasoning so will he do in his perceiving: some sense-data he will accept; others, as unsuitable for his unconscious need, he will eliminate and try to forget. If he has a straw which he considers to be gold, he discards certain straw qualities, as for instance, its small weight, b u t he would accept willingly everything which reminds him of gold, i.e. the yellow colour and shining quality. If anyone, however, were to draw his attention to the fact that what he considers gold is much lighter than gold, he would find justification for his inconsistency in the built up ad hoc theory that his gold is lighter than usual, because it has been invented by his scientists specially for him, and is therefore of a better quality.
As we see then, all his pre-established attitudes are responsible for the creation o f his false perception, which is due to his urgent need to confirm by perceptually given experience all the system o f his ideas,. for on this confirm ation depends all the delusionary system of emotions and m otor reactions.
The work o f his attention in dealing with sense-data might be com pared to trial and error in the m otor sphere; he tries to “catch” those sensations only which suit his unconscious purpose, rejecting others as unsuitable. This activity in him is developed to such a point that it does not allow him to see objects as we see them —according to their “objective” qualities.
Now we come to another point why in our usual true perceptions we do not see the same “subjective” kind o f activity and seem rather to accept the “objective” qualities o f things as we see them as appertaining to the world independent o f our perception, which seems more as given to us than constructed by our inner activity.
What we call objective qualities o f things are due to the m anifold activity o f the hum an race, and emerged thanks to our numerous trials and errors which shaped our knowledge o f the external world. We do not know what the things are in themselves, but we know what to expect from them according to our various behaviours; they contain for us various potentialities of action directed to them.
Perception and its K in a esth etic Origin 13
In general, this expectation is so m uch in accord with the expected result that we are inclined to think that we discover their objective nature.
That is so, because our reactions tow ards the objects have been shaped by many experiences o f which only the successful ones have been fixed in our habits, and have inserted themselves into the system o f all our reactions.
For this reason mistakes are in most cases comparatively rare. If I see an aspect o f a chair, for instance, two legs o f wood and p art of a seat, it is enough not only for me to form a perception of the whole chair, but also enough for me to decide to sit in it. (We find a very similar example in W hitehead’s Symbolism .)5
All our previous experiences concerning a chair are related to its various aspects, and it suffices to have merely a sing from the senses o f a particular kind to rely on them and adopt appropriate behaviour, which with every repetition fixes more firmly the relation o f this sign to the whole perceptual object. The form ation of perception resembles, I may say in this respect, a hypothesis which, applied successfully m any times, seems to loose with every successful attem pt m ore and m ore o f its hypothetical character, and becomes more like a passive reproduction o f reality. Percep tion gains this “objective” character with every one o f our actions tow ards objects, because every action supplies more sense-data, which confirm us in our “hypothesis” o f relating the first sign to all our appropriate reactions to the object.
But even in our norm al perceptions we can sometimes see their “hypothe tical character” — it happens when we are facing something com paratively new, not knowing which reaction would be the most appropriate.
We take such an object if we can, in our hands, try to m anipulate it in many ways in order to discover its various qualities which would be useful in future actions.
We can do the same in the case o f a new perceptual situation which excites our interest. When we find ourselves in new surroundings we examine them with our eyes from the point o f view o f m any eventual actions, especially those towards which we have the strongest dispositions.
As the Polish psychologist Władysław W itwicki6 points out, a forest will arouse quite different reactions in a poet and in a businessman. The first will admire the beauty o f the forest, while the second will examine how profitable it would be to cut the wood. In our sense, it would mean that a poet would look, for instance, for the place from which he would have the best view o f the beauty of nature, while a businessman will see all the practical sides o f the eventual cutting o f the wood, b u t both o f them, even in the first glimpse, will examine the possibilities o f future actions. This anticipation o f possible actions is im m anent in every
5 See S u p p lem en t, N o te 14.
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perception; it gives it its proper em otional colour, it makes us feel in some surroundings depressed, in others elated, according to their suggestive power directing us towards eventual activities.
5. IS T H E A C T IV E C H A R A C T E R O F P E R C E P T IO N D U E T O A M O T O R O R I G I N ?
The second questio n: o f what kind is this activity which forms our perception, is not so easy to answer at once.
I am afraid I m ust start with a recapitulation o f well-known facts. Perception is most often started by the visual stimulus. The sense-data provided by this stimulus form the necessary link between our previous experiences in which the same visual d ata had been given and this new experience which constitutes our actual perception.
There is however an essential difference between the sense-data taken apart from perception and perception itself. Perception gives us knowledge o f the objects, when the sense-data could give by themselves (if artificially isolated) the sensation o f the sense o f sight.
This sensation however, never appears alone in practice. Even if we look at the patch o f yellow colour, we have not only the sensation o f yellow, but at the same time the perception o f a scrap o f paper on which this colour is presented to us.
This feeling o f the totality o f our perception cannot be due merely to our sense of sight, it is due to this sense educated in some way by all our previous experiences. Now, if we ask ourselves of what kind are these experiences, we should first realise in what conditions we can have any visual sensation.
The answer to this is that we can have visual sensations in two ways: either when something moves before our eyes while we are immobile, or when we move ourselves.
Let us first consider the second case. The change o f position o f our body makes it easier for us to receive the new sensation. This change o f position was of course necessitated by our practical purposes, and occurs m ore often than the first case.
Therefore it seems to me th at I m ust again arrive at the conclusion th at the realisation o f movements o f our body was the first factor in the creation o f what we call our perception.
This does not necessarily mean, o f course, that every perception is'accompa- nied by an actual feeling o f a kinaesthetic kind at the present stage of development.
There are two kinds o f m ovem ent: voluntary and autom atic, and only the first kind is accompanied to some extent by the feeling of effort, while the second kind is only observed by us in the same way as other changes in the external world, th at is, by their effects.
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the feeling o f effort (supposing that even autom atic movements were vo luntary at the beginning), though this feeling is not necessarily preserved till now, when our perception has itself, so to speak, become more or less autom atic, and has a tendency to shorten itself into a purely visual process.
Now we have to return to our first case when we rem ain immobile, and the objects move before our eyes. We should ask whether in that case our perception possesses any feeling o f movements, i.e. if the perceiving o f moving objects may involve the feeling o f our own movements, i.e. kin- aesthetic experience.
Direct introspective observation seems to indicate that this is so, but how is this possible? It involves us in a great problem : what is movement in the external world, and how are we conscious o f it?
When we see any “moving” object, for instance a horse or a car, we do not hesitate in everyday life to attribute movement to it as an integral p art or intrinsic quality, basing our attribution on a general assum ption that there is such a thing as movement — absolute m ovem ent in the New tonian sense o f the word.
However m odern physics disowns such a notion. According to the theory o f Einstein every movement is relative, because what we consider as moving in relation to one point, is immobile in relation to another. If we see a horse moving on the background o f a forest, the movement from a physical point o f view could be attributed as properly to the forest as to the horse, according to which of them we prefer to treat as immobile. From this it follows that there was not any necessity for us to treat the horse rather than the forest as moving.
If there is not any physical necessity, there must have been a psychological one. We should probably not have any idea o f m ovem ent if we did not the feeling o f effort when we effectuate the movements o f our own body. This feeling connected with the results of our activity, presented to us as sense- d ata mostly of the visual kind, constitutes our idea o f our own movement.
The same feeling applied by some kind o f analogy o f anthropom orphical character to the other objects gives us an idea o f their movements, which is nothing but an extension o f our own feeling by the aid o f sympathetic identification of ourselves with other creatures (especially other hum an beings and animals), as we tried to explain already in the Introduction.
If then, the idea o f a movement o f moving bodies could be explained on this ground, it means that in the first place this idea originated in our own feeling o f movement, and from that it follows that our first question, “W hat was the origin o f our perception when we were immobile and looking at the moving objects?” is reduced to the second one, “W hat is the origin o f our perception when we move our bodies?” which I have already tried to answer.
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feeling of movement still exists in our actual perception. Even if the objective reference originated in our feeling of movement it does not mean that every perception must contain such a feeling at our present stage o f development. The reasons for this are that the feeling of movement tends to disappear when the movement is repeated many times and exercised for a long period of time. As we suppose that perception originated from the feeling o f movement at the time o f the origin of our race, or even earlier, it is quite possible that the actual feeling of movement could disappear, leaving only the traces which revive every time we return to our old ancestral experiences.
6. T H E P E R C E P T IO N S W H IC H R E V IV E T H E M O T O R A C T IV IT Y
This occurs when we are in a state of deep emotion, which causes us to descend into the depths o f our nature and to arouse our dorm ant energy, that o f the depths o f our unconscious life.
In such a state we are inclined to see movement even in perceiving inanimate objects. Very characteristic in this respect are the pictures o f the surrealists, especially those o f Picasso and Makowski. Even the most ordinary objects represented in these pictures as “nature w ork” seem to be invested with a new life full of movement and emotion. But this bringing to movement o f nature is at the same time inseparable from the anthropom orphical outlook upon things. It seems to be the law which even the greatest artists cannot escape; that anyone who goes to the depths o f unconsciousness revives in himself n o t only the greater m otor activity in perceiving objects, but all the anthropom orphical attitudes which were characteristic o f the primitive mind.
The great artists seem to emphasise only for artistic purposes what is the natural tendency in every one o f us, when the strata o f our unconscious are deeply stirred by emotions.
How many times, for instance, when we are frightened or uneasy, does everything seem to revive, and the objects to which we are used in everyday life seem to get a new unusual life, especially in the evening or moonlight.
On this idea is based one o f the famous fables of Andersen in which he tells us how in the night the furniture in a room leads its own mysterious life. Innumerable are the poems written about love in which the roses and the stars sing in praise o f an eternal charm.
But it is especially so of those anthropom orphic ideas which are connected with nature itself; everything in their nature is brought o f life by artists and anim ated by movements, particularly those manifestations o f nature which thousands o f years ago were considered by our ancestors as gods showing their faces upon the earth.
M oon, sun, stars, sea and river are the everlasting themes which have such a great suggestive power o f life that even in our civilisation artists
Perception and its K in a esth etic Origin 17
com pare them, in semi-conscious m etaphors, giving them in this way the greatest degree o f psychological reality and charm ; and the anthropom orphic element is always the one that is kinaesthetically coloured.
The examples are so num erous from all the literature o f the world th a t I m ust limit myself to a few examples and quotations.
This beautiful poem by Shelley7 is one o f many illustrations:
To the M oon, (fragm ents) A nd like a d y in g lady, lean an d p ale, W ho to tte rs fo rth , w rap p ed in a g auzy veil, O u t o f h er c h am b er, led by the insane A n d feeble w an d erin g o f her fad in g b rain , The m o o n aro se u p in th e m u rk y E ast, A w hite a n d shapeless m ass —
A rt th o u p a le fo r w eariness
O f clim b in g heaven a n d gazing o n th e earth , W an d erin g co m p an io n less
A m o n g th e sta rs th a t have a d ifferent b irth , A n d ever c h an g in g , like a jo y le ss eye T h a t finds n o object w o rth its co n stan c y ?
The m otor expressions describing the m oon in this poem are the following: “totters forth”, “w rapped”, “led”, “wandering”, “arose”, “clim bing”, “gazing”, “finds”...
A nother example from Joseph C o n ra d 8 is the description o f the W estern W ind on the sea. It is a fully developed m etaphor, like that o f Shelley, and it is difficult to discriminate where artistic purpose prevails, where the echo o f real feelings, since the origin o f the whole is in the ancestral unconsciousness.
H erald ed by th e increasing fierceness o f th e squalls, so m etim es by a fa in t flash o f lig h tn in g like th e signal o f a lig h te d to rc h w aved fa r aw ay b eh in d th e clo u d s, th e shift o f w ind com es a t last, the crucial m o m e n t o f th e c h an g e fro m th e b ro o d in g a n d veiled violence o f th e so u th -w est gale to the sp ark lin g , flashing, c u ttin g , clear-ey ed an g er o f the K in g ’s no rth -w esterly m o o d . Y o u b e h o ld a n o th e r p h a se o f th is passio n , a fury bejew elled w ith stars m ay h a p b e arin g th e c resce n t o f the m o o n o n its b ro w , sh a k in g th e last vestiges o f its to rn c lo u d -m an tle in in k y -b lack squalls, w ith hail a n d sleet d escen d in g like show ers o f cry stals a n d p earls, b o u n d in g o ff th e spars, d ru m m in g o n th e soils, p a tte rin g o n the o ilskin coats, w h itening the decks o f h o m eb o u n d ships.
F a in t, ru d d y flashes o f lig h tn in g flicker in th e s ta rlig h t u p o n the m asth ead s.
A chilly b last h u m s in th e ta u t rigging, c au s in g th e ship to trem b le to h e r very keel, an d th e so ak ed m en o n h er deck shiver in th eir wet clo th e s to th e very m arro w o f th eir bones. B efore one squall h a s flown o v er to sink in the e a s te rn -b o ard , the edge o f a n o th e r peeps u p alre ad y a b o v e the w estern h o rizo n , ra cin g u p sw ift, shapeless like a black b a g full o f fro zen w ater re a d y to b u rst o v er y o u r d ev o ted head.
T he tem per o f th e ru ler o f th e o c e a n has ch an g ed . E ach g u st o f th e c lo u d e d m o o d th a t seem ed w arm ed by the h e a t o f a h e a rt flam ing with an g er h as its c o u n te rp a rt in th e chilly b las t th a t seem s b low n fro m a b re ast tu rn e d to ice w ith a su d d en revulsion o f feeling.
7 Poem s fro m Shelley, selected by O lw en W. C am p b e ll, L o n d o n 1925.
8 J. C o n ra d , "R u lers o f E ast and W est" in The M irro r o f the Sea, 3rd ed., pp. 134-135.
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In ste ad o f b lin d in g y o u r eyes a n d c ru sh in g y o u r soul w ith a terrib le a p p a ra tu s o f clo u d an d m ists an d seas a n d rain , the K in g o f the W est tu rn s his p ow er to c o n te m p tu o u s p eltin g o f y o u r b a c k w ith icicles, to m ak in g y o u r w eary eyes w ater as if in g rief and y o u r w o rn o u t c arc ase q u a k e pitifully. B ut each m o o d o f the g reat a u to c ra t has its own greatn ess, and each is h a rd to bear. O nly the n o rth -w est p h ase o f th a t m ighty display is n o t d em o ralisin g to th e sam e ex ten t, because betw een the hail an d sleet squalls o f a n o rth -w esterly gale one c a n see a lo n g w ay ahead.
It would be quite useless to point out all the m otor expressions in this description of the wind; I should like to point to something else instead: the fact that a phenom enon of nature like wind is animated by the feelings o f the writer, involves somehow the subordinated role o f other objects or phenom ena which are considered merely as the means to its anthropom orphi- sed activity. For instance, the moon, considered as a living being by Shelley, in the description o f Conrad plays only the part o f an object in the described activity o f the Western Wind (the wind “bearing the crescent o f the moon on its brow ”). It proves once m ore the truth that we perceive objects according to their emotional value, and that in the act o f perceiving we are actively following our em otional inclination.
Let us finish these few examples from literature by a description of wind in m odern poetry. Here is a poem by Andrew Young, called A Windy
D a y :9
A W indy Day. T his wind b rings all d ead th in g s to life, B ranches th a t lash the air like w hips A n d d ead leaves ro llin g in a h u rry O r peerin g in a r a b b its ’ bury O r try in g to p u sh do w n a tree; G a tes th a t fly o p en to the w ind A n d close again behind.
A nd fields th a t are a flow ing sea A nd m ak e the c attle lo o k like sh ip s; S tra w glistening an d stiff
L ying o n air as o n a sh a lf
A n d p o n d th a t leaps to leave itself; A n d feath ers to o th a t rise an d float. E ach feather c h an g e d in to a bird ,
A nd lin e-h u n g sheets th a t c ra c k an d stra in ; Even the su n-greened co at,
T h a t th ro u g h so m any w inds h as served, T he scarecrow struggles to p u t o n again.
All things anim ated by the wind seem to be alive in this poem, the m ovem ent creating this illusion o f life which was so typical o f hum anity in the earlier periods.
In the works o f anthropologists we find innumerable examples o f this
9 A N e w A n th o lo g y o f M odern Verse, 1920-40 , p. 213. C h o sen by C. D ay Lew is and L. A. G . Strong.
Perception and its K in a esth etic Origin 19
anim ation of the phenom ena o f nature, giving rise to great myths o f an th ro pom orphic character which are wide-spread through all hum anity. The history o f ancient religions provides so m any examples o f this tendency o f attributing the manifestations of nature to gods, th at I limit myself to one o f many examples taken from Sir James Frazer. E arthquakes are from immemorable times attributed to the action o f gods, conceived sometimes in an extremely primitive way. Here is the account given by Sir J. G. Frazer.
T h e p eople o f T im o r, in the E ast Indies, th in k th a t the e a rth rests o n the sh o u ld e r o f a m ighty giant, a n d th a t w hen h e is w eary o f b e arin g it o n one sh o u ld e r, he shifts it to the o th er, and so causes th e g ro u n d to q u ak e. A t such tim es, acco rd in g ly , th ey all s h o u t at the to p o f th e ir voices to let him k n o w th a t th ere a re still peo p le on the e a rth ; for otherw ise they fear lest, im p atien t o f his b u rd e n , he m ig h t tip it in to th e sea, . . . W hen the B alinese an d the S u n d a n e se feel an e a rth q u a k e they cry o u t, “ Still aliv e” . . . to acq u a in t th e e arth -sh a k in g god o r giant with th eir existence. T h e natives o f Leti, M o a an d L ak o r, islan d s in the In d ia n A rch ip elag o , im agine th a t e arth q u a k e s are caused b y G ra n d m o th e r E a rth in o rd e r to a scertain w h eth er her d escen d en ts a re still to th e fore. So they m ak e lo u d n oises fo r the p u rp o se o f satisfying her g ra n d m o th erly solicitude. T he T am i o f G erm an N e w G u in e a ascribe e a rth q u a k e s to a certain old P a n k u w ho sits u n d e r a g reat ro ck ; w hen h e stirs, th e e arth quak es. I f the sh o ck lasts a lo n g tim e they b eat o n the g ro u n d with p alm b ran ch es, saying, “ Y ou d o w n th ere : E asy a little! W e m en are still h ere.” T he Sh an s o f B u rm a are ta u g h t by B u d d h ist m o n k s th a t u n d e r th e w orld there sleeps a g reat fish w ith his tail in his m o u th , b u t sem etim es he w akes, bites his tail, a n d q uivering with p a in causes the g ro u n d to q u iv er a n d sh ak e lik e w ise .10
From these and many other examples given by Frazer we see that the causes o f earthquakes am ong primitive races are very different, though of a similar kind, according to their systems o f beliefs; but in every one o f these cases the perception of earthquake is interpreted in anthropom orphic ways,
as m otor experience projected on imaginary gods.
It is not so much a case o f myths influencing the interpretation o f perception, but the m otor character o f perception which creates those myths out of the necessity for reasonable justification of the processes perceived in a m otor way, where there is no visible agency to which to ascribe the activity contained in perception.
The traces o f this old anthropom orphism , and the m otor activity connec ted with it, are preserved even now in European languages and the forms o f grammar, I shall m ention only the masculine and feminine articles used to denom inate inanimate objects in many m odern languages (French, Polish and others), and which is preserved in English for such things as the sun (he), the m oon (she), ship (she), rivers, the sea, and so on.
The revival o f m otor activity is especially obvious in the works o f artists and in the relics o f ancient mentality, but it appears also, as is pointed out by Stout, in the observation o f external movements and the perception of geometrical figures.
10 Sir J. G. F ra z er, The Golden B ough, p t. IV : A donis — a S tu d y in the H isto ry o f O riental R eligion, pp. 162-163.
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T he sight o f e x te rn al m ovem ent o ccasio n s the revival o f c o rre sp o n d in g m o to r experiences in th e subject w ho is a tte n d in g to it. T h is m o to r revival fo rm s an in te g ral p a rt o f the p e rc e p tu a l com plex, n o t o f c o u rse a d is ta n t idea. T h e c o n d itio n s o f p lea su re and d isp leasu re w hich ap p ly to th e m o to r process in general, apply also to the re p ro d u c e d m o to r process involved in a tte n d in g to a m oving object. W hen it tak es place w ith special ease and facility o f a d ju stm e n t, we call th e external m ovem ent th a t excites it “gracefu l” . B u t it is n o t m erely th e p ercep tio n o f m o v em en t th at involves th e revival o f m o to r activity o n the p a rt o f the subject.
A slender co lu m n s u p p o rtin g an a p p are n tly d isp ro p o rtio n a te weight has a disagreeable effect on th e sp e c ta to r. It is as if he h im se lf were s u p p o rtin g a b u rd en to w hich he is n o t equal. T he m ere th o u g h t o f A tlas b e arin g up th e heavens on his sh o u ld ers m akes u s u n co m fo rtab le . T h e pleasin g o r u n p leasin g effect o f geo m etrical fo rm s is also to a large e x te n t d u e to the m o to r activity involved in perceiving them . In p a rt, th is m o to r activity c o n sists in actu al m ovem ents, such as th o se o f the eye fo llow ing an o u tlin e ; b u t in a g reat m easu re it arises from o u r m ode o f a p p reh e n d in g lines and surfaces as if they were them selves active.
W e sp eak o f a c o lu m n “raising itself” in to the a ir; o f a p a th “ w in d in g ” ; an d so on. L anguage o f this kind m ark s a fu n d a m e n ta l featu re o f p e rce p tu a l process.
T h e d irectio n o f lines an d surfaces is ap p reh e n d ed as if it were a d irectio n w hich the lines a n d surfaces them selves actively ta k e an d m ain tain . H ence in ap p reh e n d in g th em th ere is a sy m p ath etic revival o f m o to r activity is us, w hich m ay be pleasin g o r unpleasing. W hen the geo m etrical o u tlin e is so irreg u lar in its co u rse as to defeat p re -a d ju stm e n ts o n o u r p a rt, an d to d e m a n d a b ru p t changes for w hich we are u n p re p are d , it is disagreeable. O n th e o th er h a n d , a gently flow ing curve is agreeable, o f course, if the figure is to o sim ple it will be a lm o st n e u tra l in feeling-tone, b u t w hen it is a t once com plex and graceful, it m ay give rise to co n sid erab le p leasure. M a rk ed d isp leasu re occurs w hen sufficient regularity is p resen t to c rea te a p re -a d ju stm e n t w hich o th er c o n d itio n s d isa p p o in t. T he experience is also u n p lea sa n t w hen ow ing to th e sim plicity o r m o n o to n o u s rep e titio n o f the object, a tte n tio n is n o t sufficiently occupied. In this case an active tendency is th w a rte d because it d o es n o t find a d e q u a te m aterial for its exercise. O f c o u rse, w h at is to o sim ple o r to o com plex for one p e rso n m ay n o t be to o sim ple o r to o com plex fo r a n o th e r .11
Similar revival o f m otor activity according to Croce occurs in our apprecia tion o f the objects of a r t .12
This revival of m otor activity is especially striking as we pointed out, in the deep em otional life and particularly am ong neurotic people. Such people sometimes feel a strong dislike for someone whom they know only slightly, and with great difficulty restrain within themselves certain instinctive m otor reactions; such as scratching their face or beating them. In the case of obsession for instance, the mere sight o f a knife suggests killing, and subjects suffering from such an obsession are horrified by their m otor association, even if they have not the slightest desire to kill anybody. Some very religious people, at the sight o f holy pictures or figures, are tempted to knock them from the altar, or seeing a collection made in the church, are too frightened to steal any money from the plate.
In many phobias the same happens. Someone at the sight o f a precipice has the impression that it is only thanks to the effort o f his voluntary
11 S to u t, M a n u a l o f P sychology, ed. 1901, pp. 290-291. 12 See S upplem ent.
P erception and its K in a esth etic Origin 21
will that he does not throw himself into its depths. People suffering from claustrophobia do not attend any public meeting, because the sight o f a big crowd suggests to them the idea o f being immediately crushed. But even in our m ost comm on experiences it is difficult for a lover at the sight of the face of his beloved to refrain from kissing her, or at the sight o f his enemy to refrain from attacking him.
U nder deep em otional stresses these natural reactions directed to m otor discharge are so accentuated that even what are otherwise the m ost indifferent objects engage our feelings as if they were our personal friends or enemies, and suggest the corresponding m otor attitude.
Here is the lively scene from De Quincey’s, The Confessions o f an
English Opium-Eater, describing his last m om ent before he runs away from
his school in search o f adventure.
I shed tea rs as I lo o k ed ro u n d o n th e ch air, h e a rth , w ritin g table, an d o th e r fa m iliar objects, k n o w in g to o c ertain ly th a t I lo o k ed u p o n th em for th e last tim e. W hilst I w rite this, it is nin eteen years ag o ; and yet, at th is m o m en t, I see, as if it were y esterd ay , the lin eam en ts an d expressions o f th e object on w hich I fixed m y p a rtin g gaze. It w as the p ictu re o f a lovely lady, w hich h u n g over th e m an tle piece; th e eyes an d m o u th o f w hich w ere so b eau tifu l, so ra d ia n t w ith d ivine tra n q u ility , th a t I h a d a th o u s a n d tim es laid dow n m y p en , o r m y b o o k , to g ath e r c o n so la tio n from it, as a d ev o tee fro m his p a tr o n saint. W hilst I was yet gazing u p o n it, th e deep to n es o f th e o ld c h u rc h clock p ro c la im e d th a t it was six o ’clock. I w ent u p to the p ictu re, kissed it, th en gently w alked o u t an d closed th e d o o r for e v e r ! 13
In this description we see that the em otional stress reached such a pitch that the author not only anim ated the objects with his life o f feelings, but gave outlet to his reaction, actually kissing the picture.
In idolatry the inanim ate objects seem to play the part o f the outlet for m otor reactions as we know from the writings o f the anthropologists who describe, for instance, the very widespread custom in China o f beating the idols when they do not answer favourably to a request for goods.
This kind of reaction seems to be only the natural result o f the m otor character o f perception.
S U P P L E M E N T
William James considers that so called “idea-m otor action” is typical of all actions and that the exceptions to this rule are due to “an antagonistic representation present simultaneously to the m ind” .
Answering the question: “Is the bare idea of a m ovem ent’s sensible effects its sufficient mental cue, or m ust there be an additional mental antecedent, in the shape o f a fiat, decision, consent, volitional m andate, or other synonymous phenom enon o f consciousness, before the movement can follow?” 14 he says:
13 D e Q uincey T ., The C onfessions o f an English O pium -E ater, P re fa to ry n o tice, X IX . 14 Jam es, Principles o f P sychology, V ol. II, p. 522.
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I a n s w e r: S om etim es the b a re id ea is sufficient, b u t som etim es an ad d itio n al elem ent, in th e sh ap e o f a fiat, m an d a te, o r express c o n sen t, h as to in terv en e a n d p re ce d e the m o v em en t. T h e cases w ith o u t fiat c o n stitu te th e m o re fu n d a m e n ta l, because th e m o re sim ple, variety. T h e o th e rs involve a special co m p lica tio n . . . W henever m o v em en t follow s un h esitatin g ly a n d im m ediately th e n o tio n in the m ind, we h av e id eo -m o to r actio n . W e are th en aw are o f n o th in g betw een th e c o n c e p tio n an d th e execution. A ll so rts o f n eu ro -m u scu lar processes c o m e betw een, o f co u rse, b u t we k n o w a b so lu tely n o th in g o f th em . W e th in k th e act, a n d it is d o n e ; a n d th a t is all th a t in tro sp e c tio n tells us o f the m a t t e r .15
Pointing out that there is not any necessity, neither is there introspective evidence for the feeling o f innervation, claimed by the other authors, he says that: “An anticipatory im a g e ... o f the sensorial consequences of a movement, plus (on certain occasions) the fiat that these consequences shall become actual, is the only psychic state which introspection lets us discern as the fore-runner of our voluntary acts.”
James includes among these “anticipatory images o f the sensorial conse quences o f a m ovem ent” the impressions which he calls after Dr. Bastian, “Kinaesthetic impressions”, the impressions coming up from the parts which are actually moved. He considers th at the anticipation of all these impres sions is a sufficient condition for achieving a movement.
All these impressions, or rather, as James calls them, m otor ideas, origina ted according to him as the result o f many movements which were involuntary.
Even if we agree with James that voluntary movements are not prim ary functions o f our organism, we disagree with him that they originated from unconscious movements.
On the contrary, we believe the every movement was “conscious” in the vaguest sense o f this word, being “felt” whenever it met resistance, and that the reviving o f these “felt” movements lies at the basis of voluntary movements.
This prim ary experience we call “pure m otor experience” as it does not yet imply any presentation which is necessary when we make a voluntary movements. This “pure m otor experience” is, in our belief, the prototype o f all voluntary movements. This “pure m otor experience” belongs to the stage when it is impossible to talk about “consciousness” or “unconsciousness”, b ut is “felt” and not autom atic. The p ro o f that it could not be “autom atic” is that through these prim ary “pure m otor experiences” we achieved choices (or rather our ancestors in the animal stage of life), according to the resistance which was met.
If it had been autom atic we could not have achieved these choices in our “trial and error” attem pts as autom atic actions consist in the repetition o f the same. On the other hand, it could not be “voluntary” as we had not yet all the mental equipm ent necessary in order to represent to ourselves a movement.
P erception and its K in a esth etic Origin 23
Similarly as this prim ary “pure m otor experience” has a dynamic cha racter expressing our needs (or the lack o f balance in the organism), so our voluntary movements possess the similar dynamics. The anticipation o f the sense-data in voluntary movements is a p a rt o f the revival o f the feeling o f being active in a concrete situation.
B IB L IO G R A P H Y
A N ew A nthology o f M odern Verse, 1920-1940, selected by C . D a y Lew is a n d L. A. G . Strong. A lex an d er, Space, T im e and D eity, Vol. II, L o n d o n 1920.-
B ergson H ., M a tter a n d M em o ry, L o n d o n 1929.
B erkeley G ., Selections fr o m B erkeley, ed. by A. C am p b ell F raser, O x fo rd 1891* B erkeley G ., P rinciples o f H um an Knowledge.
C o n ra d J., The M irror o f the Sea, 3rd. ed.
D e Q uincey T ., The C onfessions o f an English O pium -Eater. D ew ey J., H um an N a tu re and C onduct, N ew Y ork.
F ra z er J. G ., The Golden Bough, pt. IV, L o n d o n 1911. Jam es W ., Principles o f P sychology, Vol. II, L o n d o n 1890.
Shelley P. B., Poem s fr o m Shelley, selected by O lw en W. C am p b ell, L o n d o n 1925. S to u t G ., A M anual o f P sychology, L o n d o n 1901.
W itw icki W ., P sychologia, Vol. II, W arsaw 1925. S u p p lem en t
A lex an d er, B ea u ty a n d O ther Forms o f Value, L o n d o n 1923.
W h iteh ead A. N ., Sym bolism , Its M eaning and E ffect, C a m b rid g e 1928.
