"Polish Yearbook of International Law" 2004-2005, vol. XXVII

(1)

PL

ISSN 0554

-

498X

POLISH

YEARBOOK OF

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

XXVII

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POLISH

YEARBOOK

OF

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

XXVII

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BoardofEditors

RENATA SZAFARZ(Editor

-

in

-

Chief) JAN BARCZ

WŁADYSŁAWCZAPLIŃSKI(Managing Editor)

JERZY MENKES

ANNA WYROZUMSKA

Advisory Board

PIOTR DARANOWSKI, GENOWEFA GRABOWSKA,

KAZIMIERZ LANKOSZ, JERZY MAKARCZYK, ANDRZEJ MĄCZYŃSKI, JERZY POCZOBUT, KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI, KAROL WOLFKE

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POLISH

ACADEMY OF

SCIENCES

INSTITUTE OF

LAW

STUDIES

POLISH YEARBOOK

OF

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

XXVII

2004

-

2005

H

WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE SCHOLAR Warszawa 2006

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The Polish

Yearbook of International Law publishes articles on public

international

law,

conflicts

of

laws

, and

different

aspects of

relationship

between

international

law and

municipal legal

system. The Yearbook is

open for Polish and

foreign

authors

.

The

principal language

of

publication

is

English

,

but publishing

texts

in French is

possible

in

exceptional cases

.

All

texts

express

exclusively

personal

viewsof the

authors

.

Authorsbear

full

responsibility for statements and opinions expressed in

the

published

studies.

Manuscripts

should

be addressed to:

Prof

.

Władysław Czapli

ń

ski Institute

of

Law

Studies

Polish

Academy

of

Sciences

72

NowyŚ

wiat Street

PL

00 -

330 Warszawa

tel

.

/fax(

022

)

826 78

53 All manuscripts should

be sent

in

triplicate

with

footnotes

double

space

atthe endof

the

manuscript

.

Instruction

for authors

available on

request

.

If

possible

, the texts

can

be sent

on IBM

-

PC

diskette

elaborated with

Word

7.0

.

The present volume

should

be

cited as:

PolYBIL 27(

2004

-

2005

)

© Copyright

by

Institute

of

Law

Studies

Polish Academy

of Sciences

,Warszawa

2006

ISSN

0554-

498X

Printedin Poland

WydawnictwoNaukowe SCHOLAR,00-322 Warszawa

62KrakowskiePrzedmieście Street,

(6)

.

. . . WŁADYSŁAW CZAPLIŃSKI, International Responsibility of Inter

-national Organisations-An Outline

ANNAPRZYBOROWSKA-KLIMCZAK, The International Protection of the Intangible CulturalHeritage

WOJCIECHDAJCZAK,TheImportance of RomanLawTraditionfor the

EuropeanHarmonisationof Private Law

ROMAN KWIECIEŃ, In Defence of the Idea of State Sovereignty in

InternationalLaw

AGNIESZKASZPAK, Granting Judicial Protection to the Guantanamo

Detaineesby theAmerican Courts

MICHAŁ BALCERZAK, The Doctrine of Precedent in the International

Courtof Justice and the EuropeanCourtof Human Rights

PAWEŁ FILIPEK,1944“RepublicanAgreements” and the Compensation for“Property Left Beyond the Bug River”-Reaching a Definite Set

-tlement After 60 Years?

ROBERT ANDRZEJCZUK, Theoretical Assumptions Concerning the Protection of Foreign Investments in the Light of Bilateral Interna

-tional Agreements

MACIEJ BARCZEWSKI, Author’s Rights to Scientific Publications in International Agreements

KRYSTYNA KOWALIK

-

BAŃCZYK, PolishTransitionalPeriods Relating toFour Freedoms-Temporary Derogations

7 33 49 59 73 87 105 131 145 159 169 185 Polish Practicein International Law

Execution of European Arrest Warrants in the Polish Judicial Practice After the Judgment of the ConstitutionalTribunal of 27 April 2005

-by HANNAKUCZYŃSKA

Jurisdiction of Administrative Courts in the Community Matters - by AGNIESZKAWILK,PIOTRWRÓBEL

199

205

Book Reviews

A.OTT,K.INGLIS(eds.),HandbookonEuropeanEnlargement. ACom

-mentaryontheEnlargement Process-byANNELIALBI 217

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ULRICHMAGNUS(ed.), GlobalTradeLaw

.

InternationalBusinessLaw of the United Nations and UNIDROIT Collection of UNCITRAL’s

and UNIDROIT’s Conventions, Model Acts, Guides and Principles

-byKRYSTYNAKOWALIK

-

BAŃCZYK

DIETER BLUMENWITZ, GILBERTH

.

GORNIG, DIETRICH MURS

-WIEK (eds.), Die Europäische Union als Wertegemeinschaft - by

KRYSTYNAKOWALIK

-

BAŃCZYK

DIETERMAHNCKE,ALICIA AMBOS, CHRISTOPHER REYNOLDS

(eds.), European Foreign Policy. From Rhetoric to Reality? - by

KRYSTYNAKOWALIK

-

BAŃCZYK

JOËL MOLINIER(ed.), Lesprincipesfondateursde l’Union européenne -byKRYSTYNAKOWALIK

-

BAŃCZYK

SEYEDALI SADAT

-

AKHAVI,Methodsof ResolvingConflictsBetween Treaties

-

byKAROLINA WIERCZYŃSKA

DOMINICMcGOLDRICK,From‘9

-

11’totheIraq War2003,International

Law inanAge of Complexity-byKAROLINAWIERCZYŃSKA

. .

ENZO CANNIZZARO AND

PAOLO

PALCHETTI (eds.), Customary

InternationalLaw on the Use of Force, A Methodological Approach

-byKAROLINAWIERCZYŃSKA

ADEMOLA ABASS, Regional Organisations and the Development of

Collective Security: Beyond Chapter VIII of the UN Charter-by

KAROLINAWIERCZYŃSKA

N. WALKER (ed.), Europe’sArea of Freedom,Security andJustice-by

KATARZYNASTRĄK

C.TOMUSCHAT,J.

-

M.THOUVENIN(eds.),TheFundamentalRulesof theInternational LegalOrder-by KAROLINAWIERCZYŃSKA . .

P.EDEN,TH.O’DONNELL(eds.), September 11,2001.ATurning Pointin InternationalandDomesticLaw?-WŁADYSŁAWCZAPLIŃSKI . . M. FITZMAURICE, D. SAROOSHI (eds

.

), Issues of State Responsibi

-lity before International Judicial Institutions - by WŁADYSŁAW CZAPLIŃSKI

A. ZIMMERMANN, R. HOFMANN (eds

.

), Unity and Diversity in In

-ternationalLaw-by WŁADYSŁAWCZAPLIŃSKI

218 219 223 226 230 231 233 234 235 236 237 239 240

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27 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

2004-2005 PL ISSN 0554-498X

Some

Comments

on the Judgments

of

the

Polish

Constitutional Tribunal

on

the

EU

Accession

Treaty and on the Implementation

of the

European

Arrest

Warrant

ANNA WYROZUMSKA

The Polish Constitutional Tribunal (CT) has recently rendered two judgments addressing i.a.thepositionand hierarchy of theEU lawin thePolishlegal system and the scope of theTribunal’s review overtheEU acts,the judgmentsof27April 2005(Case P 1/05on the implementation of theEuropeanarrest warrant (EAW)), and the judgmentof11 May2005(CaseK 18/04 on thecomplianceofthe Accession Treaty of2003 and Article234of theTreatyestablishing the European Community with theConstitutionof 1997).The significanceof these judgmentsgoes evenfur

-ther as thefindings of theCT apply generally to international treaties

.

They are of essentialimportance to theapplication of both internationalandthe EU lawunderthe Constitution of1997.TheCT faceddifficult issues,andalso a“difficult” adversaryin the second case

.

The applicants putforwardnumerous allegations,whichwere often inconsistent.The judgment of theCTisthusquitestrongly dependent on the nature of these allegations.

Both judgments arequiterich incontentandmany oftheiraspectscouldbecom

-mentedupon.We focushereonthose statementsof the Tribunal,whichare essential for the applicationofinternationallawin Poland.

1 .

Subsequent Review of

Constitutionality

1.1.Materialand Formal Review ofaTreaty

In thejudgment on theAccessionTreaty,the Tribunalremovedany doubts regard

-ing the subsequent review oftheconstitutionalityofthetreaties whichwereconcluded andareinforce

.

1_We_call_{it subsequent review to}_{differentiate}_{it from the preventive} control, i.e. the controlwhich may beexercised before ratificationandprovidedfor in Article 133(2) of theConstitution.2_The_{Tribunal dismissed}_the_suggestions_made

1 _Para_1.2_of_the_judgment_.

2 _{The President before ratifying}_an_{international}_agreement_may_{refer it}_{to the}_{Constitutional Tribunal} with arequest toadjudicateupon its conformity withtheConstitution.

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8 ANNAWYROZÜMSKA

hereand there in thedoctrinethat theAccession Treaty asa partof the EU primary lawis not subjecttosuch control,and thatatreatyconfirmed byreferendum(as the Accession Treaty)could notfallwithin such areview (asthehighest embodimentof thenation’swill),alsoduetoformal reasons,as the control overthe validityof the nationwide referendum lieswiththe Supreme Court.3The CT noted that althoughitis

notauthorisedtomakeanintrinsic control{kontrolasamoistna)ofthe constitutional

-ity oftheEUprimarylaw, under the competenceprovided forin Article 188(1) ofthe Constitution itcancontroltheAccession Treatyasaratified international agreement.4 Thisconclusioncannotbechanged bythefactthat theAccession Treaty hasbeenrat

-ifiedupon priorconsentgrantedinareferendum

.

The powerconferred ontheCT to rulein mattersconcerning“thecomplianceof statutesandinternationalagreements with the Constitution” doesnotdifferentiatetheTribunal’sauthority withregard to treatiesconcluded under theprocedureofgrantingthe consentforratification.

Astothe domesticlaweffects,we agreethat thereisnoreason for precluding the control simplyduetothefactthatthe treatyis the actof the EC primary law,since at thesame timeit is the act of nationallaw

.

Moreover,the competenceof the European Courtof Justiceislimitedonlytotheinterpretationof primarylawandthe Courtin Strasburgassumestheresponsibility of theMemberStateforany actsinfringingthe European ConventiononHumanRights,aswell asthe actsoftheEC primarylaw.

Anotherproblem iswhetherthe Constitutional Tribunalmayexaminethe legal

-ityofprimarylaw otherthantheAccessionTreaty,e.g

.

theTreatyestablishingthe European Community(theCourt was askedto reviewthe constitutionalityofArticle 234of the TEC).PursuanttoArticle1oftheAccessionTreaty,Poland became the partytothe founding TreatiesandArticle 2 ofthe Actof Accession confirmsthatfrom the dateof accession Polandisbound by theprovisionsoftheseTreaties

.

Therefore,

these otheractsof primary law,may also be examined bytheConstitutional Tribunal as the acts incorporated by theAccession Treaty (that is indirectly, “through” the AccessionTreaty)

.

Butthereis no clearstatementin thejudgment of the CT

.

Instead, theCTseemedto treate.g

.

theTEC ratheras an appendix to theAccession Treaty

.

Speakingon thenatureofitscompetence,theCTnoticedthat thecontrol mechanism

3 _R_._{K w i e c i e ń:}_Miejsce_um_ó_w_mi_{ędzynarodowych}_w_{porządku prawnym pań}_stwa_{polskiego [}_The Positionof InternationalAgreements in theLegal Orderof theRepublicofPoland],Warszawa2000,p.188:

“The argumentforexcludingthesubsequentreviewof theCT withrespectto thetreatyreferredto inArticle 90oftheConstitution,is a specificnatureoflegal order,towhichtheaforementionedtreaty shallcontrib

-ute, when concluded

-

thelegal orderofthe Community/European Union definedassupranational law.” W.S o k o l e w i c z: “Ustawa ratyfikacyjna” [Ratification Act], in: M. K r u k: Prawo międzynarodowe iwspólnotowe wewnętrznymporządkuprawnym[International andCommunityLaw in InternalLegalOrder], Warszawa1997,p.125.

4 _Article₁₈₈_reads:

“The Constitutional Tribunal shalladjudicateregardingthefollowingmatters: 1.the conformityof statutesand international agreementswiththeConstitution;

2.the conformityof a statutewith ratifiedinternationalagreementswhose ratification required priorcon -sentgranted by statute;

3.the conformityoflegal provisions issued by centralStateorganswith the Constitution,ratifiedinterna

-tionalagreementsand statutes;[...].”

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9

SOME COMMENTSONTHEJUDGMENTSOFTHEPOLISHCONSTITUTIONALTRIBUNALONTHE EU...

providedfor in the Constitutionisaclearproofof thesupremacyofthe Constitution on an internal plane:

“ [

...

] thesupremacy(nadrzędność)of theConstitutionisconfirmedbya constitutionally determinedmechanism for the review of theconstitutionalityof the Accession Treaty and acts forming itsintegralcomponents.This mechanism isbasedonthesame principlesonwhich the Constitutional Tribunal adjudicatesonthecompliance ofratifiedinternational agreements withtheConstitution.”

andfurther,quitesurprisingly, theCTadded:

“In thissituation,however indirectly,alsootherprimary law actsoftheCommunitiesand

European Union which are theappendicestothe Accession Treaty become the subject ofthe

review

.

”5

Lateron, the CTreiterated that thescope ofthe reviewof constitutionality: “canalsoincludean internationalagreementitself,therein treatiesconcerningrelations betweenRP and European Communities,andalso

-

however only to theextent inherently connectedwiththe applicationof the Accession Treatyand theAct concerningtheconditions of accession forminganintegralcomponentthereof -Treatiesconstitutingandmodifyingthe

Communities(EuropeanUnion).”6

Wewillreturntotheissueof supremacy of the Constitution.Letusfirst concen

-trateon the finding that theTECisan integral partof theAccession Treaty

.

TheCT rightlyheld thatprimarilythe content of a treaty is subjectto constitutionalreview, evenin thecaseof a treaty concluded underArticle 90of the Constitution, which includes a procedure reserved fortreatiestransferringthepowersof thestate’s organs to an international organisation or international organ

.

This “content” however,

seems understood toobroadly by the CT

-

the Accession Treaty accordingtothe CT,encompassesall itsintegralparts,whichaccordingtothe CT are i.a

.

theAct of Accession, FinalAct of the conferencein Athensof16April2003,andalso the TEC and theTEU

.

The submission oftheFinal Acttothereview is strongly emphasised in para 19of thejudgment and,as itcan beseen,it results fromthe assumption of integrityacceptedby theapplicants:

“The representative of the applicantsatthe trial on 4 May2005confirmed the integrity of theAccessionTreatyandFinal Act in view oftheindicationof patterns of constitutionality review

.

In thissituation,the Constitutional Tribunal,treating theFinal Actasanintegralele

-mentof the Accession Treaty,within its evaluationofthe constitutionalityof the provisions of theAccessionTreaty, itencompassesalso adequate provisionsofthe Final Act,making the reviewbyapplying particular reviewpatternsof compliance with the Constitution,referred to by the applicants.”

5 _Para_7. 6 _Para_11.3_.

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10 ANNA WYROZUMSKA

Itseemsthat theCT simplified the problemandmisunderstood the roleandthe meaningof the FinalAct. The TEC and the TEU donotform an integralpartof the AccessionTreaty.Neitherare they appendices totheTreaty. The misunderstanding seemstoresultfrom thefactthat the texts of the TECandthe TEUwere placedin the Final Act totheAccession Treaty, and therefore theFinal Actaccordingto theCourt alsofalls under thereview. The Final Acttothe Accession Treaty mainlyserves to confirm the authenticityof theAccession Treaty,theAccessionAct,protocolsand appendiceswhichare

-

in the legal meaningof this word

-

integralpartsof thetrea

-ties, unilateral or common declarations madeby other MemberStatesacceding to the EU, old Member States andtheinstitutionsoftheEC/EU,etc.,and also theauthentic

-ityofthenew authentictextsofthetreatiesforming theprimarylaw, e.g.theTEC, theTEUinCzech,Estonian,Hungarian,Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish,Slovak andSlovenianlanguages.

Contrarytothe Court,theFinal Act itselfis notanintegralpartoftheAccession Treaty.TheFinal Act, in principle, is not legally binding although it can bring about legal effects,7_{and the same applies}_to_the_{Final Act}_to_the_Accession_{Treaty. It is}_inter

-estingthatelsewheretheCTheldthat, ithasnoauthoritytoexamineactswhichare notlegallybinding.TheCTaddressedthis problemdealingwiththe claimofconflict betweenArticle6(2)oftheTECandArticle 17 oftheCharter ofFundamentalRights of the EuropeanUnion,andArticle21(1) of the PolishConstitutionon the protection of the proprietaryrights.Referring tothe ChartertheTribunal rightlypointedoutthat:

“Sucha reviewis still de lege latainadmissible.The Charter, in the form in which itwas proclaimed inNice, up tillnowis an agreement, the status of which is closerinnature to declarationrather thantoan act of binding law.Therefore, itsprovisions arenotofa legally binding character.Considering thelegalaspect, they do not resultin anyspecificrightson the

partofindividuals.Theycannot invoke rights whichareincludedinthe Charteras the sole basis of claims.”8

Asa consequence, contraryto theCT primaryassumptionasit isnoticedabove, theFinalAct, as anactwhich isnotlegallybinding,cannotalsobesubjecttotheCT review.

The CT wasfurtherconfronted with theissueof thecontrol of constitutionality of what the applicants called(possiblyincorrectly),theECJ jurisprudenceorlineof judicialdecisions, instead ofcustomary law (oreven acquis communautaire)

.

The 7 _The_document_named_{the Final}_Act_{in the form known}_today_{comes from the Hague Conference of} 1899.Itwas treatedas aninstrument whichcould be signedby alldelegations participating in the negotiations without assumingany obligations; it was basicallyaform ofreportfromtheproceedings of the conference.All

instrumentsaccepted on the conference were attachedtothisreport.This waythe FinalActauthenticatesthese documents.TheVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 referstothe FinalActin Article 10(2), and

confirmsthatsigning theactcan constitute the authentication of thetext.TheFinalAct,asadocumentsettling theauthenticityof theagreement,can take effectreferredtoin Article 33 CLT.

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11 SOMECOMMENTSONTHE JUDGMENTSOFTHE POLISHCONSTITUTIONALTRIBUNAL ONTHE EU...

Tribunal seemed to prefer not to beengaged in the complex nature of the issues involved,and wenton tostatethat:

“The scope ofthe review concerning the compliance of the Constitutional provisions mentioned intheapplicationsincludespecificnormsof the Accession TreatyandAct con

-cerningtheconditionsofaccession,andalso the Final Actofthe ConferenceinAthens.The

ConstitutionalTribunal cannot,however,subjectto its direct reviewtheconstitutionality of the rulingsof the CourtofJustice of the European Communities

.

This appliesbothtoindi

-vidual judgmentsandtothe “ constantlineof judicialdecisions” ofthe European Courtof

Justice

-

drawnout from individual judgments,towhichtheapplicants refer (especially in the applicationsubmittedon 19 April 2004).Regardlessof thesubjective elementsin“drawing out” and “ determining thisline” ,whichcaninherently leadtoquitediversified results, the

evaluationof the jurisprudence of any judicial bodyof theEuropean Communitiesclearly falls outsidethecognitionoftheConstitutionalTribunal,strictlydeterminedinArticle188 of the Constitution

.

”9

ThustheCourthasinteraliarefusedtoexaminetheimportant argument onthe unconstitutionalityof theprimacy of theEC lawoverPolish law

.

It seems thatthe Tribunaldid notwant totakeanypositionwithrespecttothe nature of theprinciple ofprimacy,anymorethanif ithad thecompetencetoexamine the constitutionality of the customarylaw.Thiscompetenceisnotexpressly provided inArticle188of the Constitution,andfromthis point of view, this decisionisaccurate.

Thejudgment of theCT confirms not onlythe possibility of thematerialcon

-trolofthe constitutionality ofthe treaty concludedbyPoland, butalso,accordingto

the Court,of“the processserving to introducethis agreement into the Polishlegal order.” TheCT foundthe basisof thiscompetenceinArticle 42 ofthe Act on the Constitutional Tribunalof1997:

“Whileadjudicatingonthecomplianceofanormativeactorratifiedinternationalagree

-mentwiththe Constitution,theTribunal examines boththe content oftheactoragreement and its competence and observance oftheprocedure required by the lawtoissueanactorto

conclude andratifytheagreement

.

”

TheTribunalstated thatthelatterprocess includedifferent proceduresfor granting the consentfor ratification.Inthe caseof treatiesratified withpriorconsentgranted by statute the reviewappliesto the ratification statute,10_“_not_{excluding the}_agree

-mentsmentionedin Article90(1) andArticle 91(3) of theConstitution.” Thereisno doubtasfarasthe issue itself is concerned; the CThasalreadyreferredtoitinits ear

-lierjudgments, however, the indication of Article91(3)is surprising as it appliesto secondarylawactsof aninternational organisation.11_As_far_as_EC_law_{is concerned}_,

9 _{Para 9.1}. 10 _{Para 11.3}_.

11 _Article₉₁₍₃₎_{reads: “}_If_an_agreement_,_{ratified by the}_Republic_{of Poland, establishing}_an_{international} organisationsoprovides, thelawsestablishedby itshall be applied directly and haveprecedencein theeventof

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12 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

it isobvious thatregulations, directivesordecisions are not international agreements, whereasagreementsconcludedbyECarenotconcluded byPoland, sothey cannot be subjecttoreviewreferredtohereinasthereisnoratification statute in this case

.

PerhapstheCTmeantagreements establishing international organisations(however, this raisesaquestion: whatis thesignificanceof theabovefortheAccessionTreaty, whichcertainlyis not thatkindof atreaty?)

.

Consideringthe procedure underArticle90(3) oftheConstitution,itseemsthat the formal review in the opinion of the Tribunal, could apply only to the statute enacted in thisprocedure.12_The_{Tribunal held}_{that it}_{does not}_have _the_competence to controlreferendum granting the consent for ratification of the agreement

.

Such astatementcanbejustifiable,as faras referendumisconcerned(due tovaliditycon

-trol exercised by the Supreme Court)

.

However, the CT could control the Sejm’s decisionto holdareferendum(takenin theform ofaresolution). Itmaybeadopted e.g.contrary totheprocedureprovided by lawor withtheinfringementof the compe

-tenceof otherstateorgans

.

Onthegrounds ofliteralinterpretation of Article188(3), itwould be difficulttodenytheTribunal wasright

-

theSejm’sresolution, although beingan act ofstatecentral body, doesnotnecessarily needto be treatedas a nor

-mative act

.

However,if itisexcludedfrom theCT’sreview, thenitis notsubjectto any control andtheprovision ofArticle 42of the ActontheConstitutionalTribunal of1997is limitedtothereviewof thecomplianceofthe ratification statutewiththe Constitution

.

Thiswaythe procedure forconcludingatreaty,which is animportant legislativeprocess,becomesalmostuncontrolled.13

1.2.Does the CTReviewApplytoSecondary Law

- i.e.Resolutions ofInternationalOrganisations?

Inpara18.5of thejudgmentof 11May 2005concerning theconformityofArticle 249 oftheTECwithArticle31(3),Article8314andArticle87 oftheConstitution,the

12 _Article₉₀ _{reads: “}₁_._The_Republic _{of Poland may,}_by _virtue _{of international agreements}_,_transfer

(przekazać) toaninternationalorganisation or international institution the competenceof organs of State authorityin relationtocertainmatters.

2.A statute,grantingconsentfor ratification ofaninternationalagreement referred to inpara1,shall be passedbythe Sejmbyatwo-thirdsmajorityvote in the presence ofatleast halfofthestatutory numberof Deputies,and by theSenate byatwo

-

thirdsmajorityvoteinthepresence ofat least halfof thestatutorynumber ofSenators.

3.Grantingofconsentforratification of such agreementmayalso be passedby anationwide referendum in accordancewith theprovisionsof Article 125.

4.Anyresolutionin respectof the choice of procedureforgranting consenttoratification shall be taken bytheSejm byanabsolutemajorityvotetaken in the presence ofatleast halfofthestatutorynumberof Deputies.”

13 _See_on_{infringements while concluding the}_Accession_Treaty:A.Wyrozumska:“Charakter prawnytrak

-tatuoprzystąpieniudo UniiEuropejskiej z 2003r.”[Legal Natureof the Accession Treaty to theEuropean Union],in:S.B i e r n a t,S.D u d z i k,M. N i e d źw i e dź: PrzystąpieniePolski do Unii Europejskiej,

TraktatAkcesyjnyi jegoskutki[AccessionofPolandtothe European Union, Accession Treaty and Its Effects], Zakamycze2003,p.34if.

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13 SOMECOMMENTSON THEJUDGMENTSOFTHE POLISH CONSTITUTIONALTRIBUNAL ONTHE EU...

CTgaveanotherimportantsignal,namely, thatits controlmayconcern alsosecond

-arylaw.

Article87 of the Constitution15_does_not_enumerate_the_{resolutions of international} organisations,(e

.

g

.

theECregulations or directives)amongthesourcesofgenerally binding law

.

Theapplicantsexpressedtheir doubts“iftheyare apartof Polishlaw and iftheyarebinding on Polishcitizens,” asthey arelegislatedcontraryto formal requirementsof the Constitution

.

Moreover,they questioned whetherthe conditions permitting the limitations on the enjoyment of constitutional rights and freedoms referredtoinArticle31(3)of the Constitution,16_apply_to_{the EC}_regulations_{or direc}

-tives.TheCTobservedthat:

“passing the requirementsresultingfromthe content ofArticle 31 para 3directlyonto

theareaof Community legislation is unjustified.Eachof theseprovisionsconcerns different legalsystemswhich are autonomoustoeachother.This does not overrule the possibility of the evaluationof legal regulations,including Community regulations in the scope oftheir

binding forceontheterritoryof the Republic of Poland as componentsofthePolishlegal system,among others,with regardtoabiding with the rulesresultingfromArticle31(3)ofthe

Constitution,including particularlytheproportionalityoflimitations.”

Thisstatementsuggeststhatregulationsordirectivescouldbeexamined by the CT as components of Polish law. The rationality of this statement with regard to Communitylaw ishighlydoubtful

.

Itiseven obviousonthegroundof the EClaw thattheECJhasexclusivecompetence to interpret orreviewthe legalityoftheEC secondarylaw

.

Itis worthnoting,thatArticle31of the Constitutionenshrines anele

-mentofa rule of law

-

theprincipleonwhich alsotheEuropean Unionis founded.

Thus thesame act maybeexaminedbytheECJ,and if jurisdiction wasalso exercised by theCT(evenif thecompetenceoftheCT inthisarea is doubtful), then thetwo jurisdictionscould conflictand it couldbe concludedfrom theCT'_s_judgment_,_the

conflict would besolvedonthebasisof the friendly(orsympathetic)attitudeof one system towards theother (orrather the friendlyattitudeof Polish lawtowards the Community law)

.

TheCTalluded, forexample,tothe “requirementtorespect and befavourablypredisposedtowards appropriatelyshapedregulationsof international law binding uponthe Republic ofPoland”17₍_{the CT derived}_{it from}_{Article 9}_{of the} Constitution

-

“

TheRepublicof Poland shall respect internationallawbinding upon it”) and further on the “constitutional principle of comity towards the process of European integration and co

-

operation between States”

.

Nowadays, this approach toCommunity law may be seen as conservative

.

However, the CT seemed not to

15 _Article₈₇_reads_:_“_The_sources_of_the_{universally binding}_law_of_{the Republic}_of_Poland_shall_be:_the

Constitution, statutes,ratified international agreements,and regulations.”

16 _{Article 31(}₃_{) reads: “}_Any_{limitation upon}_{the exercise}_of_{constitutional freedoms and rights}_{may be} imposed only by statute,and onlywhen necessaryinademocraticstateforthe protectionofitssecurityor public order,ortoprotectthe natural environment,healthor public morals,orthe freedomsand rights ofother persons.Suchlimitationsshallnotviolatetheessence of freedomsandrights.”

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14 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

exclude the primacyofthe secondary law but emphasisedthattheprimacyover the Constitution may notbeautomatic. Thesamemechanism applies to allotherinter

-national agreements(namelytoresolutionsoforganisations ororgans createdon the basisof these treaties),and initsgeneral dimensionitmayhavesome value

.

TheCTclearly(andrightly)analysed regulations and directives as elementsof the Polish law

.

They are thesourcesofgenerally binding Polishlawalthough Article 87 enumeratesonlyratified treaties

.

TheTribunalexplainedthat:

“Theobligationtorespectthe lawof theRepublicof Poland,expressedinArticle83 of theConstitution,itsscopeincludesthesetypes ofagreements( ratified agreements

-

noteby

A.W.).Therefore,thereisnodoubt,whichwasraised by theapplicants, whetherCommunity regulations being Community lawactsarebinding upon theRepublicof Poland

.

”18

Furtheron,the Tribunalnoted:

“Theseregulations are issuedonthe groundsof anagreement constituting international organisations:European Communities (andEuropeanUnion),andratified by the Member States(i

.

e.alsoby theRepublicofPoland)

.

Article 91(3)of the Constitution expressly pro

-vides,that law enacted by such an organisationisapplied directly and takesprecedencein the case ofa conflictwithotherstatutes.”19

We fully agreewiththestatementsof the CT,however,regulationsarenotissued on the basisof the AccessionTreaty but the TEC, which has not beenratified by Poland,but whichisbindingfor itbyvirtueoftheAccession Treaty. The first passage quotedaboveseemstoshowthattheTribunal assumed that anactderivedfromarat

-ifiedtreatyis binding in thenationallaw,becausethe treatyfulfilsall requirements necessary to becomebinding

.

Thisthesis issignificantfortheapplicationof treaties andresolutionsoftheinternational organisationsorinternational organs constituted by these treaties. From thispoint, itis only onemore step tohold thatpursuant to Article188 ofthe Constitution,theCT has thecompetence toreviewthe constitution

-alityof resolutionsofinternational organisationsororgansestablished by atreatyvia thistreaty

.

Let usberemindedthatArticle 188of theConstitution does notmention resolutionsof international organisations

.

The questionremainswhether or notthe CTwillmake thatstepinfuture.Forthetime being,inthejudgmentof 27April2005, whichrefers totheFramework Decision of 13June2002on theEuropeanarrestwar

-rant,the CT avoidedtheproblem, focusing onthecomplianceof thelaw implement

-ing thisdecisionwiththe Constitution and nottheFramework Decision itself.Still, consequently,thedecision also

-

although onlyindirectly

-

appeared to be inconflict withtheConstitution.

Inthis context,thejudgmentsoftheCTare alittle bit inconsistent

.

TheTribunal confirmed that theEUisan international organisation,soitshould treat acts adopted

18 _{Para 18.5}_.

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15 SOME COMMENTSONTHE JUDGMENTSOF THEPOLISHCONSTITUTIONALTRIBUNALONTHE EU...

under the Third Pillar as resolutions of international organisation

.

20 _Even _if _the Framework Decision is nota resolution of theinternational organisation(ifthe EU isnotassumed tobe an internationalorganisation),then atleastit isa resolution of a body constitutedbyvirtue of an internationalagreement(theFrameworkDecision is an actof the EUCouncil). In order todescribe the character of theFramework Decision,theTribunalusedtheformula, which is infactapplied intheEUlegal doc

-trine,but in a slightly different manner.TheCT referredtotheframeworkdecisionas an“intergovernmentalobligation”:

“Moreover, the frameworkdecision, as adecisionreferring to theareaofintergovernmen

-tal cooperation (Third Pillar) within the scopeof co

-

operationofcourtsand policeincriminal matters,is only anintergovernmentalobligation.It isaddressedmainly tothegovernment of theRP.It doesnotpossessnecessaryfeaturesofaninternational agreement, hence it cannot be treated asasourceoflaw bindingonthe territory of the Republicof Poland, in the meaning of Article87(1) of theConstitution.”21

It is not clearto what extent thisstatement oftheCT can be generally applied to resolutionsof international organisationsotherthan those enumerated in Article 91(3)oftheConstitutionandresolutionsofthe bodiesconstitutedby ratifiedagree

-ments

.

Itappears that it referstoframework decisionsdueto theirspecific features setforthin Article34(2b) of theTEU, i.e. the lackofdirect effect,andthespecific character ofthedecisionconcerningtheEAW, as further on, the CT stated:

“ The Constitutional Tribunal, having analysed the content of the above mentioned Framework Decision,havecometotheconclusion, that given thegeneralityof this Framework Decision andthe solely directional nature of its disposition it is not subject to compliance reviewwith clearly stated norm in Article 55(1) of the Constitution of the RP.Suchareview maybe applied to an act constituting the implementation of thedirectionaldisposition of the aforementionedFrameworkDecision.”22

It could beconcludedthat aresolution“wouldbesubject” tothe CT’sreview, if itwasnot general and itsdisposition was notof directional nature (i.e

.

ifitwasself

-executing).

The CT held that a provision of a treaty is subject to constitutionality review only ifit isself

-

executing (as notself

-

executingtheCTconsidered e.g

.

Article 308 oftheTEC23_{, Article 105 of}_the_TEC24₎_{. Non self}

_-

_{executing norms}_{are “}_not_subject to review,” becausethere is no directconflict between the norm of the treaty and theConstitution.TheCTdoesnotlimitthisrequirement to reviewtobe performed through theconstitutionalcomplaint procedure.

20 _{Compare para 8.5 of the judgment of 11}_May₂₀₀₅_. 21 _{Para 18.9}_.

22 _Ibid_.

23 _{Para 18.6}_. 24 _{Para 18.7}_.

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16 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

Itis worth noticingthattheCT hastheoccasion todealwith the self

-

executing natureof thenormsofatreaty in thejudgmentof 19 December2002(K33/02)onthe compensationfor thepropertyleft bytherepatriatesbeyondtheBugRiver(mienie zabużańskie)

.

The Tribunal accepted that theprovisionsof theso

-

calledrepublican treaties (treaties with the Soviet Union or Soviet Union Republics

-

Belarus and Ukraine) were notself

-

executing as “substantial construction of theseagreements and the scope of obligations accepted there, did not allow for claiming that they formeda legal basis forcompensationclaims of repatriates and their heirs.” They requiredthereceptioninto theinternal legalsystem,as inthe opinionof the Tribunal, thenecessaryconditionof direct effect ofanormofagreementis:

“determinationof allnormativeelementsinthetreatyitself,onwhich the application of certain legal instrument depends.Thisattitudeclearly finds confirmation in Article 91(1)of

the Constitution,according to whichonecantalk about direct application of international agreementonly ifitsapplicationdoesnotdepend onadoptingastatute.”

Self

-

executingnature is a notion strictly connected with the applicationof the norm. Nonself

-

executing provisions cannotbe applied directly.However, it isnot convincing thatthe lackof self-executing natureprecludes the reviewof theprovi

-sions’constitutionality. In orderto illustrate this problem withan example, let us assume thata constitution contains a provision forbiddingthedeath penaltywhereas a ratified treatyincludesa provision which isnotself

-

executing: “thestateparty shall takeall necessary measures to introduce thedeathpenaltyinto itsnationallaw.” Why shouldthe review of constitutionalityof this provision (a clear and unconditional one, requiringimplementation, however,sonotcomplete) be precluded? Isit pos

-sibleto conclude treaties whicharein conflict withthe Constitution? Theopinions candifferonthematter, however,itseemsthatinsomecasesalsonon self

-

executing provisionsmayandshouldbe subject to review.

In view ofthe above,onemayhavedoubts concerning the correctness of ageneral limitation excludingnon

-

self

-

executingprovisions.Moreover,another questionarises ifitmay beassumed thatprovisions conferringcompetence (thisisthecaseofArticle 308 and105 oftheTEC)arenotself

-

executing.Probablyit is theother wayaround. Considering thefact thattheentityisendowedwith competence, certainly thisprovi

-sionisself

-

executing (directlyapplicable)

.

If so,thenwhatis themeaningof“self

-

exe

-cuting” in thecurrent view of theCT? Unfortunately the CT offered no explanation, makingonly laconicstatements instead

.

Forexample, with referencetoArticle308 of theTEC,it found that thisprovisionis notself

-

executing,because“itsapplication requiresissuing secondarylaw acts bythe Community(Union)Council

.

When mak

-ingsuch law,the Council musttakeunivocaldecision,thereforeitcannotbeaccepted without the consentoftheRepublicof Poland.” Itseemsthat theCT mixestheareas ofverificationof the provision’snatureand theconceptofself-executingnorminthis approach, as itdoes not applytodirect application of thenorm,and doesnotdenote clear,completeandunconditionalnorm whichcouldbedirectlyapplicable

.

(18)

17

SOMECOMMENTSONTHEJUDGMENTSOFTHE POLISH CONSTITUTIONALTRIBUNALONTHE EU...

It ispossible thattheCTunderstood“intergovernmental obligation” asa nonrati

-fiedagreement(thatisconcluded in a simplifiedprocedure), but actually that wasthe position of the applicants.Asfarasthis typeofagreementis concerned, thefinding of theTribunal wouldthensuggestthatif they arenotthesources ofthegenerally binding law (therefore, simplifying the problem to someextent, from the point of view of thePolishlaw, theyarenotself

-

executingagreements) they arenot subjectto the CTreview

.

Such statementof theTribunalseemseven morequestionable

.

Non

-ratifiedtreaties,despite thefactthat theyare notsources ofthe generally bindinglaw, arethesources ofobligationsforstateorgansandcanproduce legaleffects forother persons,e

.

g

.

byreference clause included in thestatute.Moreover,Article188of the Constitution in para1 (rather deliberately)empowerstheCTtoreview theconstitu

-tionalityof the statutesandanytreatieswith the Constitution;onlyinparas2and 3 is therereferencetoratifiedtreaties.

Nowletusconceivethatthe same norms on thedeathpenaltyareincluded in anon

-ratifiedtreaty

.

A non-ratifiedtreaty is encompassed byArticle9 ofthe Constitution.

Hence, could theauthority designated bylaw submittotheCTa legalquestioncon -cerning theconstitutionalityof such an agreement?Who issupposed to examine, e.g.

whetherstate organs infringe upontheruleof lawby concludingan“unconstitutional agreement”?If this is not the CT, then it follows that non

-

ratified treaties receive thesamestatusasinformalagreements which arelegally notbinding.Anotherissue is thatcasesmay bebroughttotheCTunder different proceduresand may referto national lawactsbasedon nonself-executingactsof international law

.

It ishardly possiblethat the CTcould avoid sucha review(albeit anindirectone).

It is worth mentioning here, that the Belgian Constitutional Court (Cour

ďArbitrage)hasrecentlyfacedthe problemof reviewofcomplianceofthe Framework

Decisiononthe EAWwiththe Constitution

.

The Tribunal hasnotrejectedthecom

-plaint because theFramework Decisionon theEAW couldnot beapplied directly (it is “non

-

self

-

executing” )

.

Theapplicant brought the complaint toannul thelaw implementing the Framework Decision on theground that theFramework Decision itselfisnotvalid

.

SinceBelgiumhasaccepted theECJjurisdictionunderArt

.

35 TEU (Poland hasnotdoneit todate), theCourtreferredthe question to theECJ

.

25_It_seems that ifBelgium hadnotacceptedthe jurisdictionof theECJ, the CourďArbitrage would nothaverejected the complaint,and it would havesettledthecasebyitself. Then itwould alsohave todecideonthe legalityof theFramework Decision,perhaps asan actof Belgianlaw.

25 _The_questions_{of the Tribunal concerned the conformity}_{of the}_{Framework Decision on the EAW}_with Article 34oftheTEC(theapplicantarguedthatthe matter

-

international cooperationincriminalmatters -should have been regulatedbyconvention instead ofaframework decision) and theconformityofpartial derogationofthe dualcriminalityrequirement for a list of 32offenceswith the principle ofnon

_-

discrimina -tionandequality (accordingto theapplicant,thereisno reasonable justificationfor it).Seenoteof theBelgian delegation: Council 11518/05of4.8.2005r.,COPEN116,EUROJUST 42,EJN38; judgment Cour d'_Arbitrage 13.7.2005.

(19)

1 8 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

2 .

Supremacy of the Constitution

over

International/ Community Law

2.1.TheMulti-Component NatureofthePolishLegalOrder

Thefundamental issue referred to in the judgment of 11May2005 is theproblem ofsupremacy oftheConstitutionoverinternationallaw bindinguponPoland,includ

-ingtheTEC/the TEU.The Tribunal held thatArticle8(1)of theConstitutionclearly guaranteesthattheprovisionsoftheConstitution have the status of thesupremelaw ofPoland

.

26_However_,_{it noticed that}_:

“thisregulationisaccompaniedbytherequirementtorespectandbefavourably predis

-posedtowardsthose provisionsofinternational law whichareproperlyshapedand binding upon the territory oftheRepublicofPoland

.

The legislature - by virtueof aconscious deci

-sion,tothesupremeprinciplesof theConstitutionof the Republic of Poland and directly next toart8(1),describedbytheapplicants as apattem ofconstitutional review

-

introduces the principle enshrinedinArticle9.Asstipulatedinthis provision “ the RepublicofPolandshall respectinternationallawbindinguponit”

.

”27

The consequence thereof,in theopinionoftheCT,is themulti

-

component nature of thenationallegalorder,the “constitutionalassumption,thatontheterritory ofthe Republicof Poland,nexttoprovisions enactedby thenational legislature,theregula

-tionscreated outside the systemofnational(Polish)legislative bodiesarebinding

.

”

Community lawis not totallyexternal law,as theTribunal rightlynoticed,because national bodiesalsoparticipate intheprocessof itscreation,through theconclusion ofinternationalagreementsor acceptanceofacts intheCouncil.(It can beadded that thesamereasoningappliesto eachinternationalagreement.) Thisfurther leadstothe conclusion that:

“Ontheterritory of Poland,the subsystems of legal regulations originating from different legislative centresareboth binding.Theyshouldco-existonthe basis ofmutually favourable

interpretation and co-operative co-application

.

This circumstance,from another perspective, poses the problemof thepotentialcollisionofnormsandthe ultimate precedence of oneof

theseparate subsystems.»28

The generalpresumptionthatthe nature ofthe lawbinding inPoland hasmultiple componentsisnotunderminedinthiscase,because this is notanepisodicregulation, assumed only in connectionwiththeaccessiontotheEU

.

Hence,as onemaybelieve, it issupposed toapplyto the wholeinternationallaw

.

As ageneralstandpoint,this couldbe correct

.

If so,then thenextsentence in the judgmentis misleadingas it appliesonly to treaties concludedundertheprocedureprovidedforin Article 90 of the Constitution.

26 _{Para 2.1}_.

27 _Ibid_. 28 _{Para 2.2}_.

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19

SOMECOMMENTS ON THE JUDGMENTS OF THE POLISH CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNALONTHEEU...

Althoughit refers toArticle91oftheConstitution

-

which would suggest allratified treaties

-

the specialprocedureintroducingtheconceptof legal“ subsystems

”

ispro

-videdforonly inArticle90of the Constitution,andonlythis procedure

“

showsthe relationship” ,discussed hereunder:

“TheConstitution,asaresultof regulationsincludedinArticle9,Article87 andArticle 90*91,accepts the multi-component structure ofregulations binding upon the territory of

the RepublicofPolandandprovidesaspecial procedure for itsintroduction.Thisprocedure showsitsrelationshipwiththe procedurefor changingtheConstitution.«29

Furtheron,the CT stressedthespecial stabilityofthis structure, acknowledging thatthemulti

-

component structureof lawtook placebyvirtueof theConstitutionand canonlyberevoked followingtheamendment procedure of theConstitution

.

The vision of a multi

-

component legal system based on the supremacy of the Constitution in thejudgment of 11 May 2005is complemented bythe holding in the priorjudgmentof the CTon theEAW

.

Inthat decision,theTribunal held that Article607t(l) of the Criminal Procedure Code implementing the Framework Decisiononthe EAWwas contrarytoArticle55(1) ofthe Constitution,which pro

-hibits theextradition of a Polish citizen under thecircumstances set forth therein.

Sincetheimmediate(on the day ofpromulgationof thejudgment)eliminationof the provisionchallengedin thecasewouldresultinaninfringement ofinternationalobli

-gationsbinding upon Poland,theCTdecidedtotakeadvantageof the competence grantedto it in Art

.

190(3)of the Constitution30_and_maintained_the_questioned_provi

-sioninforcefor18months

.

31_{The CT}_recognised_it_as_an_{expression of}_:

“judicialmoderationderivedfromtheprincipleoftheseparation of powersandco-opera

-tionofstateorgans. Ina situation in which theinvalidationof the provision considered as unconstitutionalcould lead toaninfringementof internationalobligationsoftheRepublic of Poland,theinstitutionofprolongingtheperiodof itsapplicationcomestothefore withinthe field of the international obligations of the state

.

Taking advantage of it is asolution ensur-ing(untilanyconflictsinnational legalorderareremoved)thatPolandmeetstheaccepted

obligations.«32

29 _Ibid

.

30 _Article₁₉₀_{(3) reads}_:_“_A_judgment_{of the}_{Constitutional}_Tribunal_shall_take_effect_{from the day}_of_its publication, however, the ConstitutionalTribunalmayspecifyanother datefor the endofthebindingforceof

anormativeact.Such time period maynotexceed18 monthsinrelationtoastatuteor 12monthsinrelation to anyothernormativeact.Whereajudgmenthasfinancialconsequences not provided forinthe Budget,the

Constitutional Tribunalshall specifyadatefortheendof the bindingforceof the normative act concerned,after seekingtheopinionof the Council of Ministers.”

31 _Para_5.4_{of the judgment of 27 April}₂₀₀₅_:_“_The_effect_of_the_deferral_{of the moment}_of_cessation_{of the} binding force of Article 607t§1of the CodeofCriminalProcedureissuch that overtheperiodof18months after thepublication of the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunaltherespective provision should continueto be appliedby the courts(unlessitis earlierannulledor amendedby thelegislator),inspiteofthefact thatthe presumptionof itsconstitutionalityhas been refuted. Polishcourts, therefore,cannotrefuseto surrender Polish

citizensindicted by Europeanarrestwarrants”. 32 _Para

(21)

20 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

Moreover,theCT viewstheinstitution of prorogation asa timely and valuable exception“to the principle of hierarchical conformity of the legalsystem and the principle of the Constitution supremacy, clearly admittedby thelegislature. Infact, theConstitutional Tribunal decides in concretoabouttheoccurrenceofsuchexcep

-tionshavingcarefullybalancedallthe values,and also determines the datethatpar -ticularprovisions

-

whicharesubjecttoreview

-

becomeinvalid.”33

Havingregard to thesupremacy of the Constitutionclearlyexpressed inArticle 8 and the rigidconceptof a closed catalogue of generally bindingsources of law and its hierarchical structure upon which the Constitution of 1997 is based, both judgmentsoftheCTshouldbeconsidered as a successful reconciliation ofinterna

-tional obligationswiththe Constitution

.

Simplifying, theCTperceivestheseissues inthe followingway:theConstitution is the supreme lawof theRP,but Article9and Article 190(3) of thesame Constitution, in individualcases,allowforensuringthe performanceof internationalobligationswhichare inconflictwith the Constitution. However, onecannotspeak ofany general primacyovertheConstitution:

“ Each decisionofthiskindmustimplythebalancingof values:i.e.the harmcausedasa foreseeableconsequence of theprolongedapplicationof unconstitutionalprovisions,in rela

-tion tothe valuesprotected by thedeferral oftheentryintoforceoftherespectivejudgment

.

There isnodoubt that theConstitutional Tribunalshould be guided especiallyto take care in assuringtheprotection ofconstitutional rights andfreedomsofindividuals

.

”34

Let usrepeat that the statement of the CTconcernsnot only EU law but any otherinternational obligation(especially sinceit does not refertoCommunity law butthe act of the EU ThirdPillar).Asageneralstatement, it issignificantand right. Theconfirmationof theprecedenceof the bindingforceand theapplication of the Constitutionoveranyratifiedtreatyand alsoothersourcesofinternationallaw (with apossibilityundercertain conditions to fulfil internationalobligations remainingin conflict with the Constitution)areoffundamental importance for the application of international lawin thePolishlaw.This mechanism may not necessarily be viewed as asatisfactorybasisfortheprimacyof the EClaw.However,itallowsoneto view Article 9asa constitutionalbasisforthis primacy

.

33 _Ibid

.

_,_para_5.1_.

34 _Ibid_._,_para_5.1_._The_{CT adds thereafter: “}_{It should}_be_noted_,_however,_{that the}_possibility_{for the Tribunal} to prolongthe period,overwhich therightsandfreedomsarelimitedas aconsequence of maintaininginforce certainunconstitutionalprovisions, isnotsubjectto such restrictive and unequivocallyformulatedconditionsas

thelimitationsregulatedinArticle 31 para 3 of theConstitution,which restrainthescopeof actionof the legisla -tor inthisregard.The Tribunalpossessesmorediscretionhere. Therefore,it isacknowledged that the deferral (ofcourseonly within time limits specifiedbytheconstitutionallawmaker)canbeapplied owingtovaluesother thanthose specified in Article31para 3(i.e.securityand public order, protection of the environment,healthand publicmorality,as well as freedoms andrightsofother persons),and

-

when this becomesinevitable

-

evenif itshouldleadtotemporary maintenanceinforce of the regulations limiting constitutionalfreedomsand rights. Aconclusiontothecontrarywouldbeunacceptable, asArticle 190 para3doesnotruleoutthe possibility(as

alreadymentioned earlier)of the prolongation by the Tribunalof theperiodof applicationevenin thecaseof provisionsinfringing the limitssetin Article 31para 3of the Constitution.”

(22)

21 SOMECOMMENTSONTHEJUDGMENTSOFTHEPOLISHCONSTITUTIONALTRIBUNAL ONTHE EU...

2.2.TreatiesTransferringCompetence of StateAgencies-Primacy OnlyOverStatutes TheCTin thejudgmentof11 May2005 indicatedthattheConstitutionis basedon aclosedcatalogueofgenerallybindinglaw

.

Thiscatalogueincludesratified treaties (Article87(1)oftheConstitution),andthere isnodoubt thatthis categoryincludes treatiesratified under Article 90.PursuanttoArticle 91(2)oftheConstitution,trea

-tiesratified by thePresidentoftheRP with theprior consent of theSejmand Senate granted bystatute,have precedenceover statutes ifthetermsof suchatreatycannot bereconciled withthe provisions ofstatutes

.

Itshould be emphasised thatArticle91(2)concerns only treaties ratified uponthe priorconsentgranted by statute.Theprovisiondoesnotcovertreatiesratifiedunder theprocedure of a nationwide referendum underArticle90(2).TheTribunal doesnot seemtonotice thisproblem,sinceitomitted anyreference to theissue,treating in thesamemannerthe whole categoryof treaties transferringcompetences“incertain matters” of the State organs. Thisisreflected in para 4.2

.

of thejudgment:

“The precedenceof theapplicationofinternationalagreementsprovidedfor inArticle

91(2) oftheConstitution,ratifiedbyvirtueofastatutoryauthorisationoranationwiderefer

-endum (accordingtoArticle90(3),includingagreementstransferringcompetences“ incertain matters”

-

overthestatutoryprovisions which cannotbeapplied together [

...

]

.

”

TheTribunalhas notdistinguished situations inwhichtreaties are ratified in ref -erendumprocedureand apriori assumed thatthey enjoythesamestatusastreaties ratifiedaccordingtotheprocedure providedfor in Article 90(2)

.

The Tribunal has only distinguished between treaties transferring competence and other treatiesratifiedupon the priorconsent grantedbythe statute,emphasis

-ing thattheir specificity is reflected in the ratificationprocedure “ofclearly more stringentrequirements” in comparisonwith theprocedure required forothertreaties ratifiedover priorconsentgrantedby thestatute

.

Morestringent requirements mean: raisingthe majorityrequiredinbothchambers fromasimple majority to two

-

thirds majorityvotebothin theSejmand in theSenate

.

Asfarastheothergroupoftreaties isconcerned“alternatively (by virtueof adequate resolutionenactedby theSejm by an absolute majorityvote)theaforementionedrequirements meanauthorisationfor ratification granted inanationwide authorising referendum”. Thisway,by equalising the authorising statutewith theauthorising referendum(thealternativecharacterof the proceduresseemstobe decisivehere), the CT overlooks this issue

.

Moreover,

expressing its opinionon the natureoftheAccession Treaty,35_{it clearly}_qualifies_it asa treatyconcluded with prior consent of theSejmand theSenate (grantedby the statute).Anothercomparisonof bothtypesof treatiesratifiedwithinthe procedure providedfor inArticle90canbefound inpara4.3

.

ofthe judgment, wherethe CT stated thatin grantingtheconsentforratification underArticle90(2),the Sejmand theSenateact asorgans representing theNation

-

the sovereign.Whereas,regarding

(23)

22 ANNA WYROZUMSKA

theothergroupoftreaties

“

(i)ndirectreferencetosovereign decisionof theNationis more intensive

.

” Therefore these treaties haveanotherfeature incommon

.

Following thisreasoning, onecan agreewith theaforementioned conclusionof the CT

.

However,it isnotArticle 91(2)that guarantees theprecedence of treaties ratifieduponthe consent grantedinreferendum, becausetheconstitutionallegislator hasclearly forgotten about this categoryoftreaties,but thenormconcludedfrom it,

which logicallymust also apply to treatiesacceptedwithin amorestringent proce

-dure,and havingstrongerdemocratic authorisation

.

However,itis a pity thatgiven thesilenceof the Constitutionandthe clearwordingof Article9of the Constitution, theCTdid not usethespecial character of thetreatyratified withtheconsent granted ina referendumtoaccept its primacyof application towards all the domestic law

.

Instead, theCTfoundthat thefactthat Article91(2)guaranteedthe precedence:

“of acts transferringcompetencesin‘certainmatters’

-

overthe provisionsof statutes that cannotbeco

-

applied

-

doesnot directly leadto (in any scope)theacceptanceofanalogical precedenceof these treatiesovertheprovisions oftheConstitution.The Constitution remains

then

_-

duetoitsspecialpower -‘thesupremelaw oftheRepublicofPoland’ withregardto all international treatiesbinding upon the RepublicofPoland.This also applies toratified international treaties transferring competencein ‘certain matters.’Byvirtueof thelegalpower of thesupremacyof the Constitution provided for inArticle 8(1) it enjoys the precedence of bindingforceand applicationontheterritoryofthe Republic of Poland.”36

The above statement raisesa question of whether this primacyconforms with the principle of primacy of the Community law over national law inherent in the Accession Treaty.

First,theconceptassumedbytheCT includingtheexistence of two autonomous legalorders,i

.

e

.

,ofEuropeanlawandof national(Polish) law givesrise toquestions, aspreviouslytheCThas spokenaboutuniformity ofthePolishlegal order

.

According to theCT

_“

(t)heir mutual interaction cannotbe fullydescribed using the traditional conceptsofmonismand dualism in the system:internal law-external law

.

” Contrary

to what the CTsaid, the Tribunal actually applied traditional concepts(dualism),

whereas theenduringachievement of theCommunitylawis themonisticapproach

.

TheEC/EUlawformsa partof thenationalsystem (asoneorder)

.

Nonormofthe national law,remainingin conflict with the Community norm,may be applied includ

-ingtheConstitutional norm(thishowever doesnotinfluencethevalidityofthenorm assuch)

.

Furtherspeculations of theCTarereminiscentof the lineof thinkingofthe GermanFTKand theDanish Constitutional Court, and thisis notsurprisingsincethe CTconcededthat it takesinto accounttheir judgments.Itisnotbyaccidentthat these statesaretheones which adopteddualisticapproach.Itis doubtfulif the identical solutionshouldbe appliedtoPolishlaw which,in viewof theConstitutionof1997, seems to be rather a monisticorder (whichresultsatleastindirectlyfromArticle91,

especiallyparas2 and 3).

(24)

23

SOMECOMMENTS ON THE JUDGMENTS OF THE POLISHCONSTITUTIONALTRIBUNALONTHE EU...

Withoutgettinginto a discussion on monismand dualism,it should benoticed that the CT rightly observedthatconsidering the axiological unity and thefact that theEuropeanlawisaresultofa jointactionof the MemberStates, conflictswiththe Constitution willberatherrare

.

However,the possibility of “ irremovableconflict” cannot beexcluded:

“Such a conflict may innoeventbe resolved by assuming thesupremacyofaCommunity normoveraconstitutional norm.Furthermore,itmay not lead to asituationwherebya con

-stitutional norm loses its binding force and is substituted byaCommunity norm,nor may it lead to anapplication of the constitutional normrestricted toareas beyond the scope of Community law regulation.In such anevent,itis the Polishlegislator who should decide on amending theConstitution,causingmodifications withinthe Community provisions; or,

ultimately decide on Poland’s withdrawal from the European Union.This decision should be taken by the Nationasthe sovereign,thatisthePolish Nation or a state organ authorised by the Constitution to representtheNation.The norms oftheConstitution within thefield of individual rights and freedoms indicate a minimum and unsurpassable threshold which may notbeloweredorquestionedasa resultofthe introduction of Community provisions.

The Constitution in this contextservesaguarantee function for theprotectionof rights and freedoms explicitly specified therein,and with respecttoall entities in thescopeof its applica

-tion.The principleof interpreting national lawincomity with the “ European law” , as formu

-lated withintheConstitutional Tribunal’sjurisprudence, has its limits.Innoevent mayit lead to resultscontradicting the explicit wording of constitutional normsnor canit beirreconcil

-able withthe minimumguaranteefunctions realised by the Constitution.The CT doesnotthen acceptthe possibility of questioning the validity of any constitutionalnormsimplybyvirtue of introducing Community provisions to theEuropeanlawsystemwhich are in conflict with the Constitution.”37

The supremacyoftheConstitutionis verystronglyemphasised,whichis,tosome extent, arepetitionof the thesisincludedin the FTKjudgment.

However, ifthenormsof theConstitutionconcerning rightsandfreedomsof indi

-viduals determinethe minimumandunsurpassablethreshold,which canbe neither lowerednor questionedasaresultofintroductionof Communityprovisions,andif in suchcasesthesupremacy oftheConstitutionismanifested intheareaof validity and application,thejudgment ofthe CTof27April2005 on theEAW becomes lessclear. The ConstitutionalTribunalheldthat theunconstitutional provisionwill nevertheless beeffectivefora furtherperiod of18 months.The questionthereforearises whether this judgmentindicatesthat the“threshold is surpassable” ,evenin the case of simple “ intergovernmentalobligation.”

Asimilar problem was facedby Bundesverfassungsgericht. Inthe judgment of 18 July 2005,38 _{the Tribunal} _{acknowledged that} _the _German _statute _implementing theEAWwas in conflictwiththe constitution-encroachingupon

“

thefreedomfrom extradition” (Article 16(2) of the Basic Law-Grundgesetz)in a disproportionate

37 _Para_6.4_. 38 _{2 BvR 2236/04}_.

(25)

24 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

manner, because thelegislatorhasnot fully exercised the discretionprovided bythe FrameworkDecisionon the Europeanarrestwarrantin awayensuringthat theimple

-mentationofthe Framework Decision into nationallaw showsthe highest possible consideration for the fundamental right. Moreover, the statute infringed upon the guaranteeofrecoursetoacourt (Article 19(4)Grundgesetz)asthere isno possibility of taking an appeal fromthejudicialdecisionthat grantsextradition. FTKpointedout that theextraditionof a German citizenisnotpossibletill a new statute is adopted. FortheGerman Tribunal this threshold is“really” unsurpassable.

Still another question arises asto why the CT actually acknowledged the primacy of application of a national provision which implements an international obligation(althoughtemporary and ensured individually by the CT)thatis in con

-flictwiththeConstitution(withtheprovision concerning rights and freedomsofthe person, determining a minimumand unsurpassable threshold)overthe normof the Constitution, when itdoes notwantto accept the primacy of Community law (CT distinguishes ThirdPillarEUacts)

.

TheansweroftheCTisastrong emphasisofthe Member States’sovereignty:

“Theprinciple of primacy of Community law over national law is strongly underlined by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities.This stateofaffairs is being justifiedbythe goals of theEuropeanintegration and the necessitytocreateacom

-mon European legal framework.This principle undoubtedly reflects the pursuit to guarantee a uniform application and execution of European law.However, it is not only this principle which determines final decisions adopted by sovereign Member States inahypothetical con-flict between Community legal order andtheprovisionsof aconstitution.In the Polish legal

systemsuchdecisionsshould always be adopted with reference to thecontentof Article 8(1) of theConstitution.PursuanttoArticle 8(1)the Constitution remainsthesupreme lawof the Republic ofPoland.”39

According tothe CT, in thecase ofa conflictbetween theConstitutionand the Community law,theCommunitylawwillnotautomaticallyprevail(even ifthepri

-macy means onlythe primacy ofapplication of anorm)

.

Theprimacyof application of the Community law elaboratedby theECJmay not negatethe right of a“ sovereign Polishconstitutional legislator” to “ takea decisionconcerningthe mannerofremov

-ingthis conflict through a possible amendmentof theConstitutionitself.”40_{The CT} evidently sees its role as aprotector ofthe supremacy oftheConstitution.This clearly showshowdifficultit isfornational systems based on traditionalconcepts ofsov

-ereignty, independence,etc.,to acceptthe“ Community” nature of law. In fact, the judgmentof thePolishCTdoesnotdivergeessentially fromjudgmentsconcerning thisissuedeliveredby theConstitutional Tribunals ofotherMember States

.

However, the judgment oftheCT of11 May2005 doesnot fully contradictthe primacyoftheEClaw. Itseemsthat itshould be readin conjunction withthe judg

-39 _{Para 7}_. 40 _Ibid_.

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25 SOME COMMENTS ON THEJUDGMENTSOFTHEPOLISHCONSTITUTIONALTRIBUNALONTHE EU...

mentontheEAW, inwhichat least afew important statementsonArticle9of the Constitution can be found. Both judgments of the CT could be read to state that thesupremacy of the Constitution encompassesthe supremacy ofArticle9of the Constitutionand thatin thecaseof aconflict Article190(3)oftheConstitutionmay apply.Thusthe Constitutionitselfallowsforensuring primacyof applicationof the Community normover theConstitution inanindividualspecificcase.Moreover, it seemsthatCT indicatesthesame“precedence”of anyotherinternational obligation.

Consideringthe above, theconclusionemergesthat theCT,although it triedtosee anewquality in theAccession Treaty (a treaty differentfrom othertreaties in thetra

-ditional internationallaw),inessenceit hasnotattributed any individual featureto it, and it hasevenmovedaway fromthe “ Community” natureofthe legalordercreated by theTECbindingupon Poland.

In addition,theCTnoticed thattheAccession Treaty“incomparisonwith the tra-ditionalinternationalagreementsshowscertain individualfeatures.” In the opinion oftheTribunal, traditional treaties show“predictabilityof future functioningat the timetheagreementisconcluded” whereasthe European Unionsystemis dynamic.

“Itprovidesfor the possibilityto changethe contentof lawatthetimeof accession.It alsostipulatesforthepossibilityofevolutionofthe principles andscope of theUnion operation

.

Atthe timeofaccessionnoonemayspeakwithcompletecertaintyof its further development

.

”

This thesis isnotconvincing.TheAccessionTreaty doesnotshowany specific feature in that respect, as at present the dynamicsnoted by the CT may beattrib -uted to many international treaties binding upon Poland. Such dynamics cannot distinguishtheAccessionTreaty. For example,how “ predictable” arethe European Conventionfor theProtectionof Human Rights orothertreaties on theprotection of human rights,the Statuteestablishing theInternational Criminal Court,or economic treaties establishing organsendowed with thecompetencetoadoptdecisions,which are bindingonstatespartiesoreventheCharterof theUnitedNations?Statesalways trytoprotectthemselvesagainst the“dynamics” of suchtreaties, and thebestprotec -tion isensured by aprecisedetermination ofobligationsandcompetencesof thecre

-atedorgans

.

In thisrespect,theCTrightlyconcludedthatin thecase ofthe Accession Treaty“ the competencestransferredbythe Member Statesatthesametimeensure the influenceofthesestateson activities and decisionsofthe wholeEUsystem

.

This istheessentialguarantee ofits correctness and approvability

.

”41

3

.

The

Transfer

of

Competences to an International Organisation

or International Organ “

in

Certain

Matters

”

There are atleasttwoissuesattractingattention in the findings ofthe Tribunalon the transferofcompetences“in certain matters” (przekazanie kompetencjiw niek

-tórych sprawach)referred toinArticle90 of the Constitution:the CT’sunderstand

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26 ANNAWYROZUMSKA

ingofthe notionoftransferofpowers and the scope ofthistransfer determined by Article90oftheConstitution

.

TheCTobservedthatthetransfer ofpowersis notrare in international relationsand it waspracticedbyPolandevenbeforethe effectivedate ofthe Constitutionof1997.TheCT gavethe exampleoftheECHR:

“Itshould be remembered that before theConstitutionwaspassedon2 April 1997,the

Republicof Poland

-

by joiningthe Convention for theProtection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and by acceptingthejurisdiction of the EuropeanCourtofHuman Rights

-

hadexpressed itsconsentforthetransferof certainpowers,uptill then remaining solelywithin the domainof national courts

.

»42

Thus the Tribunal madetheECHRand the AccessionTreatyequal

.

Itcouldbethe signthat the CTdoesnothaveenough understandingoftheintegrationprocessand is notfully awareof theconsequences of itsfinding.Thisfindingencouragesone to understand Article90of the Constitution as notonlyaEuropean clause

.

Following thereasoningofthe CT,theECHR

—

if itwasconcludedtoday

-

wouldbe subject toArticle 90. Additional Protocols to the Convention accepted later wouldalso be subjectto Article90.ThisseemsdangerousforthePolishtreatypractice

.

In no way maythesubmissiontocontrolofaninternationaljudicial body be com

-pared tothetransfer ofpowersreferred to inArticle90,and which isaccomplished by theAccessionTreaty.It isnot convincing that Polandhastransferred itscompetences totheCourt in Strasburg, sincethePolishcourts arestill empowered to adjudicate in casesconcerning infringements ofrightsprovided forintheConvention

.

Rather, the natureof theobligations under theECHR istheconsentfor control of thecompliance ofthestate organswiththe ECHR by the internationalbody.Thecompetenceofthis bodyisincidental,involved onlyin cases oftheallegation ofbreachof theobliga -tion bythe stateparty.Transferringa competencemeansthe lackof it in agivenfield (i.e.a differententity exercises thiscompetence), whereas ordinarytreatiesonly limit discretion intheexerciseofthecompetence,whichthestatestillholds

.

Inthe doc

-trine,itisemphasisedthatthetransfer of powersonone hand includes abandoning the competence by thestate inacertain field infavourofagiveninternationalbody, and onthe otherhandproviding this organ withexclusivelaw

-

makingcompetence incertainareas,makingthislawtobe directly applicableinthestatelegalorderand ensuringitsprecedenceoverothernational norms

.

In orderfor thetransferofpowers tobeeffective,all theserequirementshaveto befulfilledat thesame time

.

43_{It should} benoticed thatin thecaseoftheEC/EUthetransferofcompetencesdoes not include allpowers heldby theECorEU

.

42 _Para_8.1_.

43 _See_:_J_._{K r a n z}_,A_._{W y r o z u m s k a:}_{“Ratyfikacja Rzymskiego Statutu}_{MiędzynarodowegoTrybunału} Karnegoa interpretacja Konstytucji z1997r.: Artykuł 90-czytylkoklauzula europejska?” [Ratificationofthe StatuteofRomeof the International Criminal Court of 1997:Article90orOnly theEuropeanClause?],Studia Prawno_-Europejskie,vol.V,Łódź 2001,p.17ff; J.B arcz:Międzykonstytucjąaponadnarodowością.Opcja

integracyjna konstytucji RFN[BetweentheConstitutionandSupranationalité TheIntegration Optionofthe GermanConstitution],Warszawa1990,p.127

—

133.