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VOL. XLVII, 4 SECTIO H 2013
Johannes Kepler University Linz, Department for Corporate Finance
HELMUT PERNSTEINER, MARCUS DICK
The capital structure and the dividend policy of family firms
6WUXNWXUDNDSLWDáRZDLSROLW\NDG\ZLGHQGRZDILUPURG]LQQ\FKKey words: family firms, divident policy, corporate finance
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Two of the most discussed and most examined topics in the field of corporate fi-QDQFHDUHWKH RSWLPDO FDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHDQG±WRDOHVVHUH[WHQW±WKHGLYLGHQGSROLF\RI FRPSDQLHV%RWKTXHVWLRQVDUHFOHDUO\LQWHUUHODWHGDVIRUH[DPSOHWKHGHFLVLRQRIDILUP WRUHWDLQHDUQLQJVUDWKHUWKDQSD\LQJWKHPRXWLQIRUPRIGLYLGHQGVFDQEHFRQVLGHUHG as a financing decision. Furthermore, factors such as taxes, costs of financial distress DQGDJHQF\FRVWVDUHLPSRUWDQWGHWHUPLQDQWVRIERWKGHFLVLRQV 3DOHSXHWDO
7KHPDMRULW\RIWKHRUHWLFDODQGHPSLULFDOSDSHUVZKLFKDQDO\]HGERWKWKHVHUH-VHDUFKTXHVWLRQVKRZHYHUIRFXVHGRQlarge public/listed companies showing a dis-persed ownership structure,WLVTXHVWLRQDEOHLIWKHVHUHVXOWVFDQEHWUDQVIHUUHGWR FRPSDQLHVGRPLQDWHGE\ODUJHVKDUHKROGHUVHVSHFLDOO\WREXVLQHVVHVRZQHGE\RQH RUPRUHIDPLOLHVEHFDXVHIDPLO\FRQWUROOHGILUPVVKRZDspecific goal and incentive structure FRPSDUHG WR QRQIDPLO\ HQWHUSULVHV 7KH\ GR QRW H[FOXVLYHO\ IROORZ WKH SULQFLSOHRIYDOXHPD[LPL]DWLRQEXWSXUVXHQRQHFRQRPLFJRDOVWRR HJ&RUEHWWD DQG6DOYDWR 0DQ\IDPLOLHVKROGXQGLYHUVLILHGSRUWIROLRVFRQVLVWLQJPDLQO\RI ODUJHVWDNHVLQWKHLUILUPDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\FDUU\H[FHVVLYHULVN 6KOHLIHUDQG9LVKQ\ 7KH\GHVLUHWRSDVVWKHLUEXVLQHVVRQWRWKHQH[WJHQHUDWLRQV HJ$QGHUVRQ 0DQVLDQG5HHE $QGUHV DQGWKH\DUHFRQFHUQHGDERXWWKHLUSHUVRQDO
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DQGWKHLUFRPSDQ\¶VUHSXWDWLRQ HJ$QGHUVRQ0DQVLDQG5HHE '\HUDQG :KHWWHQ 7KHUHIRUHWKH\FRXOGSXUVXHDVWUDWHJ\ZKLFKIRFXVHVRQORQJWHUP firm survival instead of strictly adhering to the goal of value creation (Anderson, 0DQVLDQG5HHE 0RUHRYHUWKLQNLQJLQJHQHUDWLRQVFRXOGDOVRIDYRUDVSHFLILF ORQJWHUPRULHQWDWLRQ -DPHV $FFRUGLQJO\WKLVSDSHUDGGUHVVHVWKHIROORZLQJWZRUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQV $UHIDPLO\ILUPVPRUHRUOHVVOHYHUHGWKDQQRQIDPLO\EXVLQHVVHV" 'RIDPLO\ILUPVSD\PRUHRUOHVVGLYLGHQGVWKDQQRQIDPLO\EXVLQHVVHV" 7KHFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHRIIDPLO\ILUPV &RQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUN 0\HUV DQG0\HUVDQG0DMOXI VKRZHGWKDWFRPSDQLHVIROORZDpecking orderZKHQLVVXLQJVHFXULWLHV7KLVFRQFHSWVHHPVWREHHVSHFLDOO\VXLWDEOHIRUIDPLO\ EXVLQHVVHVDVIRUH[DPSOH5RPDQR7DQHZVNLDQG6P\UQLRV 3RXW]LRXULV DQG/ySH]*UDFLDDQG6iQFKH]$QG~MDU SRLQWHGRXW:KHUHDVLQJHQHUDOFRPSD-nies try to avoid the increasing costs of financial distress and information asymmetry DVVRFLDWHGZLWKFOLPELQJXSWKHSHFNLQJRUGHULQIDPLO\ILUPVPDLQWDLQLQJIDPLO\ FRQWURORYHUWKHLUEXVLQHVVDQGSUHVHUYLQJWKHLULQGHSHQGHQFHWKHUHDOVRVHHPWREH PDMRUIRUFHVEHKLQGIROORZLQJWKHSHFNLQJRUGHULQILQDQFLQJGHFLVLRQV H g., Michaelas, &KLWWHQGHQDQG3RXW]LRXULV 7KHSHFNLQJRUGHUWKHRU\KRZHYHUGRHVQ¶WSUHGLFW a special target capital structure; therefore, family firms will favor internal sources RIILQDQFH DQGWKHUHIRUHVHOIILQDQFLQJ RYHUULVN\GHEW7KLVFRXOGLPSO\DORZHU OHYHUDJHRQWKHRQHKDQG2QFHLQWHUQDOFDSLWDOLVH[KDXVWHGIDPLO\EXVLQHVVHVSUHIHU GHEWILQDQFLQJ WR LVVXLQJ H[WHUQDO HTXLW\ LQ RUGHU WR SUHVHUYH WKHLU IDPLO\ FRQWURO DQGLQGHSHQGHQFH7KLVEHKDYLRUFRXOGOHDGWRDKLJKHUOHYHUDJHRQWKHRWKHUKDQG
The so called “trade-off theory” suggests that a company chooses its optimal FDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHE\EDODQFLQJWKHEHQHILWVRIGHEWDJDLQVWLWVGUDZEDFNV:KHUHDV DKLJKOHYHUDJHUHGXFHVWKHWD[EXUGHQRIDFRPSDQ\ WD[VKLHOGV LWDOVRUDLVHVWKH SUREDELOLW\RIILQDQFLDOGLVWUHVVDQGWKHUHIRUHWKHDVVRFLDWHGFRVWVRIILQDQFLDOGLVWUHVV HJ0\HUV )DPLO\PHPEHUVGHULYHVHYHUDOVSHFLDOEHQHILWVIURPFRQWURORYHU WKHLUFRPSDQ\7KHVHEHQHILWVDUHDWULVNLQWKHHYHQWRIILQDQFLDOGLVWUHVVRUEDQNUXSWF\ as these events are often associated with a change in control (Mishra and McConaughy, 0RUHRYHUIDPLO\RZQHUVDUHHVSHFLDOO\HQGDQJHUHGE\ILQDQFLDOGLVWUHVVEHFDXVH RIWKHLUODUJHXQGLYHUVLILHGRZQHUVKLSVWDNHV $QGUHV 6LQFH KLJK OHYHUDJH LQFUHDVHVWKHSUREDELOLW\RIILQDQFLDOGLVWUHVVIDPLO\HQWHUSULVHVZLOOVHHNWRreduce their leverage HJ0LVKUDDQG0F&RQDXJK\ $QGHUVRQDQG5HHE $QGUHV DQGPLJKWDGKHUHWR³ILQDQFLDOFRQVHUYDWLVP´ 0LOOHUDQG/H%UHWRQ0LOOHU S 7KLV DYHUVLRQ WR GHEW KRZHYHU FDQ JR KDQG LQ KDQG ZLWK JLYLQJ XS SURILWDEOHJURZWKRSSRUWXQLWLHV HJ0LVKUDDQG0F&RQDXJK\ $QGUHV
%\FRQWUDVW-HQVHQ VKRZHGWKDWdebt can mitigate agency problemsEHFDXVH LW³UHGXFHVWKHDJHQF\FRVWVRIIUHHFDVKIORZE\UHGXFLQJWKHFDVKIORZDYDLODEOHIRU VSHQGLQJDWWKHGLVFUHWLRQRIPDQDJHUV´ -HQVHQ S )DPLO\EXVLQHVVHV VKRZ IHZHU DJHQF\ FRQIOLFWV EHWZHHQ RZQHUV DQG PDQDJHUV GXH WR JUHDWHU RZQHU LQFHQWLYHVWRPRQLWRUWKHPDQDJHUVHVSHFLDOO\EHFDXVHRIWKHLUODUJHXQGLYHUVLILHG RZQHUVKLS VWDNHV $QGHUVRQ 0DQVL DQG 5HHE 9LOODORQJD DQG $PLW $QGUHV 0RUHRYHULQVRPHFDVHVWKH\HYHQVKRZWKHLGHQWLW\RIRZQHU V DQG PDQDJHU V -HQVHQ DQG 0HFNOLQJ /DUJH RZQHUV KRZHYHU WHQG WR SXUVXH their own interests which need not comply with the interests of other shareholders. 7KHUHIRUHWKHSRVVLEOHH[SURSULDWLRQRIPLQRULW\VKDUHKROGHUVFDQEHVHHQDVDPDMRU GLVDGYDQWDJHRIFRQFHQWUDWHGRZQHUVKLSLQJHQHUDO 6KOHLIHUDQG9LVKQ\ DQG IDPLO\RZQHUVKLSLQSDUWLFXODU )DFFLR/DQJDQG<RXQJ 6HWLD$WPDMD7DQHZVNL DQG6NXOO\ :KHUHDVGHEWSOD\VDOHVVLPSRUWDQWUROHDVGLVFLSOLQLQJGHYLFH IRUPDQDJHUVLQIDPLO\ILUPV $PSHQEHUJHUHWDO LWFDQKHOSWRGLVFLSOLQHWKH H[SURSULDWLQJIDPLO\LWVHOI 6HWLD$WPDMD7DQHZVNLDQG6NXOO\ )LQDOO\$QGHUVRQ0DQVLDQG5HHE UHYHDOHGHPSLULFDOO\WKDWIDPLO\ILUPV face lower costs of debt due to their special incentive structure that attenuates agency FRQIOLFWVEHWZHHQRZQHUVDQGFUHGLWRUV7KH\VKRZDULVNDGYHUVHEHKDYLRUEHFDXVH RIWKHLUXQGLYHUVLILHGRZQHUVKLSVWDNHVDQGEHFDXVHWKH\GHVLUHWRSDVVWKHILUPRQ to their heirs. Furthermore they want to protect their family’s and firm’s reputation. )LQDOO\WKURXJKWKHIDPLO\¶VVXVWDLQHGORQJWHUPSUHVHQFHLQWKHFRPSDQ\EDQNVFDQ develop personal and well-informed relationships with family executives (“relationship EDQNLQJ´ 7KHVHORZHUFRVWVRIGHEWFRXOGIDFLOLWDWHWKHUDLVLQJRIGHEWE\IDPLO\ILUPV
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Research on family firms’ capital structure has gained momentum in the last years. Most of these studies have analyzed the capital structure of listed family firms 0F&RQDXJK\DQG3KLOOLSV 0LVKUDDQG0F&RQDXJK\ DQG0F&RQDXJK\ 0DWWKHZVDQG)LDONR IRUH[DPSOHIRXQGHYLGHQFHRIDlower leverage in US OLVWHGIDPLO\ILUPV$PSHQEHUJHUHWDO LQ*HUPDQOLVWHGIDPLO\EXVLQHVVHV 7KLVVWXG\DOVRVKRZHGWKDWWKHQHJDWLYHIDPLO\LPSDFWRQGHEWVHHPVWREHGULYHQ E\PDQDJHPHQWLQYROYHPHQWLQFOXGLQJDVWURQJQHJDWLYHHIIHFWRIDIRXQGHU&(2RQ OHYHUDJH6FKPLG IRXQGHYLGHQFHRIDORZHUOHYHUDJHLQ*HUPDQOLVWHGIDPLO\ firms too, whereas the opposite is true for East Asian and other European countries. 7KLVUHVXOWFRXOGEHDWWULEXWHGWRKLJKHUFUHGLWPRQLWRULQJLQ*HUPDQ\¶VEDQNEDVHG ILQDQFLDO V\VWHP ZKLFK LQGXFHV IDPLO\ ILUPV WR DYRLG GHEW DV D ILQDQFLQJ VRXUFH )LQDOO\6WUHEXODHYDQG<DQJ UHYHDOHGWKDWSXEOLF86IDPLO\ILUPVDUHPRUH OLNHO\WREH³]HUROHYHUHG´1 than non-family enterprises.
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No differencesLQWKHFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHZHUHQRWLFHGE\$QGHUVRQDQG5HHE LQSXEOLF86FRPSDQLHV)DPLO\ILUPVKRZHYHUVKRZHGhigher leverage in the stud-LHVRI+DULMRQR$ULIIDQG7DQHZVNL DQG6HWLD$WPDMD7DQHZVNLDQG6NXOO\ ZKR ERWK DQDO\]HG $XVWUDOLDQ OLVWHG ILUPV LQ &KHQJ DQG 7]HQJ¶V UHYLHZRIOLVWHG7DLZDQHVHHQWHUSULVHVLQ.LQJDQG6DQWRU¶V DQDO\VLVRI&D-QDGLDQSXEOLFFRPSDQLHV(OOXO¶V VWXG\ZLWKDIRFXVRQOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVIURP FRXQWULHVDQGILQDOO\LQ&URFL'RXNDVDQG*RQHQF¶V DQDO\VLVRISXEOLFO\ listed Continental European enterprises.
When we turn to studies analyzing private companies a lower leverage in family EXVLQHVVHVZDVQRWLFHGE\3RXW]LRXULV LQ8.SULYDWH PDLQO\ VPDOODQGPHGLXP HQWHUSULVHV*DOOR7jSLHVDQG&DSSX\QV LQ6SDQLVK ZLWKDIHZH[FHSWLRQV non-listed medium and large companies (sales over €21.6 million and more than 150 HPSOR\HHV =HOOZHJHU LQ6ZLVVQRQOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVDQG/ySH]*UDFLDDQG 6iQFKH]$QG~MDU LQ6SDQLVKPHGLXPVL]HGHQWHUSULVHV ZLWKEHWZHHQDQG HPSOR\HHV No differencesLQWKHFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHFRXOGEHIRXQGE\&ROHPDQ DQG&DUVN\ LQ86SULYDWHVPDOOFRPSDQLHV ZLWKIHZHUWKDQHPSOR\HHV 3HUQVWHLQHU LQ8SSHU$XVWULDQ PDLQO\ PHGLXPVL]HGSULYDWHHQWHUSULVHVDQG ILQDOO\%MXJJUHQ'XJJDODQG*LDQJ LQ6ZHGLVKFORVHGPHGLXPVL]HGHQWHU-prises. A higher leverage RI IDPLO\ ILUPV KRZHYHU ZDV QRWLFHG E\ :X &KXD DQG &KULVPDQ LQDPL[HGVDPSOHRIPDLQO\SULYDWHEXWDOVRSXEOLFHTXLW\ILQDQFHG &DQDGLDQ60(V ZLWKQRPRUHWKDQHPSOR\HHV )LQDOO\*RQ]iOH]HWDO D IRXQGLQDPL[HGVDPSOHRIPDLQO\SULYDWHEXW DOVROLVWHG&ROXPELDQILUPVWKDWWKHW\SHRIIDPLO\LQYROYHPHQWPDWWHUV ZKLOHIDPLO\ PDQDJHPHQWKDVDQHJDWLYHLQIOXHQFHRQOHYHUDJH ZKLFKKRZHYHUEHFRPHVSRVLWLYH LQROGILUPV IDPLO\RZQHUVKLSKDVDSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRQOHYHUDJH)XUWKHUPRUHWKH SUHVHQFHRIIDPLO\PHPEHUVRQWKHERDUGKDVDQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHXVHRIGHEW
To sum up, the presented empirical analyses don’t clearly indicateLIIDPLO\EXVL-nesses show a higher or lower leverage than non-family controlled companies. This is especially true for listed firms, whereas non-listed family enterprises show a slight WHQGHQF\IRUOHVVRUHTXDOOHYHUDJHWKDQWKHLUQRQIDPLO\FRXQWHUSDUWV
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$V GLVFXVVHG DERYH IDPLO\ ILUPV IROORZ D SHFNLQJ RUGHU RI ILQDQFLQJ 0\HUV 0\HUVDQG0DMOXI WRSUHVHUYHWKHLULQGHSHQGHQFHLHDPRQJRWKHUV they are reluctant to raise external funds (Michaelas, Chittenden and Poutziouris, 5RPDQR7DQHZVNLDQG6P\UQLRV 3RXW]LRXULV /ySH]*UDFLDDQG 6iQFKH]$QG~MDU )DPLO\EXVLQHVVRZQHUVKRZHYHUKDYHOLPLWHGILQDQFLQJ FDSDELOLWLHV 6DOYDWR )HUQiQGH] DQG 1LHWR QRW OHDVW EHFDXVH RI WKHLU
low diversification of wealth. Therefore, family-controlled enterprises should tend to retain profits 3RXW]LRXULV %ODQFR0D]DJDWRVGH4XHYHGR3XHQWHDQG&DVWULOOR LQVWHDGRISD\LQJWKHPRXWWRWKHLUVKDUHKROGHUV 0RUHRYHU-HQVHQ VKRZHGWKDWQRWRQO\GHEWEXWDOVRdividend payments can disciplinePDQDJHUVDQGWKHUHIRUHPLWLJDWHDJHQF\FRVWV$VIDPLO\EXVLQHVVHV VKRZIHZHUDJHQF\FRQIOLFWVEHWZHHQRZQHUVDQGPDQDJHUVGLYLGHQGVZLOOSOD\DOHVV important role in disciplining the managers of these companies (Gugler, 2003; Schmid HW DO 3LQGDGR 5HTXHMR DQG GH OD 7RUUH ,I KRZHYHU VHYHUH DJHQF\ SUREOHPVEHWZHHQPLQRULW\VKDUHKROGHUVDQGFRQWUROOLQJVKDUHKROGHUVDUHSUHYDOHQW IDPLO\ILUPVFRXOGPLWLJDWHWKHVHSUREOHPVE\SD\LQJRXWKLJKHUGLYLGHQGV )DFFLR /DQJDQG<RXQJ 6HWLD$WPDMD7DQHZVNLDQG6NXOO\ 'H&HVDUL 3LQGDGR5HTXHMRDQGGHOD7RUUH
Finally, the personal preferencesRIWKHIDPLO\PHPEHUVFDQLQIOXHQFHWKHSD\-RXWSROLF\)DPLO\PHPEHUVXUJHWKHFRPSDQ\WRSD\RXWGLYLGHQGVLQRUGHUWRIXQG WKHLUSHUVRQDOFRQVXPSWLRQ ³FOLHQWHOHHIIHFW´ ZKHUHDVWKHDPRXQWRIWKHGLYLGHQG SD\PHQWVLVDOVRLQIOXHQFHGE\WKHLUDQGWKHFRPSDQ\¶VOLIHF\FOH<RXQJIRXQGHUV FRXOG IRUHJR SD\RXWV WR EXLOG XS WKH EXVLQHVV ZKHUHDV LQ ODWHU \HDUV WKH\ PLJKW fund personal consumption with cash received form dividend payments. Moreover, FRQIOLFWVLQIDPLOLHVZLWKPXOWLSOHPHPEHUVDQGHVSHFLDOO\ZLWKVHYHUDOJHQHUDWLRQV FDQLQIOXHQFHWKHGLYLGHQGSD\RXWSROLF\RIIDPLO\EXVLQHVVHV7KHUHIRUHPDQDJHUV of family firms could use high dividends to pacify their family owners (DeAngelo, 'H$QJHORDQG6NLQQHU 6FKPLGHWDO RUVRPHJURXSVRIIDPLO\RZQHUV IRUH[DPSOHIDPLO\VKDUHKROGHUVZLWKZHDNWLHVWRWKHILUP
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0DQ\VWXGLHVDQDO\]LQJWKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHSD\RXWSROLF\EHWZHHQIDPLO\DQG non-family firms have focused on listed enterprises. On the one hand, evidence of lower dividend paymentsE\IDPLO\ILUPVZDVIRUH[DPSOHIRXQGE\0F&RQDXJK\ 0DWWKHZVDQG)LDONR LQ86OLVWHGILUPV'H&HVDUL LQ,WDOLDQSXEOLF FRPSDQLHVDQGILQDOO\:HLHWDO LQ&KLQHVHOLVWHGHQWHUSULVHV2QWKHRWKHU hand higher dividend paymentsE\IDPLO\FRQWUROOHGHQWHUSULVHVZHUHREVHUYHGE\ 6HWLD$WPDMD 7DQHZVNL DQG 6NXOO\ LQ $XVWUDOLDQ OLVWHG ILUPV <RVKLNDZD DQG5DVKHHG LQ-DSDQHVH27&OLVWHGILUPV3LQGDGR5HTXHMRDQGGHOD7RUUH LQOLVWHGHQWHUSULVHVLQQLQH(XURSHDQFRXQWULHVDQG6FKPLGHWDO LQ *HUPDQ SXEOLF FRPSDQLHV 7KLV VWXG\ DOVR VKRZHG WKDW „real“ family firms (with PXOWLSOHIDPLO\PHPEHUVDQGRUJHQHUDWLRQV KDYHDhigher payout propensity than IRXQGHUFRQWUROOHGIDPLO\ILUPVZKLFKFDQEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKHH[LVWHQFHRIFRQIOLFWV DQGFRPPRQDFWLRQSUREOHPVEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWIDPLO\PHPEHUVDQGRUJHQHUDWLRQV )LQDOO\&KHQHWDO IRXQGmixed evidence of the payout propensity in listed Hong Kong firms depending on the percentage of family ownership.
When we look at the studies focusing unlisted firms*XJOHU QRWLFHGlower dividend payoutsLQDPL[HGVDPSOHRIPDLQO\XQOLVWHGEXWDOVROLVWHGODUJH$XVWULDQ enterprises, whereas higher dividend payments E\ IDPLO\ ILUPV ZHUH REVHUYHG E\ /\EDHUW9DQGHPDHOHDQG9RRUGHFNHUV LQDVDPSOHRISULYDWH%HOJLDQFRPSD-QLHV)LQDOO\*RQ]iOH]HWDO E VKRZHGLQDPL[HGVDPSOHRIPDLQO\SULYDWHEXW DOVROLVWHG&ROXPELDQILUPVWKDWWKHNLQGRIIDPLO\LQIOXHQFHPDWWHUV ZKLOHPDMRU-ity family ownership, a founder CEO and indirect family control through pyramidal VWUXFWXUHV KDYH D QHJDWLYH LPSDFW IDPLO\ LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKH ERDUG KDV D SRVLWLYH influence on dividend payments.
7RVXPXSWKHHPSLULFDOVWXGLHVRIERWKSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHHQWHUSULVHVVKRZno clear evidence concerning the payout propensity of family firms.
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Our theoretical analysis indicates that the specific goal and incentive structure of family firms affects agency conflicts prevalent in these enterprises. As agency SUREOHPVDUHLPSRUWDQWGHWHUPLQDQWVRIFRPSDQLHV¶ILQDQFLQJGHFLVLRQVWKHIDPLO\ LQIOXHQFHLWVHOIFDQEHVHHQDVDQRWHZRUWK\IRUFHEHKLQGFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHDQGSD\-out decisions. The theoretical analysis, however, shows no clear evidence that this IDPLO\LQIOXHQFHOHDGVWR PRUHRUOHVVleverageDQG KLJKHURUORZHUdividend payments of family firms compared to their non-family counterparts.
The same holds true for empirical studies which present mixed results concerning WKHOHYHUDJHDQGSD\RXWSURSHQVLW\RIIDPLO\EXVLQHVVHV7KHVHDPELJXRXVHPSLULFDO UHVXOWVKRZHYHUVKRXOGQRWEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVHYLGHQFHRIWKHQRQUHOHYDQFHRIIDPLO\ LQYROYHPHQWLQILQDQFLQJGHFLVLRQVLQSUDFWLFH5RPDQR7DQHZVNLDQG6P\UQLRV showed that family specific factors VXFKDVWKHGHVLUHWRPDLQWDLQIDPLO\FRQWURO have a significant influence on the financial and capital structure decision-making process of family firms. Moreover, significant differences in the capital structure GHFLVLRQDQGILQDQFLDOSROLF\EHWZHHQIDPLO\DQGQRQIDPLO\HQWHUSULVHVZHUHQRWLFHG E\/ySH]*UDFLDDQG6iQFKH]$QG~MDU IRUH[DPSOH
7KHPL[HGHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHFRXOGUDWKHUEHDWWULEXWHGWRDPRQJRWKHUVcoun-try effects and different financial systems EDQNEDVHG YV PDUNHWEDVHG ILQDQFLDO V\VWHPV )XUWKHUPRUHmethodological issuesDQG RPLWWHG FRQWUROYDULDEOHVFRXOG have influenced the results.2 Moreover, the impact of different family firm defini-tions and especially different types of family involvement (e. g., management vs. RZQHUVKLSIRXQGHUOHGYVQRQIRXQGHUOHGFRPSDQLHV PXVWQRWEHQHJOHFWHGDVIRU H[DPSOHWKHVWXGLHVRI6FKPLGHWDO DQG*RQ]iOH]HWDO DE KDYH
2 )UDQNDQG*R\DO IRUH[DPSOHVKRZHGWKDWWKHPDLQIDFWRUVLQIOXHQFLQJWKHFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH
RIFRPSDQLHVDUHLQGXVWU\OHYHUDJHDPRXQWRIWDQJLEOHDVVHWVSURILWDELOLW\ILUPVL]HPDUNHWWRERRNUDWLR and expected inflation.
shown. Finally, listed family firms PLJKW EHKDYH GLIIHUHQWO\ WKDQ WKHLU QRQOLVWHG FRXQWHUSDUWVDVLQXQOLVWHGILUPVQRWRQO\WKHRZQHUVKLSEXWDOVRWKHPDQDJHPHQW is often concentrated in the hands of the family. Furthermore the expropriation of PLQRULW\VKDUHKROGHUVFRXOGEHOHVVOLNHO\LQVXFKILUPVDVWKHPLQRULWLHVRIWHQKDYH DFORVHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHGRPLQDWLQJRZQHUIDPLO\ 3LQGDGR5HTXHMRDQGGHOD 7RUUH 7KHHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHIRUnon-listed companiesKRZHYHUVHHPVWREH UHODWLYHO\OLPLWHGFRPSDUHGWROLVWHGRQHVQRWOHDVWEHFDXVHGDWDLVODFNLQJIRUSULYDWH HQWHUSULVHV&RQVHTXHQWO\future research on the financing decisions of family firms could focus on non-listed companies on the one hand and different types of family involvement on the other hand.
7RVXPXSZHVWLOOVHHPWRIDFHD³FDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHSX]]OH´ 0\HUV DQG ³GLYLGHQG SX]]OH´ %ODFN DW OHDVW ZKHQ DQDO\]LQJ WKH OHYHUDJH DQG SD\RXW propensity of family firms in relation to their non-family counterparts.
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