D iscussion 27
B. M. fie d ro v •
I sup p o rt th e le c tu re r’s statem en ts th a t: a) th e h isto ry of science a n d technology is also a science a n d m ust n o t be reduced to a sim ple description of facts, b) th e applied sciences a re not a secondary thing derived from th e “p u re ” sciences, c) all! sciences a r e united, and con seq u en tly the history of science o u g h t to com prise th e social sciences as we1!.
It is how ever necessary to establish a criterio n for determ ining th e m om ent w hen a given branch of know ledge tu rn s in to science. This is a complex, long and m any-sided process im plying th e fulfilm ent, a t least, of tw o conditions: 1) form ation o f a fu n d am en tal i d e a conveying th e peculiarity of th e su b ject b eing studied, and 2) w orking o u t of a p articu lar research m e t h o d , ad eq u ate to th e subject of a given science. In itis fu ller form, th a t criterio n includes: 3) th e creation of a scientific t h e o r y generalizing the experim ental d a ta an d helping to separate science from fiction and facts fro m inventions, an d 4) th e discovery of a single re a l l a w , on th e base of w hich th e explaining o f phenom ena observed a n d th e predicting of p ew phenom ena w ould be possible. In applying th a t criterio n to chem istry, w e ascertain th a t th e process of its becoming transform ed into science took m o re th an a h u n dred years: it w as -Boyle {Sceptical C hym ist, 1661) who in itiated th e said process, an d Lavoisier (Trait e de chimie, 1787) who com pleted it.
A fter applying th a t criterion to social sciences, we fin d ou t th a t th e y becam e a veritable science n ot earlier th a n in th e m iddle of th e X lX th century, this process being linked w ith the nam e of K arl M arx. Up to- th a t v ery mom ent, th ere only w ere separate elem ents of the fu tu re science on society. It is th erefore not to b e considered th a t th e social sciences had appeared earlier th a n th e n a tu ra l ones.
J. R. Ravetz '
The problem s raised by Professor Suohodolski cannot be solved this w eek, bu t th ey cannot be ignored. U ntil recen tly th e histo ry o f science was little m ore than th e chronology of innovations in p u re n a tu ra l science. Now w e know th a t science is a social activity, a n d w e m u st consider all its m anifold relations w ith th e practical, social an d intellec tu a l life of society. B u t w here are w e to d raw th e line? If social science should be considered along w ith n a tu ra l science, w hy n o t also classics, jurisprudence, and even theology. M any m em bers of this Symposium are atheists, some a re m ilitant atheists. Shoùld such am ong us tre a t the
28 O b je t e t pro b lèm es de l’h istoire de la science
h istory of theology w ith respect? It miightt seem so; the interaction of science and religion a t several critical points is well known. Also for several centu ries theology was m ore of a W issenschaft th a n was the exploration of the n atu ra l world. I cannot answ er this question con cerning theology; I use it as a n illu stratio n of th e deepest problem raised by the w ide perspective of Profeslsor Suchodoliski.
There a re also practical problem s in th is new extehded view of science an d its history. Witih so- m any d ifferen t disciplines demanding consideration m ust each of us become a universal specialist? O r m ust we all apply th e tactic of the “m assed ty p e w riters” of m uch A m erican scholarship! A possible solution to th is problem w as suggested some years ago by our colleague dr G el la; if one investigates well chosen problem s ra th e r th a n try in g to accum ulate facts, th e n one finds it possible to achieve sufficient com petence in neighbouring disciplines to use evidence to igood effect.
L. S zyfm a n , *, )
Le professeur Suchodolski dans son excellent ra p p o rt a justem ent posé la question de l ’un ité des sciences n atu re lle s e t des sciences anthro pologiques et sociales. C’est bien vrai que l ’histoire des sciences sociales, anthropologiques et naturelles doit être incluse à l’histoire générale de la science et que les sciences n atu relle s ne sont pas m oins exposées au x influences idéologiques, ainsi que politiques, que les sciences sociales. Il n ’est pas difficile de citer des exem ples p o ur cette thèse. Il su ffit de se souvenir d u so rt historique des théories de Lam arck, de Haeckel e t des au tres ém inents savants pour com prendre la n atu re de ces in fluences.
Comme nous a m ontré, par exemple, M. F ran ck B ourdier de Musée N ational d ’H istoire N atu relle à IParis, Georges Cuvier, adversaire le plus ferv en t du transform ism e croyait lui-m êm e à l ’évolution des êtres vivants, m ais à cause des m otifs politiques e t idéologiques il com battait im pitoyablem ent les idées d ’évolution. J e ne veux pas dire, que c’é ta it la seuile cause d u “fixism e” de Cuvier, m ais q u ’élle jouait chez lui un rô le assez im p o rtan t lo rsq u ’il fallait appro u v er ou désap prouver u n e théorie.
Nous voyons donc, que to u tes les théories rév olutionnaires — socia les, politiques, scientifiques 'dépendent d e certain es lois analogues. D écouvrir ces lois générales, com m unes aux toutes les sciences, est un devoir des historiens d e la science. Mais en cherchant les lois générales auxquelles sont soumises toutes les sciences, il fau t év iter le danger de rem placer la tâche essentielle de l’histoire de la science — c ’est à dire
