"Polish Yearbook of International Law" 2001, vol. XXV

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498

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POLISH YEARBOOK OF

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POLISH

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XXV

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WydawnictwoNaukowe SCHOLAR,00-322Warszawa

62Krakowskie Przedmieście Street,

ANNA WYROZUMSKA, Direct Application of the Polish Constitution and International Treaties to PrivateConduct

KRZYSZTOFWÓJTOWICZ, ProposedChanges in thePolish Constitution of1997aheadof Poland

’

sAccession to theEuropean Union

WŁADYSŁAW CZAPLIŃSKI, Harmonisationof Laws inthe European Community andApproximationofPolish Legislationto Community Law 45 MARZENALASKOWSKA,The Parliamentary European LegislationCom

-mitteeintheApproximationofLawsProcedure

CEZARY BANASIŃSKI,TheNegotiationsDecision

-

Making Machinery

.

. 69 JANBARCZ,TheTreatyof Nice andEnlargementof the European Union 85 ROBERTRYBICKI,Schengen and Poland

ROMAN WIERUSZEWSKI,The EuropeanUnion CharterofFundamental Rights

-

History,Contentand Relationship to Polish Law

EUGENIUSZ PIONTEK,European Union Membership and Obligations under Bilateral andMultilateralAgreements to which Poland is a Party 127 PRZEMYSŁAWSAGANEK,Transition to the Second Stage of the Asso

-ciation between PolandandtheEuropeanCommunities and TheirMem

-berStates

ARTURNOWAK

-

FAR,Polandandthe Economic and Monetary Union in Europe

MATTHIAS PECHSTEIN,

PHILIPP

KUBICKI,The Legal Framework of Accession to theEuropeanUnion

MARISE CREMONA, Accession to theEuropean Union: Membership Conditionality andAccessionCriteria

NATIVIDADFERNANDEZ SOLA,DifferentEuropeanUnionApproaches toImmigration:PrivilegedImmigrants in theEuropeanUnion?

STEPHAN HÖBE, SANDRA BARTELT,International andEuropean Law Aspects of theEasternEnlargement of theEuropean Union

TORSTEN STEIN,The Treatyof Nice aridEnlargementof theEU

-

with SpecialRegardtoEnhanced Cooperation

MONICA DEN BOER, Police Co

-

operation in theEuropean Union: An UpdateofEvents

PATRICIA CONLAN,Irelandand theInternal Market

5 27 57 97 113 149 175 197 219 241 259 277 293 307

BookReviews

CEZARYMIK,Europejskie prawo wspólnotowe. Zagadnienia teoriii praktyki

-

byWŁADYSŁAWCZAPLIŃSKI

WILHELMKNELANGEN, Das PolitikfeldinnereSicherheit imIntegrations

-prozess

-

by WŁADYSŁAW CZAPLIŃSKI

CH

.

PITSCHAS, Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen

Gemeinschaftundihrer Mitgliedstaaten

-

by WŁADYSŁAWCZAPLIŃSKI 327 N.H

.

B. JOERGENSEN, TheResponsibilityofStates for International Crimes

-by WŁADYSŁAWCZAPLIŃSKI

Polish Bibliographyof International Law,1998-2000

325 326

328 331

-Direct

Application

of

the

Polish Constitution

and International Treaties to Private Conduct

ANNA WYROZUMSKA

Oneof the consequences ofthefuturePolish membershipin theEUwillbe the directapplicationof the Communitylaw in thePolish law

.

The issuewasdeveloped bymanyPolishauthors; however the questionofapplicationof the Community law

to horizontal relationswas rather neglected

.

This article touchestheproblemonly

indirectly tryingtoshow whether the Constitution itself and international treatiescan beappliedinPoland to private conduct

.

I

.

Constitution

1.General Remarks

Therewereseveral constitutionsinPolish history, the Constitution of 1791,1921 1935 and1952

.

The Constitution of1952 contained regulations characteristic for

socio

-

political relationships and ideological foundations of the communist period in

Poland.Variousamendments totheConstitutiondidnotchangeitscharacter

.

Abreak

-throughconstitutedthe amendingactof 29 September 1989.Itintroducedinto the

Constitutionnewfundamentalconceptsasthe rule of law(Article1), sovereigntyof thePeople (Article2),politicalpluralism andfreedom ofcreationandfunctioning of political parties (Article 4),protectionof ownershipandfreedomtopursueeconomic activity(Article 6).In1992theso

-

called Small Constitutionhadbeenadopted(Con

-stitutional Act,passed on 17October1992

,

on theMutual Relationsbetween the LegislativeandExecutiveInstitutions of theRepublic ofPolandandonLocalSelf

--

govemment)and remained inforceuntil16November1997,which isthe datewhen thecurrent Constitution,passed on 2April1997,entered intoforce.

None of the former Constitutions contained a provision concerning its direct

applicability

.

1_{Thelackof it didnotkeep theacademicsor the judiciary from formu}

-1 _{ThedoctrineofthePolishconstitutionallawunderstandsthisnotionmeaningtheapplication ofthe} constitutionas a basisfor the decisiontaken bytheState organe.g.thecourt(alsotogetherwithstatutes)oras aninterpretative guideline for statutes.Indirect application oftheconstitutionis, accordingtothisview,the applicationthroughthestatutewhichwas adoptedforthepurposeof implementationof the constitution(actu

-allyin thiscaseit is nottheconstitution which isappliedbut thestatuteitself).TheAuthor isofthe opinion that

theabovementioned differentiationis misleadingand incoherent, and differsfromtheconceptusedinrelation

-6 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

lating the thesisof directapplicability atleastfor some oftheconstitutional provi

-sions

.

However

,

theyconcernedrather theapplicationof theConstitutionin relations between State organs or between individual andtheStatebut not in horizontalrela

-tions (individualversusindividual).

Thefirst toapplyconstitutional provisionsmoreor less directly wastheChief

Administrative Court(foundedin 1980) and then the Supreme Court

.

The jurispru

-dence of these Courts could not further developbecauseofstructural drawbacksof theConstitution of 1952

-

its provisionswere too general, susceptible tovarious

interpretations andofa programmaticcharacter

.

In1985the ConstitutionalTribunal wasfounded

.

Forthefirst time in Polish historythecontrol ofconstitutionality of

statutes and other normative actswaspossible

.

2.Direct Applicabilityofthe Constitution of1997

The Constitutionof1997 containsa broadcatalogueofrightsandfreedomsof the

individual,inspired by fundamental acts of international law,amongothers theInter

-national CovenantsonHumanRightsof1966and theEuropean Convention forthe

Protectionof HumanRights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950.The Constitution distinguishes:

1) personalrights and freedoms(Articles 38-56), includingtheright to life,the rightto inviolabilityandsecurity ofperson(i

.

e.theprohibitionofscientificexperi

-mentswithout voluntaryconsent,theprohibitionof torture or cruel, inhumanor de

-gradingtreatmentor punishment), the right to fairtrail, theright toprivacy,thefree

-domofreligion

,

the freedom ofopinionandexpression;

2)political rightsandfreedoms(Articles57

-

63)e

.

g

.

freedom ofpeacefulassem

-bly,freedomof association;

3)social

,

economic and cultural rights and freedoms(Articles 64

-

76), among others the right to property,therighttopursueeconomic activity, labour rights, the rightto socialsecurity,protection ofhealth,education etc

.

Several provisionshavebeen devoted to the definition of theobligationsof theindi

-vidualtowards the State

.

The Constitution containsArticle8para

.

2,whichstates clearly that

“

theprovi

-sions of the Constitution shallapplydirectly

,

unlesstheConstitution providesother

-wise.

”

The thesisthat theConstitutiondoesnothaveanormative characteraswell as thethesis that itsprovisionsareaddressed only tothelegislativeor otherStateorgans,

inthesensethat they determineonlythescopeof their competence,havebeendecid

-edlyruled out

.

2

tion” of theconstitutionnarrowlyasreferringtotrulydirecteffect ofthe constitutionwherethe constitution itselfisa soleground for decisionorisco

-

appliedwith statutes; indirect applicationmeansapplication for interpretationofa norm.

2 _{Ondirect applicationof}

the Constitutionof1997cf.W.S krz yd ł o: KonstytucjaRP

-

komentarz

(2000), p

.

19ff.,Z

.

W i tko w s k i(ed.): Prawokonstytucyjne(1998), p. 114; W.S a netr a:“Konstytucyjna ochrona wolnościi prawpracowniczych,”5PrzeglądSądowy(1998),p.15 ff ,K.Dzia ło ch a: Zasada

Article 8para

.

2encompassesthe

_whole

scopeoftheconstitutional provisions,the

freedoms, rightsandobligationsof thehuman andcitizenincludedinthe secondchap

-ter oftheConstitutionbeing only apartof them

.

Forthis chapter, however, Article8

para

.

2 hasthemost significantmeaning.The principleofdirect application of constitu

-tionalnormsisnotunlimited

.

Article 8para. 2 clearlypointsoutpossibleexceptions: “The provisionsoftheConstitution shall applydirectly,unless theConstitution pro

-vides otherwise.” In thiscontext Article 81 oftheConstitution isworth attention.It specifiesthat rightsdefinedinArticles65 para

.

4 and5,66, 69,71 and74

-

763

canbe invokedonly withinlimitssetbystatutes

.

It isunderstood that the rightscontainedin theseprovisions may thereforebe notapplieddirectly

.

Thedetermination whetherthe

constitutionalnormis directly applicableandcontains sufficientlyclear andprecise

norms(doesnothaveonlyprogrammatic character), isleft tointerpretation

.

TheConstitution doesnot providean answerto the question whetherconstitu

-tional rights and freedoms define alsothe sphereof relations between individuals

themselvesand canbeinvoked byindividualagainst theotherindividual(are hori

-zontallyapplicable)

.

Thedoctrine doesnotgivea clear answereither.Thefew au

-thorswhotackledthe issueare dividedintotwo groups

-

one supports thecategorical

opinion that“the Constitution of theRepublicofPoland belongsto thenumber of

constitutional actsofdemocratic States which donotrecognise horizontal applicabil

-ity ofrightsand freedoms,”4_{theotherfollows theoppositeview.Tothe latter belongs}

P. Sarnecki5whopoints outthatcertainrightsareapplicableinhorizontalrelations andprotect the individual from interferenceonthepartoftheother persons,as for examplethe prohibition of tortureorcruel,inhuman,or degradingtreatment orpunish

-ment orprohibitionof application ofcorporalpunishment

.

However,“theeffectof

human rights

on

horizontal relations has manyspecificaspects

.

Sincetheyareimple

-mentedbythe meansofcivilandcriminal regulations,under normal circumstances

there is noneed toinvoke the provisions of the Constitution in relations between individuals

.

Only in unusual situations when statutesdonot provide theappropriate levelof protectiontheneed to applyconstitutional provisions directly mayarise.”6 L

.

Garlicki statesin turn that“theconcept ofhorizontalapplicabilityof constitutional

rightsand freedoms of theindividual has not sofar wona broadacceptancein the

Polish jurisprudence.” He thinks, however,that both the new Constitution (with the generalprincipleof direct applicability of itsprovisions) and foreignexperience inthatmatterwillallowfor it inthenearfuture

.

7

3 _{The rightsenumeratedintheseprovisionsconcernaminimum level of remunerationforwork,right to} employment,occupational advice andtraining,theright tosafeandhygienic conditions of work,aid to disabled persons, the rightoffamily andmaternity,to specialassistancefrompublic authorities etc.

4 _{B.B a n a s z a k:Prawokonstytucyjne (1999),p.389.}

5 _{P.S a r n e c k i (ed.):PrawokonstytucyjneRP(1999),pp.45-46;similarly,A}._{Łabno,in the opinion}

on B a n a s z a k,0_/7.cit,supra,n.4; Ruch Prawniczy,EkonomicznyiSocjologiczny, No.3

-

4 (1999), p.281. 6 _{P.S arnec ki},_op.cit.,_supra,n

.

_5.

7 _{Polskie prawokonstytucyjne,Warszawa 1999,pp}.₁₀₂

-

_{103.Similarly, J.O n i s z c z u k: Konstytucja} Rzeczypospolitej PolskiejworzecznictwieTrybunału Konstytucyjnego(2001),p.185 ff.;Sar necki,op. cit.,

supra, n.5, pp.45

-

46.M.P r z y s u c h a:“Bezpośredniestosowanie konstytucji.Najszybszadrogadopaństwa

8 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

3.Constitutional Norms PotentiallyApplicable toPrivate Conduct

Onlyfew constitutionalnormsmaybe appliedtoprivateconduct

.

The mostobvi

-ousseemstheright to ownership, otherproperty rights and therightof succession

(Article64)8_{andtheprincipleofequality andanti}

_-

_{discrimination provisionscontained}

inArticle32para.29andArticle

33.10

Onecanquote aswellArticle59 providing for

the rightoftrade unions and employers and theirorganisations tobargain,particu

-larlyfor the purposeof resolvingcollective disputes,andtoconclude collectivela

-bouragreementsandother arrangements

.

Theotherprovisionsthatmay findapplica

-tion in horizontal relations concern the prohibition of scientific experimentation,

including medical experimentation,withoutone’s voluntaryconsent(Article 39), pro

-hibition of tortureorcruel

,

inhuman, ordegrading treatment or punishment(Article 40), applicationof corporalpunishment It is difficultnowtoforeseehowthey willbe understoodorusedinthefuture, they mayneedspecific penalisation

.

At this stage ofhorizontalapplication of theConstitution inPolandit is quite impossibletoidentify more precisely the substance and scope of the abovemen

-tionednorms

.

Italsocannotbe excluded that some othernormsmayfindapplication

tohorizontal relations.

4.EnforcementMechanisms

Constitutionalrightsand freedoms enjoyprimaryprotection inthelaw making process(statuteshavetocomplywith the Constitution)

.

Ithastobenoted that almost

allconstitutionalrightswere complemented bystatutorylaw.11Theconsequenceis thatthe Constitutionismoreoftenused togetherwiththestatues (eitherdirectly or

indirectly)

.

12

In thelightofArticle8,there isnodoubtthat the provisionsof the Constitution

havetobe interpreted intwoways.Every provisionregulating acertain rightorfree

-8 _{Article 64:“ 1.Everyoneshallhavethe righttoownership,other property rightsand the rightofsucces} -sion.2.Everyone,onanequalbasis, shall receive legal protection regarding ownership, otherpropertyrights

and theright ofsuccession.3.The right of ownershipmayonlybelimited by meansofastatute andonly to the extentthat itdoesnot violatethesubstance of such right.”

9 _{Article 32 para.2:}"Noone shallbediscriminatedagainst inpolitical, social or economic life for any reasonwhatsoever.”

10 _{Article 33: “ 1.Menandwomenshallhaveequal rightsinfamily,political,social and economic lifein}

theRepublicof Poland.2.Men andwomenshallhave equalrights,in particular, regardingeducation,employ

-mentandpromotion,and shall have therightto equalcompensationfor workofsimilarvalue. . . .”

11 _{TheConstitutionof 1997 obligedinArticle236para.1 theCouncil of Ministers,within aperiodof} 2 years fromtheday on which theConstitution enteredinto force,to present tothe Sejmall draftsofstatutes

necessaryfor the implementationoftheConstitution

.

!2 _ForD._{D udek (.Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, zagadnienia podstawowe, wyb}órźr_ódeł(2001_), p.22ff.)applyingonly constitutional provisionsas a basisfor aruling,seemstobepracticallyunlikely, bearing

in mindthatthelevelofdetailofordinarystatutes (especially codices)is higherthantheonein the Constitu

-tion;see alsoE.Ł ęt o w s k a:“Cotoznaczy‘bezpośrednie stosowanie konstytucji’,” Rzeczpospolita of 13August1996;A.S t r z e m b o s z i n:A.A b r a m c z y k:“Podochronątrzeciejwładzy,”PrawoiŻycieof 28 June1997,p.3

.

dommustbe

,

on one hand,seenascontainingguidelinesfortheState organs, and

reflectingvalues thathavetoberespectedbythem.Ontheotherhand, it providesthe

individualwith aright,whichcanbeinvoked beforeanyState organ.13_{This right can}

be understood eitheras a

_“

freedom,” which creates an obligation on the part of publicauthoritiestorestrain themselvesfrom anyactionthat wouldimpedeormake

impossible the enjoymentof thatfreedom

,

or asa“right” that binds the public au

-thorities to takeactionstoensuretheexecutionof that right

.

In bothcasesthe indi

-vidual,14_{towhomthe rightis addressed, is equippedwithlegalmeansthat will allow}

himtosecuretheobservance of theparticularright by publicauthorities

-

firstofall theaccess to courts.

Thenatural consequence ofthedirect applicationof theConstitution isthen the

directeffect; anindividual

can

invokethe Constitution beforethecommoncourt

.

15

Theindividual canraisehisclaims againstthe Stateoragainsttheother individual.

Themechanism isstrengthened by Article45 oftheConstitution providing for the righttocourt,Article 77 para

.

2(“Statutesshallnotbartherecoursebyanypersonto thecourts in pursuit ofclaims alleginginfringementoffreedoms or rights”) andArti

-cle 78

-

the right toappeal (however,exceptionsareallowed)

.

Manycourtcases inwhichtheapplicationoftheConstitutionisinvolvedare the

casesinwhich theconstitutionality ofnormativeactis questioned.Itcan be doneby

the individual himselfor bythecourtthat has to baseitsjudgement onlaw

.

16_Inthis

contextArticle 193of theConstitutionisworth mentioning.Accordingto thisprovi

-sion anycourt mayreferaquestion oflawtothe Constitutional Tribunalas to the conformityof anormativeactto theConstitution,ratifiedinternationalagreements or statute,if the answertosuchquestionof lawwill determineanissuecurrentlybefore such court

.

The characterof the court competence stemming from this provision

wasthe substanceofalongdebate.

Thequestionconcernedthe possible behaviour ofthejudgeof thecommoncourt confrontedwith theissueof unconstitutionality ofthenormative acts;ifthejudgehas

no doubtsastounconstitutionalityof an act,ishe obligedto referthequestionto the

Constitutional Tribunal? At the beginning the answer

was

not obvious

.

Different

standingsweretakenby theConstitutionalTribunalandthe common courts

.

Someof

13 _{Theobligation to observe rights of individuals is addressedinthe first placetopublic authorities}

-

_to

Stateorgans andtolocal self-government.Someoftheserightsbecauseof itsnaturecanonly be invokedin verticalrelations (individual

-

State),e.g.therightto petition,therighttosocialsecurity.

14 _{Individual meansforeigneraswell.Somerightsareaddressed exclusivelytocitizens}

-

_{e.g.theright to} social security.There isnodoubtthat certainrights, e.g.the righttoown property,thefreedomofeconomic

activity, appertain notonly tonatural persons but also to economic entities which consist of these natural persons.Atthesametimeit is not arguedthat onlya naturalperson can be entitledtosomeother rightsand

freedoms(e.g.theright tolife).(The ConstitutionalTribunale.g.heldthat thelegalperson maylodgethe

constitutionalcomplaint onthebasisof Article 79oftheConstitutionfor theprotectionofits constitutional

rightsand freedoms, seejudgementTs9/98of6 April1998).

15 _{See S a n etr a, op.cit.,supra,n.2, p.15ff.;P.Wi n c zor ek:Komentarz doKonstytucji Rzeczypospolitej} Polskiej(2000),p

.

20.

16 _{AccordingtoArticle 178 para.1 oftheConstitution“judges,withinthe exercise of theiroffice, shallbe} independent and subjectonlytothe Constitution andstatutes.”

10 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

the judges of the Tribunal stressed that the

common

judgeshouldsuspendproceed

-ings and ask the Tribunal

-

thesole competent body to determine the issue of unconstitutionality. According to one opinion, “Article 8 cannot be understood as

allowingthe judgewhonoticedtheconflict between statute and theConstitutionto ignorethe statutory provisionandbaseits decision directly on the Constitution,be

-cause it would leadtochaos

.

Thejudgeis boundbythe Constitution but alsoby the

statuteand unlessthestatuteis in aspecificproceduredisqualified and excludedfrom

the legal system,itcannotbe not taken into accountbythe judge.

Thejudgesof thecommon courts wereof a different view.18_{TheSupreme Court}

had theoccasiontoformulate itsopinionin the decision of26 May

199819

inconnec

-tion to elec-tion complaints

.

The Court emphasised’

_’

independence” of thecommon court andheld that if the judgediscoversthe conflict between the statuteand the

Constitution,he has to baseits decision directlyontheConstitution

.

But thisdoes not

mean that he hasto refer the questiontothe Constitutional Tribunal

,

he maydoso in

case of doubts

.

The competence ofthe Constitutional Tribunaltoadjudicateon the

conformityof statutes and internationalagreements to the Constitution is not in

-fringed

.

20_{The decisionsoftheTribunal and the courts and theireffects}

_are

_different

_.

TheTribunaladjudicatesonlaw andisabletoannul the statutoryprovision,its judge

-mentisfinalandbindingerga omneš

.

21On theotherhand,thecommoncourtsettles

individual socialrelations,its findingonthenon

-

conformityof statutes to the Consti

-tutionisnot bindingforother courts dealingwithsimilarcases

.

However

,

thecourts

may share the same opinion

.

Thesametoken is reflectedin theruling of theSupreme Courtof 3 December

1998.22

TheSupremeCourt,whileansweringthequestionreferred to it bythe lower court,acknowledgedthattheregulationwhichhad to beappliedin the present case was

unconstitutionalandheld that inasituation likethis, whenthecourtfinds thenorm

unconstitutional, it has to ignore it. Similar opinion was expressed by theSupreme Court(differentpanel ofjudges) in thejudgementof 26September

200023

andalso by the ChiefAdministrative Court in thejudgement of 4 December

2000.24

Thelatter

noticed that itsjurisdictionintheframeworkof the directapplication oftheConstitu

-tion includesthe possibility not toapply thestatutory provision inconcreto

.

In such

a casethecourtisobliged toapply thenormhigher in the hierarchyofsourcesof law.

»17

17 _{See opinionoftheformerPresidentof theConstitutionalTribunal A}._{Z o11 in: A b r a m c z y k,op.} cit.,supra,n

.

13 ,p.12.Similarly, L.G ar 1ic ki:Polskieprawo konstytucyjne,zaryswykładu,PartI (1997),

pp.56-57;A

.

M a c z y ń s k i: “Bezpośredniestosowanie Konstytucji przezsądy,”Państwo i Prawo,No.5

(2000),p.9.

18 _Eg._D._{Czajka:“Czysędziowie mogą stosowaćkonstytucję?,”Gazeta Sądowa, No}._3(1999),p.3;

W. S ługiew ic z:“Konstytucyjneaspektyfunkcjonowaniaorzecznictwasądówpowszechnych,”Przegląd

Sądowy,No.2(2000),pp.32

-

34.

19 _{III SW1/98,similarly,judgementof19April2000,IICKN272/2000not published}

.

20 _{Article188para.1 oftheConstitution.}

21 _{Article 190 of the Constitution.} 22 _IIICZP38/98.

23 _{IIICKN1089/00.}

FacingthesedecisionstheConstitutionalTribunal

seems

to easeits standing.In

thejudgementof 22 March 2000, answering thelegal question referred to it,25_the

TribunalobservedthatArticle 8of theConstitutionondirect application of theCon

-stitutiondoes not impede the application of the Constitution by common courts.How

-ever, the courts shouldusethistool onlywhen itisnecessary and possible,and with duecare

.

DirectapplicationoftheConstitution cannotlead to neglectingstatutory normsin force andcannotbe understoodasapowertodecidethecaseonthe basisof

the Constitution instead of the statute. Furthermore, theTribunal admitted that the

common judge hasnoobligationbutrather discretionarypowertoreferthe question

of constitutionality ofnormativeactsto theTribunal.

Atthismomenttheissueseemssettled

.

Twoadditional mechanisms may servethe individual to enforce constitutional

rights:

1) constitutionalcomplaint

-

according to Article79para.1 oftheConstitution, “everyone whose constitutional freedomsorrights havebeen infringed,shall have therighttoappealtotheConstitutional Tribunalfor itsjudgementontheconformity

totheConstitutionof astatuteor anothernormativeactupon which basisa courtor

organof publicadministrationhasmadeafinal decisiononhis freedomsorrightsor on his obligations specified in the Constitution.” (The issue may bedealt by the

Constitutional Tribunalindifferent procedures aswell.The applicationcanbelodged by thePresidentof the Republic,theMarshalofthe Sejm, the Marshal of the Senate, the Prime Minister, 50Deputies, 30Senators, the First President of the Supreme Court, thePresidentof theChief AdministrativeCourt,the Public Prosecutor

-

Gen -eral, the President ofthe Supreme Chamber of Controlandthe Commissionerfor

Citizens’ Rights, the National Councilof theJudiciary, the constitutiveorgans of unitsof local self

-

government; the national organs of trade unionsas well asthe

national authorities of employers’ organisations and occupational organisations;

churchesandreligiousorganisations(Article 191));

2)complainttoOmbudsman

-

according toArticle80 oftheConstitution“eve

-ryoneshall have the right toapplytothe Commissioner forCitizens’Rightsforas

-sistance in protection of hisfreedoms

or

rightsinfringedbyorgansofpublicauthor

-ity.” TheOmbudsmanmayact aswellonhisowninitiativeoron theinitiativeof the otherinstitutions

.

Hisinquiries may leadhim to directthematter to theinstitution concerned (also the court, hecanintervenein different forms and stagesinthecourt

proceedings),includingthe

Constitutional

Tribunal.

In thecaseofsome constitutionalrights thespecific mechanismsmayexist, e.g.

labour rights protected bythe State LabourInspection.Protectiongivenby the In

-spectionto constitutional labourrightsand freedoms has constitutional dimension

(Article24ofthe ConstitutionobligestheStateto exercisesupervisionoverthecon

-ditionsof work)

.

26

25 _{P. 12/98; similarly,judgementSK15/00 of21May2001.}

26 _{See S ane tr a,op.cit., supra,n.2, pp.22-23;“Ochrona prawpracowniczych,”in:H.}L e w a n d o w s k i

12 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

Constitutionalrightsand freedomsmaybealso protected byinternationalmecha

-nismsacceptedbyPoland

.

Themostimportantones arethe mechanisms providedfor by theEuropean Conventionforthe Protection of HumanRightsand Fundamental

Freedomsof 1950andthe InternationalCovenantonHuman Rightsof 1966(fore

-seen in the Optional Protocol).It isobvious thatin theabovementioned international procedures theclaim isaddressedagainst the State and not against aprivateparty.

5.Application of theConstitution toPrivateConductbyCourts

Nowadays therefore the substantial question is whether thecourtsapply the

Constitution inprivatelaw relations,i

.

e

.

inrelations betweenindividualsbut also

intherelations betweenan individualand the State whentheStatedoesnot exer

-ciseitspublic powerbut acts inthescopeof private law(civil law, labour law etc).

Therearenot many judgementsin thisfield sincetheapplication of the Constitu

-tionassuchhasno longtradition.TheConstitutionisrarelyinvoked by theparties;

moreoften itis thecourtreferring toit onitsowncompetence

.

In most casesthe

constitutionalnorm isused asaguideline,indirectly,forthepurpose to interpretthe inferiornorm

.

Forillustrationonecanquotethe rulingof 12January

199927

in the case brought

byFranciszkaandKazimierzH.againstEdwardH.forterminationof thecontractof

transferof thefarm byparentstotheir son

.

TheSupremeCourtrecognisedthat the actionwas justified inthe lightofthe conductoftheson.Thesonshowed disregard towardsthe hardship ofhisparents

-

within afewyears sold thelivestock,stopped cultivatingthesoil andstartedtosell itoutandsquandered theobtainedsignificant

financialmeans

-

leadingto bankruptcy of thefarm.The Courtheld that hisbehav

-iourwasincompatible withtheprinciples of community life.Thereference tothese

principles couldbefound in severalstatutese.g.the Actonsocial securityoffarmers

whichhad to be appliedinthis case.Todefinethemeaningofthe principlesofcom

-munitylifetheSupremeCourtreferred to Article2 ofthe Constitution declaringthat

“theRepublic ofPolandshallbeademocratic state ruled bylawand implementing

the principles of social justice.

_”

Thus referring to theprinciples ofcommunity life means, according to the Court, referring tothe idea of justice in law and to the

universalvaluesin theculture ofoursociety(principlesof ethic and fairconduct).

Thesamereasoning wasused in asimilarcasebrought byEdward S.against Bogdan S

.

,

of 14October

1998.28

Afterconsidering the interestof

successor

in the lightof the

principles ofcommunitylifetheSupremeCourtdismissedthecase.

Anexample ofthedecision towhich thecourtappliedtheConstitutiondirectly (although together withstatutorynorms), is,as itseems,the judgementofthe Su -preme Court of18 September

1998.29

The applicants Teresa and ZygmuntB. re

-27 _ICKN971/97. 28 _{II CKN 928/97.} 29 _{III CKN 609/97.}

questedthe Courttoestablishtheservitude ofnecessaryaccess through theneigh

-bouringpropertysituatedinP

.

ownedbyElżbietaA.S

.

The lower court established the easementbut the courtof appeal dismissed therequest

.

TheSupremeCourtshared theopinion ofthecourtof appeal

.

It observedthat the purposeofthe easement of

necessaryaccessistoservethefunction of the ownership ofareal estate,especially

itsusage

.

However, in suchcases thereisaconflict betweentwocompeting rights and, asaresult,the propertyrightsof a neighbouraretobe limited

.

Therefore, the

evaluationof admissibility of theestablishmentofsucheasementhastobeverycare

-ful.In the circumstances of the presentcase, the Court foundjustifiabletoprotect ratherthe rightoftheneighbour

.

Indoingsoit referredinter alia toArticle21para.1 of theConstitution (“ TheRepublicofPoland shall protectownership”) and to the European ConventiononHuman Rights andFundamentalFreedoms (Article 1 of

Protocol No

.

1)

.

Sincepropertyis subject to legalprotection equaltoeverybody(Article64 para

.

2 of the Constitution)

-

continued theCourt

-

in thecaseof thelackofaccesstoapartofreal estate

resultingfrom the owner’s autonomous actof will,he may not,onthebasisof this,request interferenceinsomebody else’s property right,claiming priority ofprotection of his right.The

equalityof the legalprotectionofthepropertyrightsof the neighbouringestatesresultsin the fact that theapplicantsmay seek awayof improvingthe functionality oftheirproperty by contract,on theother hand,inadequateaccess to thepublicroad caused by erectionof a build-ingcovering thewholewidthofthe propertydoesnot justify the requesttoestablish theeasement of necessaryaccessby the court.

Inits judgementof17 October 1997,30_{in thecasebroughtby KatarzynaK.with}

participationofJerzyK.concerningdivisionofthe gained property of spouses, the SupremeCourtreversedthejudgement of the courtofappeal

.

Thereasonwasthat the

courtof appealdidnot takeinto account the amended provisions of Article218para.4

oftheCo

-

operative Societies Act which constitutedaviolationof Article316para.1

of theCodeofCivilProcedure(“ acourtof appealshalldecideonthebasisof lawin force at the closure of the hearing ofanaction”). TheCourt further added that it

violated the constitutional principleofprotectionof property rights (Article 64ofthe

Constitution)aswellas the interestofthe RepublicofPoland, which, in the opinion

of theCourt,makesitpossibletoallowthe cassation,despiteitbeingbroughtafter expiryof the term provided forin theCodeof Civil Procedure.

Apartfromthe legal protectionofproperty rights,theConstitution is alsoapplied

inthelabour law cases.Aspecial example maybe the jurisprudencedevelopedwith regardtothe rightto equaltreatment andthe principle of non

-

discrimination,even beforethe adoptionof theConstitution of 1997.Forexample,in therulingof 13No

-vember1990,31_{theSupremeCourt held that anemployeehas,in theperiodofnotice,}

thesamerightsastheother employees of the companyincluding theright toremu

-30 _{IIICKU 47/97.} 31 _{IPR 352/90.}

14 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

neration inaspecified amount. Consequently,ifallemployees were granted araisein

wagesandtheapplicantwasignored onlybecauseof his periodofnotice,it should be treated as the violation of law. In the judgementof 7 January

199732

the Supreme Courtstated interalia thatin case of division ofthebonus fromthe“putaside” profit

workedout inyearlyaccountperiods,an employeewhoreliablyperformed his tasks in thoseperiodsmay notbe deprived ofashare inthisremuneration; while according

to theviewuttered in thejudgement of23October 1996,33_{theomitting anex-em}

-ployeewhilegrantingbenefits, which is a component of the remuneration for work, inthe periodof his employment,violates therulesofremunerationfor performed

work,remuneration according to quantity and quality ofwork and equaltreatmentof

the employees (respectively Articles 80, 78, ll34 _{of the Labour Code)}

_.

_In

therulingof 13February1997,35_{theSupremeCourtheld that physicians couldn’tbe}

discriminated byalignmentof turn of duty

.

Inallthese judgementsoneof thebasis was, in fact,therespectfor the constitutionalright to equaltreatment; however,itwas

notexplicitly stated ineverycase

.

TheConstitutionwasinvokedinregard tolabourrelationsin thejudgementof the SupremeCourtof7December199936concerning theactionforreinstatementwhich was brought byRyszard J. againstManufacturer of Transport Equipment “PZL

-

Ś

.

” S.A.The Supreme Courtheldthatthe provisionsof thecollectivelabour agreement37

regulating the rulesof special protection of employees against thetermination of employment, arevalid,although contrarytoArticle240para

.

3subpara

.

1oftheLa

-bourCodewhich excluded the modificationofprotectivestatutory

norms

through the

collectiveagreement

.

Decidingontheeffectivenessoftheprovisioncontainedin the

collective agreement, theSupreme Court referredtothe general provisionof Article

59 para

.

2of theConstitution which providesfor the trade unions as well as for employeesand their organisations the right tobargain, particularly for the purposeof

resolvingcollectivedisputes,andtoconcludecollectivelabour agreements andother

arrangements

.

Exerciseof this right

-

the Courtstated

-

which belongs to the category of ’’freedoms,rightsanddutiesofmanand citizen” maybe limited only by statuteand onlywhen it is“necessaryin a democraticstateof lawforthe protectionofitssecu

-rityorpublic order, or toprotectthenatural environment,healthorpublicmorals,or

the freedoms andrights ofotherpersons

_”

(Article 31para

.

3 ofthe Constitution)

.

Thereto,pursuanttoArticle 59 para

.

4of the Constitution,thelimitationsareallowed

onlytotheextent whichisadmissibleonthebasisofthe international agreement to

32 _IPKN53/96. 33 _{PRN 94/96.}

34 _{ArticleVIisa collateralnormtoArticles32and33of theConstitution,itwas introducedtothe Labour} Code in1996.The levelofgenerality of the provisionsofthe Constitution and oftheLabour Coderegulating thequestionof equaltreatmentand prohibitionof discriminationissimilar.

35 _IPKN5/9. 36 _{NI PKN 438/99.}

37 _{We left asidethequestionofalegalcharacter ofacollectiveagreement(whether privateorpublic law}

whichPoland is aparty.ThentheCourtreferredto theILOConventionNo

.

87 onthe

freedomof tradeunionsand protection of tradeunion’srightsof1948and foundthat theexclusions undertheLabourCodearecontrarytothesaid Convention

.

Consequently,theCourtheldthatthe provisionof theLabour Codewascontrary totheConstitution andtheprovisionsof the ratifiedconvention

.

Therefore,the par

-tiesto thecollectiveagreement wereentitled toagree thattheemployeris not allowed

to terminateanemployment contractfor thereasonofanemployee’s incapacityto

work resultingfrom professional diseaseiftheemployee’sstateofhealth,confirmed

by aphysician

’

scertificate, enableshimtoworkata differentpost.

6.Application oftheConstitutiontoPrivateConductandtheConstitutionalTribunal

Asmentionedabove,the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal,especially

in the sphereof constitutional complaints,mayto

-

certain extent

-

evidence the

applicationof the Constitutionto privatelaw relations.The private law characterof therelations providesonlya“deep” background forthecase,sincethe

essence

of the

constitutional jurisdiction liesin decidingonthe conformityofinternal law to the

Constitution

.

Consequently,ifthecompliance withtheConstitution ofe

.

g

.

the statu

-toryprovision is questioned,itis not theconformitytothe Constitution of theconduct ofotherindividual,butoftheStateorgan

-

thelegislator

-

thatiscalled intoquestion.

Therefore, the Constitution isinvoked against theState and not againsta private party

.

Theillustrationof theseissues may be the constitutionalcomplaintofthe Proexport

Ltd.38 _{The complaining company maintained that theprovision of the Acton the}

Administration of Agricultural Estates Ownedby theState’sTreasuryof199*

1, per

-mittingthelimitationof theexecution of claims from the Agricultural PropertyAgency of theStateTreasury (State’slegal person)whenthelimitationisnotallowed inacase ofprivate enterprise,iscontrary tothe principleofnon

-

discrimination (Article 32of

the Constitution). The Constitutional Tribunal did not share this opinion

.

He found thelimitationofresponsibility justifiedinthe lightoftheprincipleofpropor

-tionality and the principle of social justice

.

ImportantisthattheTribunal confirmed that the

non

-

discriminationprincipleis equally appliedto natural and legalpersons, thereintoState

’

slegalpersons

.

Anna W

.

broughttheconstitutional complaintagainstprovisions of the Co

-

opera

-tiveSocietiesActof

198239

which,according to her opinion

,

infringedi

.

e

.

her consti

-tutional rights

-

the principle of protection ofownershipand the rightofsuccession

enshrined in Article 64 and derived

as

well from Article 21 para. 1

.

Indeed, the Tribunal found the provisionin question,deprivingthe

successor

oftheco

-

operative

tenants’housingrightsonly byreasonofafailure to complywiththe time limit,as contraryto Article21para

.

1.40

TheTribunalsawtheconstitutional provisionas the

38 _{Judgement of 24February1999, TK 4/98.} 39 _{Judgement of 21May2001,SK 15/00.}

16 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

clear obligation towardsthe State

-

toenactthe lawthatcouldcomply with thewillof

thedecedentandwould notimpedethe succession.41

TheConstitutional Tribunalisalso competenttogive rulings onquestionsof law

submitted by thecommoncourts withregardtocasespendingbeforethesecourt.An

exampleof this kind of decision is thejudgementof the Tribunal of17May

199942

concerning question of law submitted by two different

common

courtsonmattersof,

i.a.compatibilitywith theanti

-

discriminationclauseofthe provisions oftwoRegula

-tionsof1974andof1992concerning

some

ofthedutiesand rightsofpersonsem

-ployedin the public health service, including principles of remuneration forwork.

Under the Regulations the person on medical duty

was

not paid forovertime.The

Tribunalfoundno infringement ofArticle 32para.2of the Constitution andreferred toitsearlier judgements,43whereitstated that

_“

differentiation oftheemployee’s rights and duties according tothe character of employment and the nature of work is

a characteristic feature of labourlaw

.

The invoked constitutional

norm

(i

.

e. Article

32)grants protection against discrimination which canberecognisedonthe basisof generally accepted standards,however,cannot be interpreted as a prohibitionofdif

-ferentiation betweenthesituation ofdifferentsocial andprofessional groups,if such differentiation issubjectto a justified discussionwithinthe democraticsociety.” Ac

-cordingto the Court,medical duties havesomespecificfeatures that thelegislator couldtake into account while settingoutthe admissible timeandthe rules forremu

-nerationof such duty.

Theconstitutional rights and freedoms operating in horizontalrelations mayalso beprotected bytheCommissioner for Citizens’ Rightswhohas thecompetenceto applytotheConstitutional Tribunal in

cases

concerning thequestionof constitution

-alityofanynormativeact. Inthe judgementof3October

200044

the Tribunal found Article62oftheActof1994 on Lease of LocalsandLeaseAllowances

,

to theextent theprovision excludedthepossibilityofvalorisationof rent bail,incompatiblewith

Article64para

.

1inconnectionwithArticles 31 para.3and64para

.

2of the Consti

-tution. The lackof valorisation causedasituation when in case of termination of a lease, thetenant receivedonly asymbolic amount of money.The regulationadopted

bythe legislator obviously led, according tothe Tribunal,to infringement oftheten

-ants’ rights,as theywere tobearall the consequencesofdepreciationof currency

(inflation)

.

TheTribunalheld this also contrary tothe private lawprincipleofequal

-ityofthe partiesof legalrelations(thelegislatordid nottakeintoaccounttheprofits

thatthelessorscouldgainusingfunds comingfrom therentbails)

.

41 _{Similarly, judgementof25February1999,K 23/98.} 42 _{P 6/98.}

43 _{E.g.U.6/96of 26 November 1997.} 44 _TKK33/99.

n

.

International Treaties

1.General Remarks

Directapplicabilityofinternationaltreaties inthePolish legalorderactually started

only inthe 80

’

s

.

Duringthe interwar periodthesystemof introduction of treatiesinto thedomestic lawwasbasedonthedualistic approach;a treatyratified with theprior

consentofthe parliament and publishedinan officialjournal wastransformedinto domesticlaw

,

becameastatuteandwasfunctioning asastatute,withall the conse

-quencesofsuch transformation(sounder the Constitutionof 1921, of 1935, until 1952). Thetransformationinto domestic law excludes

-

atleastin theory

-

the direct

applicationofatreaty

.

TheConstitution of 1952did notcontain anyprovision on

effect of treaties in internal legal order

.

For many years the treaties wereapplied

almost solelythrough transposingacts ofinternal laworowningtoexpress provi

-sionsreferring tointernationaltreatiescontainedinsomestatutes. In the60’s,how

-ever,thedoctrine presentedtheopinionthat the silenceof theConstitution maybe

read asacquiescing the application of treaties ex propio vigore providing that the

treatywas ratifiedandpromulgated.

Theconcept wastakenupby the judiciary butapplied rarely,depending

on

actual politicalneeds

.

Whenitwas politicallyinconvenientthecourts rejectedany effectsof treaties. In suchcases theyused to refer to Article62of theConstitutionof 1952

whichread that thejudgewasindependent andsubjectonlyto theConstitutionand

statutes(which obviously meant not treaties)

.

Actually, the firstjudgementinwhich thecourt appliedthe above mentioned doctrine and based theratio decidendi on

aninternational agreementwasthejudgementoftheSupremeCourtontheregistra

-tionof the Independent Trade Union Solidarity(NSZZSolidarność)of10 November 1980

.

Unquestionably, theCourt recognisedtherightsof the employees to establish trade unions arising fromthe ILOConvention No. 87 andNo

.

98.TheCourtstated

that agroupof employees couldrelyontheprovisionsof the conventionasa basis for

aclaim to positiveactiononthepartof the State. However,afewyears later

-

in 1987,in a similarcaseonregistrationof an independent trade union

-

the Supreme Court changed itsopinion (undoubtedlybecause ofpoliticalreasons)and rejectedthe directeffect ofthe ILO ConventionNo.87andof theInternational CovenantonCivil andPoliticalRightsof

1966.45

Theessential change took place in Poland afterthe turnof1989

.

Sincethendirect

application of ratified and published treatiesin principle had not beencalled into

question

.

It wasclosely connected both to thechangeof the political systemandto theamendmentofthe Constitutionof1952which providedfor theprior consent of

the parliamentforratification ofthemost important categories of treaties(in thisway theconstitutionalnovelof 1989andso

-

calledSmall Constitution of1992)

.

Theac

-cessionof theRepublicof Polandtothe European Convention on ProtectionofHu

18 ANNA WYROZUMSKA

manRights and Fundamental Freedomsof 1950(ECHR)was alsoof great impor

-tance.Allremainingdoubts were additionally dispelled by theConstitutionof

1997.46

Accordingto Article 9of the Constitution of1997 “the Republicof Poland shall respectinternationallaw bindingupon it

.”

Thisprovisionisseenasa directivefor the

organsof the State

.

Thus,itis theobligation ofthe government,theparliament, the

judiciaryand other State organs to observetreatiestowhich Poland is the partywhile

applyinglaworlawmaking

.

The obligationtoassuretheconformityof domesticlaw

tointernational treatiesfollowsaswell fromArticle188of theConstitution,as the

ConstitutionalTribunalhas been conferredonthe competence toadjudicateon mat

-ters ofthe conformity of statutestoratifiedinternational agreementswhoseratifica

-tionrequiredpriorconsentoftheparliamentandtheconformity oflegalprovisions

issued bythecentralState organs to ratified international agreements

.

In relationto

non

_-

ratifiedtreaties, i.e

.

treatiesconcludedby acceptance,approval etc

.

,theobliga

-tiontoimplement the treaty in domestic law is similarly imposedonevery organ of

theState but itis ratherlimitedtotransposition

.

ByvirtueofArticle87 oftheConstitutionof1997 the ratified treaties becamethe

sourcesof Polishuniversallybindinglaw

.

TheConstitutionincorporatedtheminto thePolish legalorder. They operate in thesamewayas the Constitution,statuteand regulationandhavetheir specified positioninthis system.

AccordingtoArticle91 para.1of the Constitution“after promulgation thereof in

theJournal of LawsoftheRepublicofPoland{DziennikUstaw)

,

aratified interna

-tional agreement shall constitute part of the domesticlegalorderand shall beapplied

directly, unless itsapplication depends onthe enactment ofa statute

.”

Article 91

para.1setsout three prerequisites for direct applicability of international agreements.

Thetreatyhastobe:

1)ratified(i.e

.

the consentof theRepublicofPoland to be boundbythe treaty must

beexpressed bythePresident;forratificationofseveralcategoriesofinternationalagree

-ments thePresidenthastoobtainprior consent expressedby astatute,whichrequires theconsentof both chambersof theParliament

-

theSejm(lowerchamber) and the

Senate (higher chamber);thecategoriesofagreementswhich requiresuch statutory authorisation are listed in Article89para

.

1oftheConstitution;47_{other agreements}

,

whichdo not require ratificationareconcludedby theGovernment),

2)promulgated in theDziennik Ustaw,

3)suitablefor directapplication(i.e

.

itsenforcement doesnotrequireenactment of astatute)

.

4 6 _{S e e A}._{W a s i l k o w s k i}:_{“InternationalLawand International RelationsintheNewPolishConstitu}

-tion of2 April1997,”23 PolYBIL (1997

-

1998),p.7 ft

47 _{Article 89para.1: “ Ratification of aninternationalagreementbytheRepublicof Poland, aswellas}

denunciationthereof,shallrequirepriorconsentgrantedby statute

-

ifsuchagreementconcerns: 1)peace, alliances,political ormilitary treaties; 2)freedoms,rightsorobligationsofcitizens, asspecifiedin theConsti

-tution;3)theRepublicofPoland’smembership inan internationalorganisation; 4)considerablefinancial responsibilities imposed ontheState; 5)matters regulatedby statuteor thoseinrespectofwhichthe Constitu

Theeffectivenessofratified treatiesin relationtoother

sources

of lawdepends

uponthemode of their ratification.Onthe basisofArticle 91 para.2andArticle188 point 1 itis indisputablethatincaseof a conflictwithstatutorylawthe treatyratified withapriorconsentexpressed bystatute prevails uponstatutory law,however,not

upontheConstitution.Itseemsindisputableaswellthata treaty ratified without statu-toryauthorisationin caseofconflicttakes precedence over regulations (Article188 para.3)

.

Yet,thepracticehas not answered thequestion whether thetreaty ratified withoutthe consent oftheparliament is equal withthestatute.

2.DirectandIndirectApplicability

Thedoctrine has, since long,pointedoutthenecessityto apply international agree

-mentsin thedomesticlegalorderandtodistinguishbetween thedirect andindirect

(i.e.forthepurposeof interpretation of domesticlaw)applicationoftreaties

.

Italso

formulated the indispensable criteria for direct application of treaties; onlytreaties

containing provisions having self

-

executing character may be applied in thisway (the provisionmust,firstofall,containaclear and precisenormestablishinga rightoran obligation)

.

Directapplicationoftreaties

-

ratified, publishedinthe Dziennik Ustaw andcon

-tainingself

-

executing provisions

-

is unanimouslyunderstoodasthedirecteffectof thetreatyprovisions. Consequently,theindividualmayrelyupon such provisionsand

invoke them againsttheState before anyorgansof theState,i.e.in vertical relations. Thecourtthus maybase itsjudgement directlyonsuchtreaty(ratiodecidendi)

.

Such needarises in situations of legallacunainthe system of nationallaw,whenthematter

in questionisregulated exclusively orin alarge partonly by internationallaw or whenthere isaconflictbetween a domestic and international norm that cannot be

eliminated throughinterpretation ofnational law.However,itmeansthat a treaty may notbeappliedwhenitcomesoutthatthescopeof the rightsguaranteedbyatreaty is narrowerthan the scope of suchrightsin domesticlaw

.

In the Polish practice,there arealreadymanyexamplesof direct application of internationaltreaties bythe courts.

Themostfrequently invokedinternationalagreementsarethetreaties concerning the

protectionof humanrights

.

Upuntilnowthejurisprudenceconcentratedmostlyon application of treatiesin verticalrelations

.

However,theapplicationoftreatiesin horizontal relations

-

indi

-vidual versus individual

-

does notseem togive rise to any fundamental doubts, especially whenone considersthat the Constitutionstipulates expresis verbis that

48

48 _Seee.g.W._{C z a p l ińs k i:“International Law andPolishDomesticLaw,”in};R

.

Mü11erson,

M. F i t z m a u r i c e,M.A n d e n a s (ed.):ConstitutionalReformandInternational LawinCentraland EasternEurope (1998);W.C z a p l iń s k i,A.W y r o z u m s ka:Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne(1999), p.385ff.;W.C z a p l i ń s k i,A. W y r o z u m s ka: Sędzia krajowy wobecprawamiędzynarodowego (2001),

p.105ff.;R.Kw iec i eń:Miejsce umów międzynarodowychw porządkuprawnympaństwapolskiego

(2000);M. M a s t e r n ak

-

K ubiak:Umowa międzynarodowawprawie konstytucyjnym(1997); J.Lę to w

-ski: “Sądownictwo polskie a koncepcja praw człowieka,”in:PrawaCzłowieka

-

wymiarsprawiedliwości, editedby theCentreforEurope,UniversityofWarsaw (1995), p.30ff.

20 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

a ratified treaty is asourceof internal law.Therefore,ifthetreatyfulfilstheformal and material criteriamentioned above,regulates specified relationsof private

-

law nature,thenit shall bedirectlyappliedto theserelations.

3.Enforcement Mechanisms

The rightsanddutiesofindividualsset outin international agreements,just like

constitutional rightsandfreedoms,enjoy-primarily

-

legislativeprotection(astat

-ute should complywitha treaty ratified with the prior consent granted by statute, a regulation should comply with a ratified treaty

,

etc.). This kind of protection is

particularlyimportant whenatreaty in question isnotsuitable for direct application;

notonlywhen theprovisionsofatreatyarenotof a self

-

executing character butalso

ina case ofnon

-

ratifiedtreaties

,

i

.

e

.

treaties concludedbyapproval of the Council of Ministers. Approved treatiesarenotsourcesof universally binding law,sotheiref

-fectivenessinthe Polishlegal order depends on transposition(implementingstatute orregulation is necessary;sometimesthe referencetothiskindoftreaties in domestic

statute-expressprovisionallowing for application ofsuchtreaty)

.

Sincetheratified treatiesare directly applicable the individual may invoke them before the common

court-against theStateor against individual

.

It is worthtonotice,bytheway,that this right isnot questioned,althoughArticle178of theConstitution points out that thejudgesaresubjecttothe Constitution and statutesanddoesnotmention interna

-tionaltreaties.

Similarlytotheconstitutional rightsandfreedoms,theindividualmayclaimthe

rightsgranted by atreatybymeansofconstitutional complaint. In this procedure the

treaty is invokednot againstanindividual assuch but against the State (although reasonsforthe complaint may haveoriginina private

-

law act/relation).Theconstitu

-tional complaintisrestricted within narrowlimits (see I(4)); it mustcharge astatute

or regulationwithincompatibility with ratified treaty

-

andat thesametime

-

with

infringement of constitutional rightsand freedoms

.

The individual, therefore, may

notin this way claimtheapplicationof thetreatyto his case,or complain ofe.g

.

non

-applicationorimproperapplication of treaty provisionsbyacourtetc.

Thesequestionswereexplained intwojudgements oftheConstitutional Tribu

-nal. In the judgement of 8 June 1999,49_{theTribunalheld that the complianceof the}

legalactin questionwiththe Constitution(andnotwithanyothernormativeact)is

theonlysubject of the constitutional complaint. The Tribunalexaminedwhetherit was possibletofindanyotherlinkto internationalagreements tomake the constitu

-tional complaintpossible.Theclaimant

-

a private company

-

argued thatthefailure

ofthecommoncourttoapplyatreatywhile decidingonthecase infringedArticle

9 oftheConstitution(citedabove)and otherconstitutional provisions concerning the

positionof treaties within the system of sources of lawand theprocedures forratifi

-cationandpublication oftreaties(Articles 89,91and 241). TheTribunalstressedthat

theseprovisions imposed obligations on the specified organs of theStatebut didnot

createany constitutional rightsorfreedomsforthecitizens

.

It is thenexcludedthat the subjects enjoying the right of complaint to theConstitutional Tribunal on the basis of Article79 para. 1, could usethis legal measure in order tocontrol how theorgansof the State fulfil their constitutional obligations

.

TheTribunalrepeatedanddevelopedthis thesis inthejudgement of 10 July2000.50 Itexamined whether infringementofArticle 7of ECHR guaranteeing thataheavier penaltyshall notbeimposedthantheonethat was applicableat thetime thecriminal offence

was

committed

-

andArticle15ofthe International CovenantonCiviland

Political Rightsof 1966

-

stipulatingthatincaseof changeof legislation theregula

-tion

more

favourableforthe perpetratorshouldapply

-

could constitute the basisfor

a constitutionalcomplaint

.

The Tribunal observedthatit might beproper toaccept theidea thattheterm“constitutionalfreedomsor rights” usedin Article 79 para.1 of theConstitution,referred alsotothe humanandcitizen’srights providedforin the

fundamentalactsofinternationallawsuchasthe InternationalCovenanton Civiland

Political Rightsof1966orECHR.However

,

theindividual could base his constitu

-tionalcomplaint on these actsonlywhen he is abletoinvoke collateral constitutional

right

.

The wording of Article 79 para.1 does not justify control of legality of

anormative act on the basis of anormofinternationallaw which isnotenshrinedin theConstitution

.

Consequently,ina constitutional complaint atreaty hasto be invokedtogether withtheConstitution.Thisobviouslymight limitthescopeof treaties able tobe used like that.However,a caseconcerningthe protection of rightsofindividualsetout in atreaty(incompatibility of the statute with thetreaty, etc.) maybebrought beforethe

Constitutional Tribunal alsothroughthe other procedures, and ifso thelink between

thetreatyprovisionandthe constitutionalnormis notrequired.Theseproceduresare notinstituted by individuals andareaddressedagainstactsoromissionsofthepublic

authorities (seeI (4)).Similarly,in the

case

of international proceduresaccepted by Poland,acomplaint brought by an individualwithin thesystemofe.g

.

ECHRor the

International Covenant on CivilandPoliticalRightsof1966, isacomplaintagainst theState

.

4.Applicationof Treaties to Private Conduct byCourts

The practiceof the application oftreaties in horizontal relations isnot broad.

Mostfrequently atreatyis invoked against the State

.

However,itisworth tonotice thatin the80

-

ieswhen, due to political

reasons

, thedirectapplicability of treatieswas questioned,theeffectof atreaty inhorizontalrelationswasrecognisedin

some

of the judgements, e

.

g

.

in thejudgementofthe SupremeCourtof14 June1988. Thecase

concerned protectionofthe trademarkofthe company“INTERAGRA

”

established in Paris

.

This trademark wasthen registeredforthePolish enterprisein Poznan

.

The Frenchcompanysought protection onthebasisofArticle 8of theParis Convention

22 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

for theProtection of Industrial Propertyof 1883, revised inStockholm in 1967

.

The

SupremeCourtheldthatsincetheprovisioninquestion regulatesthe rightsand du

-tiesofthe subjects entering intoprivate

-

law relations,itissuitable for directapplica

-tionininternal lawsincetheday ofentryintoforce oftheConvention towards Po

-land.51Similarly,the SupremeCourtin the judgement of 28June

198952

heldthat the

international agreementsconcerningprivate lawandfamily relations mightconsti

-tutethe basisforthecourt

’

sdecision equallywith the provisionsof domesticlaw. Reasonsfor this may follow fromthefact that, although at thattimethe Constitution containednoprovisiononthe position of treatieswithinthe domestic law,manystat

-utesreferred (astheystill donowadays) to international agreements

.

The Interna

-tional Private LawActof1965(still inforce)whichin Article 1 para

.

2providesthat theprovisionsoftheActshall not applyifa treatytowhich Poland isapartyprovides otherwise, mayserveasa good example

.

Oneof thetreaties thatare frequently applied isthe Hague Convention on the CivilAspectsof International Child Abduction of1980

.

E.g.in the judgement of 18November

199953

incasebroughtby Anderas P.againstUrszulaC

.

forreturn of

a childonthe basisof theabove

-

mentioned Convention, theSupremeCourtrepealed thedecisionsof thelowercourtsandordered UrszulaC

.

to returnthechild backtohis

father

.

TheCourtreferredto Article12of the Conventionand agreedthat in principle

separation fromthe mother could not impedethe returnof the child illegallykid

-nappedtothe Stateof hishabitual residence

.

Ifthe systemofnational lawhasnolacuna orthere isno obvious conflict between

theinternationaland thedomesticnorm

,

atreatydoes not needtobe applieddirectly.

It is thensufficienttoassure the complianceofthedomesticlawwithatreatythrough interpretationofexistingdomestic norm

.

Thisis thecaseof indirect applicabilityof

international agreements.Forindirectapplicationofatreatyit doesnot matterneither thekindof procedure in which thetreatywas concluded(questionsof ratification, approval,publication,etc

.

)northenatureof theprovision of thetreaty(whetherself

-executingornot)

.

Undoubtedly, it isa verycommonway to apply treaties,inparticu

-lartheseconcerning theprotectionofhumanrights.

Anexample of indirect application of atreaty inhorizontal relations is thejudge

-mentof the Supreme Courtof13November 1997

.

Theactionwasbroughtbypart

-nersofnon

-

commercial partnership against Jacek L.who exercised economicactiv

-ityundera brandname“A

.

. .

” andconcernedthe righttoa word

-

graphic trademark

containingtheword “ A.

. . .

”54_{TheCourt gavethe interpretation of Article 5 ofthe}

Actof 1993againstUnfair Competition in the lighti.a.of Article 8 of the Paris

Conventionfor the ProtectionofIndustrial Property of 1883,revised in Stockholmin

1967

.

Theinteralia Court referred also to theEurope Agreementestablishingan associationbetweentheRepublicofPolandand theEuropean Communities,inpar

-51 _IICR367/87.

52 _{II CR 200/89.}

53 _{ICKN 992/99,similarly, II CKN855/97of 16January 1998.} 54 _ICKN710/97.