Understanding Ro-Ro rapid capsize - Opening in shell and around cardeck side collision - ATLAS I and II

(1)

ATLAS

by. E. Vossnack

p .a.

P.O. Box 29

2600 AA DELFT

TECHNISCHE UNPJERSITEII

.aboratoriurn 'icor

Scheepshydromochanjc

rchief

Mekeiweg 2, 2628 CD De!ft

TeLi O15-7a88r. Fax

_015-781833

UNDERSTANDING

RO-RO 'RAPID CAPSIZE"

Opening in shell and around cardeck

side collision

27 November 1995

drawing

_{Ir. E.}

_Vossnack

titre personnel

tests

_{Ir. J.}

_{Journée. A. Goeman.}

TUD

C. van den Bergh. A. Versluis.

P. de I-leer

calculations

Ir. A.W. Vredeveldt.

_TNO

(2)

O. AESTRACT

A, CENERAL

E. WATER ON

"E S TONI A"

C. SL D

-

COLLI 510 N

CAP SE

EUROPEAN cATE WAY (J.SPOUGE)

FERRY G2

FEY '72

CAR'DECK- CAPSE

HEIRALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE

TRANSVERSE

SUBO IVi5ION

IN

t'tC ROOMS

_TESTS,

T.'.,.

"'TNO

LONCIT &JLKHEADS

OVER LENGTH OF 5HIP

J

s

VIKNC,RFD.

SUBDIVLON OF CARIDECKSPACE

LQÌ'4CIT

U Li".HEAD

AT B1

.E.DOOR5/ 3,J',

5WtF'4C _{-TELE5CQpC-DOOR.S}

.5

DYNAMIC-5TABLJTY UP 10 CRITICAL-ANGLE

'i

i.

L FT"

"PRINCES S

-

_{CHAF?LOTTE'J "SKAGERRAK,WAHINE}

si

NOFOAM-BLOCKS iN

VOID WINGTANV5

ff0 A T'1

5PQP4SONS

.

Ro RO -CARGO

_{CAROSt-1fFT SyRE5ONACEROLLLNc}

- CAPSIZE

H. DOUBLE EMDER FERRy "51ER"

FO1

WADOEMZOE (A.VELDMAN)

i. = M DOUBLE SlOE 5KIN FILLED

WITh P.S4-IARDFOAM 8L0C1Ç5

L Sí

_{COLLISION TESTS + FALLING HAMM ER-3.5'T,TNO}

PENE TRPrIOt4

Er

cjy-A6 SORPTION

, INFWENCE OF FOAM.

(3)

ABSTRACT

RoRo VESSELS FOR CARGO AND CAR PASSENGER

_TRANSPORT

RoRo vessels have

_{proven to be commercially very succesfuu due to the rapid}

smooth cargo operation.

This undisturbed operation is possible because the car space upon the

free-boarddeck stretches from board to board and from stem to stern and is loaded

via stern and bow.

However, a side collision at full soeed might cause a rapid capsize within 3-4

minutes causing a great death toll: because high-located lifeboats are worthless.

in case of a side collision the underwatertiull is hit by

a bulbous bow and

simultaneously the topside shell is holed by the forbody of the attacking vessel.

The inburst of water at 3 m Jsec at 7 m2lower hole,will

cause rapid heeling.

(2 t

The rapidly increasing list will retard the crossflooding. Water does not flow uphill.

Crossflooding will be hampered by longitudinal separation bulkheads in

engine-room (mind purifier comptm.) which Will act as a breakwater. When the righting

moment is dwindling, ccrssflooding will stop.

-I.L

ANALE.. OF tMNRSIO4 Of c.PRDECK

8

The cardeck will be immersed if listing continues and water, entering via a hole in

the topside of the ship, will spread out over this continuous deck: free moving

water is detrimental to a positive stability.

-This sequence of events may lead to a rapid capsize if downflooding of entered

water is too sluggish.

o TP4

WATZ t 3 SPREAPtMC

L.L. ov

THE 3RD'LNTh IN TP( CP&øcXAMCLE

In this case it has no sense to make requirements about a final damage

stability range because in the intermediate stage when dynamic forces

cannot find an equilibrium and consequently the vessel is continuing in

turning over her side.

(4)

Reg.

Ferry 0.62

This vessel characterized by transverse

subdividion-bulkheads in machinery

compartments ticr be improved

by buoyant wingtanks located on the

outer car

lane upon the RoRo freeboard

deck. IOEMER,

TESTS NaICATE ThAT

T1LS tS ACTF4 TOO

LPT

There is a risk that

trailers might topple and cargo

might shift to the lee-side at

this heel angle.

LaNctTUbUiAL 5ULKHDS

2 wc PREVENT.

THiS TOPFLtNC.

er reviews various attern.ts to im.rove

safe

M

Buoyant wingtanks on the RaRo freeboard

deck are MOT EFEIC.IENT

below 80 heel

the buoyancy on the leeside is

NJ.L co)

will have influence NOT UNTEL

2.-L

50 Reg. Ferry 0.72

This vessel is characterized by longitudinal

bulkheads at B/5 under the

RoRo

freeboard deck over the total length of

the ship.

TESTS iMDtCPTE: DO4T ALLOW

WATEQ.

REDUCTLO

OF Tt-IE

FLOW 0f WATER CAN BE

ACHIEVED BY

FOAFThLOCK5

VOtO WING T5.

PNPJUT7 P.fDVC.D

The authors are .ro.osin. a built-in lifebett" consistn. of

foamblocks. stowed

inside the empty winqtanks below the

cardeck.:

HEELAFTE

SLOE. COLI.. IS

rc

CALVAN t D C.C*IJCA.TC.D P t.P:TiN #Ap4 I.S

t

P i O T £T I N

N t O9 CCI<.5

S IC E

-

gOKWØO%.GI_AN.ET IN TOP

Mc DANCER OF F%R 'N ft?.C1N OO !rLP.E. tI

DtCX

I-%E.

Sb4ELL-R!FR

Sponsons are very effident

iN pREVENTING

CAPSIZE

--.1

+ P

SaILIT)' OF

OOMT ING EVACUAT%Or(.

SUTES ON TOP 0F SPOsO5

PoNSort B.5ri)

+ NO WS OF

CARGO

PPCE çTAtLE LANES)

- SPEEDLOSS

-

I(N 1P4 C.ASE T' t5 EXTEJWING

EELO'#I WATER UNE

LotL) to r4djjcE

OLLtHC

- r1OnLF1CPTLQN

OF TERf1INAL-AtiPS

- -4OWEVER

Gri t$ RAISED ENORMOuu

C

t.3 N -

NO

'

IM PORT

s

ß%E <EELS

SLACt(

B çiri.s

ANTLR.OLUP TAP4<

,ROLLINC T L6-8 SEC.

S

CI<t4E.S,

ACCtLRATIOt4S 4 z TRAILERS TQPUH

Q' Te O

SUC'

srg.

(5)

IL

\ 8

FERRY 62

FERRY £2

1.65 M

i2

CAP.ECK AEOVEWL

&

-

M-LOM

_j

_14 U4

- IO

io

20 30

o 50

F E R Y

72

,

OC1PARI5oN

FERRY .72

CAPEC)< AEOVE WL

A

h

NO

' V ''

(6)

o-- *7

- *6

\ 8

3° INrrAL LIT

EA3.T0 LZE

L

CPRCK IMMER5ED.

CA P5 11 E

o-]

FERRY 62

_FERY.72

GNL65 ti

Cri:1.6011

tO 20

50 40 50

I IO

Ó 30 40 50

O

1M

o

IMIN

FERRY HEELIWC ArJ 51DE-CQLL150N

CMP5oENÇ.R.)

Tt?1

_{CALE FQR FULL 5JZ}

A QUITED1FFRENT

HAVIOL)

(7)

LIFE-SAVING AT SEA

DEVELOPMENTS IN HOLLAND

Introduction:

Free-Fall-Lifeboat

-

The tanker, container and bulkcarrier, designed with engine room

and

accommodation aft, are (thank goodness). now being fitted with a

Free-Fall-Uf e boat- aft.

With this boat a rapid escape, even in bad weather from a listing ship

is

rather safe.

This cannot be said of the high located davit/liteboat arrangements on

the

majority of RoRo passenger vessels and cruise ships.

Here is a rapid launching of 20 boats from a listing, rolling and

burning

vessel very dangerous and almost impossible. The 2 tackle Davit system

in

a swell is risky.

-

Moreover, in case of a sde-collision, the Ro-Ro ship might capsize

within

minutes.

SLIDES The low-level-davit-lifeboat drrangement

is an improvement nowadays, and

finally we are hoping that the slides will be common in future.

Floating upright

-

For ships with a large number of people on board it is a must to

keep the

vessel floating in upright condition, which must be

maintained for a few

hours at least to allow desembarkation.

Size of hole

-

The dynamics of flooding after a side collision and the behaviour of

the ship

are of utmost importance.

-

In our lecture we will pay in first place, attention to the

influence of the

penetration: ihe size of the holes.

The first minutes are of utmost importance:

-

The rapidly increasina list, caused by the water rushinc into the

ship after a

hull penetration reQuires close attention. Crossfiooding may be

sluaish and

is effective only in case the ship has a positive nqhtincj moment.

The cardeck will be immersed if

Iistin

continues and water entennQ via a

hole in the topside of the vessel will spread-out over this

continuous deck

from fore to aft.

-tEEL PNCLE OF cAR.OEC.K.1MER5

ION

t3 NOic-ALLYS°-iO°

This seQuence of events may lead to capsizinq if crossflooding

and

down-flooding is too sluggish.

The Ro-Ro vessel might turn over within a few minutes,

and all theoretical

calculations based on a final statc equilibrium in order to fulfil SOLAS 90

,

damage stability reQuirements are senseless.

RAN

We are coming to the conclusion that a ship with a

single side shell is very

vulnerable even to a small damage. Plating with thickness of 7-9 mm cati

easily be ruptured.

Theoretical unhampered crossflooding cannot be

realised.

In case the watertight doors in the transverse

subdivision bulkheads are

open", a 2 compartment flooding is for sure.

(8)

There exists a rather great difference between the results of the normal statical

damage stability calculation, and the time-based

dynamical damage stability

calculation.

When comparing results of both calcu'ations it becomes clear, that nobody knows

exactly how the flooding is developing. The influence ofAinternal structure is rather

great. OH

'/NAMtC 6VOUR Í.oLLNC

-,

The only way to convince each other is to simulate a side-collision: on a large scale

model, registrating the heel-time curve, and simultaneously observing the flooding

procedure by video-camera.

Increase of draft and trim should also be registrated.

CRITICAL POINTS

-

Size of the hole, caused by the collision, below and above water is of great

importance.

4 different sizes are to be tested.

How long will the mass of water remain on the collision

side ?

This depends mainly on the obstacles in crossflooding

For example:

er European

Gateway: longit 'open'separation bulkhead

of generator room

Ferry.62:

longit "open'separation bulkhead of separator room

.

Ferry.72:

crossoverduct between port and SB wing

tank having

many internal obstacles.

The water in the 'lee-bilge" cannot flow uphill against

the heel;

Shall the inburst of water equalize within one minute?

Can the ship find a static equilibrium with the

freeboard-deck still above water?

Or will the vessel continue to turn over her side

?

TRANSIENT ASYMMETRIC FLOODING

John Spouge, analysing the heel-time curve of the "European Gateway' (after been hit

in a side collision by the bulbous bow of the

"Vanguard') came to the conclusion, that

by application of the normal-static-stability

calculation, this heel-time curve

could not

be clarified.

(see J.R. Spouge RINA 1985 april par, S-1 page 56)

'the gradually increasing heel during

the first 31/2 minutes up to 45° could only be

simulated under the assumption of transient-asvmmetric-floodinq

That means, that the inbursting mass of water did not equalize

sufficiently

rapid;

The water could not flow uphill the

heel, which in 12 seconds increased to

7°:

7° is the angle at which the

freeboard deck started to

immerse and water

entered via a hole in the ships topside on

this deck;

6

(9)

The free moving mass of water spread along the "tee" side to fore and aft

together with the simuttaneous flooding inside the hull of generatorroom,

two engine-rooms and the stabilizer compartment (wfth W.T. doors open")

resutted in the continuous increasing list. Then the ship grounded and rolled

to its side.

With the following simulation the sinking could be explained:

ftowrate about 7m2 hole x 3m/sec = 21 m3/sec 0° (NMI flood computer program)

O sec.

0° heel

10 total imburst

211 ton

5° heel (7° freeboard deck immersed)

20"

429 "

90 60"

1050"

13°

120"

2100"

20°

150"

3000"

32°

210 -

(3Y2 min.)

ship aground

42°

Dunng the first 2 minutes a considerable gradient must have remained on the water

surface, most probably because of deep "bucket" garage for cars; acting as

breakwa-ter, separating the wingspace from the centreline space of the generator room.

(10)

5tZE OF HOLE5

_{TO 8E}

_TESTED

ON FERRY-MODEL 62

AND

_'72

Ør1

_®

3MZ

7)

7r%Z _JI C«AP

_¡ti

GAP 1V

; r

2 ,

t

TeT3

GATEWAy

7 3 1

1

4

(11)

__

_1i:

-

tPr---.

-r';,

L__J;

--4:

.iL$

lift

liii

AN THE

RcRUDLNG BUL8

TO

VE LIFE

sri

MINIIAL

MN. 'NOROC 5TREAM"

DAN1QU 5ELLB

_-_--

L___

s.-UNflER

t1AN' 5EVICE CCN.DIYIONS} TRIn ASTEPN,A CBuLs L5 ATINC AS CRAG.

ftTr

NO\J

E VICTIM DID

NOT CAP5I2E

1

THIS VESSEL PE4ETIATED AFYAT 6SLOE

PHANkJ.RC VAS HURT

MNLYA3OVE.WATR-ßECAUSE NCRCICL)< HAD AN

\CE-BQW

OE1JLß

'ALE

QW SR

_6OL/

_{rlODZATE. aULE}

_Ex1Er'

UL8 F.

FaA. vi N _{FC(Z CtIT} AI'

_TArEQ.

_{EfcZy MW cruI5a}

V

1R L/AV CANCLLIr

FiCC'

OOAi

_CC _'-lAV

CPtIC..

(12)

Conclusion:

Future vessels

need more reserve buoyancy

!!

A double

hull

improves safety.

Howevergross tonnageA5a

-

?JRAMçe

t

ACTING A

_A'aO5ETAROUN

THE

vessel and should be banned.

In case of collision, the bulbousbow is a dangerous weapon and can

cause the loss of many

lives.

Protruding bulbs are to banned also.

e

- -.

APL ica

UTCH

uC.I-(

ßULKCAR1E.Q

Sa

-WAS i-m-

y THE LARc,

N1.0

BULS

OF A OTAlNESSEL-NJt3UtLÖtN

111111 ...IIIIIlII

INAVIAN

HANSA - Schffahra - Schiffbau - Hafen -1991- Nr. 18

10E 30W

Nr'

ßULS

Nach dec Kollosion des DFDS-Fihrchiffes ,,Hamburg" in dec Elbmùndung im November 1989. Beidem Unfall starben drei Menschen, acht wurden schwer. zwôlf leicht verletzt. Der entstandene Schaden wurde bei der Seeamtsverhandlung im Januar1990 nut rund 1.2 Mio. DM beziffert.

C.AD .CA

_y-O-

(13)

NO EXTENDING BULB

It

is worthwhe to underline the statement &f

_{Mr. D.K. Brown (U.K. Navy research),}

1986:

"The bulbous bow should be prohibited";

"The bulb is a protruding weapon almost killing the victim to death".

Contrary. by many shipmodel basins t is stated:

5-10% fuel could be saved by a well designed bulb; this is true.

Results are valid for 85-90% MOR, full draft, even heel, flat sea.

In practice this condition is seldom applicable, because in case cf most of the

vessels, the draft is less, the ship is trimmed by stern, the power applied is 75%

and seastate BF 4 à 5, and often the vessel is pitching.

There are cases, where the shipowner is

not directly aware how different service

conditions are,compared to tanktesting ¡n project state.

Quite often a shipyard s offering his hull form which does require the minimum

shafthorse power at full draft, full power, even keel, flat sea.

For this condition the so called "hurrah bulb" fits,ß'celIent.

lt

is a typical advise

from people not familiair with ships at sea.

The truth comes one year later: service condition, moderate speed, pitching in

BF 5 headsea, draft fwd 70%, under this condiiton the hurrah bulb is acting as a

"drag", exiting two strong vortexes on both sides of thè partly immersed bulbous

bow.

Tanktesting should be carried out at mean service condition: with the re

t

t a

soft-nose-stem is preferable.

To the contrary, for ferries and large

_{container vessels, the service conditions are}

less variable. A ferry sailing at constant

_{draft, even keel in a smooth sea can}

gain advantage of a long-extending-just-immersed-slender bulb.

Hère the bowwave system of the shipbody can be almost cancelled by the

anti-body ahead down below.

Sea farers with common sense, sometimes are proposing their shipowner to

delete the bulb, however, ¡t brings the naval architect in

difficulty, where to install

the bowthruster? On a normal V-shape forebody the waterflow along the edges

of thruster openings might cause 3-6% extra resistance.

Therefore a not protruding-soft-nose-bulb with vertical sides allows for a better

location of openings which might cause only 1-2% extra resistance.

However, in icegoing condition

a bulbous bow is an obstacle and the V-shaped

Mayer forebody is by far preferable to push down the flues.OF ICE-.

Under these circumstances the bowthruster(s) should be accommodated in

a

parallelI skeg underneath the low part of the "Mayer bow".

SAFETY

Finally, ¡f we should do something positive in avoiding the capsize of a ship at side

collision, we should forbid to construct a bulb which is protruding almost as far as the

forebody above water.

The flared bow should touch first, in order to absorb the collision energy above water.

(r

(14)

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(15)

X

i

î

Casualties since 1953: 4R RO-RO vessels -> 22 capsized

SOME RECENT RO-RO DISASTERS DATE

FLAG NAME TYPE BACKGROUND DEATh IS 1953 Princess Victoria capsized

Route Larne-Starnaer, bad weather, vehicles breaking

loose. 133 1955 Jap Toya Maru capsized

Japan North, open stemdoor.

1172 1955 Jap 4 railway ferries capsized 2 1966 Gre ileraklion ferry

Sank in Aegean Sea, bad weather.

217

(p

1966 _.1968 Nor NZ Skagerak Wahinc capsized

Leakage during heavy weather, sank at hlirtsitals. Grounded. heavy weathet. Capsized. Vellington.

60

z.

1973

Fr

Mont Laurier

Cargo overboard. Fire in engine-room. Heavy weather.

6

r)

1975 S irai tsman capsized Capsized in port. ru 1976 Gr Sophia capsized Capsized in port. 1977 Egy Lnselberg

At Bornholm collision with RO-RO Bore Xl. Fire in engine-room.

(D

1977 Br Federal Byblos Fire. 2

(Ji

1977 G Seaspeed Dora capsized

Capsized during unloading in Djeddah.

w

1977

Br

hero

Heavy weather. Filled up. Abandoned by crew.

s.

1978 Ma Zetjun capsized Capsized at La Goulette. 1978 Gr Nissos Rodos Fire in engine-room.

4'

1978 Pa Jolly Azzurm

Sinking after collision.

2

00

1978 1979

Ag Fr Collo Saint Germain Sank after collision with RO-RO Espresso Man-ilen. Collision with bulkcarrien- at Gru Nez.

26 2

o

1980 1980

Br D

bIlan

Rabenfels During fog collided and sunk on Taag river. Explosionifire in Spezia.

4

o

1980 Zw Zenobia capsized

Heaving listing during bad weather near Cyprus. Passengers and

crew abandoned

ship. Captain stayed. Towed in. Put upright. Capsized and sunk.

1980 1980

Br Ph Harp Don Juan

ferry

Bad weather. Ingressing water. Fire. Collision off Philippines.

5 1000+ (11

C

1981 Indon Tampomas 11 ferry Fire in Indonesia. 431+ 1981 D Ems

Collision in fog with RO-RO Undine.

4

1981

Gr

Sloma.n Ranger

capsized

Capsized after collision in heavy fog.

4

rl

1981

Gr

Anon

Explosion and lire. Deliberately grounded.

(p

1981 Arg Siboney capsized Capsized in port. 1982 Maligaya

Ph 2406 lIre during repair work in ManilI&

o

1982

Ru

Mekhanok Tatasov

Capsized

Heavy weather. Cargo overboard. Capsized.

32 1982 Pa Tambu Express Engine-room Itre. 1982 Br European Gateway capsized

Collision nicar Felixstowe with RO-RO Speedlink Vanguard.

3

C's

1984

Bah

Sundancer

\Vater ingress. Grounding.

1984 1986 1987 1987 1988 1988 1990 Fr Ph Ph Hr Zw Mont Lauis Dona Joseflna Dona Paz J Icrald of Free Enterprise Vjnca Gorthon Bintang Madura Scandinavian Star

ferry RORO car ferry ferry RO-RO car ferry capsized capsi ,.cd capsized capsized Sunk after collision willi Olau-Brittania. Listing and water tngress. Fair weather. Collision off Philippines. Capsize at Zeebrugge, Belgium. Terschellingerbank. Cargo overboard and water ingress. Off Madura Is., Java Sea, Indonesia. Arson in Skageriak.

194 4386 193 200 f 158

p4-) p')

n

X,

-D

(p

1991 1993 1993

Po

Moby prince Neptune Jan hlewellu.sz

ferry ferry

capsi ted

Collision off Genoa, Italy. Sank off Port au Prince.

approx. Bad weather. 140 2000 51

N

m

ci

1994

s-uov-j)5

Est Estonia SA SsM IT Z RO-RO car feny

ro_10

capsized s u'

P Cb

Sank off tJtö Island, Baltic Sea. Lost bowdoor. Water

on cardeck. approx. LO I-srIrL li-i ßF BydtlC 5r.a. CAPÇ0 Sttir lSunrC töKEr4 GCAI5 ,S1OIUi 859 IOWA(,wIS X

(16)

rRo94

BULKHEADS ON CARDECK * W.T. DOOR5

PRO POS AL

or

5HIP>'AD

vD

C-LDE N

IAVE S

t-cDEoK

ANCLE OF CAR DE.CI(

N.

UF TO FI ,-ER5ON

SIZE OF HOLE

COLLON

DOWN FLOODIN

SIZE OF CUEDLJCÍ

CROSS FLOOD INC

08-STACLES IM ER (PtATCZ gr)

CARGO

5HIFÎ

TRAILERS ILTIt4G

I,N NTAL_U5T OF 3(5 OF:

OREAT riPoRTANE,

APsLaE OR NOT

CASING

J

CAPSIZE

EPNDS ON :

YNAM1C LIFT UP TO4CRITICL ANcLE"

DISPL -C.M-.5TAB-CZ

CURVE

-INCRESS OFWATR

(17)

PRINCIPAL PARTICULARS S'rENA LINE RO-RO/TRAIN/PASENGER FERRe L.nçifl DO 1690Sr'n r..oin. n,o,,iiaed _..._.27.20rnr O.i,in. rerot.iOd.. __9 40m Orauçrri. Oesqri 50m

Orauçht scanning ,_&O0n'i

O..aSegnc. derçn. 52500wt

C..Ow.rqiti. su il q.. .___,_,57Odwt

Train CnCD length _570rn

Trsni.ar rane length 100mm,

.500

OjOns

Main .ngrn. autour .._...___C 64.80kW 1,4.1 so..d l85).t _..______22 knot.

C1.ss,iic.ai,on__ UQydS Seq,siir IOOA i

to-rOnrainIp.ss.ng.t ferry It,

Clan, IA: -LMC: UMS: r1S;

SCM: LNC l.kAI.

r,

tOOR

LIMC

LONCITULKHI +

DOOfS-DE3IG

IS5

The basic design wis more or'

less finished when the Estonio ws loti at the end of September. Subsequent re

e.saminaiion of he basic conceot which

rkSS intended to be flestble to suit tsr-vins demands, showed thai ti ws,s also fletible

br improtin; stability charcierisucs IO

tricen rules introduced as a result of the

sinsng. said Chrnt van }-locren. GNs chief

designer.

L5:

70 vo G DE N

Pr-oÜIe a? ltre new rrairr,freight'passennçer ro-no oenign currently uridgi- constructIon at van de- Gressen-ce ,Vaoi-d for Stena Line. DeI,very

s ncnedijId for May 1596, rrorTIy arlar Ivh,cn the vessel w,4! entrer service on the Gorne'nbur-ç-Fr-eoeriksha vit (OUi'.

LONC1T

.H

2780M

O

DOOR.

j-CARtECK l

OQm

(18)

l7.3o

r

Lii

I.95O

e

35.o8

H

7.5

&o&

ri

LS.

64

T

Dw..

640o

T OI5PL

0A0

T

fOO NUCH.

Cr1TA8JLrTy.

LOA

7.3O Mi

Lit

a5o

8

25.08

7.85 Tc

ó.o8

ri

L5.

Ii6I.rO T

6Oo T

OISPL

0L40 T

-O'JG 0.717

---_-

::--250

NO L055 0F3PEEb

Cil ABOUT RICH

D.'1.

L.055-.- DOT

WECHT- 5PON..50

250 S9Q P a.jrriri OLv

ir

ir: ri

_.r

_1! _1m .iÇ .iu)Q__&rCf PUdL Paons 5 10 I'S

DESIGM

98O

-11 re -JT9p

I-

__

.

-r

i'

r,l151r P.0r4tV ¶r-,,c)rl t,ecx. JiQ.P . .

,,--,,j

Ii

I

i.

,". IIV

c1

ir

-fl r _íIn

5 08 M

.5ro8 M

3O.0

winr SPONSONS

2 r-)

72

250

5O

H

EVACUATION VIA SLIDES

37G--2

_.c8

29.00 M

W L rl

'T0 13E SMALL

AT V'IL P9 Arrr 5 PO N S O NS

EVACUATiON VIA SLIDES 37G- CRS

PUL R00r15 n (K 0.717 FT

RSTArtN-rS

t!Dt

S Po NSO F'J S95 PROPQZM..

ES1GN-I.960

'/

lIC 5T.'rcP !Pi-r 7OO Ç) flH'P

(19)

>_

1Thzd3 '

E::: i:::

A

50

35

30

25 10-40H

15-BØWL

25.06

I I

.o&

2e.08

30.45

r

-/

f::::

I

-. : : : : : . :

: :...

L i

IL II_Ii!_

''L

I

2. JLDTH OF5FONSQN

M

:

:11

C1

1H.,

.30WAP

0 WAVE ENERC

-

seastate in beaufort

_1 i

SEAKiNDLy.:---

-'

1.! 1

SEC 2.0

II5 t

jz

ID .

-lo

r

Kil

Gli

K.8

8

1.0

10.20

13.54 .43

(33

2.&3

3

V?ITh

1.13 i.G7

T

7.4 (2.

0.9

8. VGri

-RQLUN PERIOD OFVESSEL

o3r1

MAZ .L0 LO..2

KM

354 K

.tI.1O

r1- 24

-_r

2.2.3

L50

T. =

FERP/ 72

::!WIDTH:1OFSPoor.

0

0.5

1.13

3-34

I L50

1.26

334 12.a3

16.17 (2.11

4.06 3._55

.59

B

200

2.0

1.56

1.79

3.34 3.34 r

265 3r1_154o 207

.

K3

4: T

PÇÇ»I

IO

.-'--_

7Z4

-_..L4

Le. ".

rNK.

T ¡4-8 SEC

TO

E AVOIDED-.

T

WAVE PERIOD

3.07 .3 5E(

V 7.Z6Q

056 -j

. -t.L no raAos,c-.

T:2!

SEC

45 MSC

N0R5LJ4 ORIG.

WITh 5P0M50k0

LSSrI

14.84-e,

5.50

15.24

12.

7. 3

7.03 ta3o r

2[.54.

t-(2.11

t-a5.

r

5.43

(20)

r-32.

TENDER

4

PLTFO RM'

5240

L

BOX

\

t'i

/

TO

C.N5ICEE

)N

RPSTI c.: PLT

A.tCNCL

tMFL-RFT5

6.O

O

-SPONSONS 1:621/2

PROPOSAL

oc

L. 2fCA

i

s.'

r

\

528Oj.-

-E

l265

I'

-I

( 6i\

= 25.0&OM

FERRY .72

[uoc

/

_-; 2

ML _

:

,.

_.-->_\

I - .5.

\'_

-' Z x7 " \___S..

5'CL

- i --1CCL

\

S' .- I NS

c-7850

CARDCK

voiD WLNGTANK

(21)

.;_---

EP2Z

r=

I

II

C

_F-

:

--

_4L

UIUIL Li'Ii!IIM

-

_O.Cii

r LIIJL

IIfl

I' H

-

-=

-

-. -=A

-==

rTh

2x3

SU D ES 25

. cccro

TC

cop

cÑ.

EuATroN

ArrC

-SELF LAUe.4C.k-4IP4C,-L1FERAFTS

2 15

t

33

(22)

(23)

CENERAL:

4

THE

150 RANGE IS NOT AT1AINALE

StDe.- COLLI5I N

Q CRITIC APIGLE CPRDECK AWASH - TOP PLNC TRA%LES 'C

I

IN CASE HEEL IS LARGER TPIAN FREE8OARD-ANCLE

COtitOr

AMCt-.

(tot

IS)

CARDECK WiLL BE FL000ED VERY

CpUSCKLY

ZQJ _OO _RA I CZ

SUrFACE7ßE

SOLAS 90

50L1V5 36

ONLy fl-tS LJtT

(24)

Ig

iii'

f

¡N

CA''

' "roO

JQL)

¶H»t00i,I14G

)

gr4G1

b,

HEEL

$

,r0PP1

¡W I 5

5(DE COLLISION

-i I

-;

CONFORI1 RCMWAY

Hth.E=7M

3 S2M/3

FLOW R1\TL-3''/5Ec

AFTR 2O5Ec-OO TON

AFT[1

M-OOOTON

-1 N ELO

o

Ø3'II

-it'

vE-'

,1eA°

0 v1A

s')

F

(25)

-D/E

Ttj-.TNO

FERF/

62 2_fl

SMOOTh SEA NO CAPSIZE

cti. ..6s ti

SMOOTH SEA

.3 INITIAL LIST

CAPsIzFWITHN ZMIM

- CROSS FL000ING Tt-4OLH

MPCl1INEIy.

SPACES

SNOULO MOT BE

BY OBSTR&)CTIONS,LIKE SEr1I-EÍ'CLOSEP

SPPCE5 Ç----.- VJQrKSt-iOP--- PURIFIER Roo

ri)

THESE OI3JACJ-.ES STRONGL'y INCREASE

THE CANCER OF CAPSIZING.

- IN CASE OF A SIDE

C.ILUS ION AT SEA'

A SIN Ç LE S IDE S H B LL ((ZEATL'Y Er' DPT10ER5

TI-iB LIFE OF

ENiNEEÍ5-VESSEL* PASS +CREW

BUOyANT WINÇTANS ON CAROECK O NOT

PREVENT A C'PS LiE (ACT

TQ L&t)

-

.SPOt'4 SONS

Cfr.-N LAVE TtjE St-UP

LN CE OF 05i_VJATER ON CARDECK

-

WIDENN .'CuPPRS tS5TR0MCL ADVISAI3LE

COMPARISON

CAP5ZE TESTS RESULTS 1995

CI-1

FERRY 72

-N

CN =

2.- M

5rIoaTl-(

c'

ô<

G-Fi

1.6 M

SNOOTt- SEA

OK

NO CAPSiZE 1.60 N

SItOOTH SEA

ç 3 INITiAL LIST

HE S ITAT IN C LIST

L CAesraE Wm-iIN

-

DURING FL000INC,, EF(CCT 0F SWPPERS :NOT 'TEr TES-rEc

3CuPP S OF ¿1X DIA(1 FIICI4T 51-lOW CPEAT INPROVEI%ENÏ ROUJNC MOTION Ot-4CL'f FI-ATTENED BY DAWING

OLLIC ANCLES

CA4-00 t'1ICH TOPPLE ..

CR0SS-0VEI2

jETS

IN- POU 8LE Borro r

OF NACk4INER'1 SPACE-S

ARE DIFFICULT TO

AR-RANGE ANO J?ATHER

5fIPLL IN SIZE

- CONCLUSION IS.

ThAT cgoss FLOODING

OF I.&1(NCTAt'4KS (5

RAT#tE.. 'UNPREDICTABLE

FILUr

TM

VOID \JINC5

WITh NARDFOAII BLOCKS

IS PREFERA6LE

BECAUSE

A"f3UFFE(Z-LtFE6ELT"IS CREATEO

INGRESS OFWATE(

AND L(ST(NC OF Tt-tE

VESSEL IS R[DUCED

TO AREP.T E)cTEND

FR-lr -AiROLUpCTiN

BtIMC 0U1 OF PHASE

- GUOYAMT WINCTANKS oi

c.AçWECi< ACE ACTINc TOO LATE

SPOÑSONS CAN

I N CASE

OF OSN WAEZ QN CARDECK

(26)

ci 1.65 M

.t

L

J it

- to

Extract of Results November 1995

lt is reassurinG that both shies Saum. in service normali

with a metacentric

heioht:

GM

2 m.

Under this condition in a calm sea both vessels will not capsize after being

hit in a side collision.

/f

I'

c?PEC<

cVç:L

FERF.Y HEELINC

.SIDE-COLLI5IDN

CfO55-FLOOD%NC INSIDE ENCINEROO1

S

IS HAPIPERED BY hAN?

Qg5TPCLE5

-ci

6L

u cM=LOM

._ Jt .I 4)2

4tt

.jo

I_'.6o

io 20 3G dZt 50

c;RC< 'ECVE WL

NO CAF5LE

OSCILLATING NAS5 OF WATER IN

IS EXCITING LARGE AMPLITUDES

FERRY £2

FERRY

72 u

C

Li

rL

(27)

crl:I.65 il

o

cM REDUC.D FfOt1 2.00 M-1.G5 ri AND 3°IrmL L(ST

CAP5ZE TE5T5v TU+TNO

DELIT 1994-95

30 _{Nfl1AL L!T}

EA.5. TO Lf.t SrD 10 20

30 40 50

FERR'.6Z

ti -r

-pOexj< IMMER5ED

iMirt

-Q.

WLTh

50 FREBOPRD -ANCLE- INITIALLY,

THE CARDEC.K REt1PN5 BELOW WAUN

ThE SHIP WILL CAPIlE

t

Cii:1.6Of

,0

°INITIAL U5T

FERRY HEELUIJC

rr.c 5IDE-COLLISION

C2cMP5ENÇR.)

CALE FOR FULL.eIZf

FERY72

H ES I TAT I N G

/

V D(FFRNT

HAV1OUR

"ANTI-ROLL1NG TANV-EFFECT')

PIS 5i8AK

LACE HEELNCPt'&CLES

ruRsV

MIGHT CAUSE IOPPUNC OF TPtLER5

o __17 .47

CAP5ZE.

(S (5 (t

-- ¿0

Io

o

0

20 30 40 50

1

MIN

(28)

Gil: 1.65 M

o

15 - 14

5

cl_J

l'

&IJ -P3

W -112

lo

3

lO 20 30 40 50

3° INITIAL LIST

EA5.S TO Lf.E SIPE

t t t t t

i

lO 20 30 40 50

o

FERRY .62

CAP.DECK AOVC WAÎER

VESSEL

UPRIGHT

-CARDECKIOSEC IMNCRSD, NO 5CUPPIRS

IP1MRSED NO5WPPER5

I t I I t

HESITATiNG

CAP5IZE

L

I I t I t

MI?'!.

2

3

3 FERRY HELINC ArrR 5IDE-COLLISJON (2CQPtP)

(29)

G1i.6O M

o

i

NTAL _L15T_

FERRY .72

RECK EOVWprER

VL. UR!HT

i

I t

I

NO

CUPPER5

HETAT1NG

I I I

C) 1I1AN1NC lMr1R.SZD

4o sup

CAPIZ

¶ f I T

t

T

2. FERFY

HEELINC AFrtRiDECOLL151ON

TF1

CALz FR FUL-.5IZf

TU...TNCPLFT

OCT 35

IN(TIAL LIST TO 6

AVO(DFD

zMIN

j

INITIAL LiST

ar

L!.0E

(30)

HEAVY 51

CLL.I.5ION (5 M DEEP

(LOSED -CROSDJCT

PEÑTRAT ION LE5S THPk14,

L4GITutINAL. BULKHCA

INTACT

2 ENGINE coMppRTr1ENTs: INTACT

FERRY 72..

PcX

w.b.rER

-6

MA$ EL

L60r1

HARDFOAtICLOCPÇS

I N VOID WI N TANK 5

_{INS%0E WE8PRAPES}

4 4F1tR51DECOLLi5ION (2COMP

?ENETRATION)

LESS THAN 5MDEP

I I

î

L i

T16.6

(31)

HEAVY SIDE.C.OLLISION> 5 tI DEEP

CROSSOUCT CLOED NO O4R.FWW

LONGITUDINAL

ULS(HCAD PENETrRA-rED. ON PORT 5IDE

2 ENGINE COMPAITMENTS FLOODED

TAN KTOP ER FLOODED

APPROX.

'V

FERRY

.

72..

n MIlIS 'II UI 'III' UI UI

-Il

NID T H

J!

.:M

Cl'ZrJLA')

7- S NA HEEL

GM=I.60M'

HARDFOA1E3LOCtc5 IN VOID WNGTANKS

coAr' StOC.Sç$

CMCORR

1.6-0.6 =1.0

1--MOST PROBkBLYiNO CAPSIZE

J. I f

i

¶1!. ' I

i

J I i I I i

3iiiÑ.

4 Y

_{EELIÑC JAETfR5IDECOLLISJON}

_{(2c1P rENETR,>}

(32)

-

AN

FINALL1

AP51LE5

VOID WtNcTANK5ARErLOODED

CM 160 PI

I

FERRY. 72

HVPOTHETIC CASE FOR FERR'Y 72

ENCINE ROOMS

XTEND)NG OVER FULL EPM

VOTt WINGS

OPEN TO E.R.

HVY 51

-C3LLION ) 5 MDEP

>

B'

LONCITuOINAL BULK5 IN E.REALLPETFTED

(N.B. TH5 TEST IS NOT

EALI5TtC

2. ENGINE COMPPRTME.NTS FLODE.D OVE1

5-1IP5

REAcrr.H

VE55L 15 LACK(NC STASILUTY

AU5ED BY

CE FEESURFACg

r

-E

2M'N

3 FR

5URFAC CO

/25M

H ESITATI N

AFTER DEF

5 WE COLU5 JON

PS: O.

(33)

R0 R0 CAF'5JZE

H3J F0 PREVEN4T

WATER ON CARDECK, Et'TENÇ \(JA OPENNC

1W TtE SUt DUNDNC ZhEL

( puNc: _v

roQ.

ZHcA ,,

TQtIA )

DOWN FLOODING IS A MUST

RST

Tk-IN.0

S TO

ço OF TE Jt..TEZ

(Y RAPtO 0OV1NFLÛOD(NC

I\A

WtOE Ducr

)

Tt-

S-uPs

C1TCr1

(PEFcLy

ro SPECL TArK)

-

Scup.s

CC TO

A'jJ

TOO flIALL /-\NO

r00 FEVJ

D

ASEÛ ON

RF(HNC

rcES ,EkDrr

OVt0.o

ç1u5T

k-A.v. t'4OtETuRNVALVEc,

i

SPLITE12.S NICHT

LO(

TIIE NION RTtVALV

SOLUT(OM (S

PrE(kT

CTC

TO TU

HIGH IES5.

CKW/\SLt4E TO.FUJ51!

RAPID DOJN

4 iutr

N LL

/

CA(

.cic

H R WAS)

PRO POS

ry ?IQ f-lUIS

U? .VEILTA$

_t

ci.r

-CAPSfZ

\.

j

'SQ

0.018 M

2 5UOYANT WtNCTAt'ZKS 0M rHECAROEb(

5 A"BUILT_lN_LfFBELT 'WE 11'INK

- HOWEVER ,THLS BUOYAWCY

ISACTINC -roo

LATE'

(?4CL5E OF A SIDECOLLSSIOP4

THE 5HIP WILL TE E(t

f-.o Fi

rtic'ut

-

.75 >F- 37.

I I

Ju du

nnnn

I Ii

i 7

uuuu,

1 -j w

k

V)

030 r

MEELJ2ECUSE CROSS FLOÖDtNC

SELWC TOO SLOW

cONPtto TÓ STATIC CALC.

A5 SOON THE. CAROECK Is

EINC tMPiERSED

tHE

000N.

OFfl4E CARDECK 8ICINS

T U !1O D E L T S T 5 ARE F R O V t

N G

T WI T(\P4

eoT

nieri Ar CFI EC.T YT

LT

5 TOO LAiE

(34)

SIDE COLLISION:

-

IN CA

OF A ?oo VEE.LJ A(LN

T MODRArL

GM

15 eT

IN

5DE Tt1E INBURST 01 WlîE.

OW The WATE(L\NE 1Ic;-tT

7r(t1

21T0W/

,

VJUCt-ç

AN INVrIAL LARGE I-iEL.

tE 1ASON (S, THAT (tSi

THE

i-UJLL,

1-i

OVERFLOW 0F WAÇ

To THE 0PPrE

SOE

IS HAnpEgD

B','

PIAN'y O8STCt.ES (SEiro

WOtU

N

-

AU P'NO UIL

LN

T'-lE

FtST

OND

'E

EEL rnC-iT

.XCED ThE CARDtCK -ç\N(Lo '

Sco

A

\NFLOu c

wATEt V

Tk-i k-(OLE

OJE Tt

CADCc-<

(5

30

20 10_

ThE FLOoDN

OF 11tE CARDECb( uTTQ iD

F0RF.

ND

FT ShIP IS A srEALW

bANGER

TO N,' /5 C

I

CT

tNFLLASQJE ccC'

ÛL A3OVE CAIO( V NEF_L

/

- 000

A

/

7

i ¿

2

MIN O

I

Z 3 MIN

0

1 2 3 VIIÇ-(

(-1OLE (JNOEcW.L

'EUROPEAN CATEY/AY

:7. SPQVCE

WlT

THIS

NFLOV)

0F

'IATE.L

0F

3000

TON

(N 3

r'WTE3

A,FTE

C0LLLlON

(T

E-5 I10CE 1)

CA UP

PuMPs

TO

R.*aLÈ. t

Z HYQ SE.TZ

+

1-L)'P t -C'dJE4-

'LE

x I

r/

C

r(H

pPtN C.

o -TOM

,' N

= .3

AT rrE riûflErÇ( TE SURFACE EFFECT

OF FREE NOVIMC. WATER HAS ABSORBEP

TE

t-iI

_{TURMS OvE./}

L100C) TON

46

'3

3000

30

o

(35)

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(36)

SP0ÑS0NS ARE

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-{ip GOES INTO

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(37)

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(38)

COtSIICLUS(ONS :

jJOwt4FLOOtNG VIA 0uT60PRP-5CUPPERS wrr NON RETURN VALVES 15 INSUFFLC.IEN

ETUR-FLOW FROn

THE SEASIDE INTO THE SHIP 5HOULD B

(NWO5SI3LE -,

HOWVEÍ TME'REVURN'-VALVE riIt-iT IEnAIN IM HALF-OPEN POsI1OPi

y 5PUNThR

LRT AND DEI3RIS, ACCONULATED IN THE SCUPPERPIPE AFTER DECKWASHINC

(IcwEE)

THE PRACtICAL SOLUTION OF THIS PROSLE.M iS A f'ERMANENT CONNECTION To TrIE

HICIH PRESSu

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WHICH CAN 01.0W AWA7 THE- DIRT INSIDE THE SWPPER.

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, oR

2 II.BUOVANT WINCTPNKS ON 'TI-te CA1WECK ARE NOT EFFECTIVE

-

1HEY AR

ACTING TOO LAIE IN PREVENTINC A CAPSIZE

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AND CAPSIZE fOI.LOWS

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k

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SAFEST WA'( To PREVENT THE CAPSiZE OFA COMMON

FERRY.

OP Tilt FREMOVIMC WATER

wini CAPDECK

ABOVE ThE WArERUNE (WMKH IS (WTE C0clON)

ANO A SINGLE 6HEL.t- AROUND THE

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OF THE ORItt4AL V.SSEL

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HOWEVER

STAILITy WILL BE RAISED ENoRMOUSLy AND SPEEDLO

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RESONANCE ROL.LiNG (N

13F9 SEAS IS MOST PROØASLy

SEA SICK PASSENcERS

How -ro COPE w&H This RO-L.LN

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c-t

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RAVID DOWN FLOODING OF FftIE

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VIA MANY WID DUCTS

LS A MUST ON EVERY

RoSo

(

'

(39)

WAHINE

New Zealand; turbo-decine ferry; Unwn S.S. Co.

of

New Zealand,

Ltd.; 1966; Fairfields (Glasgow), Lid., Glasgow; 8,948; 488'9" X

72'7 X 41'6".

A total of 51 lives were lost when the Ncw Zealand inter-island

turbo-electric ferry Wahine capsized after running aground onareef

while entering Wellington harbour during a southerly storm on

April 10, 1968. The Wahine was entcring Wellington Heads at

about 6 a.m. in a severe storm, with winds gusting up to 120 miles

per hour, when she struck Barrett Reef. Although she managed to

clear the rocks, she sustained complete loss of engine power and,

under the force of the storm conditions, slowly drifted under

anchors within the harbour entrance to a position abeam Dorset

Point. Badly holed and continuously making water, the i4'ahine

turned o'er and

k3p.rOnéö1lhesurvivoiin engine?

sud that thic was quitElöt of water in the engine-room and the

bilge pumps couldn't handle it. When the car deck be an to I I

with watcraDd the ship çk a list, all thewa.ç.aLj2

side and the list worsened until she sttTed in 38 feet ofwaterjying

onjiersde with approximately one-third6TTler hufl above water.

Of the 822 persons reported to have been ori board, miraculously

771 were rescued by tugs, a train ferry and an armada of small

craft. There were also reported to be 68 motor cars and caravans,

48 bags of mail and 25 tons of general cargo on board.

The wreck of the Wahine, which was declared a constructive total

loss, subsequently broke in three pieces in mountainous seas

whipped up by hurricane-force winds during wreck removal

activity in May 1969. The last part of the wreck was eventually

removed from the Site

fl

1973.

(40)

Elliauuauluu:il

iasa tau um um

n.aa

Ill

IJ s.i ¡1.11

iiI gulls

1II1IM

iii. usui

suis sill ululi uuu mus

¿*»l .ts

f

fi.000IliO OtJCtl

LONC.ITUINA

ULXHEAD5

EXI5TING RoRo FERFJES

"ÑOR5UN"

"MARIELLA"

fl

_s, 1._ti liTt

i-t-'

0 i'tL.

sui.ICR Tua. - ID.., ,at,._. 20...

t.-frI.

4-.t-./._

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fl

TRANVr.fSE

ULKHADS

IA

,

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r

IIDJ11

tmi

z ìo

Pafl Ca.$ t-D

j, ,, .Do-c (

p..a (a4 .1*t'-e..

(41)

(42)

ESTONIA

RO RO-PASS-FERRY

11WATER ON CARDECK"

=WATER ON FREE5OARD OECK

Y

HULL BELOW FR.DECJ<

INTACT!

BOWDOOR LEAK INQ!

FREE 5URFC CORRECT%ON S EATINC AWAY

AMO COMES NEAR TO cC% VALUE

V

CAPSIZE \SS4

iMFROVEr1Er: BREADTH 0V CARDECK

LESS THAN BREADTH OF SHIP

FREE SURFACE CORRECTION

TO ßE LESS THAN C

CAPSIZE PREVENTED

t

NON- RET UR VAlVE MtGHT Not çuMC1101

3CUPPRS

EV MIUA tu L( U

CAP.- CPRRYNG CAPACLTy

150-TOO SMALL

BUOYANT W)NGTANFSSOH

FRBDECK!

SfCOND BOWDOOR

oRAr WE U- .-ALARM

DOWN FLOOD1N

DUCIS OR PiPES

:

5OO-600

I

LEPDlNC TO LOWER

HOLE

DB ThWKS OF ER.

ALtRN. OVERBOARD

VIA UTL' -

VALVES.

HYO!. OPRA7EO FgOMWHEEU4OLJ5E

IDNTtCAL TO wT- tOORS çpcI(usr)

3E PAcE B B B

13 t

3

4

(43)

I

_{Introduction and Summary}

1.1 _Introduction

The Estonian-flagged ro-ro passenger vessel ESTONIA capsized and

_sank

shortly before 2 a.m.on 28 September 1994 whilst on a scheduled voyage

from Tallrnn to Stockhohn. The vessel had, according to available

informa-tion, 989 passengers and crew members on board. 137 persons survived

the accident.

The accident is being investigated by a joint Estonian/Finnishl Swedish

Commission, set up in accordance with a decision taken on 28 September

1994 at Turku by the prime ministers of the three countries. Under

Esto-nian'chairmarìship the Commission has nine regular members, three from

each country. Experts have been assigned to the Commission to ensure

competence in all areas.

The present report is a part-report, covering the findings, conclusions

and recommendations of the Commission regarding the technical causes

arid development of the accident. The final report will also cover all other

factors and circumstances contributing to the development of the accident,

including weather conditions, certification and inspections, stability

in.for-mation, operational practices, training and rescue operations and resources.

It will also describe affected institutional organizations.

Several investigations by appropriate independent institutions have been

initiated during the work. They include inter alia analysis of the weather

and sea conditions, the wave induced motion of the ship,

_{calculation of}

hydrodynamic forces in the bow area, metallurgical investigation of

frac-tured surfaces from failed parts and investigation of an hydraulic actuator.

In reading this part-report it must be noted that the causes and

con-clusions quoted herein relate only to technical matters and do not describe

or explain the full sequence of events nor any operational issues related to

the accident.

1.2 The Vessel

The vessel was a ro-ro passenger ferry, built as yard newbuilding number

590 by Jos. L Meyer Werft of Papenburg in Germany for the Finnish ferry

company Reden AB Sally. She was delivered on 20 June 1980 under the

name of VIKING SALLY and was put into service on the route between

the port of Stockholm in Sweden and the ports of Mariehamn and Turku

in

Finland. After the Sally company merged with Efohn Oy, the vessel

was

E3'

8

(44)

operated from April 1990 as SILJA STAR between Stockholm and Turku

and from January 1991 as WASA KING on the routes between Vsa and

UmeJSundsvall in the Gulf of Bothnia.

The vessel was the second largest passenger ferry in the Baltic Sea iii

those days and was one of the first "jumbo" size ferries. A general

arrange-ment drawing of the vessel is shown in

Figure 1.

The vessel was acquired on 15 January 1993 by Estime Marine Co Ltd

and was bareboat chartered to the Estonian company E-une Ltd. It was put

into the service of Estime between Tallinn and Stockholm under the name

of ESTONIA. The operations were conducted by Estonian Shipping

Com-pany Ltd under a management contract. The companies E-une Ltd and

Estime were owned equally by the state owned Estonian Shipping

Com-pany Ltd and by the Swedish shipping comCom-pany Nordstöm & Thuim AB.

Technical management was subcontracted to Nordström & Thulin AB.

The vessel was built after a similar newbuilding, DIANA II, delivered to

the Swedish shipping company Reden AB Slite. The ESTONIA was longer

by an extra midship section but the bow and stern areas were identical in

the two vessels except for the length of the bulbous bow which was

increas-ed by 0.8 metres in the ESTONIA. Both ships were built to the rules of the

classification society Bureau Ventas rules with class notation ±1 3/3 E, Deep

Sea., Ice IA, Car/Passenger Ferry ± (AUT). The ESTONIA was

modified in

1985 when the aft part of the hull below the waterline was rebuilt to

in-crease buoyancy and stability.

Upon delivery from the yard the vessel was issued a Passenger Ship

Safety Certificate in compliance with the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)

convention by the Finnish Authorities. The vessel was certified for short

international voyages. The permitted number of passengers was linked to a

note referring to short international voyages between Sweden and Finland

(this note was introduced since certain life saving equipment complied with

the 1974 issue of the SOLAS convention, not yet in force at the time, rather

than the 1960 SOLAS convention). The vessel was under the statutory

supervision of the Finnish Board of Navigation from the time of

construc-tion up to 14 January 1993. The administraconstruc-tion had authorized

Bureau

Ventas to perform the related hull surveys and inspections. It was under

Estonian supervision from 15 January 1993 to the time of the accident.

The Estonian Board of Navigation had authorized Bureau

Ventas to

per-form the statutory functions under the SOLAS and other international

con-ventions.

The vessel had the following main particulars:

Length, over all 155.40 m

Length, between perpendiculars 137.40 m

Breadth, moulded 24.20 m

Depth to bulkhead deck, moulded 7.65 m

Maximum draft 5.60 m

Numberofdecks 8

Propulsion power 17,600 kW

Deadweight 3230 tons

Ught weight 9733 tons

Gross tonnage 15,5g8

Max. number of passengers 2000

Max. service speed

21 knots

E ST

(45)

10 _{MV ESTONiA Part-Report}