[latin-american-cities]: nueva
convocatoria
revista
especialidades
Collective maintenance of affordable condominiums in Bogota and Quito
Condominium
(n) / kɑndəˈmɪniəm/
From Latin com- "together” + dominum “domain /control” (1)
A form of housing tenure , institutionalized and regulated by
modern property laws. “Condominium” entails both individual
and collective rights of ownership and use.
In co-housing schemes under the condominium regime, common elements such as land, structure, infrastructure, and common economic goods are owned and governed in collective.
Governance and maintenance of the common property implies sustained organization and depends on institutions of collective action.
Condominium as a property regime exists in civil law countries around the world. The modern law of condominium , or Law of Horizontal Property, is from 1948 in Colombia and from 1960 in Ecuador. (2)
Perceived maintenance levels of common elements
Index (100)
METHODS:
A sample of households from eight case studies was surveyed during February and March, 2014 in Bogota and Quito (n=414). The goal was to measure collective action factors (3), as well as socio-economic information from households to understand the collective capacity of the group in order to govern and maintain the common property.
The conceptual model for the analysis follows the institutional design principles of long enduring common property resourses (4).
The problem of the “free-rider” and rational individual behaviour is
present in co-housing schequemes such as in the condominium (5,6).
CONCLUSIONS
According to law, the nature of condominium tenure is its self-governance and self-regulation of rights and obligations. Its
maintenance outcomes depend on the group’s configuration, ‘rules in
use’ (property law) and cooperation among housing policy actors (4). While comparing cases from Bogota and Quito, ideas of self-governance differ, as do types of interdependencies with external actors and therefore maintenance outcomes show interesting differences.
• Data shows that, while in Bogota households see the property
manager as the main actor in charge, in Quito surveyed households see the board of co-owners as the main institution that should both care for and inform about rights and obligations ensuring maintenance.
• Survey data is extensive and there is a lot more to say about
collective action in condominium. The index calculation with perceived
maintenance data will be used as a dependent variable as the ‘action
situation’ necesary to study collective action factors.
REFERENCES
1 Online Etymological Dictionary , www.etymonline.com
2 Definition by Rosa E. Donoso based on legal and commons’ definitions in Blandy, et al (eds). 2010; Hansman, 1991, Orban, 2006; Ostrom, 1990.
3 Ruonavaara, H (1993) Types and forms of housing tenure: towards solving the comparison/translation problem. Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research, 10:1, 3-20.
Elsinga, M (2005). Affordable and low risk home ownership. In PJ Boelhouwer, J Doling & Elsinga M (eds). Home Ownership: getting in, getting from, getting out DUP Science. Delft.
4 Ostrom, E (1990). Governing the commons. The Evolution of Institutions of Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(2003). “How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective
action’. Journal of Theotherical Politics, Vol, 13.No. 3, 239-270
5 Bengtsson B. (1998). “Tenant’s Dilemma – On Collective Action in Housing.
Housing Studies,Vol.13, No.1, 99-120.
6 C.W.Ho & Wei Gao (2013) Collective action in apartment building management in Hong Kong. Habitat International 38 p.10-17
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research project is funded by the Netherlands Felllowship Programme for PhD studies (2011-2015). I thank all organizations and actors that have colaborated with me during field work, data collection and analysis.
Any mistakes in this poster are the responsability of the author.
Elements in common
property
PROBLEM OF STUDY :
This study looks into the institutional complexity of condominium tenure by seeking to understand and compare how low and middle income homeowners organize themselves to maintain their common property, both in Bogota and Quito.
Low and middle income households buy affordable units in condominium with the assistance of a down-payment subsidy that comes from the government. This study focuses on condominiums that are built for the affordable housing market and observes how the interdependent behavior of actors affect the maintenance practices of the common property. There is empirical evidence that units are in a path of deterioration due to lack of maintenance.
DELFT UNIVERSITY OF TECNOLOGY - FACULTY OF ARCHITECTURE - OTB
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
High percentage of residential units in condominium
in Bogota’s and Quito’s housing markets
This condominium is close to the Historic Center of Quito. Owners have built ‘mini aparrtments on the roofs to accomodate family members or to let out.
Housing institutions’
levels of analysis
Land Infraestructre Structure Common use spaces Economic goodsB01
B02
B03
B04
14ha. / 960 units 1958 198 units 2003 83 units 2010 230 units 2013Q01
Q02
Q03
Q04
4h/ 528 units 1974 “Vivienda Solidaria” programe 2003 9129 m2/ 194 units 2010-2014 Ciudad Bicentenario Mz 7, 9, 16 2013Subsidy-based housing policy State-centered
provision
1980 /1990
Case study selection in Bogota and Quito
© Donoso, 2011.
Source: Total number of housing stock data is from Housing Census DANE –Colombia; INEC - Ecuador. Condominium residential units based on Cadastre information for this research project (2011).
Rosa Elena Donoso Gomez
PhD Fellow 2011-2015
65%
In Bogota 45%
In Quito
“Luluncoto” Condominium, Quito-Ecuador, 1974
Institutional model
“We are trying to understand how difficult property systems affect the incentives of participants, their interdependent behaviour and the outcomes they produce for themselves and others”
Ostrom (1995 ) Conference Proceedings on Common Property Resource Management/ p:601
Internal Network
Actors maintaining the common
property
External Network
Actors and institutions of housing policy
- Context -
Change in housing policy system / same form of tenure
HOUSING POLICY FOR LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERS – CONDOMINIUM TENURE
Who is responsibile for the maintenace of the
common property?
32,7% Co-owners 39,3% Board of co-owners 16,4% P.M. Co-owners Board of Co-owners Each one Property manger Builder Asembly of co-owners Municipality Don't know BOGOTA 86% ‘Property Manager’ (PM) ’ QUITOCondominium tenure: users are owners and
tenants – case studies sample:
44% 28% 39% 32% 32% 31% 2% 7% 56% 72% 61% 68% 68% 69% 98% 93% B01 B02 B03 B04 Q01 Q02 Q03 Q04 Tenant occupied Owner occupied
Sig. P value .00 | Households’ responses in Bogota shows that 86% of them think that the property manager is the responsible actor for maintenance, as it is law regulated by their property law (Law 675, 2001). While in Quito, responses are more diverse since the law is not specific in this aspect. Households see themselves or their leaders responsible for maintenance, showing a stronger knowledge of self-governance responsibilities than in Bogota.
These results show the extent to which co-owners share common space, use and maintenance responsabilities with tenants. From the sample, 61% of tenants pay maintenance fee themselves. Low and middle income owners can let their units after five to seven years after purchase of the property.
AESOP – “From Control to Co-evolution” 9-12 July, 2014, Utrecht / Delft, The Netherlands
State-centered provision Subsidy-based housing policy
Resource unit Characteristics Rules in use Constitutional Collective choice Operational Patterns of interactions Outcomes Evaluative Criteria
A framework for insitutional analysis. Adapted from E. Ostrom 2005, 15 (source: Poteete, Jansen and Ostrom, 2010:41) Action Situations Exogenous Variables Attributes of the community Users
Providers, policy makers
Tenure form is a key variable influencing housing policy systems and outcomes (3). In Latin
America, ‘homeownership’ is the policy goal, steering the provision of low-cost apartments in condominium regime.
Condominium owners have the obligation to self-govern and selft-regulate their community to maintain their common property :
Group percepcion of common property maintenace levels (index)
Size Property Law & Informal rules Low-income households in condominium r.e.donoso-gomez@tudelft.nl | rosaelenadonoso@yahoo.com Bldg.30. Jaffalaan 9 . 2628BX Delft, The Netherlands.
Pearson Chi Square - p value .00 / index / Mean Source: Donoso, Households’ Survey - 2014
Pearson Chi Square 75,780a, p value 0.00 | Maintenance of common property elements such as the
‘community house’ was evaluated by each surveyed household. In total, 10 common property elements were included in the survey, such as green spaces, facades, or stairs. The statistics below show the index calculation (weighted over 100 score) of the percieved maintenance levels of common elements (q18), by case study :
. 73 68 44 85 48 56 48 60 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 B01 B02 B03 B04 Q01 Q02 Q03 Q04 Crosstab case_code Total B01 B02 B03 B04 Q01 Q02 Q03 Q04 Q18_J According to your personal opinion, grade the level of maintenance of the following elements of common use: Common room/ community house
(1) Not maintained Count 4 1 20 2 5 7 6 1 46
% within case_code 8,0% 2,0% 43,5% 4,3% 10,4% 25,9% 18,2% 20,0% 15,0% Std. Residual -1,3 -2,4 5,0 -1,9 -,8 1,5 ,5 ,3 (2) Maintained Count 16 24 21 11 24 15 16 2 129 % within case_code 32,0% 48,0% 45,7% 23,4% 50,0% 55,6% 48,5% 40,0% 42,2% Std. Residual -1,1 ,6 ,4 -2,0 ,8 1,1 ,6 -,1
(3) Well maintained Count 30 25 5 34 19 5 11 2 131
% within case_code 60,0% 50,0% 10,9% 72,3% 39,6% 18,5% 33,3% 40,0% 42,8% Std. Residual 1,9 ,8 -3,3 3,1 -,3 -1,9 -,8 -,1 Total Count 50 50 46 47 48 27 33 5 306 % within case_code 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% Report indexQ18 Code Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
B01 73 54 26,807 0 100 B02 68 50 21,557 31 100 B03 44 46 27,357 0 100 B04 85 50 18,998 35 100 Q01 48 56 24,007 0 100 Q02 56 52 23,272 0 100 Q03 48 50 19,220 5 90 Q04 60 56 23,877 11 100 Total 60 414 26,574 0 100
