Grzegorz Lewicki
Dostoyevsky Extended : Aldous
Huxley on the Grand Inquisitor,
Specialisation and the Future of
Science
Kultura i Polityka : zeszyty naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Europejskiej im. ks. Józefa Tischnera w Krakowie nr 2/3, 210-233
DOSTOYEVSKY EXTENDED:
ALDOUS HUXLEY ON THE GRAND INQUISITOR,
SPECIALISATION AND THE FUTURE OF SCIENCE
Knowledge alone will teach us (...), that man in fact does not have and never had neither will, nor wants, but is in fact something like a piano key, or an organ pin; that there are laws of nature beyond the world; and everything that man does is not happening in accordance with his will, but just happens, in accordance with the laws of nature. It is sufficient to discover these laws of nature and man will cease to be re sponsible for his deeds, and will lead his life with ease.
Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Notes from the Underground
1. Introduction
Aldous Huxley’s B rave N ew World (BNW ) rem ains one o f the m ost im por
tant books o f the tw entieth century. The phrase “brave n ew w orld” is rooted deeply in our culture: if one searches for it in academ ic databases or the Inter net, thousands o f results will appear, w hich are connected n ot necessarily to H u xley’s w ork itself, but to spheres ranging from the on-line cataloguing sys tems, entomology, economic innovations, developm ent o f genetics, information sciences, medical technologies or social sciences1. The secret o f this popularity stem s m ost likely from the conviction am ong readers that the course o f histo ry tends tow ards the reality presented in BNW, m aking the novel an adequate point o f reference. The readers seem to believe that even if one cannot be sure w hether the biological alteration o f the hum an race will be stim ulated by state or by private actors, one thing is clear at the beginning o f the tw enty-first cen
* Grzegorz Lewicki, politolog, dziennikarz, absolwent stosunkówmiędzynarodowych w Wyższej Szkole Euro pejskiej im. Józefa Tischnera w Krakowie isocjologii nauki w U niversiteit M aastricht (Holandia). Obecnie stu dent filozofii (UJ). W latach 2003-2006 kierow nik krakow skiego oddziału Instytutu Badań nad Cywilizacjam i; w spółautor raportów dla M SZ (m.in. Civil Caucasus, 2007), obserw ator n a Kom isji ONZ ds. Z rów now ażonego Rozw oju w N ow ym Jorku.
tury: the technological shift has already started and is likely to continue rapidly (see: Fukuyam a, 2004; K urzw eil, 2000, 2005; N aisbitt 1990, 2003; also: sec tion 6 o f this paper).
T h roughout his lifetim e H uxley w rote three futu ristic novels, o f w hich B N W was the first. A fter the publication o f B N W in 1932 cam c A p e and Es
sence (1948) w ith his final novel Island being published in 1962 (see: H uxley
1992, 2004, 2004b). As R.T. Sion puts it: “Brave New World shows how mental conditioning and drugs can produce a m indless society devoid o f hum an values. In Ape and Essence a nuclear w ar causes m ankind to degenerate into ruthless animals. Only in Island, the m ost idyllic o f these utopian novels, has hum anity learned to accept those technologies that prom ote hum an advancem ent and to discard all others” (Sion, 1999: IE )2.
It should be noted that H uxley’s scientific inspirations so far did not receive enough attention from the historical perspective3. Peter Firchow ’s article (1975) later incorporated into the literary study o f Brave New World (1984, reviewed: Fjellm an, 1985) still rem ains an extrem ely useful source o f reference w hen exam ining H u xley ’s antipathy tow ard the ideology o f Freudianism . U nfortu nately, it show s no w ider context o f the debate on science and society. The lack o f a broader contextualisation seems to rem ain an intellectual gap in stud ies on H uxley w ho from the great synthesis o f his fears presented in B N W up to the philosophical publications and last essays, was concerned with the social im pact o f technology and the m oral lag betw een science and society - the h u m an inability to use technological capacities w isely (com. Baker, 2001: 37).
2. Huxley’s Image of Science - Inspirations
W hen one searches through historical sources it is som etim es striking to find that all o f th e crucial issues raised in B N W w ere actually w idely dis
2 The evolution o f thought is clearly visible: (1) from the m erely dystopian novel ( B N W ) , w ith its passive vision o f state-controlled society, H uxley w ent on in A p e a n d Essence (A a E ) to reflect on the situation o f hu m anity devastated by the atom ic bom b, where only som e refugees have the w illingness and courage to establish society anew, to his final novel, in w hich the com plete image o f an isolated, happy society is presented (Island). Respectively, other ideas also evolved: (2) from the pure pessim ism o f B N W , via a m ix o f pessim ism and op tim ism in A a E (Sion, 1999: 159) to the final set o f clues for hum anity, allow ing it to live in peace in Island; (3) from the satire o f the drug-happy culture in B N W to the acknowledgement o f the wise use o f drugs as the gate w ay to the ultim ate reality in Island; (4) from the rejection o f the possibility o f change ( B N W ) , through its ac know ledgem ent in A a E to the description o f possible change (individual, spiritual self-perfection and a som e w hat pantheistic worldview); (5) from harnessing science and technology to establish and determine the fate o f hum anity ( B N W ) , through a reflection on the destructive pow ers o f technology (AeE), to the superiority o f the quality o f hum an life over som e aspects o f technological progress (p. 178).
or acquaintances. Som e o f the critics even w ondered “if H uxley put any orig inal ideas into his book” (Thody, 1974: 50-51). H uxley’s ideas allegedly come from the works o f J.B.S. H aldane and Bertrand Russell in term s o f science and technology and M athew Arnold, Eugene Zam iatin, H.G. W ells, Dostoyevsky, Shakespeare, and Einstein w hen it comes to literary form and his perception o f m etaphysics4.
W hereas the accusation o f filching literary inspiration constitutes a com m on experience o f fam ous w riters5 and is hard to disprove since every w riter assim ilates the piles o f literature from different periods throughout his life, the accusations o f pilfering the perspectives o f science and technology can be scru tinised, as the scope o f analysis will be narrower.
The study o f H uxley ’s biography reveals that Julian H uxley, A ld o us’ older brother, was probably the one who influenced his ideas on science the most. He was a successful scientist and surely was an authority and inspiration for the young Aldous, who wanted to follow his footsteps and becom e a doctor6. H ow ever, Julian never m entioned this fact and em phasises his adm iration for his brother as an independent researcher o f scientific knowledge. As to Brave New
World, he claimed elsewhere that Aldous never asked him to help with the novel
(J. Huxley, 1965: 22). H e also recalled som e situations w hen it w as A ldous who made him fam iliar with the latest research results (J. Huxley, 1978 II: 167).
J.B.S H aldane, a geneticist, evolutionary biologist, visionary socialist and Julian’s collaborator also influenced the young A ldous w ho lived in H aldane’s parental house, Cherwell, during his first y ear in Oxford (Firchow, 1975: 305). Even i f this influence w as initially indirect it is logical that the flow o f ideas betw een H aldane and A ldous took place before the 1920’s through the discus sions o f the H uxley brothers. It is a sim ilar case w ith B ertrand R ussell, a ph i losopher and m athem atician w ho frequently m et H uxley in the late stages o f w ar (p. 305, see also: Dunaw ay).
The table below juxtaposes Brave New World with other published literary works which at least partially cover its content when it comes to technological foresight.
4 Com m on features o f some science-fiction utopias are elaborated in Szacki, 2000.
5 Jacek K aczmarski, Polish poet, encapsulated this phenom enon in a poem describing his discussion w ith the muse (entitled: “Do Muzy suplikacja przy ostrzeniu pióra” [“A Supplication to the Muse while Sharpening a Quill”]).
“You are the daughter o f m an ’s m em ory So m any poem s are rem em bered G atherings o f wise m en will tell me
W hich m y phrase from where has been tak en ”.
Brave New Worldand some other literary works containing a similar image of science Year 1921 1923 1923 1931 1932 Name Aldous Huxley J.B.S. Haldane H.G. Wells Bertrand Russell Aldous Huxley Title Crome Yellow Daedalus Men Like Gods Scientific Outlook Brave New World
Table I, based on: Firchow, 1975,1976
In Crome Yellow H uxley anticipated m any o f the ideas later incorporated into BNW, concerning the physiological and psychological control o f the so ciety. One o f the characters in the novel envisions a future, w hen state incuba tors will exist and people will be m ade in bottles; the population will be bred in accordance w ith the needs o f the current w orld situation; the fam ily system w ill vanish, sex w ill be separated from reproduction. H e also develops the principle o f The R ational State w hich resem bles caste separation and condi tioning in B N W (Firchow, 1975: 304). It seem s these ideas w ere taken from J.B.S. H aldane, w ho in his 1923 essay (the substance o f w hich dates back as far as 19127) Daedalus, or Science and the Future put a small science-fiction re portage called: “ extracts from an essay on the influence o f biology on history during 20th century”, w ritten from the perspective o f a student living in the future. Sim ilarly to Crome Yellow, it introduces ectogenesis (in vitro breeding), elaborates on the social effects o f behaviourism and psychology, free sex, the decline o f religion, the abolition o f disease, the possibilities o f the w orld state and hopes that biologists m ay educate society by enabling it to use science w isely (see: H aldane, 1924).
One y ear later B ertrand R ussell published Icarus, a pessim istic answ er to
Daedalus (Russell, 1924) and continued the topic in subsequent years, publish
ing inter alia The Scientific Outlook in 1932 (a few m onths before the publica tion o f BN W ), w here he spoke o f keeping people happy by chem ical means, the central control o f access to high culture (e.g. licenses for reading Shake speare), the exterm ination o f non-reconditionable citizens and a strict intellec
tual hierarchy (Firchow, 1975: 308). Similar ideas are to be found among other science-fiction w riters and philosophers o f the tim es (e.g. W ells, 1923)8.
It seem s that w hereas Julian was A ldous’ first scientific educator, H aldane was the supplier o f all illum inating vision, the fram ew ork o f w hich A ldous re flected to develop a new, enhanced one on his own. O f course, this conclusion does not preclude the possibility that the final version o f Daedalus w as the re sult o f com m on discussions o f all three gentlem en (Lew icki, 2007). M o reo ver, it testifies that the ideas synthesised by H uxley in B N W w ere very m uch in the air in the 2 0 ’s, regardless o f w hose im agination pictured them first. O f particular note, none o f the involved intellectuals seem to have ever publicly claim ed that Brave N ew World extensively borrow s from any o f th eir works (see: Firchow, 1975: 302). C onsidering A ld ou s’ friendship w ith H aldane and R ussell, it is likely that they understated their influence on him to give credit to their young pupil, who developed their com m on vision.
3. Huxley’s Inequations
3.1. Huxley as Realist
The im age o f science in B N W is not as straightforw ard as it m ay at first seem. A lthough the m ajority o f readers will definitely consider it to be gloomy, it should be know n that this kind o f assessm ent carries som e inherent liberal presuppositions typical for the m odem W estern state o f mind. The principle o f freed om is p h ilo so p h ically flexible (see: e.g. O rtega, 2004); the question whether freedom is objective (realism) or subjective and dependent on the con sciousness (nominalism) cannot be answered here, but it is clear that the m odem reader blam ing the drug-happy B N W society for the lack o f freedom implicitly opts for realism (as nom inalists w ould say the happiness o f B N W cannot be false, as this statem ent w ould assum e the external criterion o f judg em ent)9.
8 H.G. W ells, w ho knew th at BN W w as originally intended to be a satiric answ er for his M e n Like Gods, never claim ed H uxley w as plagiarising him , as they both w ere probably taking scientific know ledge from the same sources. In fact, he felt deeply offended by the book, accusing H uxley o f m isunderstanding o f his thought. B N W was surely a good piece o f literature, as W ell’s aversion tow ards H uxley is said to have lasted m ore than ten years (Firchow, 1976: 262). M e n Like Gods, a utopian novel, developed an idea o f a future, happy, sponta neously hierarchical society, w ith individuals doing physical and intellectual w ork in turns and w ith the volun tary aristocracy on the top (pp. 263-264). Huxley, fearing th at people m ay try to im plem ent such and idea, rid icules it in BNW by show ing it is based on the false anthropological assum ptions. In letters from the period o f his w ork on BNW, H uxley claim ed explicitly th at his aim was to expose the “horror o f the W ellsian U topia” and th at “a ll’s w ell th at ends W ells” (quoted in Firchow, 1976: 260-261, 278).
M oreover, his evaluation is based on a com plete know ledge o f the world, som ething w hich ordinary citizens o f B N W do not have. Throughout the book the reader is introduced to the concept o f conditioning and m ade aware o f the existence o f islands for the deconditioned, so he acquires a bird-eyes-v iew w hich allows him to stigm atise the universal happiness as false. N evertheless, the question rem ains: is an individual, deprived o f know ledge about the lack o f certain possibilities, objectively enslaved or is this statem ent only true in the eyes o f an external observer, w ho has this know ledge10? Is freedom a rela tive, or objective concept? H uxley clearly opted for the latter. This problem re-em erged m any tim es during H uxley’s lifetim e and was one o f the m ain are as o f philosophical debate in the realm o f science in society.
3.2. First Inequation - Happiness opposed to Truth
This philosophical undertone is also crucial when it comes to understanding the im age o f science in BNW , w hich is inseparable from H u x le y ’s assum p tions about hum ans. The latter are w rapped around the utilitarian conviction that people value happiness over freedom. H uxley considered universal hap piness and universal freedom to be contradictory ideas. The free pursuit o f an ancient philosophical triad o f values (Truth, G oodness, Beauty) always results in pain and will not give ultimate happiness to an individual. Therefore, the uni versal inequation, as H uxley im plies, is: H appiness ^ Truth, Goodness, B eau ty. One can choose only one side o f the inequation simultaneously, never both11. It is very probable that H uxley found this idea in D ostoy evsky ’s Brothers
Karamazov, as in 1912, w hen H uxley w as 18, the first E nglish translation o f
the book (by C onstance G arnett) was published, starting the period o f D o s toyevsky ’s profound influence on the artistic consciousness in B ritain (Kaye,
1999: 1), forcing B ritish novelists to either adm ire or hate the R ussian writer. Huxley, as a future ‘m an o f letters’ m ust have been interested in these trends. E ven i f he did n o t read th e book then m any o f his friends (like D.H . L aw rence) did so and m ay have exposed him to the ideas found within its pages12. m ore on the quality o f this external reality, which is ideal, constant, non negotiable. In the same vein “nom inalism ” indicates the relevance o f nam es and th e ir subjective validity, w hereas “m aterialism ” on the priority o f the judgem ents based on the m aterial senses, not external abstractions. Some sources, w hen discussing H uxley’s at titude use different terminology. In this text the dichotom y realism -nom inalism will be kept. Philosophically, one can distinguish m any types o f nom inalism and realism - this is no t o f great im portance in this essay, though.
10 I f one accepted the form er answer, every child should be deem ed to som e extent enslaved by the genetic m aterial and social circum stances inherited from the parents, i f the latter, the BNW society is genuinely happy and free (as freedom is the m atter o f subjective feeling).
11 “Inequation” (^) is a m athem atical term th at describes a lack o f equality. It is used in this paper as a m et aphor o f the friction and lack o f coherence in term s o f some values/group o f qualities, w hich are opposed to each other. I f one chooses the form er, the attainm ent o f the latter becom es im possible and vice versa.
N evertheless, it is certain that the above-m entioned inequation (a prerequi site o f the social order in BN W ) is to be found in the “L egend o f the G rand In quisitor”, a chapter from D ostoyevski’s Brothers Karamazov. Huxley sum m aris es the concept in Brave New World Revisited (1958), an essay w hich concluded that the m odem w orld is closer and closer to the reality described in BNW. A c cording to the parable m an will be ultim ately freed from the liberty he could nev er cope w ith in history, receiving in exchange happiness. The G rand In quisitor, who oversees hum anity, arrests a returning Christ for leading hum an ity into m isery and explains the rationale for the introduction o f paradise on earth. C h rist’s greatest fau lt is th at he p ro m ised transcendence to m an and granted him the freedom o f choice betw een good and evil, but did not prepare him to choose well. The In qu isito r argues that i f G od w as truly loving and pow erful, H e w ould not have given m an the capacity to cause unspeakable suffering along w ith beauty and good. The m ost unhappy person in the future w orld will be the Inquisitor him self, w ho controls hum anity and is aw are o f hum an flaws. Thus, for his ow n responsibility he sacrifices the freedom given to hum anity by G od for the sake o f a stable universal existence and public sensational happiness. Christ w ould be dangerous in such a society (see also: Rozankow, 2004).
“The sort o f table m ay be created, and indeed it will occur that w e shape our needs in accordance w ith this table” (D ostoyevsky, 1992: 26) said D o s toy ev sky’s character in Notes from the Underground, who regarded “sharpened consciousness” and individuality as a kind o f sensational sickness that will cease to exist with the advance o f knowledge. H uxley takes this D ostoyevsky’s fear o f the potential deconstruction o f will a bit further by nam ing “the table” and show ing that the key o f control in the hands o f the G rand Inquisitor will be science and technology: “The older dictators fell because they could never supply their subjects with enough bread, enough circuses, enough m iracles and m ysteries. N or did they possess a really effective system o f m ind-m anipula- tion” . H itherto efforts to ensure stability w ere alw ays insufficient, there were no appropriate technologies, P la to ’s ideal R epublic did not com e tru e 13. H o w
13 The advantages o f servitude and to talitarian organisation have long been known. W hen Plato w rote his
Republic (see: Plato, 2006), he uttered the thought th at the pragm atic state m ay have some totalitarian features
ever, in a future “ruled by a scientific dictator education will really w ork - with the result that m ost m en and w om en will grow up to love their servitude and will never dream o f revolution” (Huxley, 1958). W hereas D ostoyevsky curses the future epoch in advance (see: Shestov, 1987: 80) w ithout describing it, H uxley paints its suggestive picture.
It is an exclusively hum an rational decision w hich causes the em ergence o f BNW: H uxley never blam ed technology itself. It is the capacity for evil which should be feared; science is neither exclusively positive n or negative in his eyes. Technology m ay be evil in principle (e.g. atom ic bom b) but it is hum ans w ho chose to create it. As m an is an am biguous creature, his creations are in principle the same.
3.3. Second Inequation - Pure Science opposed to Applied Science
H aving in m ind First Inequation, Huxley claims that happiness and the triad o f suprem e values cannot be attained simultaneously. Science can progress to w ard only one o f these goals, leaving the other aside. F o r centuries people could not decide w hich path they should follow and pursued truth and beauty, but dream ed o f happiness at the sam e tim e, or vice versa. In B N W the choice has been m ade for the ever indecisive hum ans: happiness was chosen, not ar bitrarily, but in accordance with the will o f the majority: “W henever the m ass es seized political power, then it was happiness rather than truth and beauty th at m attered” - justifies the regim e W orld C ontroller (Huxley, 2004: 201). Freedom and truth w ere lost, b u t stability and jo y w ere given in exchange. H igh culture, religion and history w ere suppressed as they cause unease and their final goal is alw ays truth, the phantom w hich stim ulates but does not sa tiate. A steady, carefully-conditioned, predictable com m unity-life trium phed over spontaneity and unpredictable individualism .
gone on controlling ever since. It h a sn ’t been very good for truth, o f course. B ut it’s been very good for happiness. One c an ’t have som ething for nothing. H appiness has got to be paid for” (pp. 29, 201).
A fter the w ar science concentrated on ensuring happiness. The elite real ised that pure science, conducted w ithout reflecting on its potential, utilitarian future role in society, but only for the sake o f truth and the imperative o f progress w ould be detrim ental to their efforts. Finally, equilibrium was reached: social stability attained by satisfying hum an needs com bined w ith the abolition o f m etaphysical fears. Paradoxically, science gave hum anity the freedom to take freedom aw ay from the m ajority. T hanks to genetics and behaviourist p sy chology m ass m anipulation becam e possible for the sake o f happiness.
Therefore, H u x ley ’s Second Inequation m ay be presented as: Pure Science ^ A pplied Science. The latter is the application o f science done or social pur pose, science w hich is harnessed for the sake o f the society.
4. Analysis of the Image
In accordance w ith the already described am biguity o f hum an being, the im age o f science presented in B N W is also am biguous (Table II):
SOCIALISED/APPLIED Science in the Society of BNW (1) associated with: (2) opposed to: Happiness (relative, not objective)
Stability Materialism Community Values and Purpose Predictability
Pragmatism and Specialisation
Truth Freedom Spiritualism Individualism Disinterestedness Spontaneity
High culture (Humanism), Religion, History
Knowledge, Progress
(are controlled but allowed in some spheres o f scientific inquiry)
Table II
H uxley rejects the subjective m eaning o f happiness, im plicitly associating true happiness w ith the freedom o f choice betw een spiritualistic and m aterial istic values, p erso nally ad vocating the m oderate attitude. This conclusion com es to m ind w hen one analyses the fate o f the three nonconform ists in the novel, above all that o f the Savage. H aving rejected m aterialistic values and opted for spiritualism , after the m eeting w ith the W orld C ontroller he is even tually tem pted by a group orgy and com m its suicide afterw ards. In contrast to this, other tw o find th eir w ay in the B N W reality. B oth B ernard M a rx ’s and H elm holtz W atson’s experience “parallels that o f the Savage, though w ithout any o f the S avage’s intensity o f feeling” (com. Firchow, 1975: 314)14. The or igins o f their unorthodoxy are different though: M arx desires acceptance within B N W w hile W atson’s dissatisfaction stem s from intuitions about the existence o f transcendence. A fter know ing the truth about the sources o f stability during their discussion w ith M ustapha M ond, they both are sent into exile on an is lan d 15. In contrast to H elm holtz, who accepts his fate, M arx in a paroxysm o f despair begs M ond on his knees to change his m ind and is eventually carried out by force. It seem s that sanity and a steady life in B N W is im possible when one is too individual16.
B earing in m ind the First Inequation, the W orld C ontroller deem s spiritu alism in its all form s to be pulling hum anity tow ards the ultim ate truths o f ex istence (Religion, H igh Culture and therefore also H istory) and thus disruptive and incapable o f serving stability. Searching for truth stim ulates individualism and unpredictable behaviour that cannot be controlled w ith the usage o f stand ard physiological and p sychological schem es available to the W orld State thanks to the progress o f science and technology. A ccording to the schem e the state “ can tolerate sensation bu t nev er feeling” (Firchow, 1975: 315), small and prim itive feelings based on the im perative o f consumption, but not deeper, liberating incentives w hich disrupt the already-engineered order.
The controllers are aware that, in contrast to physiological satisfaction o f hum an instincts, th eir sublim ation and creative harnessing alw ays leads to spontaneity and the search for truth (Firchow, 1975: 314). This in turn leads to cultural progress and the creation o f high culture, w hich actually ceased to
14 The nam e o f H elm holtz W atson is laden w ith meaning, alluding to tw o fam ous physiologists: H erm ann von H elm holtz, the G erm an physiologist, and J.B. W atson, the founding father o f behaviorism .
15 The nam e “M ustapha” refers to M ustapha Kemal A taturk (Meckier, 2002: 430), the world-fam ous Turkish statesm an who started the revolutionary process o f the m odernisation and rationalisation o f Turkey in the 2 0 ’s (the separation o f the state from religion, laicisation etc.), w hich required radical m eans to be im plem ented in a deeply religious Turkish society. L ast nam e “M ond” alludes in turn to A lfred M ond (Lord M elchett), a Z ion ist and a m em ber o f a distinguished scientific and financial family, who w as the head o f Imperial Chem ical In dustries (1926), probably the second largest privately ow n corporation in the w orld at the tim e.
be necessary in BNW. C ivilization reached its peak as it ensured happiness for everybody - further progress is obsolete. The pursuit for truth carries a d e structive and unpredictable charge w hich in the n ew w orld rem ains hidden thanks to the lack o f spiritualism . As feelings blossom in the period betw een the occurrence o f desires and their satisfaction, B N W society has to be kept busy. In other w ords, the scientifically acquired social equilibrium has to be constantly sustained and cared for. A pplied science, in the hands o f a ruling m inority, is favoured: “the creation o f highly organized and regim ented soci ety, w hose m em bers exhibit a m inim um o f personal peculiarities, and whose collective behaviour is governed by a single m aster plan im posed from above” (Huxley, 1946: 35). An “orthodox theory o f cooking” (a scientific know ledge o f m an), m ade the creation o f the universal cookbook possible, w hich “p ro duces food for the belly but not for the m ind - technology, not science” (Firchow, 1975: 314).
The distinction betw een “applied science” (H uxley’s definition o f technolo gy) and “pure science” im plies that through the p rocess o f application for cer tain social purposes science is being socialised. Thus, etym ologically “applied science” is very close to “socialised science”, w hich reveals H ux ley’s concern w ith the lack o f value-neutrality in technology, highlighted by m any scholars (see: Tiles, 1995; Cutcliffe, 2000).
It also seem s that, for H uxley, tech n o log y serves m aterialist purposes, w hereas pure science caters for the spiritual. This opposition is at least su g gested by some passages in BNW. A lthough the C ontroller believes in God, he claim s that now adays H e m anifests H im se lf in H is absence (Huxley, 2004: 206), as “ G od isn ’t com patible w ith m achinery and scientific m edicine and universal happiness. You m ust m ake yo u r choice. O ur civilization has chosen m achinery and m edicine and happiness” (p. 207). Spiritual values are in some w ay contrary to m achinery, happiness and biological tinkering w ith hum an; thus religion cannot be reconciled w ith scientific progress17.
O f particular interest is that m any o f the qualities that socialised science is opposed to are in fact associated w ith pure science: the im age o f pure science is to som e extent the m irror im age o f socialised science. In contrast to social ised science, pure science is associated w ith Truth, Freedom , Individualism and Spontaneity, but threatens H appiness Stability, C om m unity and Predicta bility. Truth on the one side, H appiness on the other, in accordance w ith the F irst Inequation.
W hy did socialised science trium ph over the pure? Because, as the m ateri alist paradise has been successfully engineered thanks to socialised science, “w e don’t w ant to change. Every change is a menace to stability. T h at’s anoth
er reason w hy w e ’re so chary o f applying n e w inventions. Every discovery in pure science is potentially subversive; even science m ust som etim es be treated as a possible enem y” (Huxley, 2004: 198). By saying so, the W orld Controller im plies that the technologically aware elites are carefully choosing the paths o f developm ent, as technological progress is always path-dependent and a lack o f control will alw ays bring harm. O f note is the fact that he does not elabo rate on the possibilities o f dim inishing the m oral lag, created by the uneven speed o f technological and m oral advancem ent, o f w hich the form er exceeds the latter. H e already assum ed that they will never harm onise and potentially destructive technologies will finally find their application in reality (this is a re ference to the w orldview held in 1920 by B ritish conservatives)18.
The im perative o f stability and happiness also serves as the basis for stig m atising some technologies being o f no use: “Technically, it would be perfectly simple to reduce all lower-caste w orking hours to three or four a day. B ut would they be any the happier for that? No, they w ouldn’t. The experim ent was tried, m ore than a century and a h a lf ago. The w hole o f Ireland w as p ut on to the four-hour day. W hat w as the result? U nrest and a large increase in the con sum ption o f soma; that w as all. Those three and a h a lf hours o f extra leisure w ere so far from being a source o f happiness, that people felt constrained to take a holiday from th em ” (p. 197). The balance betw een leisure and w ork should not be interfered with.
W hen the behavioural aurea mediocritas19 is disrupted and the m asses have too m uch tim e, they either increase consum ption or lose the feeling o f self-sat- isfaction. In B N W technologies do not serve “the m agic circle o f leisure” (Or tega, 1961: 117) anym ore, they are n o t devoted to supplying hum anity w ith additional leisure or personal freedom. They serve the opposite purpose: they are devoted to ensure “no leisure from pleasure” and the equilibrium betw een consum ption and production. Only science w hich serves stability (the technol ogy o f breeding, socialisation and am usem ent) is being researched: “We d o n’t allow it to deal w ith any but the m ost im m ediate problem s o f the m oment. All other enquiries are m ost sedulously discouraged. I t ’s curious... to read w hat people in the tim e o f O ur Ford used to w rite about scientific progress. They seem ed to have im agined that it could be allow ed to go on indefinitely, regard
18 C oherent action in relation to technology requires a certain universal set o f values and laws, w hich ex
ist in the hierarchically controlled BNW, but will probably no t exist in the real world, taking into account the va riety o f civilisations capable o f technological advancem ent (Chinese civilisation m ay serve as the exam ple o f a com pletely different set o f values, where the im plem entation o f BN W logic w ould not m eet w ith m oral dilem mas). Thus, H uxley’s dream uttered in later novels and essays, th at potentially harm ful technologies will be uni versally abandoned is very likely to be w ishful thinking. “Internationally organised science” th at he suggests in
Science L iberty a n d Peace (Huxley, 1946: 77) is at present tim es unlikely.
less o f everything else” (Huxley, 2004: 200)20. T hat is w hy the notions o f K now ledge and Progress are put into a separate, overlapping area in Table IT. although they are not suprem e values in BNW , progress is allow ed, but only in the carefully selected areas o f biology, w hich are devoid o f any potential threat to the equilibrium.
R esearch is being done by the m em bers o f higher castes; it is in fact the routine science controlled by the authorities. Scientists dreaming o f pure science, not confined to the official directives m ight be deconditioned because o f their free, disinterested pursuit. The W orld controller h im self used to be a physicist, who realised that the B N W science “is ju st a cookery book, w ith an orthodox theory o f cooking that nobo dy ’s allow ed to question, and a list o f recipes that m ustn’t be added to except by special perm ission from the head cook” (p. 198). W hen the authorities realised his naughtiness, he was given a choice: to jo in them or to be sent to an island, w here he could live am ong the other “too self consciously individual” inhabitants and m ake pure science, but w ithout any hope for its m ass im plem entation.
It is significant that B N W does not need hum anists. As w ith pure science, hum anism and high culture can decondition and disrupt stability. Three people who finally m eet the W orld Controller because o f their disobedience are Bernard M arx (a scientist) the Savage (the naturally b o m prim itive from reservation park, who read Shakespeare), and H elm holtz W atson (a journalist, who likes solitude, w hich m akes him odd in the eyes o f the m ajority)21. This conclusion is especially significant w hen tracing H u x ley ’s opinion about specialisation and hum anism .
To sum up, it is clearly visible that science and technology, w hen controlled and socialised, support the regime However, pure science has the same liberating potential as hum anism and high culture.
5. Specialisation - Humanism
O ne scholar claim s th at “H uxley caricatured H.G . W ells and Sir A lfred M ond in the com posite figure o f M ustapha M ond because he considered both m en to be proponents o f anti-hum anistic rationalisation - the reorganisation
20 H uxley does no t say it explicitly in relation to the technologies o f am usem ent, but it is logical to im ply th at am usem ent is also being researched as it serves stability. In 1926, after Huxley discovered Henry F o rd ’s M y
Life a n d W ork in the library o f the ship on his w ay to the U S A - and subsequently experienced that everything
in the country is “perfectly in tune” w ith F o rd ’s principles - he started to describe the U SA as “the nearest ap proach to U topia yet seen on our planet” (Bradshaw, 1993). As a result, BNW becam e a seam less critique o f so cialism and capitalism . The phrase “O ur F ord” is a reference to the religious cult o f his figure - in the novel Christian faith (sym bolised by a cross) has been supplanted by the ideology o f fordism (sym bolized by the letter T th at refers to the Ford M odel T autom obile, the sym bol o f m ass production).
o f society on an allegedly m ore scientific, m ore efficient, m ore technological basis” (M eckier, 2002: 432-433). This is true, but only partially. The society o f B N W is truly, not “allegedly”, m ore efficient and m ore scientific. It is pre cisely this fact that m akes the m odernist reader feel so unnerved during read ing, as he sees the inevitable cost o f progress: true anti-hum anism .
Long before C.P. Snow published his Two Cultures in 1959 (1998), the con sequences o f the grow ing specialisation in sciences were already perceived as a threat to cultural progress. A lthough it is hard to pinpoint the exact histori cal m om ent w hen it becam e perceived as an intellectual problem , the fear that the accum ulation o f know ledge w ould force scientists to specialise in very narro w areas o f inquiry, resulting in the im possibility o f creative synthesis, w as som ehow engrained in the w ord “ specialisation” (or “specialism ”). It en tered standard w ritten English in the m id- and late nineteenth century (Collini, 2006: 454). The first recorded definition o f specialism , has it understood as a “restriction or devotion to a special branch o f study or research” (quoted ibi dem, p. 455) and com es from 1860s and 1870s w here after it entered B ritish public discourse.
5.1. Professionalisation, Dehumanisation and Scientists
The reflection on the process o f specialisation w as generally pessim istic - the critiques did not highlight its potentially positive consequences, but they focused instead on negative aspects, such as the inability o f the sub-divided scientific branches to be w elded into a higher, coherent entity. This lam ent in itially referred to natural sciences, but w as also extended to the social sciences and h um an ities w hich increasin g ly started to sp ecialise and use scientific m ethodology in th eir research in the n ineteenth century (pp. 456-45 7). The gradual specialisation was said to affect both society and the individual: as the latter becom es deprived o f a w ider sensitivity v ia his attention to one, abstract field o f know ledge, he detaches him self from the society by losing em otional sensitivity and his m ore general interests.
to breach the monopoly. The hypothetical m anner o f the advancem ent o f a pro fession in society consists o f the four steps: expulsion (o f outsiders from the field), expansion, autonom y p rotection and m onopolisation (G ieryn, 1995, 1999). The conclusion o f G iery n ’s essay (1985) is that the 20th century w it nessed gradual professionalisation o f scientists, who began to guard their epis- tem ic authority22.
A ccording to historian Gary W erskey (1971), the profession o f scientist had quite low status in the public prior to 1939: scientists w ere treated by p o l iticians, artists and social theorists as outsiders during social debates (pp. 67-68). They w ere characterised by contem porary literature and the press as sim ple m inded, insensitive fellow s, w ho are capitalists first and scientists second, who do not understand art and do not care about the social im pact o f their re search (pp. 69-70).
To overcom e these stereotypes, scientists attem pted to influence the public by form ing various pressure groups - needless to say, the idea o f socialism was very helpful for them in advancing their goals thanks to its slogans o f equity and the potential benefits for socialism which sprang from science. Capitalising on the respect they had in their ow n field, scientists tried to alter the public im age o f their profession. J.B.S. Haldane was am ong the earliest public advocates o f scientific progress, presenting scientists as the hope for the future w orld in m any publications (see: W erskey, 1978). Julian H uxley in turn contributed to this v iew in a m ore theoretical way, w ith his idea o f scientific hum anism 23.
M any hum anists perceived the prospect o f scientific specialists addressing social issues as posing the threat o f dehum anisation and total rationalisation on hum an affairs, w hich were -acco rd in g to them - irreducible to the cold sci entific outlook. Partially as a response to scientists’ gradual struggle for the public recognition, h u m anists started to lam ent that the lack o f hum anistic sensitivity (com m only attributed to scientists) can result in the false assess m ent o f the social consequences o f the im pact o f science on society. In the sam e vein, they started to treat the lack o f specialist education as som ething one should be proud of. A ccording to Collini, “the self-conscious cultivation, from the late-nineteenth century onw ards, o f the identity o f ‘the m an o f let te rs ’ w as its e lf a form o f deliberate resistance to the perceived operation o f specialisation” (2006: 455).
22 The authority to create know ledge and speak on b e h a lf o f science.
This kind o f anxiety stim ulated discussion about universities, both their in ternal organisation and their institutional im pact on the society24, The issue o f th e reunification of knowledge, subdivided by specialisation, constituted a challenge for m any intellectuals in the 20th century. Collini describes the final intellectual outcom e o f these attem pts as constituting “ironically sententious, intellectually vap id m ixture o f h o lism and uplift w hich m erely asserts that everything is connected to everything else” (p. 458); thus he treats the topic ironically. F or exam ple, Ends and Means, H ux ley’s w ork w hich was described by h im se lf as “a kind o f synthesis, starting from the m etaphysical basis and building up through individual and group psychology to politics and econom ics” (ibidem ) is for Collini nothing m ore than am bitious m um bling filled with som e “vatic profundities”25. Certainly, this kind o f w riting m ay be regarded as boring by a historian, but for philosophers and political scientists it still has some value thanks to its universalism and the m ere fact that it attempts to create an a priori philosophical explanatory fram ew ork, som ething rarely attem pted throughout history.
5.2. Huxley as Anti-specialist
The anxieties about specialisation and education are visible in BNW, where H uxley w arns both (1) against the hijack o f social theory by scientific ration alisers and (2) against the social im pact o f specialisation26.
H e im plicitly accuses scientists o f serving the political system o f capital ism, o f being m erely tools in the hand o f politicians; o f blindly obeying the set o f rules they are given for their research. In B N W scientists w ho believed in the god-like pow ers o f their profession (like J.B.S H aldane, a specialist with am bitions to speak about society), ultim ately becam e a tool to sustain a social equilibrium actually achieved by them. They do not care about the m etaphys ical questions o f hum an existence, m erely concerned w ith the sm ooth p e r form ance o f the social tribes. I f som e distinctly hum an features are a constant cause o f confusion, they are destined to be w iped out thanks to genetics. This is done w ithout any social reflection: “You can’t consum e m uch if y o u sit still and read books” (Huxley, 2004: 42) - says the Controller, show ing that scien tists, in the pursuit o f m axim ising the efficiency o f perform ance reject the po tential usefulness o f intellectual self-developm ent, as it ceased to be needed after civilization reached the peak o f happiness. Similarly, if freedom o f choice
24 “Lam ents about the effects o f specialisation had becom e som ething o f a critical com m onplace by the sec ond h a lf o f the nineteenth century, and by the early tw entieth century universities w ere, w ith increasing v eh e m ence, identified as the villains o f the piece” and stigm atised as succum bing to too m uch specialisation w hich results in detracting from the unity o f the com m on culture (Collini, 2006: 454).
results in both good and bad deeds, it can be supplanted by a n ew quality: the identity o f freedom w ith necessity. E verybody w ants w hat one has to want, because scientists, carefully observing hum an behaviour, produced the very table D ostoyevsky feared, the one w hich enables the conditioning o f behav iour. Scientists do not have scruples, they do not protest against the tyranny o f consum ption and obedience, they only insist th at it should not be based on force, as the research has proved that it will not be efficient27. T heir dilem m as are not o f an ethical, but a pragm atic origin. The Controller rejects violence as a behavioural tool only because “the C ontrollers realised th at force w as no good” and he proposes instead “the slower, but infinitely surer m ethods o f ec- togenesis, neo-Pavlovian conditioning, and hypnopaedia” (p. 43).
The im perative o f happiness underm ines also the usefulness o f high culture. “There w ere som e things called the pyram ids, for example... A nd a m an called Shakespeare. Y ou’ve never heard o f them o f course... Such are the advantages o f a really scientific education” (Huxley, 2004: 42, 44) - says the Controller. Cultural, aesthetic, religious and other contemplative experiences are, according to him, useless because they contribute to the “production” o f spiritual expe riences, w hich are im m easurable and do not translate into m aterialist welfare. Teaching history is obsolete, in contrast to specialist education - know ledge o f Shakespeare and the pyram ids can only stim ulate free thinking, w hich will in turn allow individuals to contem plate everlasting hum an flaws, dim inishing their feelings o f happiness. “M ost historical facts are unpleasant” (p. 19) - he says, ju stify in g th e in tro d u ctio n o f th e sleep -teach ing p h rase “H isto ry is a bunk” (p. 29) to the m ass conditioning process. E ducation in B N W is con fined to areas useful in individual’s future work. A bit o f hum anistic knowledge, w hich is needed for the A lpha citizens designed to be the leaders, occasional ly results in deconditioning and supplies one m ore reason not to introduce it to the low er castes.
The citizens o f BN W produce specific goods or do other specialised activities, w ith no tim e for contem plation, w ith no leisure from pleasure28. The m edia also does not mention hum anistic values and any potentially liberating literature is banned. A fter the lecture o f “A N ew Theory o f B iology”, a book, w here the author w ants to prove the existence o f transcendence m athematically, the Con troller notes that although it “is novel and highly ingenious” it is also “heretical and, so far as the present social order is concerned, dangerous and potentially
27 See: section 3.2, this paper.
subversive” (p. 154). H e refuses to publish the book and orders the author kept under supervision29. No hum anism is allowed in BNW, because it is not coherent w ith the desired outcom e o f behavioural research - happiness. A lthough high culture liberates, for the C ontroller it is m ore im portant that it sim ultaneously stim ulates an unpredictable existential uneasiness; a good reason to ban it.
It is clear th at H uxley did not approve o f the dogm atic b e lie f in science, w hich w as characteristic o f his friends and other influential contem poraries like Freud. A fascination with science is nothing bad, he seem s to say in BNW, but the supplanting o f m etaphysics w ith science will bring disastrous effects. I f science w ere to cross over into the arena o f hum an affairs, if it w anted to re place a sensitivity for existential mysteries with its table, its recipe for sensational happiness, it m ay take away m ore from people than it is capable o f giving, changing them into regularly m aintained biological automatons. H uxley’s fear o f the flaws o f socialism and m aterialism is closely tied to a fear o f dehum an isation, which w ould be the fruit o f the comm on action o f scientists obediently w orking for the benefit o f capitalist principles o f efficiency and stability. A d ju stin g the am ount and quality o f individual education to the desired social
role that happens now adays is only the first step to B N W 30. G enetic m anipu lation will come next (pp. X X X V -X X X V III).
Finally, w hat is very intriguing and m akes B N W even m ore am biguous, is that the scientific dictator, the cold-hearted regulator introduces his ordered society o f specialists because he possessed the knowledge humanists had al ways wanted to obtain. M ond often justifies the regim e with behavioural facts and he uses history as em pirical m aterial to prove that a different order than the one he proposes will alw ays collapse and result in trem endous suffering. W hich o f these two alternatives w ould be better? Constant breakdow ns o f a free society or the dehum anised but sm ooth perform ance? - H uxley could not an sw er unanim ously31.
6. Huxley Today
W hat m akes H uxley interesting is his m oderation and am biguity w hich stem s from his acceptance o f the logic o f the First Inequation. H is vision o f
29 C learly enough, th e b o o k M ond reads is an allusion to th e w ritings o f E ddington (1929, see also: O ’Connor, 2003). It seems th at Aldous assum ed that transcendence, w hich thanks to Einstein came back as a sci entific hypothesis, m ay once be proven to exist scientifically. Unfortunately, even this revolutionary discovery w ill rem ain concealed for the sake o f social stability o f BNW.
30 This conclusion m akes H uxley side w ith the theses put forw ard in R ussell’s Icarus (1924).
the w orld seem s to resem ble a play in an ancient G reek theatre - no m atter w hich path hum anity takes, it alw ays has to pay for its choices; there are no ideal social solutions. D ue to the flaws o f hum an nature every hum an ideal de generates and caricatures itse lf in the process o f its application.
D espite som e flaws in H u x ley ’s vision, m odem philosophers could benefit from a careful re-reading o f H uxley32. They should be m ade aware that as long as one rem ains a nom inalist, one cannot legitim ately revolt against the im ple m entation o f voluntaristic serfdom , because one does not recognise it as serf dom. In other words, a nom inalist lacks an external, transcendent perspective to stigm atise the happiness o f B N W as false. The acceptance o f the subjective validity o f nam es m akes it im possible to do that33.
B N W rem ains one o f the m ost adequate social prophecies ever w ritten and is still m eaningful regardless o f the historical context, in w hich it was written. This is visible even m ore sharply at the beginning o f the tw enty-first century: “C urrent developm ents in genetic engineering, com bined with foreseeable de velopm ents in nanotechnology and robotics, have the potential to redefine and extend hum an life. B ut if w e follow this technology along the course favoured by its advocates, som e hum ans w ould acquire characteristics so superior to our own, or so entirely new, that w hat it m eans to be hum an, even for those left behind, w ould be forever lost” - wrote the author o f BioScience, a m onth ly academic journal tracing current research in biology (Norgaard, 2004: 255)34. On the other hand, the rapid progress o f technology m ay bring solutions to m any contem porary social problem s, the im pact o f specialisation on sciences included. Ray K urzw eil, a fam ous futurologist, w ho after the analysis o f em pirical data reached the conclusion that technological advancem ent progresses at exponential rate (see: Chart I), claims that thanks to science w e will w itness the radical change of human constitution (K urzw eil, 2005). A ccording to him, the w orld is n ow reaching the “knee o f curve” - a point, where the impact o f technology on society will be gradually m ore visible35. A fter the future suc cessful integration o f advanced technology into flesh (cybernetics), hum an ca pacities will extend, acting positively upon the w hole species. The negative effects o f specialisation will cease to exist, as the protein-based m echanism s o f brain will be reengineered, resulting in the great m em orisation capabilities. This w ill in tu rn m ake great, R an aissan ce-lik e syntheses (that w ill reunite fragm ented know ledge) possible once again.
32 See: e.g. Toffler, 1990: 466 and footnote 29, this paper. 33 It is the w ill o f the m ajority th at m akes BNW possible.
34 A sim ilar diagnosis is to be found in: Naisbitt, 1990: 241-269; Fukuyama, 2004; Galston, 2002; Rose, 2005 and m any others.
Linear vs. Exponential Growth
Chart I, from: Kurzweil, 2005:10
N ietzsche wrote in his visionary Thus Spoke Z a m th u stm : “The earth has be com e small, and on it hops the last man, who m akes everything small. H is spe cies is ineradicable as the flea; the last m an lives longest. ‘We have discovered h app iness’ - say the last m en, and they blink despicably” (N ietzsche, 2000). C onsider nanotechnology, neuroscience, behaviourism , the H um an G enom e Project, Craig V enter’s first artificial organism (see: Salomone, 2007) to be the first steps to theriaca maxima36, the ultimate antidote for the horrors o f suffering... W ould not B N W be better than the present world? A fter all, m axim ised happi ness at the cost o f m inimised freedom w ould not be introduced by force. Huxley claimed that we are now undergoing an “ultimate revolution” in our souls, which will m ake us love our servitude (Huxley, 2004: X X X III-X X X V III; see also: 1962). Is suffering w ithout surveillance better than the engineered happiness?
O ne thin g is certain. M illions o f A frican children dying from genocide, starvation, m alaria and AIDS would definitely welcome the new order with joy.
They w ould kneel dow n and kiss G rand In q uisitor’s hands.
Abstrakt
Esej, będący częścią pracy magisterskiej, wykazuje, że Nowy Wspaniały Świat Aldousa Huxley a był wynikiem jego potrzeby odniesienia się do debaty na temat nauki i technologii w międzywojennej Wielkiej Brytanii. Używając analizy historycznej i literackiej wyjaśnia idee Huxleya poprzez metaforę dwóch nierówności: Pierwsza Nierówność, klucz do zrozumienia jego poglądu na naukę i społeczeństwo, ma najprawdopodobniej - twierdzi autor - korzenie w pracach Fiodora Dostojewskiego i jest de facto radykalnym przeciwstawieniem ideału szczęś liwości triadzie trzech wartości starożytnych (prawda, szczęście, dobro); Druga Nierówność opiera się na przeciwstawieniu sobie nieskrępowanych badań naukowaych i nauki stosowanej (czyli technologii). Praca odtwarza także sieć relacji osobistych Huxleya, co umożliwia skoja rzenie jego obrazu nauki z ideami popularyzowanymi przez ówczesnych intelektualistów bry tyjskich (m.in. Julian Huxley, J.B.S Haldane, Bertrand Russell), a także ukazuje jego stosunek do rosnącej specjalizacji w nauce. Na koniec zaprezentowane są wciąż aktualne wątki filozo ficzne myśli Huxleya w zestawieniu ze współczesnym optymizmem i pesymizmem co do przy szłego wpływu nauki na społeczeństwo.
Abstract
The paper, a part of MA dissertation, shows that Aldous Huxley’s Brave N ew W orld stem med from his desire to take a stand in the debate on science, technology and society in inter war Britain. It utilises both literary and historical analyses to elaborate Huxley’s message through the metaphor of two inequations (a mathematical term): the First Inequation, a key to understanding his ideas on science and society, is suggested to have been derived from Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s works and is de fa cto a radical opposition between the ideal of happiness and the triad of ancient supreme values (truth, goodness, beauty); the Second Inequation dwells on the friction between pure science and applied science (Huxley’s term for technology). The pa per also recreates Huxley’s close social network that helps to relate his image of science to the ideas popularised at the time by the prominent British intellectuals (e.g. Julian Huxley, J.B.S Haldane, Bertrand Russell). Huxley’s concern with the growing specialisation of sciences is also elaborated and at the end the actuality of his philosophical standpoint is presented in the context of contemporary scientific pessimism and optimism.
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