O R G A N O N 7 (1970) M ISC E L L A N E A
ZJrszula Ofierska (Poland)
RECENT POLISH METHODOLOGY OF EM PIRICAL SCIENCES A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The aim of th e present paper is to provide readers interested in Polish methodology w ith some orientation in recent w ritings o n th is subject. To some extent, the choice and arrangem ent of th e m aterial w ill be arb i trary. The dem arcation of methodology from both logic an d philosophy is assumed, though there are no sharp lines of dem arcation. In discus
sing the methodological problems, th e atten tio n is limited, w ith few exceptions, to those of the em pirical sciences. A lthough rem arkable re sults have been achieved by Polish scholars in the domain of m ethodol ogy of the deductive sciences, the subject is too com prehensive to be treated adequately in so short an article. This note covers th e publica tions th a t appeared since 1955 to 1969 b u t it is not a complete p resenta tion, as some omissions w ere necessary for w ant of space.
Section I presents th e works attem pting to clarify some basic con cepts of methodology relevant to both th e em pirical and th e rational sciences. The rem ainder of th e paper w ill divide into tw o m ain parts. Section 2deals w ith the general problem s referring to th e em pirical sciences, and those pertaining to th e particular branches of em pirical in vestigation a re covered in section 3. The last section 4 contains a list of handbooks including interesting chapters on methodology.
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The traditional methodology is opposed to metascience both in its sub je c t- m a tte r and m ethod in K. A jdukiewicz’s article „Metodologia i me- tanauka” (Methodology and Metascience, JiP *). The form er is conceived
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as a descriptive science accounting for the procedures and princi ples of inquiry of recognized special sciences as w ell as th eir justifica tion; it attem pts to define and fu rth e r clarify such term s as induction deduction, em pirical meaning, etc. The la tter investigates th e stru ctu re of scientific theories and its results a re of formal character. In th e same auth or’s article “Zagadnienie em piryzm u a koncepcja znaczenia” (The Problem of Empiricism and the Conception of Meaning, JiP) th e ques tion is asked if all a priori elements can be elim inated from science: the answ er varies depending on th e adopted conception of language. The author abandons his previous view assuming th a t in every language there a re sentences th a t cannot be rejected w itho ut a violation of th e ir m eanings; a new conception of language is suggested w hich makes the above elimination possible. The possibility of radical empiricism is tre a ted by the sam e au th o r in “Logika a doświadczenie” (Logic and Expe rience, JiP) w here languages perm itting of testing laws of logic as em pirical hypotheses are discussed. In “Metodologiczne typy n au k ” (Meth odological Types of Sciences, JiP) different branches of science are classified according to the character of the ultim ate premises adopted.
T. K otarbiński’s W ybór pism (Selected Papers, Warszawa, 1957), con tains th e paper “O istocie i zadaniach metodologii ogólnej” (On the Es sence and Tasks of G eneral Methodology) w here the general methodolo gy of sciences is conceived as a specific branch of praxiological inquiry; in the article “O pojęciu metody” (On th e Notion of Method) the concept of method in th e praxiological sense is given a clear meaning. Those interested in the history of methodology can find in Selected Papers some studies on this subject.
R. Suszko in “Logika form alna a niektóre zagadnienia teorii pozna nia” (Formal Logic an d th e Evolution of Knowledge, L T N ; available also in English in Problems in the Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam, 1968) discusses form al properties of evolution of knowledge in term s of dia- chronical form al logic and constructs a scheme of development o f science.
The problems of definition are dealt w ith in the articles mentioned below, b u t additional inform ation is given in section 4, w here th e m etho dological problems of p articular em pirical sciences are dealt w ith. K. A j- dukiewicz in “Trzy pojęcia definicji’’ (Three Concepts of Definition, LTN) gives precise meanings to th e concepts of real, nominal, and a r bitrary definitions an d argues th a t th ere is no general concept of defi nition. J. K otarbinska’s paper “D efinicja” (Definition, LTN ) confines the analysis to norm al definition: its kinds and the conditions of its useful ness w ith respect to different purposes are discussed in detail. The same author in “Tak zwana definicja deiktyczna” (On the so called O stensive Definition, LTN; available in English in Philosophy of Science, 27, 1960) gives a detailed discussion of specific problems connected w ith this kind
Polish Studies in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences 297 of definition. The related problems are discussed together w ith th e ob servational term s in section 2. M. Przełęcki in “O tzw. definicji ope racy jn ej” (On the O perational Definition, LTN) points to difficulties and paradoxical consequences implied b y th e operationist principle in th e broader sense. T. Czeżowski in “Definicje analityczne i syntetyczne” (Analytic and Synthetic Definitions^ SF, 4, 1966) gives his atten tio n to the fact th a t the analysed concepts have double meanings owing to dif feren t principles of division a n d difference in th e extension of th e term s. L. Borkowski in “Ü ber analytische und synthetische D efinitionen” (in German) in SL, 4, 1956, distinguishes th re e w idely accepted concepts o f analytic and synthetic definitions. The definitions of these an d of cor rect analytic definition are given an d some theorem s proved. T. P aw łowski in “Definicja persw azyjna” (Persuasive Definition, MiS) offers a new approach to the problem of this kind of definition; the range of the concept is extended to cover p artial definitions, th e construction va ries according to th e aim in view.
The problems of classification are treated b y S. Lusizczewska-Ro- mahnowa in “Classification as a Kind of Distance Function. N atural Classifications” (in English, SL, 12, 1961), w here classification is considered as a plan of a segregative ordering either of th e whole classified dom ain or of some subclasses of th is domain. S. Lusz- czewska-Romahnowa an d T. Batóg in “A G eneralized Theory of Classi fication” (in English, SL, 16, 1965, and SL, 17, 1965) construct a form al theory of classification and give a form al definition of the concept of classification w hich is a high generalization of the usual one. A nonfor- m al approach to th e sam e problem w ill be found in T. W ojcik’s book Zarys teorii klasyfikacji (An O utline of th e Theory of Classification; Warszawa, 1965) containing an exposition of methodology of classifying and th e m ain practical applications of classification.
The various aspects of th e processes of reasoning accepted in science are considered in a considerable num ber of papers. The general exposi tion of th e problems of foundation and classification of reasonings is given by K. Ajdukiewicz in two articles: “The Problem of F oundation”" (in English) is an introductory article to FSD containing the proceedings of th e international colloquium on th e methodology of th e sciences held in Warsaw, 1961; in th e article “K lasyfikacja rozum ow ań” (Classifica tion of Reasonings, JiP) th e author gives a critical analysis of th e clas sification introduced into Polish literature by J. Lukasiewicz and m ain tained by T. Czeżowski and T. Kotarbiński, then suggests his ow n clas sification of w ide com prehension by crossing th e division of inferential processes and th a t of problem s to be solved. The general exposition of the problem of foundation is contained in “B em erkungen zum Problem der B egründung” (in German, SL, 12 1962) by R. Ingarden, who intends to show th a t this problem requires also epistemological analysis for its
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solution. The same problem is also discussed by Z. Ziemba in “P ostulat prawdziwości przesłanki a postulat jej uzasadnienia” (The Requirem ent
of T ru th and of Justification of Premises, SL , 12, 1962).
Some methodological problems of deduction are discussed by M. Ko- koszyńska in “O dw ojakim rozum ieniu uzasadniania dedukcyjnego” (Two Concepts of D eductive Justification, SL, 13, 1962), and in “O de dukcji” (On Deduction, L T N ; available in English in RL), w here the question of deductive justification is considered, including the role of the concept of analiticity. In K. A jdukiewicz’s paper “System y aksjom a- tyczne z metodologicznego punktu w idzenia” (Axiomatic Systems from the Methodological P oint of View, JiP; available in English in SL, 11, 1960), the deductive systems are divided into assertive and hypothetical, and th e possibility of constructing a justified system of assertive ty p e is considered. The au th o r attem pts to show th a t both th e methods of te r minological convention and of deduction are insufficient for th a t p u r pose; the m ethod of intuition seems necessary, and, if abandoned, th e assertive systems should be replaced by n eu tral ones. The role of in tuition in m athem atics is considered by A. Grzegorczyk in “Uzasadnie nie aksjomatów teorii m atem atycznych” (On th e V alidation of Sets of Axioms in M athem atical Theories, SL, 13, 1962).
The clarification of the 'basic methodological concepts of induction and its justification is dealt w ith in the w ork m entioned below. M. Ko- koszyńska in “O dobrej i złej indukcji” (On Good and Bad Induction, SL, 5, 1957), tries to find a theory m arking out some types of nonde- ductive inference as types of correct induction and appeals to Keynes’ theory of logical probability. K. Ajdukiewicz in “Zagadnienie racjonal ności zawodnych sposobów rozumowania” (On th e Rational Character of U ncertain Inference, JiP) finds neither the theory of probability nor confirm ation theory satisfactory for solution of the problem of ju stify ing induction, unless complemented by th e general praxiological con cept of rational hum an behaviour. A sym pathetic exposition of Popper’s theory can be found in J. Giedym in’s “Inductionism and A nti-inductio- nism ” in LTN . The basic differences betw een the respective methodolog ical systems in th eir treatm en t of hypotheses are form ulated. J. K otar bińska in “K ontrow ersja: dedukcjonizm -indukcjonizm” (The Controver sy: Inductionism Versus Deductionism, LTN; available in English in Logic, M ethodology and Philosophy of Science, Stanford, 1962) attem pts to dem onstrate th a t Popper’s argum ents against th e inductive m ethod failed because eith er his objections are misdirected or they refer only to a sim plified version of th e th eo ry of induction.
Various question suggested by the problem s of statistical inference are answ ered in the following papers by K. Szaniawski: in “Wniosko wanie czy behaviour” (Inference or Behaviour ?, LTN) an account of th e controversy over the status of statistical procedures is given. In “Some
Polish Studies in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences 29'J Basic P attern s of Statistical Inference” (in English; SL, 11, 1961) there is a comparison of justification of inferential rules in th e classical theory of statistics w ith th a t in th e theory of decision. In “Pragm atyczne uza sadnienie zawodnych sposobów w nioskowania” (Pragm atic Foundation of
U ncertain Inferences, SL, 12, 1962) th ere is a reconstruction of a p art of th e param etric inference assum ing th e in terp retatio n of rules of in ference as rules of purposive behaviour. The p ap er “A Pragm atic Ju sti fication of Rules of Statistical Inference” (in English; in FSD) also sug gests treating rules of inference as prescribing certain purposive beha viour and analyses th e justification actually provided b y statisticians. In “Zasada największej wiarogodności” (The Principle of Reliability, RL) the author points a t th e fact th a t this principle requires a pragm atic justification in spite of its intuitive value. In “W spraw ie racjonalności zawodnych sposobów w nioskowania” (On th e R ational C haracter of U n certain Inferences, SF, 2, 1959) the author criticizes th e criterion of ra tionality suggested by Ajdukiewicz (see above) and answers negatively the question if it is possible to show in general th e rational character of statical inference. Z. Czerwiński characterizes d ifferen t kinds of sta tistical inference by means of th e notion of induction in “W nioskowanie statystyczne a dedukcja i indukcja trad y cy jn a” (Statistical Inference and Traditional Deduction an d Inductional, SL, 7, 1958); th e same au th o r in “Zagadnienie probalistycznego uzasadnienia indukcji enum eracyjnej” (The Problem of Probabilistic Justification of Enum erative Induction, SL, 5, 1957) and in “Enum erative Induction and the Theory of Games” (in English; SL, 10, 1960) undertakes th e problem of justification apply ing some criteria taken over from statistical inference and th e game theory Z. Ziemba in “Częstościowe k ry teriu m zasadności wnioskowań niededukcyjnych” (The Frequency C riterion of Justification of Nonde- ductive Inferences, RL) points to some shortcomings of th e criterion and in “Racjonalna w iara i prawdopodobieństwo zasadności wnioskowania indukcyjnego” (Rational Belief, Probability and th e Justification of In duction, SL, 12, 1961) criticises the attem pts following Keynes and suggests
his own solution. S. Luszczewska-Romahnowa in “Indukcja a praw dopo dobieństwo” (Induction and Probability, SL, 5, 1957) finds th e probabilis tic answ er to th e problem of induction false.
The related problems of justification of o th er kinds of reasonings are dealt w ith in I. Dąbrowska’s paper “Kilka uw ag o rozumowaniach na podstawie analogii” (On Argum ents from Analogy, RL) w h ere the form al stru ctu re and justification of argum ents is exam ined. The fu rth er analysis of th e problem and of logical and epistemological problems of the n atu ral sciences can be found in th e book by the same au th o r “Dwa studia z teorii naukowego poznania” (Two studies on Scientific Know ledge; Toruń, 1962). J. Giedym in in “C harakterystyka pytań i wniosko w ań kontrfaktycznych” (Counterfactual Questions and Inferences, SM,
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1, 1965) offers a logical analysis and explication of counterfactual con ditionals an d gives a n account of d ifferent appraisals of th e ir cognitive role. J. K m ita in “Potoczny okres w arunkow y” (The Conditional in O rdinary Language, SM, 3, 1967) offers a n explication in terms of th e conditional form ulated in ordinary language.
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The methodological problems of empirical theories are discussed in th e largest num ber of papers. M. Przełęcki in his book The Logic of E m pir ical Theories (London, 1969) exam ines the language of empirical theo ries in term s of the theory of models. Special attentio n is given to th e problem of the interpretation of form alized empirical theories and the difficulties connected w ith the interpretation of theoretical terms. The same author in “Teorie em piryczne w ujęciu logiki współczesnej” (Empiri cal Theories from the Standpoint of Modern Logic, F III) identifies modern logical methodology of the empirical sciences w ith logical reconstruction of em pirical theories regarded as formalized axiom atic systems. The tra ditional methodology found th e modified everyday language satisfactory for its purposes while modern analysis makes use of th e concept of for malized language and its model w hich afford possibilities for explica tion of im portant methodological concepts. R. Wójcicki in “Sematyczne pojęcie praw dy w metodologii nauk em pirycznych” (The Semantic Con cept of T ruth in the Methodology of th e Empirical Sciences, SF, 3, 1969) offers an extension of Tarski’s theory of tru th w hich he finds of lim ited use in the methodology of th e em pirical sciences. The idealization of models of empirical theories and th e ir relevance to th e actual subject- -m atter of scientific research can be investigated in term s of semantical concepts for which definitions are laid down; a n analysis of the theory of classical particle mechanics exemplifies the introduced concepts. In M. Przełęcki’s article “Interpretacja systemów akcjomatycznych” (The In terpretation of Axiomatic Systems, SF, 6, 1960) the problem of em pir ical m eaningfulness of specific term s of empirical theories is understood as the problem of interpreting specific term s of axiomatic systems and tw o w ays of perform ing th e interpretation are discussed.
The problem of empirical m eaningfulness is treated by R. Wójcicki in: “Semantical C riteria of Empirical M eaningfulness”, (in English; SL, 19, 1966) w here the au th o r applies some methods of model theory in order to analyse th e concept of empirical meaningfulness and to investi gate some of its properties; and in “O w arunkach empirycznej sensow ności term inów ” (On Conditions of Empirical Significance, TiD) w here he investigates some semantic relations between theoretical and obser
Polish Studies in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences 3 0 1 vational term s and introduces a new definition of th e concept of em pi rical m eaning of theoretical term s. The article “Sprawdzalność i znacze n ie ” (Testability and Meaning, SF, 4, 1967, an d SF, 1, 1968) by A. Za błudowski is devoted to a critical analysis of th e verifiability theory of m eaning. W. K rajew ski in “O em pirycznej spraw dzalności tw ierdzeń filozoficznych” (On Em pirical Testability of Philosophical Statem ents, TiD) interprets philosophy as having the methodological character of em pirical sciences and discus'ses th e em pirical testability of some philo sophical statem ents. A. Grzegorczyk in th e paper “Sprawdzalność empi ryczna a m atem atyczna” (Empirical and M athem atical Testability, RL) analysing the theory of algorithm and theories of the em pirical sciences compares th e concepts of com putability w ith th a t of em pirically deci- dable property to find essential analogies.
The methodological status of theoretical term s is discussed by M. Przełęcki in “W spraw ie istnienia przedm iotów teoretycznych” (On th e Existence of Theoretical Objects, TiD) w here it is argued th a t predicates designating unobservables and theorem s on existence of theo retical objects are admissible in the language of em pirical theories. In “P ostulat empiryczności term inów przyrodniczych” (Empirical M eaning o f Terms in N atural Sciences, F II) he discusses some w ays of definitional introduction of term s of the n atu ral sciences providing them w ith em pirical meaning, granted em pirical significance of prim itive term s; in “Pojęcia teoretyczne a doświadczenie” (Theoretical Concepts an d Experience, LTN), th e same author deals w ith criteria of ap plicability of theoretical concepts in em pirical theories, giving his atten tio n to partial definitions. H. M ortim er in “O w arunkach przyjm o w ania postulatów probabilistycznych” (On th e Conditions of Acceptance of Probabilistic Postulates for Theoretical Terms, TiD) offers an analysis of probabilistic postulates stating relative frequencies w ith special con sideration of th e ir analicity. J. Kmita in “Uwagi na m arginesie problem u sensu empirycznego term inów teoretycznych” (Remarks on Em pirical M eaning of Theoretical Terms, TiD) questions some w idely accepted as sumptions in th e form ulation of th e problem to offer a solution of its modified version.
The methodological questions induced b y the observational term s and sentences are answ ered by M. Przełęcki in “W spraw ie uzasadnienia zdań spostrzeżeniowych” (On Validating Observational Statem ents, SL, 13, 1962) w here he discusses various concepts of observational statem ents and particularly sentences w ith all term s in terpreted directly. The same author in “O definiowaniu term inów spostrzeżeniowych” (On Defining O bservational Terms, RL) points out th a t th e direct in terp retatio n of observational term s cannot be identified w ith the ostensive definition unless the la tte r concept is broadened. J. Giedymin in “O teoretycznym sensie tzw. term inów i zdań obserw acyjnych” (On the Theoretical M
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ing of the so called “O bservational” Term s and Sentences, TiD) rejects the opinion th a t the division theoretical vs. observational can be applied to term s and sentences of the em pirical sciences and quotes exam ples from the history of science in support of his thesis. W. M ejbaum in “O tw ierdze niach bazowych” (On Basic Statem ents, TiD) gives an analysis of th e ir methodological function in em pirical theory. W. Marciszewski in “Re- ductionism in th e Light of a n Analysis of Observation S tatem ents” (in English; SF, 1, 1962) defines observation sentence as an expression con sisting of term s th a t have been introduced to th e given language by ostensive definition; in the procedure of ostension the elem ents of in terpretatio n are distinguished from those of “p u re” experience defined in term s of physiology of perception. K. Ajdukiewicz in “Subiektywność i niepowtarzalność m etody bezpośredniego doświadczenia” (The Subjective and Irreproducible C haracter of D irect Experience, JiP), discusses the w ay in w hich direct experience forms a p art of th e method of arriving a t universal statem ents w ithout depriving it of its character.
The problem of analiticity was undertaken by K. A jdukiewicz in “Zagadnienie uzasadniania zdań analitycznych” (On Foundation of A na lytic Statem ents, JiP ; available in French in SL, 8, 1958), w here th e author advocates the view th a t the foundation of analytic sentences w hich a re not laws of logic requires not only term inological convention but also existential premises w hich m ay need appealing to experience. Z. Czerwiński objects to the above view in “Zdanie analityczne, logika i doświadczenie” (Analytic Sentence, Logic and Experience, RL). The paper by K. Ajdukiewicz stim ulated fu rth e r inquiries and th e two authors obtained, quite independently, sim ilar results: R. Wójcicki in “Analityczne komponenty definicji arbitralnych” (Analytic Components of A rbitrary Definitions, SL, 14, 1963), and M. Przełęcki in “O pojęciu zdania analitycznego” (On th e Notion of the A nalytic Sentence, SL, 14, 1963), approach th e problem of defining the notion of analytic sentence in term s of m eaning postulates, b u t to avoid some objectionable conse quences of this definition a postulate is analysed into an analytic and a synthetic com ponent; only the logical consequence of a n arb itrary set of analytic components is regarded as analytic. R. Wójcicki in “Anali tyczność, syntetyczność, empiryczna sensowność zdań” (Analycity, S yn- theticity, Empirical M eaningfulness of Sentences, SF, 3 1966), deals w ith th e sam e problem and gives a precise meaning to th e concept of a syn thetic sentence and introduces th e concept of em pirical m eaningfulness to be used in methodological analysis of em piricial theories. These two authors published the article “The Problem of A nalitycity” (in English, iSynthèse, 19, 1969) w hich presents th e recent results obtained w ithin th e conceptual fram ew ork of th e model theory. A very com prehensive jbibliography covers Polish works on the subject both published and forthcoming. H. M ortim er in “Remarks on the Controversy over th e
Polish Studies in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences 3 0 3 A nalitycity of Some Statem ents of N atural Science” (in English: SF, 1,
1962) aims a t a clear form ulation of the problem s involved in th e con troversy over conventionalist thesis.
The im portant methodological notions relevant in studying th e em pirical theories are discussed by J. Giedym in in “A G eneralization of th e Refutability Postulate” (in English, SL, 10, 1960), w ho aims to show th a t th e acceptance of a hypothesis on th e ground of confirm ing evi dence and absence of discomfirming evidence; the possibility of deriving th e refutability postulate from some general conditions of rational be haviour is considered. W. M ejbaum in “Falsyfikacja hipotez” (Falsifica tion of Hypotheses, SF, 3, 1967) presents a form al approach to th e problem of elim ination of falsified hypotheses from an em pirical theo ry ; in “Wielkość fizyczna i doświadczenie” (The Physical M agnitude and Experience, SF, 2, 1965) he discusses th e acceptance or falsification of hypotheses containing term s denoting physical m agnitudes. J. Such in “Problem uniwersalności praw nauki” (The Problem of U niversity of Scientific Laws, SM, 5, 1968) discusses various concepts of universality and the problem of the openness in reference to th e class appointed as th e scope of law; in “Praw o nauki a generalizacja historyczna” (The Scientific Law and Historical G eneralization, SF, 2, 1967), his aim is to draw the dem arcation line 'between these tw o im portant types of ge neral statem ents in science. J. K m ita in “W yjaśnienie naukow e a m eta fo ra” (Scientific Explanation, SF, 3, 1967), gives a n analysis of scientific explanation w hich implies th a t it can never be of m etaphorical cha racter. The m ore general problem of th e cognitive significance of a m e tap h o r is answ ered in M. Przełęćki’s paper “O m etaforze” (On M etaphor, in: Moralność i społeczeństwo, Księga Jubileuszowa dla Marii O ssowskiej, Warszawa, 1969).
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It this section th e methodological problem s of the special sciences are grouped according to the principal methodological p atterns w hich th e sciences are supposed to reveal, b u t w hich are not exclusive of one another.
T. Pawłowski’s book Metodologiczne zagadnienia hum anistyki (Me thodological Problems in th e Humanities, Warszawa, 1969) consists of several essays dealing w ith th e problem s of the language used in the hum anities: persuasive definitions and argum ents, th e methodological function and logical structure of typological concepts, th e basic concepts of th e theory of questions, th e concept of m easurem ent an d its applica bility, some problems concerning indicators and explanation. I. Lazari- -Pawłowska in “O pojęciu typologicznym w hum anistyce” (On th e Con cept of Type in the Humanities, LTN) discusses its definition and
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thodological function.. J. K m ita and L. Nowak in the book Studia nad teoretycznym i podstawami hum anistyki (Studies on Theoretical Founda tions of th e Humanities, Poznań, 1968) give a logical reconstruction of foundations of th e branches of hum anities dealing w ith the stru ctu re of behaviour. The authors oppose antinaturalistic views from th e n atu ra listic standpoint assum ing a theory of rational behaviour.
J. Kmita in his book Problematyka term inów teoretycznych w odnie sieniu do pojęć literaturoznawczych (Theoretical Terms in th e Theory of L iterature, Poznań, 1967) offers methodological analyses related to me thodological naturalism , assum ing the fundam ental methodological si m ilarity between theory of literatu re and em pirical theories. T. Batóg in the book The Axiom atic M ethod in Phonology (London, 1967), covers alm ost all essential problems of theoretical phonology; a set of basic concepts an d th e ir axiomatic characterization are given.
S. Nowak in the book “Studia z metodologii nauk społecznych” (Stu dies in the Methodology of the Social Sciences, Warszawa, 1965) discus ses the conceptual apparatus,, construction of a theory and em pirical ve rifiability in the social sciences; th e au th o r’s aim is to realize a model of sociology in the form of a system of interrelated theories, including high-level generalizations. The problems discussed in detail are: th e hi storical character of scientific laws, theoretical interpretation of statis tical connections, empirical definability, stru ctu re of a social theory and th e problem of inductionism. The logical foundations of th e social sciences are the subject-m atter of J. Giedym in’s book Problemy, założe nia, rozstrzygnięcia (Questions, Assumptions, Decidability, Poznań, 1964).
Traditional methodology as opposed to history of science is enriched w ith th e concept of inform ation. The book offers an analysis of ques tions and answers, a generalization of the concept and procedure of ap praising the reliability of inform ant, a discussion of various concepts of ratio n ality and decidability of prognostic questions. The methodological works by S. Ossowski are collected in the posthum ously published Dzie ła (Works), vol. 4 entitled O nauce (On Science, Warszawa, 1967). The discussion of th e laws of genetic systems in “Praw a historyczne w so cjologii” (Historical Laws in Sociology) leads to the conclusion th a t the categories of law and of historical statem ent a re not m utually exclusive. The new concept of historical generalization is introduced in terms of the notion of a system isolated in some respect in th e paper “Dwie kon cepcje historycznych uogólnień” (Two Concepts of Historical G enerali zations). “Zoologia społeczna i zróżnicowanie kulturow e” (Social Zoology and C ultural Differentiation) discusses three levels of generality of sta tem ents about social behaviour of the hum an being. The book O osobli wościach nauk społecznych (On the Peculiarities of Social Sciences) is S. Ossowski’s m ain w ork on methodology. An attem p t is m ade to define th e basic concepts of society an d of social group, th e typological diffe
Polish Studies in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences 3 0 5 rentiations useful in analysis of definite com munities are discussed, then th e types of controversies on th e social sciences, th e evolution of th e so cial sciences, th e ir various functions and relations to o th er branches of science. A. Malewski in “Dwa modele socjologii” (Two Models of So ciology, SS, 3, 1961) distinguishes sociology as historical science from sociology as theoretical one by th eir m ethod and subject m atter.
In J. Topolski’s paper “Założenia metodologiczne Kapitału M arksa” (Methodological Assumptions of M arx’s Capital, SF, 3-4, 1969), the central idea of the reconstruction of the M arxian theory assumed b y th e socio- -economic analysis contained in Capital is an activity thesis, w hich is given a full discussion in term s of methodology. The same auth o r in “Integracyjny sens m aterializm u historycznego” (The Integrative Sense of Historical Materialism, SM, 1, 1965) shows th e role of historical m a terialism as a theory w ith a high degree of generality in the process of 'scientific integration. A. Malewski and J. Topolski in “Metoda m ateria lizmu historycznego w pracach historyków polskich*’ (The M ethod of His torical M aterialism in th e Works of Polish Historians, SF, 6, 1959) cha racterize th e method of studying the historical process. A. Malewski in
“Empiryczny sens teorii m aterializm u dialektycznego” (The Em pirical M eanin of Historical Materialism, SF, 2, 1957) analyses the continuity of th e M arxian ideas which result in the system of th ree theories in cluding hypotheses of strict universality and having regard for th e po stulate of empirical testability.
J. Topolski’s book Metodologia historii (Methodology of History, W ar szawa, 1968) is a monograph of inquiries upon history assum ing th a t the developm ent of structures is th e subject-m atter of history, w hile its m ethod includes observation as independent of theory. The m eaning and scope of th e notion of methodology of history is elucidated and various types of reflection upon history as th e science and the course of events a re discussed. The concept of background knowledge is discussed and recommended in procedures of reconstructing historical processes. The question of th e idiographic character of history is answ ered by an anal ysis of the methodological stru ctu re of history. In Studia z metodologii historii (Studies on Methodology of H istory, Warszawa, 1960) J. Topolski and A. M alewski analyse actual methods used in historical research to elucidate th e problem s of idiographic character of history, determ ination of historical facts, statistical methods and causal explanation. In J. Giedym in’s papers “Z logiki wnioskowań na podstaw ie św iadectw ” (On Inferences Based on Historical Sources, RL) and “A uthorship and Reliability of Inform ants” (in English, SL, 12, 1961) historical sources are treated as an instance of rational behaviour and the problem s of authorship are discussed. The same author in th e book Z problem ów logicznych analizy historycznej (Some Logical Problem s of H istorical Analysis, Poznań, 1961) contributes to th e cu rrent discussion on the definition and 20 — O r g a n o n 7/70
306 17. Ofierska
classification of historical sources, deals w ith the peculiarities in in venting and testing hypotheses in th e analysis of documents.
A. Malewski in his book Zastosowania teorii zachowania (On Appli cations of the Theory of Behaviour, Warszawa, 1964) offers a methodo logical analysis of science as a system of theorem s of different levels of (generality and considers the integrative function of the behaviour theory w hich consists in the possibility of reduction of a t least some theorems of social sciences to those of th e theory of behaviour. The au th o r gives an account of applications of behaviour theory and m utual relations betw een it an selected social theories. J. Rejkowski in “Próba programu integracji” (A Tentative Integration Program, SM, 1, 1965) criticizes the above program, and a refutation of this criticism is found in J. Giedy- m in ’s paper “W spraw ie program u integracji tw ierdzeń psychologii” (A Note Concerning th e Systematizing of Behaviour Theories, SM, 2, 1966). J. Topolski’s “O znaczeniu teorii zachowania dla w yjaśnienia hi storycznego” (On th e Role of Learning Theory for H istorical Explanat ion, SM, 5, 1968) discusses the explanatory function of learning theory and th e possibility of its application.
T. Pawłowski in Z metodologii nauk przyrodniczych (Some Metho dological Problems of the N atural Sciences, Warszawa, 1959) regards de finition and classification as the most im portant ways of introducing scientific concepts and discusses the conditions of non-form al correctness o r scientific usefulness of definition and classification. M. Przełęcki in “O pojęciu genotypu” (The Concept of Genotype, SF, 5, 1961) gives a critical exposition of Woodger’s definition of th e concept of genotype jand attem pts to modify it. M. Kokoszyńska, T. Kubiński and J. Słu pecki in “Zastosowanie pojęć logiki matematycznej do w yjaśnienia nie których pojęć przyrodoznaw stw a” (The Application of Logistic Concepts tto th e Explication of Some Concepts in the N atural Sciences, SL, 4, 1956) inten d to show the usefulness of the logical methods for th e n atu ral sciences and offer th e explication of some biological concepts in term s of definition by abstraction. H. M ortim er in “O pewnej definicji geno
typu” (About a C ertain Definition of Genotype, RL) criticizes both th e usefulness of th e above method and the adequacy of the definition ob tained in th a t way. The same au th o r in “Definicja probabilistyczna na przykładzie definicji genotypu” (Probabilistic D efinition as Exemplified by a D efinition of Genotype, SL, 15, 1964) points a t the usefulness and characteristic properties of probabilistic definitions. F u rth er analyses can be found in H. S tonert’s “Analiza logiczna teorii atomistycznej w klasycznej chem ii” (Logical Analysis of Atomistic Theory in Classical Chemistry, F II) and in J. M ajewski’s “Miejsce fizyki wśród nau k przy rodniczych” (The Place of Physics in the N atural Sciences, SF, 3, 1967). L. Nowak in Próba metodologicznej charakterystyki prawoznawstwa (Essay in th e Methodological Character of Jurisprudence, Poznań, 1968)
Polish Studies in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences 307 assumes the thesis of methodological naturalism , i.e. th a t th e social sciences are subject to the same methodological rules as the n atu ral sciences. The author tries to reconstruct th e theories of rational beha viour assumed by legal reasoning. F. Studnicki in „Cybernetyka i p ra w o ” (Cybernetics and Law, Warszawa, 1969) gives the methodological analysis of legal sciences in term s of cybernetics. F u rth er methodological analyses of legal sciences can be found in the following papers: L. No wak, “Pojęcie obowiązywania jako teoretyczne pojęcie praw oznaw stw a” (The Concept of Law V alidity as Theoretical Term of Jurisprudence, SM, 3, 1967), L. Nowak, “Koncepcja racjonalnego stanowienia norm ” (The Conception of Rational Legislature, SM, 2, 1966); Z. Ziembiński’s “O nięktórych przyczynach dezintegracji nauk praw nych” (On Some Reasons of D esintegration of Legal Sciences, SM, 2, 1966); Z. Ziembiń ski, “Rodzaje sporów w praw oznaw stw ie” (Kinds of Controversies in Jurisprudence, SM, 4, 1968); Z. Ziembiński “O w ynikaniu norm z n o rm ” (On Consequence Relation Between Norms, RL); Z. Ziemba and Z. Ziem biński “Uwagi o w ynikaniu norm praw nych” (On th e Consequence Re lation Between Legal Norms, SF, 4, 1964).
O. Lange in the book Całość i rozw ój w świetle cybernetyki (Wholes a n d Development in the Light of Cybernetics, Warszawa, 1962) uses the conceptual fram ew ork of cybernetics for th e exact and methodologically correct w ay of dealing w ith th e problems of wholes and dialectical de velopment. The same author’s book W stęp do cybernetyki ekonom icz nej, (An Introduction to Economic Cybernetics, Warszawa, 1965) pre sents th e application of th e conceptual apparatus of cybernetics to th e analysis of economic process.
4
The works on methodology will be found in the forthcom ing Encyclope dia of Logic, W rocław-W arszawa-Kraków, and in th e following hand books: K. Ajdukiewicz, Logika pragmatyczna (Pragm atic Logic, W arsza wa, 1965); T. Kotarbiński, Elem enty teorii poznania, logiki form alnej i metodologii nauk (Elements of Gnoseology, Formal Logic and M etho dology of Science, 2nd ed., W rocław -W arszaw a-K raków , 1961); T. Ko tarbiński, W ykłady z dziejów logiki (Lectures on th e H istory of Logic, Łóaż, 1957) available in French as Leęons sur I’histoire de la logique. (Warszawa, 1965); O. Lange, Ekonomia polityczna (Political Economy, vol. l, Warszawa, 1965).
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F II F ra g m en ty filo zo fic zn e , seria II, K się g a p a m ią tk o w a k u u c zc z e n iu T. K o ta rb iń sk ie g o , W arszaw a, 1959
F III F ra g m e n ty filo zo fic zn e , se r ia III, K się g a p a m ią tk o w a k u c z c i p ro feso ra K o ta rb iń sk ie g o , W arszaw a, 1967
FSO T h e F o u n d a tio n o f S ta te m e n ts a n d D écision s, ed. b y K. A jd u k iew icz, W ar szaw a, 1965
J iP K. A jd u k iew icz, J ę z y k i po zn a n ie. P ism a w y b ra n e , vols, I and II, W arsza w a, 1960, 1065
L T N L o g iczn a te o r ia n a u k i, ed. by T. P a w ło w sk i, W arszaw a, 1966
R L R o z p r a w y logiczn e. K się g a p a m ią tk o w a ku c z c i K . A jd u k ie w ic z a , W ar szaw a, 1964 S F S tu d ia F ilo zo ficzn e S L S tu d ia L ogica SM S tu d ia M eto d o lo g iczn e SS S tu d ia S o cjo lo g iczn e T iD T eo ria i d o św ia d c z e n ie . P ra ca z b io ro w a , W arszaw a, 1966 v , y
