Maritime University of Szczecin
Akademia Morska w Szczecinie
2011, 28(100) z. 1 pp. 19–26 2011, 28(100) z. 1 s. 19–26
Evacuation routes prom machinery spaces – quantity,
construction and layout
Drogi ewakuacji z pomieszczeń maszynowych – liczba wyjść,
konstrukcja i rozmieszczenie
Ryszard Getka
West Pomeranian University of Technology in Szczecin Zachodniopomorski Uniwersytet Technologiczny
70-310 Szczecin, al. Piastów 17, e-mail: getka@zut.edu.pl
Key words: fire, explosion, evacuation, escape routes, the engine-room, vessel, stairs, stairways Abstract
This article discusses the importance of evacuation routes from machinery spaces, and analyze their availability in the event of emergency cases, such as fire, flooding, toxic threat, terrorist attack on modern ships with spaces in the area of the engine room. It describes and provides an analysis of the course of action of escape from machinery spaces in typical cases of the actual fires on ships of the Polish and foreign flags. It identifies the main threats and reasons for causing the unavailability of escape routes, identifies factors of delay, or even prevent the evacuation of people from such spaces in the risk situation. It shows the current status of the relevant international rules and the requirements of classification societies concerning the number and structure of the main and emergency escape routes. It presents the current proposals for the revision of international rules concerning the number and structure of the escape routes from machinery spaces on ships.
Słowa kluczowe: pożar, wybuch, ewakuacja, drogi ewakuacji, maszynownia, statek, schody, klatki scho-dowe
Abstrakt
W artykule omówiono znaczenie dróg ewakuacji z pomieszczeń maszynowych i dokonano analizy ich do-stępności w wypadkach zdarzeń nadzwyczajnych, takich jak pożar, zagrożenie toksyczne, zatopienie, atak terrorystyczny na współczesnych statkach z pomieszczeniami maszynowymi w obszarze siłowni. Opisano i przedstawiono analizę przebiegu akcji ewakuacji siłowni w typowych wypadkach rzeczywistych pożarów na statkach polskich i zagranicznych. Wskazano na główne zagrożenia i przyczyny powodujące niedostęp-ność dróg ewakuacji, wskazano na czynniki opóźniające lub wręcz uniemożliwiające ewakuację ludzi z po-mieszczeń maszynowych w sytuacji zagrożenia. Przedstawiono aktualny stan przepisów międzynarodowych i wymagań towarzystw klasyfikacyjnych, dotyczących liczby i konstrukcji głównych i awaryjnych dróg ewa-kuacji. Przedstawiono aktualne propozycje zmian przepisów międzynarodowych dotyczących liczby i kon-strukcji dróg ewakuacji z pomieszczeń maszynowych na statkach.
Introduction
Machinery spaces form the ship’s layout which is located in the rear, aft end of the ship. Modern vessels, depending on their destination, have a variety of designs in the hull. Major part of the central area of the hull is used for cargo, which usually also imposes position and spatial layout of machinery spaces. By virtue of the applicable type of propulsion, that groups the basic propulsion
means, engine room is usually positioned near the propeller – which requires transfer mechanical energy from an engine or engines to propeller or propellers. Engine room therefore has displaced from the midship region – what was required in the early application of steam engines and paddle-wheels propulsion – to part of the aft end, what is required for propulsion with slow speed Diesel engine driving one screw propeller.
Contemporary development of main propulsion systems on vessels, using the medium-speed engi-nes, electric motors, azimuth and azipod propellers, with electrical or hydraulic motors, and also constructions of the hulls of special-purpose ships – as vessels for the carriage of heavy cargo, ro-ro and car carriers, passenger vessels – has led to a variety of solutions and spatial arrangement of machinery spaces, including layout of energy facilities on the ship. Beyond traditional engine room located on the stern part of the ship, on the lower part of the hull as a rule, below the waterline swimming, machi-nery rooms and machimachi-nery spaces practically may be found on the entire length of the ship. It can also meet ships with spaces that are located on the bow, where aft part of ship is required to locate the spatial patterns of large-scale technical equipment, e.g.: on ships to lying down of sub-sea cables, on pipe-lying ships, or on heavy-lift vessels.
In each of the common solutions are common features, due to the function of machinery spaces, which mainly concern the manufacture and supply to the ship the energy necessary to his life and work, including mainly the energy for propulsion and steering the ship, but also electricity and heat. Energy is supplied with the media for the propul-sion of a variety of devices, for example. hydraulic, pneumatic, steam, etc. To the category of machi-nery spaces belong also a number of other spaces on the vessel outside the engine room, in which are installed: boilers, equipment for the preparation and processing of the fuel, fuel bunkering stations, refrigeration equipment, rooms with stabilizing machinery, ventilation and air-conditioning machi-nery, and similar spaces, together with trunks to such spaces (SOLAS-74/II-2/3.30) [1].
Use of liquid fuel and combustion processes for power generation on ships leads to occurrence in machinery spaces large level of fire risk. Fire in the spaces arise fairly frequently – details of the world fleet shows prevalence at 1 to 3 fires per year per 1000 vessels [2]. Economical use of space by desig-ners, resulting from the need to ensure, above all, as the largest space vessel for its primary function, which is the carriage of cargo and passengers, leads to the adjacency of elements of high temperatures that are potential sources of ignition and high saturation of electrical devices, which are also potential sources of ignition, in the vicinity of the installations that contain at relatively high pressures flammable liquids with a low auto-ignition tempe-ratures. The result, in the event of leakage or spray of fuel or oil, are fires in the machinery spaces of ships. Such a scenario occurs in approximately 70% of the fires in machinery spaces related to the
leakage of fuel or lubricating oil [3], because the auto-ignition temperature of fuels and oils used in spaces is relatively low, and only slightly more than 250C. In the event of contact many potential sources of ignition with a much higher temperatures in the space. Temperature of unshielded exhaust manifolds of Diesel engines can achieve, as an example, the level of 500°C. On the Polish ships were noted, among others, two fires due to the ignition of the lubricating oil in contact with exhaust manifold of Diesel engines, two others by lubricating oil in contact with the body of the valve on high pressure steam installation, or two other fires due to unexpected spray of hot mineral heating oil with immediate self ignition.
Very important, if not the most, to the ship and its safety performance is the proper operation of equipment located in machinery spaces. Machine devices and their functions should also be con-tinued in such circumstances, when the functions of the other devices have been violated, or where the vessel as the object is in a state of emergency. On several occasions, the crew must comply with its obligations in machinery spaces to the last moments before leaving the vessel since the functioning of the machinery is dependent on the safety of the ship or the effective evacuation of the remaining passengers and crew from the ship.
In case of fires, the relatively frequent in machinery spaces, the crew should be able to safely leave the room. Complex spatial structure of space, complicated pathways and exits from each floor, and the inability to predict the location of potential sources of fire, force designers to place at least two exits from the main machinery space. Much less frequently this principle is implemented in the case of smaller compartments arranged inside the main engine room.
Escape routes from machinery spaces the fol-lowing aims:
access for daily maintenance of equipment during routine placement of watch or review the status of devices;
transport of components and tools for the repair and refurbishing of the equipment;
the movement of rescue teams and fire-fighters in the event of a fire, which should make it possible to navigate through the rescue teams and fire-fighters in protective clothing with breathing apparatus, the delivery of fire fighting equipment, including at least water hoses with nozzles;
route of escape for the crew in the event of dumping of machinery room space;
road access for rescue workers with equipment to remove water, smoke, gas freeing after use of fire-extinguishing medium – after finishing the rescue action;
road for transport of accident victims, which should enable the movement of rescue workers with a piece of equipment, for example medical stretcher and breathing apparatus.
Fatal accidents are still at the time of the events, in particular fire in machinery spaces, which could be avoided, if there was a larger number of escape routes. It forms the basis for discussions on the regularity of solutions to the escape routes from machinery spaces on ships, including in the sphere of the provisions in force.
Requirements regarding the number and placement of escape routes
The basic requirements for escape routes on ships, which are also valid for the machinery spaces, are contained in regulation II-2/2.1.1.5 of SOLAS-1974 [1]: “provide adequate and readily accessible means of escape for passengers and crew " in the regulation of the Convention regarding the main objectives of the fire protection of vessels and functional requirements, which are contained in the chapter II-2 of SOLAS-1974 [1]. This is repeated in a similar manner in the functional requirements in regulation II-2/2.2.1.6: “protection of means of escape and access for fire fighting”.
Detailed requirements regarding the escape routes from machinery spaces are included in respect of passenger ships in regulation II-2/13.4.1, for cargo ships in regulation II-2/13.4.2 of SOLAS-1974 [1]. Requirements for passenger ships applies to all types of machinery spaces and differ de-pending on whether spaces are located, above or below the bulkhead deck.
For cargo ships, these requirements are more restrictive for machinery spaces of category A, which contain internal combustion machinery used for main propulsion, and other internal combustion engines which are not used for main propulsion, for example: engines, generators, aggregates – of the total power of not less than 375 kW or any boilers fired with liquid fuels, or other devices, such as, for example incinerators. These requirements for the escape routes from machinery spaces of category A for cargo ships are similar to the requirements for machinery spaces situated below the bulkhead deck on passenger ships and provide one of the fol-lowing provisions of the possible evacuation: 1) two sets of steel ladders, as widely separated
away from each other as possible, leading to
doors in the upper part of the machinery space, from where they should have access to the open deck. One of the ladder should be located within protected enclosure, satisfying requirements for class A-60 fire divisions, throughout the height from the lowest level of the machinery space to the level of exit to the safe area. The entrances to such enclosed space with ladder inside should lead by self-closing fire doors of the same class A-60, placed at every level of the entrance to the ladder enclosure. In addition, these are also the requirements of the minimum cross-section of such enclosure 800 mm x 800 mm, and the emergency lighting within the enclosed ladder space;
2) one steel ladder leading from the lowest level of the machinery space to the exit in the upper part of the premises, offering access to the deck and additionally, in a place far from the entrance to such ladder, output by the steel doors with possibility to open and close from both sides, which leads a safe escape route from the lower part of the engine room to the open deck.
In practice, solution 1 will meet more frequently on ships powered by medium-speed engines, with gear box and two or more propellers, if there is no shaft tunnel. Solution 2 is typical of the engine room located aft on cargo ships, powered by the low-speed engine with one screw propeller. Escape route from the lowest part of the engine room leads, as a rule, by a narrow corridor along the shaft tunnel, or separated corridor along with, to the steering gear compartment, where the exit door directs to the corridor leading to open deck. On smaller ships by a steel ladder from steering gear compartment and hatch on the open deck.
One difficulty designers and Maritime Admini-stration makes while Regulation II-2/13.4.1.3 and II-2/13.4.2.2 of SOLAS-1974 [1] are applied, which concern, respectively, the exemption from the requirements of two escape routes from machi-nery spaces, respectively, on passenger ships and cargo ships.
Exemption from requirement of two escape rou-tes from machinery spaces applies to small vessels, with a gross tonnage of less than 1,000 RT, taking account of the breadth and availability of the upper part of machinery space. On passenger ships in any case, the Administration may waive the require-ments of the two escape on ships with a gross tonnage of over 1000 RT, having regard to the fact that the existing one route of escape provides easy access to the deck, if people are working in a room occasionally. On cargo ships gross tonnage below 1000 RT Administration may also dispense with the
obligation to protect with fire enclosure the steel ladder leading to exit in upper part of machinery compartment.
The provisions of the Polish Maritime Admini-stration, contained in part V of the PRS 2008 rules (as amended) [4], are compared with the require-ments of the SOLAS-1974 [1] identical and can be found in point 2.3 “Evacuation routes” in part V titled “Fire Protection” [4].
For several years, the provisions also require application in machinery spaces on passenger ships and cargo ships of emergency escape breathing device (EEBD). They are used, regardless of breathing apparatus which contains compressed air in pressure bottle, and are intended for members of the crew employed in engine room in the event of evacuation under smoke. Deployed with 2 units or 1 unit at each level in the vicinity of the entrance into the ladder or stairs for evacuation (respectively in machinery spaces of category A and placed there, the main propulsion engines, with or without such engines) and 1 unit in the main machinery control room, if control room is a separate compartment belonging to the machinery space. These devices are relatively little known by the crew, but may be helpful in saving human lives. The existing pattern of scenarios with deaths of crew in fires, including the deaths of crew on ships of the Polish flag, indicate the possibility of rescu-ing some of the members of the crew were when they had put at the disposal of such equipment.
Characteristics of fires in machinery spaces
Provide at least two escape routes, resulting in the possible shortest and quickest way to leave the engine room and reach the deck, is a consequence of risk due to the rapid development of fire in the spaces and presence within a short period of time, the order of several minutes, the conditions are dangerous for humans and impossible for survival.
A fire in the machinery space, as mentioned earlier, has a typically sharp nature of the outflow of combustible liquid incendiary igniting from a hot surface (ca. 70% of cases). Fire runs rapidly, now undergoing full development – without any initial phase characteristic to fires in accommodations with a slowly incandescence – to the original outbreak of fire. The power of fire and its dyna-mism depends on intensity of outflow combustible liquid and its properties, as well as the local conditions and the geometry of spatial structures in place of the event. At best, flammable liquid with outflow reaches a lower part of the rooms, under
the floor plates, in double bottom space, and then the fire moves into the space under the floor and runs less violently, with probability of extinction itself in case of a small leakage of fuel which is confronted with the water and lack of air in bilge area. The second scenario in the extreme, this could be a fire, with a large fuel leakage on engine, ignited immediately by hot surface of exhaust collectors of the engine, with a spillage on the hull of hot engine and the exhaust system, next on flooring and other items in the engine room. Assuming a value for the mass burning rate for fuel or lubricating oils with a value of m’ = 0,045 kg/m2s and heat of combustion of fuel of order Qc = 44 000 kJ/kg [5], we get the power of fire –
assuming it is the nature of the specified fuel combustion from pool fire of surface Ff (taken:
ρ = density of the fuel was 845 kg/m3, the thickness
of the spillage a = 1 mm), as in table 1, depending on the fuel mass m as released once, until the cut- -off outflow.
Table 1. The power of fire in the engine room with release of given mass of fuel, forming a liquid stain of burning fuel (pool fire)
Tabela 1. Moc pożaru w maszynowni przy wypływie określo-nej masy paliwa, tworzącej „plamę” palącego się paliwa (pool fire) No. Fuel mass kg Layer thickness mm Surface of fuel layer m2 Power of fire, MW 1 1 1 1.18 2.3 2 10 1 11.8 23.4 3 100 1 118 234 4 500 1 592 1172 5 1000 1 1183 2343
In case of continuous flow of the fuel, the fire power is, in the early stage, roughly equal to the quantity of heat produced per unit of time by burn-ing the leakburn-ing fuel (see table 2). When calculatburn-ing the power of fire “FLARE”, was assumed heat of combustion for Diesel Qc = 44 400 kJ/kg and the
degree of incomplete combustion of φ = 0.86 [6]. Subsequently, the power of fire increases due to combustion of other combustible materials in the room, including primarily the insulation of electric cables. Survey results indicate a large amount of heat emitted by the flammable insulation cables, row 77 MJ/m2 for cables with a diameter of 15 mm,
insulated with PVC, arranged in a cable track in one row, with heat release rate in excess of 85 kW/m2 [7, 8]. In terms of quantity and intensity of
the heat release in machinery spaces cable insula-tions are second in the order of the source of risk.
Table 2. The power of fire in the engine room with the speci-fied stream mass flow of the fuel, creating a fire type “jet fire” (assuming Qc = 44 000 kJ/kg, the degree of incomplete com-bustion of φ = 0.86)
Tabela 2. Moc pożaru w maszynowni przy wypływie określo-nego strumienia masy paliwa, tworzącego pożar typu „pochod-nia” (jet fire) (przyjęto Qc = 44 000 kJ/kg, stopień niecałkowi-tego spalania φ = 0,86)
No. Mass flow of fuel kg/s Power of fire MW
1 0.1 4.40
2 0.2 8.80
3 0.5 22.00
4 1 44.00
5 2 88.00
Fires in the machinery spaces are much more intensive and dynamic, especially in the initial phase, compared to a fire in accommodation spaces. As well as in relation to the conduct of standard time-temperature curve (Fig. 1), according to stan-dard ISO 834 [9] which is used for mapping a hypothetical fire in case of fire resistance test of fire classes A and B constructions used on ships, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Fire Test Procedure Code of the IMO fire test methods [10]. Such constructions are used to separate ma-chinery spaces from the other spaces of the vessel, in order to prevent the passage of fire from the en-gine room and spread it onto the ship. It also works effectively in the opposite direction, effectively protecting the main engine room before going on
the fire with a superstructure to the engine room, what an example might be a fire on board the fishing base ship “Pomorze” on 30.09.1987, during which the entire superstructure was burned, and despite this fire which surrounded engine room not attended machinery spaces.
The length of the escape route and time of evacuation
Design of the escape will affect the time of evacuation from the machinery space, and hence for the duration of the evacuation of the whole vessel. Due to the relatively large size of some compartments, especially the main engine room, and a complicated history with internal staircases and ladders along escape, escape from the place of work to exit onto the open can attain from a dozen to several dozen metres, including several to 30 m staircases or ladders up to. Time of the evacuation of the crew members from the engine room is from less than one to a few minutes – in a situation where there are no difficulties in using the main escape routes. However, it may reach the value of the order of 20 minutes when the evacuation takes place using the secondary exits with handicaps caused by spreading fire (smoke, hot gases, lack of visibility), or other reasons [8, 11]. In the case of a well-run properly designed escape, its duration does not affect the total time of evacuation of the ship and does not increase the overall time to escape.
When calculating the time of evacuation can be suggested, use either of the methods given in the
Fig. 1. Pattern of temperatures: the standard fire time-temperature curve according to standard ISO 834 [9], for the typical fire in the cabin of restricted use of combustion materials and in the machinery space of category A
Rys. 1. Przebiegi temperatur: standardowej krzywej temperatura-czas według normy ISO 834 [9], dla przeciętnego pożaru w pomieszczeniu mieszkalnym o ograniczonym użyciu materiałów palnych i w pomieszczeniu maszynowym kategorii A
Time [min] F urn ac e tem pe ra tu re [ C]
recommendations of the IMO [12, 13], assuming the speed of movement of human on stairs (0.55 m/s down 0.44 m/s up) and corridors (0.67 m/s) as specified in the recommendations. The results will include provision of safety resulting from the fact that the quoted speeds are for passengers in different age groups, and the crew normally moves faster and more efficient.
The cumulative duration time t of leave by the crew of the spaces from the moment a fire is long and consists of many components to it:
td t tal t twc tws toc t 1 2 (1) where:td – time to detect the fire,
t1 – working time in the machinery space and
supporting facilities prior to the decision to escape,
tal – time to perform an action arising out of the
fire alarm,
t2 – time to performing after a fire alarm to the
fulfilment of the obligations associated with the local extinguishing of fire and other things,
twc – total time passage corridors (horizontal
roads of escape),
tws – the cumulative duration of transition after
the stairs and ladders,
toc – the total time for the opening and closing
doors and openings on the way of escape.
The total time t is very important at the time of the fire in the machinery space, from the point of view of the success of the action of fire-extinguish-ing by fire protection system and material damage which arise. As already mentioned, the evacuation time associated with leaving the premises, consist-ing of 3 last elements in the model (1), may differ substantially depending on the scenario of fire escape routes and construction, and efficiency of the crew members. In literature may be found the descriptions of fires in which the crew evacuated from engine room safely in the first two minutes of fire and extinguished it successfully in time for 7 minutes. In one of the largest fires in the Polish fleet of ferry “Mikołaj Kopernik”, mechanic on watch duty managed with the greatest difficulty to leave the engine room safely during 20 minutes, after deciding to escape as a result of ineffective fire extinguishing action with a few portable fire extinguishers. Fire had broken in the transition be-tween the main engine no 2 and oil cooler (Fig. 2). He went through of control room effectively, next attempted to leave by exit ladder on starboard side in the auxiliary engine room, then through water-tight doors and corridor leading from the auxiliary engine room to steering gear compartment, and by the ladder and hath in deck to the railway wagons cargo hold. So complicated and long route of escape was caused by the exclusion of the main escape staircase on port side in the engine room (Fig. 2), as a result of blocking permanently open
Fig. 2. The arrangement of escape routes and exits in machinery spaces: main and auxiliary engine rooms, control room and work-shops on the ferry m/f “Mikołaj Kopernik” in relation to the place of the source of fire in the main engine room on 6.11.1982 [11] Rys. 2. Rozmieszczenie dróg ewakuacji w pomieszczeniach maszynowych siłowni głównej, pomocniczej i CMK na promie m/f „Mikołaj Kopernik” w stosunku do miejsca źródła pożaru w siłowni głównej w dniu 6.11.1982 r. [11]
A-60 doors to the frame mounted in such a position in the steel wire. Fire from the first minutes used staircase trunk and the main escape as the great chimney.
A similar event, and the same the reason for, took place at the time of the fire at the trawler B-29 “Luzytanka” in November 1979 in the middle of the Atlantic. When the doors of the main exit from the engine room on port side was also permanently open to improve the ventilation of machinery spaces. The crew has benefited from the departure of starboard side and then launched a CO2
extingu-ishing system. It was not openedcompletely (50% cylinders were activated) and also gas that was delivered to the engine room had flowed out to the atmosphere. The fire was not extinguished forth-with in the engine room, he quickly spread by exit door on port side to the corridors and rooms of the superstructure. As a result, the trawler burnt com-pletely to the ground and after 3 days of drift on the Ocean, unmanned and without propulsion, was being towed. Repaired and refitted was in use into 1996.
Fires in machinery spaces in the fleet of the world with the victims of lethal had taken place in recent years, including on board the Danish flag, due to the lack of an exit from the premises of the main machinery control room. In 2008 at the “Rio Blanco”, Chilean flag (FP 54/25/14.4 to 14.6), one person died directly from fire, after being sprayed with oil from the installation, which caught fire immediately after contact with the manifold of the engine, and the two due to the lack of additional escape routes from machinery spaces – died be-cause of asphyxiation.
As a result of these accidents, a Subcommittee on Fire Protection of the International Maritime Organization (IMO FP) proposes amendments to the chapter II-2 of SOLAS-1974, in order to harmonize the requirements for an escape routes for cargo ships to the level of what is on passenger ships. It is also proposed to introduce the require-ments of two exits from the premises of the work-shops and other dedicated premises in the area of the engine room. The interpretation also require provisions relating to the width of escape routes and emergency exits enclosures from the spaces contained in regulations II-2/13.4.2, II-2/13.3.3.5 II-2/13.4.2.1 of SOLAS-1974 [1], and with point 13.3 FSS code [14].
Conclusions
Fires in the machinery spaces represent a high risk for each vessel, because of the large power, rapid growth and a short time to achieve full
deve-lopment phase, and the difficult conditions for the control and extinguishing. Analyses and descrip-tions of incidents of fires in the machinery spaces available in the literature point out to considerable risk to the life of crews in the event of a fire, when a fire source in the machinery space is situated in place of impeding the evacuation of the people. Typical scenarios of fires are those in which there is leakage of fuel or lubricating oil, or oil spray with direct ignition from the available sources of igni-tion. Fires of this type are violent and have as a ru-le, large capacity, more than a few hundred MW. An inability to stop the source of leakage of fuel or oil are factors developing the fire to cover all the engine room – in consequence of which may lead to the destruction of the engine room and even ship.
Evacuation of the crew members working temporarily or for longer periods of time in spaces is difficult, often too long or impossible. In the last few years in the fleet world accidents death of crew members due to difficult escape highlighted the need to increase the number of exits from the ma-chinery spaces in the engine room. The Interna-tional Maritime Organization has taken steps to amend the provisions of the Convention SOLAS-1974, in order to increase the number and shorten the escape routes from machinery spaces, including primarily on cargo ships, on which the existing provisions of the SOLAS-1974 are assumed too liberal.
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The paper was published by financial supporting of West Pomeranian Province
