The Flood House Concept: A New Approach in Reducing Flood Vulnerability

deltacompetition 2006

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HELEEN VREUGDENHIL

PhD Student Policy Analysis

LEO MEIJER

MSc Student Water Management

LARS HARTNACK

MSc Student Architecture

TIES RIJCKEN

PhD Student Strategic Product Design & Building Technology

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ABSTRACT

Deltas throughout the world are vulnerable to natural hazards. New Orleans provides a recent and obvious example. We analyzed the situation in New Orleans and the Mississippi Delta after hurricane Katrina has passed, from a vulnerability perspective. Vulnerability can be subdivided into four components: threshold capacity, coping capacity, recovery capacity and adaptive capacity. The vulnerability of New Orleans could be decreased by increasing these capacities.

We propose Flood House as a concept to improve the four vulnerability capacities simultaneously. The Flood House is a flood-proof water management centre, in which people, science, government and business come together, first to remember victims of Katrina, but second to learn, discuss and create new - joint - ideas on all kinds of water management and flood related issues. This results in innovative strategies, policies and products to increase individual and collective safety against further future floodings.

Pre-conditions for success are adaptation to local circumstances and a differentiated approach to, and platforms for, the different societal stakeholders. The Flood House facilitates an innovative approach to governance on disaster management and could therefore even have a function during hurricanes. Once it has been tested and proven itself, the concept could be transplanted to other delta regions throughout the world.

1 INTRODUCTION

The destructive force of water is high on the agendas of many scientist, politicians and people living in sea and river shore areas. Global climate change research predicts rising sea levels, more storms and higher peaks in rainfall. Next to this, recent dramatic events, such as the Tsunami in Asia and Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, have raised our awareness on the vulnerability of deltas.

In New Orleans, the floods caused by Katrina killed over 1500 people and sent 400.000 people in exile, which is about 85% of the population. Until now, not even half of the population has returned to the city. New Orleans is empty and devastated. People grieve. Federal aid is limited and the general moral is low. Comparable disasters could happen in other deltas throughout the world.

In a way, New Orleans has an advantage over other deltas. New Orleans can be rebuilt according to new ideas. It has real-life experience with disasters, momentum, and (literally) space for alternative protective measures. For example, the Delta Works of the Netherlands could only be built after the floods of 1953. Maybe New Orleans can also benefit from the disaster. But should it be by similar gigantic structural interventions such as the Dutch dams and barriers? Maybe the 21st century demands for less prestige-oriented solutions. Subtle interventions could have a positive effect on a shorter term, involve more people and can flexibly adapt to increasing insight on the longer term.

Questions like ‘what exactly is safety’, ‘who is responsible for which threat’ and ‘how do you protect yourself or the city against a flood’ are important to be considered by all stakeholders in New Orleans. Not only to recover from Katrina, but also to prepare for future threats. This can be derived by increasing the threshold and coping capacity, but moreover by being adaptive now and in the future.

The disaster in New Orleans shows the world the vulnerability of deltas in general and the Mississippi delta specifically. At the same time it offers us an opportunity to propose a concept, the Flood House, which could contribute to reduce this flood vulnerability. This is not a new storm surge barrier design, not a policy to get more funding, no plea for restoring the whole area to its natural state, but a new attitude towards flood protection, in which all members of society are heard and will be offered to do what they do best.

2 CONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY

Vulnerability is a concept used to indicate ‘the sensitivity of a system for exposure to shocks, stresses and disturbances, or the degree to which a system is susceptible to adverse effects’ (Turner, 2003; IPCC, 2001). Disturbances can be both exogenous or endogenous (e.g. a drought can be caused by low river flow, bad water management or both). Graaf and Ven (2006) identify a combination of four components of vulnerability in deltas. These four components are the ‘Threshold capacity’, ‘Coping capacity’, ‘Recovery capacity’ and ‘Adaptive capacity’.

2.1 Threshold capacity

In all deltas there is a certain threshold capacity. The threshold capacity consists of the volume and flux of water that the water system can handle without causing any damage to everyday life. For example, the threshold capacity could be determined by long term discharge forecasts resulting in a system of dikes and a centralized spatial planning for the water system. The spatial planning could include the use of the water system as a leading principle, resulting in restrictions on building, the widening of rivers and floodplains and the application of waterproof building concepts and technologies such as floating constructions in hazardous regions (Commissie Waterbeheer 21e eeuw, 2000; Smits, 2000).

2.2 Coping capacity

If the volume of water is larger than the actual discharge capacity of the water system, the excess of water will cause flooding. The ability of a society to deal with floods or excessive rainfall is described by the term coping capacity. There are two main aspects determining this coping capacity. The first is the management of the excess of water. If there is an agreement or an organisation determining where the excess water should flow, supported by a physical structure, the flood could be (re)directed and controlled in order to minimise damage. Emergency inundation polders as applied in the Netherlands are an example of attempts to control exceptionally high river discharges. The second aspect of coping capacity is disaster management. This includes the

organisation of the evacuation of inhabitants before and after an area is flooded, but also preventing looting, evacuation of pet animals and reducing damage to loose objects such as cars.

2.3 Recovery capacity

The third component of vulnerability is the recovery capacity. This component deals with the effort, costs and time for the system to recover to the original (or desired) state. The system comprises many elements, including ecology, economy, livability and water management. For instance, in many flooded areas huge unexpected problems arose with household and industrial chemicals, which caused severe environmental pollution and put a threat on the livability of the area. The costs and time to undo these negative effects and to make the area livable again are main indicators of the recovery capacity. Furthermore, the ability to manage the period in between the disaster and the fully recovered status is also part of the recovery capacity.

2.4 Adaptive capacity

In contrast to the other three components of vulnerability, the adaptive capacity is a rather holistic notion. In general, adaptive management is an approach based on collaboration among agencies, researchers and local stewards. It sees resource management as a continuous learning-by-doing process that recognizes public participation and collaborative learning (Stockholm International Water Institute, 2005). Adaptive management recognizes structural uncertainties. Resilience in the ecosystem and flexibility in the management institutions are essential factors for adaptive management (Gunderson, 1999) in order to deal with these deep uncertainties. Pragmatic solutions for water management would be to seek for restoration of resilience and flexibility, which can occur through novel assessments, small-scale experiments or when an unforeseen policy crisis allows for reformation or restructuring of power relationships among actors (Gunderson, 1999). To increase the adaptive capacity, ecosystem processes would be the leading factor to which other policies are adapted instead of increasing control over the

resources. Furthermore, the institutions should have certain flexibility and can change easily if the situation asks for it. As such, a net could be developed in case an aspect fails.

These four components of vulnerability are interrelated. For instance, in case of an increased adaptive capacity, the pressure on the other components decreases. A resilient ecosystem is often able to store large water quantities and could in that case reduce a flood peak. A reduced flood peak could imply less stress on the threshold capacity and since the chance for a flood and subsequent damage decreases, coping and recovery capacity are less needed.

3 KATRINA AND NEW ORLEANS

The history of New Orleans showed that Katrina was not a unique event. The most recent hurricanes with large social impacts include 'Camille' and 'Betsy' in the 1960's. In fact, a disaster like Katrina has been forecasted by Fischetti in Scientific American in 2001 and by Brouwer in the Civil Engineering Magazine in 2003. Fischetti warned for the threat from the sea: with the disappearing wetlands the protective nature of the river delta at the coast around New Orleans is disappearing. Brouwer focused on the threat of Lake Pontchartrain that in case of high speed winds from a certain direction could overtop and breach the levees. This, in combination with the heavy rains, is exactly what happened during the Katrina disaster.

2.5 Threshold capacity: wetlands and levees

The threshold capacity of New Orleans is derived from a natural system of wetlands and water storage bodies and from an artificial system of levees, pumps and canals. New Orleans is located along the largest wetlands of the USA. These wetlands function as hurricane and flood protection (Restore America’s Estuaries, 2006). However, several threats, both natural and human, are diminishing this natural buffer. The area is subsiding with high speed (Dixon, 2006; Fontenot, 2006) and economic developments and urbanisation reduce the size of the wetlands.

With respect to the civil structures, it turned out that the quality of the levees was marginal (Rogers, 2006; Independent Levee Investigation Team, 2006) as a result of limited interest, subsequent marginal funding (Seed, 2006) and poor cooperation between the many levee boards (Sharky, 2006). Due to their limited quality of they could not withstand the heavy winds, flood and rains, resulting in several breaches of levees that should have protected the city. Since half of the city lies below sea level, a breach means serious inundation for large areas of the city. Besides the levees, there were limited measures as compartimentation, flood proof architecture or excess water storage basins.

Box 1: Report on Hurricane Katrina

[Rijkswaterstaat, 2005; NOS, 2005]

Katrina

Friday, August 25, 2005, Hurricane Katrina moves over the southern tip of Florida into the Gulf of Mexico. As predicted, the hurricane strengthens to a category 3 on Saturday, August 27. Voluntary evacuation starts in the threatened section of the coast. The highway lanes around New Orleans are used to transport evacuees and the Louisiana Superdome is announced as a shelter of last resort. On Sunday, August 28 Katrina increases in strength to Category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale. Despite a mandatory evacuation order for New Orleans, an estimated 100,000 people remain in the city.

On Monday morning Katrina lands and causes massive damage. Initial reports speak of a total of 55 death and $60 billion in damage. As the winds above New Orleans subside, the city seems to have been spared. However, within a few hours, water from the Gulf of Mexico and from Lake Pontchartrain begins to inundate the city through breaches in the levees and the worst case scenario becomes a reality. The main disaster thus did not directly come from Katrina, but rather from the winds raising the water levels of Lake Pontchartrain to immense heights and the heavy rains. When about 80% of the city flooded, over 1500 died in the devastating forces of the water and entire communities became homeless.

Besides the personal disaster, Katrina caused huge damage to the economy and the environment. Part of the people remaining in the town did not want to leave, but another part could not leave because of the deficiencies in the evacuation plan that did not fully account the large number of people without private transport. Only days after the storm, all people were evacuated, but for many it was too late.

2.6 Coping capacity: disaster management

The coping capacity of New Orleans was compiled in a disaster management plan including evacuation of citizens and water disposal by pumping. Technical failures (e.g. electricity breakdown), limited experience and familiarity with the plans, and unexpected human behavior caused unforeseen developments. For instance, the City of New Orleans waited quite a long time before issuing a mandatory evacuation order possibly in fear of being held liable for a loss of income had the hurricane not affected the city (Rijkswaterstaat, 2005). Local officials were overwhelmed by the magnitude and consequences of the disaster including break-downs in vital communication, thereby causing wide-scale confusion and delays, such as not putting all the available buses into action for evacuation. Other examples causing unexpected developments were the breakdowns of the pumps and the love of people for their pets. Eventually, about 100,000 people remained in the city during the hurricane. These were mainly poorer people without possibilities of transportation and they were mainly living in the most affected areas. Many evacuees found shelter in the Superdome or other cities such as Baton Rouge and Houston.

2.7 Recovery capacity: a devastated and abandoned city

After the hurricane, recovery faced –and still faces- many practical problems. Pumping the water out of the city, cleaning the city from pollution and rebuilding the infrastructure, houses and public buildings are a few of the challenges New Orleans is facing. Due to limited pumping capacity, it took several months before all the excess water had been disposed of. Excess water causes infrastructural problems and mud deposition, but also spreads and severe pollution from households and industrial chemicals. Recovery of the system from this pollution takes a long time, thereby affecting both environment and public health. The first priority of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) was to restore the levees to the pre-Katrina level of safety before the new hurricane season (Setliff, 2006), in which they succeeded (USACE, 2006).

To rebuild the city, a committee (Bring New Orleans Back) has been installed by Mayor Ray Nagin. Their main task is ‘to keep the city culturally intact while at the same time improving the areas that were marginal’ (Legarde, 2006). Difficulties include differences in perspectives on urban and spatial planning and limited resources. The federal government limits its help to New Orleans 'because it would be inconsistent with our responsibility to US taxpayers to distinguish between deltaic regions’ (Duncan, 2005).

An important aspect in the recovering the city is the return of the people of New Orleans. In January 2006, only an estimated 125.000 people resided in New Orleans, 300.000 have not yet returned (Sharky, 2006). The expectation is that in a few years only half of the city will return. The people most affected by the hurricane were those living in the low-lying parts of the city and they were generally poorer people. They showed ability to move elsewhere and started a new life. They often do not want to or cannot return. This diaspora has major implications for New Orleans, including the limited availability of workers to rebuild infrastructure, a drop in tax income and abandoned neighbourhoods with possibilities for pauperization and criminality.

Less obvious are organisational and planning problems for neighbourhoods where the majority of the houses are empty and demolished, even after a year. For instance, schools with less than 20% of the students present are hard to run and loosing the black community with the specific jazz culture is a loss for the cultural value of New Orleans as a whole. On the other hand, more space could offer opportunities in reconstructing the city in terms of quality of neighbourhoods and water storage. Not only for New Orleans the diaspora has major implications, also for the cities where the refugees went (see figure 1), this sudden increase in number of inhabitants causes problems. For instance in Houston, a direct extra police force was lacking that could deal with the increase in criminality (City Journal, 2006).

2.8 Adaptive capacity: reborn wetlands and innovation opportunities

The resilience of the water system of New Orleans has been limited in the past by, among others, canalisation, restricted sedimentary processes, reduced wetlands and ground subsidence. This made the area vulnerable for floods. The limited flexibility in institutions appeared in institutions that did not overtake responsibilities and the absence of scenarios and funds for failing mechanisms.

The adaptive capacity, as hard as it is to measure, will reveal itself the coming years and decades. Ecosystem-based management and participatory approaches offer possibilities to increase the adaptive capacity (Gunderson, 1999; Pahl-Wostl, 2006). For instance, using the available space in the city for water storage if needed or restoring natural processes in the wetlands thereby slowing down speed of subsidence (Saeijs, 2004), could increase the resilience of the ecosystem. The business-spirit and persistence of the Americans could also contribute to the general adaptivity. Facing the damage of the flood so directly should provide means for innovation by developers, insurance companies and entrepreneurs. The coming years, the integration of the physical and societal system is a challenge for New Orleans.

3 WATER MANAGEMENT CULTURE

Every country has its own water management culture developed over time. As such, different countries could learn from each other or at least better understand their own culture if compared with other cultures. In understanding some aspects of American attitude towards water management, a brief comparison with Dutch attitude towards water management is depicted. This understanding gives input for fundamental discussions at the Flood House.

The differences are derived from cultural, socio-economic and institutional characteristics. A first difference is the role of the government to protect residents and the individual responsibilities of residents. In the Netherlands, the role of the government in water management is very large, which results in large-scale spatial plans and water management plans all directed by governmental organisations. Private partnership and public participation are limited, although the Dutch government acknowledges the importance of this. The trust in the government arranging protection against floods is generally large and people are willing to spend tax money on this. As a result, the sense of collective safety is large, but this approach also implies that individual choices are usually subordinated to general policies. In some cases people even have to move out if a water management measure has been planned on where they live. In the USA the focus is much more on the individual safety. This could result in a larger adequacy in dealing with disasters of individuals, but the management of the water system as a coherent system is less adequate.

Another difference is the attitude towards risks. In the Netherlands, risks are diminished as much as possible. Dealing with risks in general enlarges the opportunities for innovations on a business level, but limiting risks for floods could increase safety. However, reducing flood risks creates a paradox of a diminished level of risk-awareness and a subsequent reduced level of ability to deal with risks and investing in originally flood-prone areas. In case of flooding, the damage will be even larger. A society should ask itself to what extent it is willing to pay to reduce risks. According to Link (2006) the limited involvement of both government and people in public safety can be explained by the limited available resources for flood protection. The importance of return on investments is another explanation why the investments needed to reduce risks are lower in the USA than in the Netherlands.

Figure 2: Three pillars or ‘floaters’ under the concept of The Flood House, creating a ‘trimaran’ (compare: catamaran)

4 TRIMARAN: A NEW WATER MANAGEMENT APPROACH

New Orleans is currently trying to recover from Hurricane Katrina. Large numbers of inhabitants have not returned yet. With the inhabitants, a large part of New Orleans’ specific culture got lost. Creating job opportunities, rebuilding the city and building trust will contribute to the return of the inhabitants. However, focus should not be single-sided on recovery. It is important to look ahead and consider opportunities to decrease the vulnerability as a whole for future threats. Therefore, serious reconsiderations on the water management system are necessary. Questions should be raised and old viewpoints reconsidered. What level of collective safety do we strive for? To what extent are we willing to pay for this level of safety now and in the future, and who is responsible for what? What is the best combination between large structural interventions such as storm surge barriers and other measures like smart spatial planning and restoring the natural water system and wetlands?

Open public debates could increase understanding and awareness and could also lead to creativity and supported management actions, which is a precondition for success. Scientific and creative ideas could be transferred into entrepreneurial activities. Integration of societal actors, collaboration between stakeholders and participatory planning are part of a global democratic trend, relevant in the 21st century (Rischard 2002). However, offering a platform for integration is only sensible and feasible if it is adapted to the local characteristics of New Orleans and the US water management approach. These three components form the basic structure of the Flood House, represented by the ‘trimaran’ in figure 2.

considering ALL four components of Flood Vulnerability facilitating and bringing together science, people, governments and business creating a neutral, enjoyable and locally inspired environment

FLOOD HOUSE

FLOOD HOUSE

Figure 3: collage showing the ‘feel’ of the Flood House (previous page)

5 THE FLOOD HOUSE

From an historical perspective, the main focus of water management in New Orleans and many other deltas has been on increasing the threshold capacity. Nowadays, with the new knowledge on interrelated physical and social elements of the water system, a more holistic approach towards flood vulnerability would be more appropriate. Governments are expected to offer a certain level protection against floods, but government responsibilities and effectiveness are not always sufficient to achieve this. If more information about the many aspects of flood vulnerability had been provided and different stakeholders had been acting integrated, responsibilities would have been clearer, people would have been better prepared and flood related business opportunities would have arisen. Therefore, governments, businesses, people and science should find a way to effectively collaborate. They should grasp and discuss the concept of flood vulnerability scientifically resulting in action and entrepreneurship. This can happen in an environment that is both neutral and stimulating.

The Flood House is a multi-purpose, flood-proof, information centre and platform in New Orleans, in which one can find all kinds of flood management related issues and products. Through multiple activities awareness for the shared problems will rise. The Flood House should be self supporting and will have four major functions:

• Educating and informing people about water management and related issues;

• Enabling people to buy products that will increase their collective and individual sense of safety;

• A conference and knowledge centre that will bring together several actors involved in water management and will combine their (research) activities;

• Memorial for the people who lost their lives during the Katrina disaster.

The Flood House concept could be regarded as an attempt to increase the adaptive capacity in New Orleans, since it encourages and stimulates collaboration among different type of actors and stakeholders. Furthermore, by the nature of the education and knowledge forums, increases in resilience of the ecosystem and flexibility of the institutions could be reached. Because of the current crisis in the New Orleans water management, a ‘window of opportunity’ (Kingdon, 1984) has opened that could be used to structurally increase the adaptive capacity and as such decrease the vulnerability of the delta as a whole.

The design of the Flood House should allow for flexibility and it functions may have to change in time. The actual decision over the appearance and location of the Flood House should be left to the people of New Orleans. In a design competition everybody could be allowed to participate and present their design. The people of New Orleans should in the end decide which Flood House should be built.

5.1 Functions of the Flood House

Survival Shop

In the Flood House products related to floods will be advertised and sold. Experts give advise to minimise flood damage and on life saving products, tax structures, risks, insurances, and so on. A number of ideas are listed below and some of them are illustrated with exemplary posters.

Products to increase the threshold capacity:

• Adopt-a-dike: this program connects civilians to a certain piece of dike, either financially or with practical activities such as inspection, mowing or maintenance. In return they will be honoured similarly to the existing American “adopt-a-highway” programmes.

• Adopt-a-wetland: the principle of this program is equal to that of the previous one, but here pieces of natural wetlands can be adopted by (groups of) civilians or schools.

• Garden water storage: farmers or people with big gardens are encouraged to store large quantities of rainwater in their garden during excessive rain showers.

• Waterproof buildings: project developers can advertise flood-resistant (highrise) buildings in amphibious zones, such as the proposed Greenway Buffers (Sharky, 2006).

Products to increase the coping capacity:

• Life jackets: Everybody in New Orleans should have a life jacket and should know how they work. In the shop life jackets will be offered for only $2, subsidised by governmental grants and donations to the ‘Flood House Fund’.

• Boats: The shop will offer several kinds of small boats. From inflatable rowing boats to small motorized boats.

• Floating cars and attributes: amphibious cars and external air-bags and lifelines prevent vehicles submerging or floating away and damage during a flood.

• Home flooding kit: a waterproof box for storage of passports, insurance policies, chemicals, (non-)prescription drugs, etc.

• Life-in-a-bubble: protection from water and pollution by a plastic sleeve that automatically covers your house during a flood.

• Floating technology: floating houses, amphibious or on existing water, do not get damaged during a flood.

• Floating dog kennels: when a flood rises, a dog or cat might retreat to his kennel, which remains floating. Possibly, it automatically locks when the dog is inside and the kennel has reached a certain height.

Products to increase the recovery capacity:

• Instant house: A house that will be self supporting and can be dropped shortly after a flood and will provide temporary housing • Temporary utilities: generators, water pyramid (Nitsche, 2006),

vaccinations against diseases that will be there after a flood, temporary hospitals.

• First-aid-after floods: health courses specially focussed on flood related problems

• Visual shields: plants or fences hide ugly damaged and abandoned houses.

5.2 The Flood House Information Centre

The Flood House provides space for research and development of new flood protection measures. It does not facilitate full-time researchers, but brings together the people of New Orleans, governmental, business and residential organisations that focus on water management, disaster management and the reconstruction of the city. Conferences can be held and the acquired knowledge can be exported to other delta areas. This knowledge centre will be easily accessible for people, business and government. A website will be maintained and it will hold a large library on flood related literature.

Many people in New Orleans did not realise the importance of a sound water system. The possible effects of hurricanes in every day life are not very clear. In the Flood House permanent education will be given on water management and the water system. Special programs for specific groups should be offered to create a better, general understanding on the water management system of the city. This could lead to in-depth discussions on water management. The main focus in this part of the Flood House could shift in time: the coming years there is plenty to tell and learn from the Katrina disaster, but in the future other topics could be interesting as well. The measures and changes in the water system can be explained to civilians, business and government. Disaster management strategies can be discussed and adjusted with everyone involved.

Examples for education and workshops include: • Flood protection and disaster management • Innovative technologies on water management

• Spatial planning (e.g. the role of wetlands in water management and the role spatial planning could serve in preserving them) • Architecture: Advice on flood prone building and furnishing of your

house

• Institutional discourses (e.g. responsibilities, implications of changes)

• Field trips for schools or kids parties (e.g. biology classes)

• Workshops in the Louisiana wetlands: ranging from ecology to the importance of wetlands for economy (e.g. nation’s oil and gas supply, seafood)

5.3 Cultural activities

After the Katrina disaster a permanent memorial is needed for the people who lost their lives to the hurricane. This memorial should have a central place in the Flood house. In the meeting area several general features as a bar and stage area, lavatories and management offices can be installed. Besides of serious issues, the Flood House could also function as a community place, where people can have fun enjoying jazz concerts and eating in the ‘Water Restaurant’. This restaurant serves all kind of local dishes with food derived from the wetlands.

5.4 Financing

The Flood House concept taps into the money that individuals are willing to spend on flood protection, businesses on exposure and knowledge development and governments on water management in general. Considering the financial and emotional damage to restore and prevent, there should be enough money available. It can be stated that the Flood House has no competitors, since it aims at embracing and facilitating anyone who works in the field. The Flood House will be a not-for-profit organisation that is financially self supporting. The financial structure is divided in ongoing (daily) budgeting and project-based budgets. Each budget gets income from profit, subsidies or donations, depending on the nature of the project, participants and responsibilities. The profit

made in the shop and knowledge centre will be used for the general maintenance of the Flood House and to attract new artists and inventors to develop new products or services. Excess money is stored in the ‘Flood House Fund’ to finance special projects.

The products and programs should allow all people to participate, independent of their social or financial status. Several basic survival products, such as the life jacket, will be offered very cheap. The poorer people can also participate in the adopt-a-dike program by doing maintenance. If enough investors can be found for this program, there might even be financial compensation for the people who offer to do the maintenance. The wealthier people can invest in dikes, increase their safety and as such decrease their insurance premium. To get the Flood House started, a number of organisations should collaborate and invest. Ideally it should be a balanced mix between governmental, corporate and individual capital. The City of New Orleans, some federal money, insurance companies and developers should unite for their benefit and the benefit of New Orleans.

5.5 Marketing

The architecture competition and the idea in general will probably get enough media attention to get known throughout New Orleans. The first feature of the marketing strategy is on getting people to the Flood House. Jazz festivals, carnival activities and the water restaurant could be used to attract people. Since the Katrina disaster is still very present in the memory of many people, there will be a general interest in the city’s water management strategy. When people enter the Flood House they will first see the memorial for the people who lost their lives during the disaster. After this they will be led to the informative and educative section. Changing expositions and general information will coincide to give people – from all walks of life and all ages – the things they need to know on the (future) water management of New Orleans. People can be informed about the activities in the Flood House by flyers. Information is of course also available on the website, which could serve as an easily accessible forum for several topics.

When people have gained the information they are being given the possibility to participate. In the survival shop there will be both practical and simple products that can be used instantaneously and more sophisticated products and programs. People can commit themselves to these programs by either financing them or participating, such that every income group has access to knowledge and products. These programs will have to be actively supported by the local government and it should – in time – become a social naturalness for every inhabitant of New Orleans. In order to get people used to these products some will be given away for free during competitions or lotteries. Also the participation should become something important or fashionable. People should feel they mean something to society.

Besides of individual inhabitants, other groups include schools, charity, NGO’s, social clubs, businesses and government. Schools educate the next generation and the Flood House could contribute to the educational program of the school. Social clubs could decide to collectively participate in larger projects such as adopt-a-dike and as such contribute to society. Businesses could be attracted by offering an extended network of organisations and contacts nearby, public relations, and practical issues such as conference availabilities. Governmental organisations could be attracted to the idea of the Flood House for ethical reasons, but moreover actively gain profits from increasing public participation.

[CNN, 2037]

Melissa

Thursday, October 15th 2037, Hurricane Melissa moves into the Gulf of Mexico and strengthens to a category 5 on Friday. The hurricane is aiming for New Orleans. It is the end of the hurricane season and due to the global climate change the hurricane season lasts longer and category 5 hurricanes are no longer an exception. The weather services have calculated that it will pass New Orleans approximately 50 kilometres to the west. So the storm surges are closed and everybody has collected some extra food and water. Mandatory evacuation orders are not given anymore because of legal conflicts of the past. Inhabitants are expected to decide for themselves if they prefer to stay or leave. Sunday morning, Melissa hits land. The hurricane did not follow its predicted pathway, but hit New Orleans right in the middle. All authorities are puzzled, how could the weather services be so wrong? After all, there were billions of US dollars invested in a better warning system? With wind speeds over 400km per hour and heavy rain showers this is the biggest storm ever to hit the US, and it hits New Orleans right in the middle.

The city is flooding piece by piece, but in a slow and predicted way. The restoration of the wetlands had a balancing effect on the storm and the levees were in a good state of maintenance. The compartimentation of the city has resulted in a predictable pattern of flooding. The new built area, with floating homes was one of the first areas to flood, but with very little damage. Other areas followed. The city alarm did work and people were able to take their last minute preparations on there homes, such as storing valuable things and chemicals in the special designed boxes. Other people took shelter in there boats and the precautionary measured seemed to work.

Around 8 o’clock the next morning the Flood House starts to undertake action. Together with the police, in boats, they start to hand out blankets and a hot breakfast. Some of the injured people were taken in the Flood House for first aid. The neighbourhood coordinators knew where aid was needed most and where people could assist other citizens. The first help was very efficient. The city had more or less anticipated on an excess of water and emergency power and pumps were installed. After two weeks the water was pumped out of the city and people started to rebuilt their houses. The Flood House has found its place again and the first exhibition is planned. The rebuilding plans are made and will be presented, and there will be a debate on flood management. Ray Nagin will be a giving a lecture about the differences between Melissa and Katrina.

6 THE FUTURE OF THE FLOOD HOUSE

6.1 Melissa: Katrina’s bigger sister

In box 2 a fictional future scenario is presented. The suggested measures and products will not prevent the next disaster happening. However, it does show what role the Flood House could play in New Orleans. The products for sale and implemented programs will result in an increase of the threshold capacity. Due to the fact that inhabitants and authorities are better informed about the water management and are familiar with the emergency plans, less surprise and panic occurs. As such, the coping capacity has been increased. Since authorities and citizens are prepared for a disaster, the process of cleaning up and restoring the city is also a lot easier. The amount of damage is limited and major environmental pollution has been prevented. The fact that people can deal with a disaster is a result of an increased adaptive capacity. By informing and educating people, through shared knowledge and collective planning the Flood House has become a stage of incredible value.

6.2 Transplantation of the Flood House concept

The Flood House is designed for New Orleans, but the concept could offer benefits in many other deltas throughout the world. The term institutional transplantability is used to describe the borrowings of institutional experiences from elsewhere (Mamadouh e.a., 2002). De Jong (2002) indicate several factors and conditions for success. The first includes the careful consideration of the relation between the goals of the transplantation and the actual transplanted institution. In other words, the concept should actually have proven itself in New Orleans and should potentially contribute to the goals of the specific area to which it is transplanted. Only if the conditions of the host country are clear, transplantation should be considered. Adaptation to local circumstances is crucial.

A second factor mentioned is that an idea in general is more likely to be transplantable than specific legal frameworks or procedures. This implies for the Flood House that the concept itself should be considered as transplantable, and not too much the results that emerge from it. Another condition for success is that the transplant should be considered as a loosely defined model rather than a strict model to be followed. In fact, this factor stresses again the need to adapt to local circumstances and use those parts of the concepts which actually contribute something and leave others out. A fourth factor for success is the timing of transplantation. Periods with a sense of emergency and urgency, facilitate the transplantation process. This also holds for the establishment of the concept, since only after a disaster like hurricane Katrina a concept like the Flood House could emerge. In periods of stability, transplantation is less easy to accomplish.

In case of the Flood House, transplantation seems possible and reasonable since it is a concept that is subject of transplantation. It could be attractive not only for the host country, but also for the donor country since it increases knowledge and availability of expositions that could be exchanged. However, it is crucial to translate the conceptual ideas to the local institutional, physical and socio-economic circumstances as was done for New Orleans. Before considering transplantation, the concept first needs to prove its value in New Orleans and it should be very well explored where to transplant it. The European Union is searching for the establishment of practical solutions to enhance active involvement of all interested parties in implementation of water management practices (HarmoniCOP, 2005). The Flood House concept could be such a solution and as such, the European Union or the individual member states should keep an eye on the development of the Flood House in New Orleans.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank the following people for their contribution to this paper and the development of the Flood House concept:

Tineke Ruijgh-van de Ploeg Jill Slinger

Stef Janssen Darby Grande

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